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Abstract 
 
This thesis reports on a UK-based ethnography of prenatal screening for Down’s 
syndrome across two hospitals. By studying the mundane and routine practices of 
the clinic, I initially capture how Down’s syndrome screening is organised and how 
its sedimentation as a taken-for-granted aspect of pregnancy contributes to the 
procedure being ‘downgraded’. This downgrading accomplishes hierarchies of 
valued/valueless work and professional specialities and also, therefore, of certain 
professional identities. In what follows, I explore the conduct of care and how 
professionals detach from Down’s syndrome screening by assigning responsibility 
for decision-making to parents-to-be. Professionals’ devotion to the rhetoric of 
‘informed choice’ and ‘non-directive care’ also naturalises screening as a ‘normal’ 
part of pregnancy, this routinisation being extended by parents-to-be (often with 
professionals) privileging the ‘social’ rather than ‘medical’ dimension of ultrasound 
scanning. I continue by analysing how Down’s syndrome itself is constituted both 
inside and outside screening encounters. During consultations, the condition is 
rarely discussed and is substituted with dominant discourses of ‘risk’, ‘problem’, 
and ‘abnormality’. The condition is subsequently constructed as a negative 
pregnancy outcome. This intersects with the production and reproduction of ideas 
around perfection in the social practices and cultural materials of the clinic and 
how, if a diagnosis is established, the unborn ‘baby’ is recast as a ‘foetus’. By 
making this move, the unborn baby is denied personhood and a termination of 
pregnancy is made possible. To conclude, I highlight how the routine practice of 
prenatal screening for Down’s syndrome has transformed antenatal medicine, 
invigorated parental expectations, shaped issues around reproductive politics, and 
cultivated certain body-society relations. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
It is almost one-hundred-and-fifty years since John Langdon Down, an English 
physician, described a group of people with a condition now generally known as 
Down’s syndrome (or Trisomy 21). Down’s syndrome is one of the most common 
chromosomal conditions in the world, affecting approximately one to two of every 
1000 live births in England and Wales alone (Morris and Springett 2013). People 
with Down’s syndrome are likely to have a range of symptoms including learning 
difficulties, shortened limbs, reduced muscle tone, restricted physical growth, a flat 
profile of the face, and a large protruding tongue (NHS FASP 2012). The condition 
is often identified as compatible with life, that is, as ‘not lethal’ (Ivry 2009: 192). 
This translates to people with Down’s syndrome being likely to survive childbirth 
and enjoying a good quality of life, although symptoms and prognosis vary 
significantly in each respective case. 
 
In the past fifty years, Down’s syndrome has occupied a central position in UK 
reproductive politics. Prenatal1 screening for the condition is now a universal 
programme which has come into ‘routine use, becoming embedded in, we might 
say, a social matrix’ (Cowan 1994: 36). Whilst predicted advances of genetic 
screening generally may be more modest than initially expected, the range of 
available screening techniques for Down’s syndrome (and other conditions) in the 
UK has steadily expanded with parents-to-be2 increasingly making use of 
techniques to assemble knowledge about the health status of unborn babies3. In 
2011, roughly 74% (N=542,312) of all parents-to-be accessing NHS services in 
                                                     
1 The terms ‘prenatal’ and ‘antenatal’ are used interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
2 The term ‘parents-to-be’ is my own. Professionals in my research frequently use ‘lady’, ‘woman’, 
‘parent’, or ‘mum’ instead. I considered using the term ‘patient’ but avoided this since screening 
commonly involves only one short visit to the clinic and professionals rarely describe parents-to-be 
this way. 
3 Other conditions including Edward’s syndrome (Trisomy 18) and Patau’s syndrome (Trisomy 13) 
may be suspected via prenatal screening for Down’s syndrome. 
2 
England and Wales opted to be screened for Down’s syndrome (NHS FASP 2012)4. 
The uptake in prenatal screening has dramatically increased annually in England 
and Wales since 2007 (53%). Whilst 2008 and 2009 saw uptake rates of 57% and 
62% respectively, an uptake rate of 70% was recorded in 2010 (NHS FASP 2012). 
This differs from other countries such as the Netherlands where uptake rates vary 
from 38% to 86% (van den Berg et al. 2005a) and Japan where uptake rates are 
less than 2% (Nishiyama et al. 2013). The increase in UK uptake rates may be 
attributable to the recent increase in maternal age (an increase in maternal age is 
the only known attribute increasing the chance of an unborn baby being diagnosed 
with Down’s syndrome), the risk of miscarriage decreasing on account of 
increasingly proficient screening technologies, and service supply factors since all 
mothers-to-be (rather than just mothers-to-be aged thirty-five and above as in 
earlier years) are now offered screening for the condition (NHS FASP 2012; ONS 
2011). The lower uptake rates in Japan, in contrast, are perhaps attributable to a 
lack of information on prenatal diagnosis and to abortion not being legally 
permitted for ‘foetal abnormalities’ (Nishiyama et al. 2013). Nonetheless, the 
increase in UK uptake rates has coincided with a birth rate increase in England and 
Wales from 690,013 in 2007 to 723,913 in 2011 (ONS 2011). 
 
In addition, a report conducted by the National Down’s Syndrome Cytogenetic 
Register (NDSCR) claims that in 2011, there were 1,873 diagnoses of the condition 
in England and Wales, 65% (N=1,211) of which were made prenatally (Morris and 
Springett 2013)5. According to the report, of the 1,211 prenatal diagnoses, 89% 
(N=931) were terminated, 8% (N=87) were live births, and 3% (N=33) were 
natural miscarriages or stillbirths (the outcome of 160 prenatal diagnoses is 
                                                     
4 Screening uptake statistics for Down’s syndrome screening in Scotland or Northern Ireland could 
not be identified. However, the National Services Division (2011) claims 34,768 mothers-to-be in 
Scotland were screened for Down’s syndrome in 2010-2011. However, these statistics do not 
represent all procedures in Scotland as it is limited to those collected by nationally designated 
laboratories. In addition, interviews conducted with 666 mothers-to-be across two hospitals in 
Northern Ireland suggests a lower acceptance rate (26% and 28% respectively) for mothers-to-be 
than reported in England and Wales (McNeill et al. 2009). I suspect this corresponds to termination 
of a pregnancy for Down’s syndrome being illegal in Northern Ireland. 
5 Positive diagnosis or termination statistics for Down’s syndrome in Scotland could not be 
identified. However, according to the latest statistics, thirty terminations for Down’s syndrome 
were carried out in 2012 (ISD Scotland 2013). 
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unknown)6. The proportion of terminations following a diagnosis of the condition 
in England and Wales has remained steady for over twenty years. From the first 
report in 1989 until 2011, the annual rates for termination after a diagnosis of 
Down’s syndrome have ranged from 88% to 94% (the mean rate is 91%). Buckley 
and Buckley (2008) claim, however, there has been an increase of 25% over fifteen 
years of babies with Down syndrome being born. They suggest this is because 
parents-to-be are having children later in life when the chance of having a baby 
with Down’s syndrome increases. Thus, despite this heavy investment in 
screening/diagnosis, the birth-rate has not fallen but what has been avoided is an 
increase in the number of children with the condition which may have otherwise 
resulted (Shakespeare 2011), with nine out of ten prenatal diagnoses of Down’s 
syndrome ending in a pregnancy termination. 
 
However, there are some major disparities in termination statistics once a prenatal 
diagnosis of Down’s syndrome has been established. According to the Department 
of Health (DoH 2012), there were 511 legal terminations following a diagnosis of 
Down’s syndrome in England and Wales in 2011 (22% of all terminations on 
medical grounds). The DoH report widely differs to that provided by the NDSCR, 
suggesting the Department of Health may be underreporting how many unborn 
babies with Down’s syndrome are terminated following a diagnosis. Nonetheless, it 
is clear how Down’s syndrome screening is centrally located in UK reproductive 
politics. My thesis is dedicated to ethnographically exploring Down’s syndrome 
screening and the conduct of professionals in antenatal care. Whilst studies have 
examined the social significance of diagnostic testing for Down’s syndrome 
(Browner and Preloran 1999; Bryant et al. 2006; Crang-Svalenius et al. 1998; Rapp 
2000) or used screening/diagnostic testing interchangeably (Jaques et al. 2004; 
Kaiser et al. 2004; Marteau 1995; Remennick 2006), I focus exclusively on 
                                                     
6 It is probable that miscarriages of unborn babies with Down’s syndrome are often underreported 
in comparison to terminations or live births since they may occur early in the pregnancy prior to 
diagnostic testing (Buckley and Buckley 2008). It is also worth noting there can be some confusion 
when quoting statistics based on the amount of diagnoses of Down’s syndrome ending in a 
termination of pregnancy. The 89% of ‘affected pregnancies’ ending in a termination of pregnancy 
does not represent all diagnoses of Down’s syndrome but rather prenatal diagnoses of the 
condition. Of all diagnoses of Down’s syndrome (N=1,873), 50% end in a termination of pregnancy 
(so this latter statistic includes postnatal diagnoses of the condition). 
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screening. This is because screening is important enough to be lifted out of broad 
debates around universal screening/testing programmes. 
 
Previous research 
Screening for Down’s syndrome has previously been the subject of academic 
attention, each drawing on different frameworks and methods, in sociology, 
medicine (nursing, genetics, and midwifery), psychology, public health, and 
bioethics. However, the majority of studies can be categorised as examining two 
core and interrelated aspects of screening for Down’s syndrome. First, a 
proliferation of studies explore decision-making process of parents-to-be and why 
they do or do not participate in Down’s syndrome screening (Aune and Möller 
2012; Chiang et al. 2006; Dormandy et al. 2005; García et al. 2008, 2011; Jaques et 
al. 2004; Kaiser et al. 2004; Liamputtong et al. 2003; McNeill et al. 2009; Pilnick et 
al. 2004; Pilnick and Zayts 2012; Remennick 2006; Santalahti et al. 1998; Skirton 
and Barr 2007; Spencer 2002; van den Berg et al. 2005a, 2008). Whilst many of 
these accounts understand consenting to Down’s syndrome screening as a result of 
rational decision-making processes, others identify how screening is an instance of 
conformity rather than an expression of choice (Gottfreðsdóttir et al. 2009a, 
2009b; Heyman et al. 2006; Marteau 1995; Markens et al. 1999; Pilnick 2004; 
Press and Browner 1997; Sooben 2010; Tsouroufli 2011; Williams et al. 2005). 
This corresponds to parents-to-be interpreting screening as a recommended part 
of pregnancy surveillance (Hunt et al. 2005; Vassy 2006), how they view 
professionals’ offer of screening as endorsing its acceptance (Heyman et al. 2006; 
McNeill et al. 2009;), and how ultrasound scans can be viewed, first and foremost, 
as offering a chance for meeting the baby, and to make a pregnancy seem more 
real, rather than for prenatally detecting conditions (Draper 2002; Gammeltoft and 
Nyugen 2007; Heyman et al. 2006; Lupton 2013; Williams et al. 2005). 
 
Second, a cluster of studies report on the interactions between parents-to-be and 
professionals, particularly concerning discrepancies of knowledge directed at the 
level of the intertwining rhetoric of ‘informed choice’ and ‘non-directive care’. 
These concepts translate to tendering medically-accurate information to parents-
to-be detached from any personal biases (Schwennesen and Koch 2012; Sooben 
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2010; van den Berg et al. 2005b). Several studies claim parents-to-be do not 
perceive their care as non-directive since the provision of information is 
interpreted as an explicit instruction (Browner et al. 1996; Hunt et al. 2005; 
Lippman 1991; Marteau et al. 1993; Pilnick 2008; Tsouroufli 2011; Williams et al. 
2002b). Others simultaneously explore how professionals encounter difficulty in 
remaining non-directive and ensuring informed choice when communicating 
information on Down’s syndrome screening (García et al. 2008; Heyman et al. 
2006; Pilnick et al. 2004). This stems from needing to balance both professional 
and private values (Anderson 1999; Farsides et al. 2004; Williams et al. 2002a), a 
conflict between the time professionals have available to explain screening and the 
time required for discussing the procedure (Sooben 2010; Vassy 2006; Williams et 
al. 2002a), the trouble of conveying (risk) information and the practical/ethical 
aspects of screening (Ekelin and Crang-Svalenius 2004; Hey and Hurst 2003; 
Heyman et al. 2006; Williams et al. 2002a), how parents-to-be may not fully 
understand screening (Burton-Jeangros et al. 2013; Gammons et al. 2010; van den 
Berg et al. 2005b), and the different definitions between parents-to-be and 
professionals of what constitutes a ‘normal result’ and/or ‘normal child’ (Hunt et 
al. 2005; Vassy 2006; Williams 2006). 
 
Taken together, this research shows how the development and diffusion of 
prenatal screening techniques has triggered critical debates around the seemingly 
contradictory aspects of offering reproductive choice to, and prompting social, 
legal, and ethical dilemmas for, parents-to-be. This means parents-to-be, in receipt 
of information about an unborn baby, must make serious life decisions frequently 
on the basis of partial knowledge (Ettorre 2002; Franklin and Roberts 2006; 
Glover 2006; Parens and Asch 2000; Rapp 2000; Rothman 1986; Rothschild 2005; 
Schwennesen et al. 2010; Thompson 2005). Nonetheless, whilst the substance and 
contribution of the existing insights cited above is irrefutable, they can be 
subjected to some criticisms. First, important voices are missing, or at least 
relatively silent, in the literature such as fathers-to-be and parents-to-be choosing 
to continue or terminate a pregnancy. Additionally, and most importantly for the 
current study, research on professionals generates a fairly undersized literature 
(McCourt 2002; Tsouroufli 2011; Williams et al. 2002a, 2002c). It is surprising that 
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professionals, playing such a key role in the provision of information, have not 
been a main priority for researchers. 
 
Second, research is regularly based on retrospective accounts of parents-to-be and 
professionals (Aune and Möller 2012; Bryant et al. 2010; Burton-Jeangros et al. 
2013; García et al. 2008; Gottfreðsdóttir et al. 2009a; Heyman 2010; McNeill et al. 
2009; Press and Browner 1998; Santalahti et al. 1998; Williams et al. 2005). 
Focusing solely on professionals, data have been gathered using questionnaires 
(Jaques et al. 2004; Samwill 2002; Smith et al. 1994), interviews (Burton-Jeangros 
et al. 2013; Farsides et al. 2004; Williams et al. 2002b), or more problematically, 
interviews with parents-to-be speaking for professionals (Gammons et al. 2010; 
Skotko 2005; Sooben 2010). These techniques, by de-contextualising context-
specific encounters and relying on romantic ideas of an experiencing individual 
(Silverman 1989), make invisible the mundane aspects of, and meaning-making 
practices in, medical encounters. Ethnographic exceptions are evident (Hunt et al. 
2005; Ivry 2006; McCourt 2002; Pilnick 2004, 2008). However, they are far from 
abundant and, more critically, too frequently focus on the simple patient-
professional dyad. This focus on ‘where the action is’ (Goffman 1967) is a grave 
sampling error since it mistakes a part for the whole. Interactions between 
professionals and parents-to-be, in turn, are only one part of medical work around 
prenatal screening for Down’s syndrome. 
 
Third, several studies on Down’s syndrome screening often fail to fully discuss the 
condition and subscribe to medical definitions of Down’s syndrome or disability 
more generally. Although exceptions are identified (Bryant et al. 2001; Gammons 
et al. 2010; Murray et al. 2006; Sooben 2010), few have conducted extensive 
empirical research, particularly via in-depth ethnographic observations of clinical 
settings. They have seldom attended to how Down’s syndrome is discussed within 
screening consultations and how claims that screening fosters a belief that Down’s 
syndrome should be prevented (Alderson 2001; Sooben 2010; Vassy 2006) play 
out in the clinic. This criticism extends to analyses on reproductive practices more 
generally (i.e. not limited to Down’s syndrome screening) and how values around 
disability are enacted within medicine (Ettorre 2002; Latimer 2007; Rapp 2000; 
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Shakespeare 2006). Studies have suggested how medical and scientific advances, 
despite being widely celebrated and embraced, promote a clear definition of which 
people should and should not live (Lippman 1994; Parens and Asch 2000; 
Rothman 1998). Many accounts, however, frame disability as a universal category7. 
Davis (1995: xv) argues that the totalising tag of ‘disability’ is an extraordinarily 
unstable category which denies the variability of bodies; ‘the category “disability” 
begins to break down when one scrutinises who make up the disabled’. By utilising 
a universal term unfairly and inappropriately creating rigid categories of existence, 
such accounts obscure the complexity of different and distinctive conditions. 
 
The current study 
My research – an ethnography of prenatal screening for Down’s syndrome across 
two healthcare institutions – bridges many of the gaps cited above. Specifically, I 
explore the everyday practices of antenatal medicine and how Down’s syndrome 
screening is ‘done’ (Garfinkel 1967) in the mundane and taken-for-granted 
encounters of the clinic, a site in which particular social, cultural, and political 
affects are accomplished (Atkinson 1995; Latimer 2000; Mol 2002; Silverman 
1987). A close ethnographic reading of everyday clinical life unmasks the ongoing, 
complex, and different ways in which knowledge, meanings, and positions are 
(re)produced in medical encounters. The study took place in two UK healthcare 
institutions: 1) Freymarsh, a large NHS teaching hospital in a metropolitan area, 
and; 2) Springtown, a privately-funded fertility clinic located in an affluent area. 
My triangulated approach meant I spent over two-hundred hours observing the 
hospital settings, completed sixteen interviews with healthcare professionals, and 
analysed secondary documents including hospital/governmental policies and 
antenatal leaflets distributed to parents-to-be. Two clarifications are provided 
                                                     
7 I recognise that the term ‘disability’ is widely contested (Davis 1995; Oliver 1990; Shakespeare 
2006). In an analysis of chronic illness, Locker (2008: 86) unpacks the disputed categories of 
impairment, disability, and handicap. According to Locker, impairment constitutes any loss or 
abnormality of physiological, psychological, or anatomical structure or function; disability involves 
a restriction resulting from an impairment of ability to perform certain ‘normal’ activities; handicap 
is a social disadvantage because of an impairment or disability which limits or prevents fulfilling a 
‘normal’ role. Whilst I do not necessarily dispute Locker’s distinctions, I use the terms 
interchangeably (though more often than not ‘disability’) for reflecting how the relation between 
embodied limits and social discrimination is complex and durable and because ‘disability’ is used 
most commonly by Freymarsh and Springtown professionals when referring to a loss of 
physiological or psychological function. I am fully aware this may reflect the medical – rather than 
the social – model of disability (Oliver 1990) but I ask for some forbearance here. 
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here. First, I will not draw on data exclusively concerning parents-to-be. Their 
experiences, perceptions, and concerns are well-rehearsed in the literature and 
although I explore their interactions with professionals, I resist regurgitating 
previous arguments. I choose to primarily focus on professionals since, as stated 
earlier, they are rarely, if ever, subjected to critical ethnographic attention in the 
context of Down’s syndrome screening. Second, whilst I draw on my observations 
of two hospitals, this is not a comparative study. There are two reasons for this. 
First, whilst the sites differed in some respects, the issues raised here were evident 
in both settings. Indeed, both institutions adopted different screening methods to 
attain the same result and so my arguments are mostly translatable. Second, many 
professionals at Springtown also worked at Freymarsh. Whilst comparisons did 
emerge, these would not hold ground as a thesis. Rather, I draw on fieldwork in 
each setting to make wider claims about Down’s syndrome screening and how it 
intersects with ‘the politics of reproduction’ (Ginsburg and Rapp 1991). 
 
My primary focus for this research was on the conduct of professionals when 
screening for Down’s syndrome. I follow professionals, as creatures of habit and 
bearers of culture, through their worlds. I reveal how their schedules, practices, 
discourses, and interactions with parents-to-be, colleagues, and materials which 
‘make up’ (Latimer 2008b) the clinic accomplish, intensify, and disturb orders and 
routines. By recognising the hospital as a privileged environment for studying the 
dramatisation of routines (Berg 1992), I am interested in how professionals 
construct and preserve order, how they structure their interactions and working 
practices, and how they perform their roles (Garfinkel 1967; Goffman 1959). 
Believing one must unmask unspectacular patterns of everyday life to distinguish 
spectacular events (Whyte 1955), I describe who does what, where, how, to whom, 
to what ends, and its consequences for participating people. This means I 
illuminate how ideas around screening for Down’s syndrome in the world of 
healthcare, as a political and contested site, are produced and made sense of from 
within social, cultural and medical repertoires. Thus, I place an emphasis not on 
people specifically and their interiority but rather the multiple forms of clinical life 
and how people are located in situations with their own properties, rhythms, and 
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gestures (Silverman 1987), a dynamic often missing in current analyses on Down’s 
syndrome screening. 
 
This involves resisting a subscription to the notion that certain frameworks or 
categories are givens defying cultural interpretation (Atkinson 1995). Rather than 
affording Down’s syndrome screening and the condition itself some unquestioned 
ontological status and limiting descriptions to biological imperatives as invoked in 
the medical literature, I view Down’s syndrome and screening for the condition as 
‘things’ continually constructed and negotiated in the everyday talk, conduct, and 
practices of professionals and their interactions with colleagues, parents-to-be, 
materials, and space (Kerr 2005). This contributes to the literature on how 
screening is both a social and medical intervention (Armstrong 2012; Gillespie 
2012; Lock et al. 2007; Scott et al. 2005; Timmermans and Buchbinder 2013) but 
extends it by considering how identities, hierarchies, responsibilities, and values 
are produced and reproduced in antenatal care. Through taking the mundane and 
taken-for-granted seriously since it is through these that meanings are circulated, I 
therefore uncover issues (in the interpretive mould) around how Down’s 
syndrome screening is organised and valued, how professionals perform their 
roles, and how the condition itself is constituted within medical encounters.  
 
Thesis outline 
This thesis is separated into nine chapters. Following this introduction, chapter 
two is dedicated to outlining the theoretical foundations informing my intellectual 
thinking. I draw largely on ethnomethodological sensibilities (Garfinkel 1967) but 
recognise the value of theoretical synthesis by drawing on concepts and ideas from 
other perspectives for making sense of data. Chapter three is a socio-historical 
narrative of Down’s syndrome screening and how the condition has intersected 
with scientific and medical worlds since the nineteenth century. This socio-history 
continues with an outline of Down’s syndrome screening in recent years and its 
current use in Freymarsh and Springtown. This socio-history is not a review of the 
literature as conventionally conceived. Rather than presenting a separate review 
outlining previous research, I have cited literature and integrated this work 
throughout the thesis to maintain cohesion and to remain loyal to the ethnographic 
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tradition. By assimilating other arguments into my chapters, I am able to identify 
the similarities and discrepancies between my claims and those preceding them. 
Chapter four situates the study by outlining the process of gaining NHS ethical 
approval, collecting field data, making fieldnotes, my relations in the field, data 
analysis, and both the ethics and struggles of ethnography. 
 
Chapter five begins with the presentation of field data. I explore how screening is 
organised in the everyday practices of Freymarsh and Springtown and how the 
task of conducting Down’s syndrome screening, at least initially, is relegated from 
consultants to midwives (Freymarsh) and sonographers (Springtown). Midwives 
and sonographers (mainly midwives), as an unwitting ‘mop-up service’ (Bosk 
1992), classify Down’s syndrome screening consultations as a repetitive, ritualised 
and valueless task. Other duties such as counselling miscarriages are prioritised 
and preferred for producing and reproducing their identity-work. The organisation 
of Down’s syndrome screening, thus, accomplishes its downgrading since this 
professional assignment is not aligned with and is not invested with value. Chapter 
six explores the conduct of care and how the naturalisation of Down’s syndrome 
screening as a ‘normal’ part of pregnancy is accomplished in mundane affairs. This 
is achieved in two ways. First, professionals ‘dispose’ (Latimer 1999) of screening 
by employing the entwining rhetoric of ‘informed choice’ and ‘non-directive care’ 
to allocate full responsibility to parents-to-be. Second, the ‘social’ dimensions of 
ultrasound scans (offering opportunities to ‘meet the baby’, receive pictures, and 
reproduce kinship) are promoted over its ‘medical’ dimensions (to detect potential 
concerns with the unborn baby). Such moves accomplish Down’s syndrome 
screening, thus, as normal and expected conduct for parents-to-be. 
 
Chapter seven explores how Down’s syndrome itself is constituted in screening 
consultations and antenatal care more generally. Professionals are often critical of 
Down’s syndrome screening and are positive about the condition specifically yet in 
consultations, such beliefs and interpretations become absent. Down’s syndrome is 
talked around and as opposed to being talked about or through. As such, it becomes 
subsumed by the broader, universalising, and more negative discourse of ‘risk’, 
‘problem’, or ‘abnormality’, ensuring that a negative portrayal of the condition and 
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familiar scripts of reproductive misfortune remain intact. Chapter eight shows how 
screening brings cultural ideals around perfection close to hand. This positions 
mothers-to-be and especially mothers-to-be at an ‘advanced maternal age’, the 
discourse used by professionals and in the antenatal literature, as accountable for 
their reproductive choices. The notion that unborn babies are ‘perfectible’ (Ivry 
2006: 459) also relates to the constitution of those with the condition. Whilst the 
effects of Down’s syndrome can vary significantly from one individual to another, 
the unborn baby with or suspected as having Down’s syndrome is frequently 
classified as a ‘foetus’ in the ordering work of professionals. As such, the 
nonhuman and technical classification of the ‘foetus’ with Down’s syndrome 
contributes to its disposal, both figuratively and physically, in the clinic. 
 
Chapter nine concludes the thesis by reiterating the previous findings and their 
importance for the sociology of medicine and beyond. I also reflect on how Down’s 
syndrome screening plays a central role in reproductive politics, transforming 
reproductive medicine whilst simultaneously invigorating parental expectations 
and providing a commentary on what lives are valued (or not). Thus, I show how 
prenatal technologies, rather than being solely perceived as a positive knowledge 
practice remaining beneficial to medical and social advancement, produces and 
reproduces the idealised (unborn) body to collude in a form of social exclusion.  I 
also offer some recommendations for future antenatal practice, namely how we 
need a more critical reflection on how Down’s syndrome is constituted in antenatal 
encounters. However, whilst suggestions are proposed, I do not offer political or 
moral disclaimers about Down’s syndrome screening. Drawing on Goffman (1974: 
74), my main intention, thus, is not ‘to present a lullaby but merely to sneak in and 
watch the way the people snore’. 
 
Taken together, the chapters tell a story of both extraordinary drama and ordinary 
routine. By providing ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz 1973) of often slim encounters 
and answering Han’s (2013) call for analysing the humdrum and banal aspects of 
pregnancy, I document a select crosscut of professionals’ worlds with important 
implications for our conceptions of pregnancy, parenthood, the family, and ideas 
surrounding the ‘normal’. I consider Down’s syndrome screening, thus, not as a 
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patient-centred and individual transaction between professionals and parents-to-
be but rather as a complicated and collective social and cultural concern extending 
well beyond the clinic and powerfully shaping the constitution of contemporary 
society. 
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical Foundations 
 
Before delving deep into the worlds of Freymarsh and Springtown, I dedicate this 
chapter to introducing the theoretical foundations on which the thesis is grounded. 
Ethnography, as Bosk (1979: 19) presses, is both a ‘theoretic and a theoretically 
motivated activity’. However, as will be made clear throughout the thesis, I stress I 
do not entirely buy into the worldview of one tradition. Whilst the study could be 
loosely defined as a cultural and interpretive analysis, my arguments draw on 
concepts borrowed from other paradigms, meaning my theoretical allegiance is 
partial, fluid, and subject to change. Undoubtedly, my research has been influenced 
by ethnomethodological concerns, that is, ‘the study of folk or members’ methods 
for producing recognisable and reasonable social orders’ (Laurier 2009: 633).  
However, in the thesis, I combine ethnomethodological sensibilities together with 
ideas and concepts from several perspectives to engage with a particular way of 
analysing the social. The complexity of the theoretical framework reflects, in turn, 
how the complexity of prenatal screening for Down’s syndrome cannot be handled 
by a single discipline or framework. Restricting analysis to one perspective would 
not do justice to the multiple, mundane, and messy character of everyday life in the 
clinic which does not always cleave at neat points. This chapter, therefore, is my 
attempt to condense the disorderliness into a coherent account with reference to a 
collection of theoretical tropes. Specifically, I describe my position here for making 
arguments throughout the remainder of the thesis. 
 
In sum, to draw on Foucault’s analogy of a toolbox, I procure tools offered by 
different theoretical foundations to make sense of Down’s syndrome screening in 
two hospital settings. Despite synthesising several concepts and ideas, my main 
aim is to analyse the mundane, familiar, and taken-for-granted ‘micro’ practices, 
routines, rhythms, and rituals of everyday life which produce and reproduce order 
and values. To do this, I focus on interactions, identity-work, accounts, materials, 
power relations, discourse, typifications, ‘motility’ (Latimer 2013; Latimer and 
Munro 2006; Munro 2001) and ‘disposal’ (Latimer 1997; Munro 2001). These 
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ideas will be briefly explained in this chapter and elaborated on more extensively 
as the thesis progresses. Following Scott (2009: 10), then, I will use material which 
involves ‘theorising the mundane’ and reveals how the micro and banal help us 
understand the wider processes and complexities of everyday life and specifically 
the everyday life of the antenatal clinic in relation to Down’s syndrome screening. 
 
Interactions, identity-work, accounts 
As stated, my intention is to examine the mundane practices of the antenatal clinic. 
Rather than simply interviewing professionals about work practices, I observe the 
interactions between them and parents-to-be, colleagues, and others. As such, a 
key feature of this research concerns attending to the micro-study of face-to-face 
interaction. The work of Goffman (1959, 1963, 1983) is valuable here. Goffman 
illuminates the strategic choices underpinning knowledge, meanings, and accounts 
and its effects on the self (Scott 2009). His ‘dramaturgical’ (Goffman 1959) insights 
are united by a recurring concern with the quirks of human conduct and the 
strategic ways people behave in situations. During such collective recitals, people 
manage impressions, maintain performances, and negotiate identities to uphold 
normal appearances. Such co-presence, for Goffman, corresponds to the regulation 
of a public order. In sum, Goffman claims one cannot dismiss the minute as trivial, 
highlighting how the intricate politics of small rules and transgressions add up to 
ordinary yet very powerful and symbolic rituals (in a dramaturgical sense) and 
ceremonies in everyday life. 
 
In relation to my own study, I explore the extraordinariness of ordinariness, that is, 
I analyse the subtle scaffolding of human interaction, the character of institutions, 
and, more generally, how professionals make sense of their world (Goffman 1959, 
1983). I examine how professionals, as ‘members’ (Garfinkel 1967), produce a 
local order as well as make shared sense of their circumstances and act on this. By 
treating ‘practical activities, practical circumstances, and practical sociological 
reasoning as topics of empirical study’, I capture the nuance of ordinary (and often 
hidden) knowledge and the ‘most commonplace activities of daily life’ in the clinic 
(Garfinkel 1967: 1). Thus, I identify the role background expectancies play in 
constructing and controlling a local order, as a ‘socially managed production’, and 
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in accomplishing ordinary routines in Freymarsh and Springtown (Garfinkel 1967: 
75). This order is a moral one (Garfinkel 1967); it produces particular moral forms, 
that is, how people organise the world and the local order. This is important for 
considering the moral order of Freymarsh and Springtown. Indeed, professionals 
‘encounter and know the moral order as perceivedly normal courses of action-
familiar scenes of everyday affairs’ (1967: 35). It is the taken-for-granted, in turn, 
which becomes ‘natural’ and ‘moral’ facts of life (1967: 35). Thus, I explore how 
professionals, in their everyday conduct, produce and reproduce particular moral 
values not only around their daily duties but also around certain bodies/future 
bodies. 
 
Attending to how people as ‘members’ accomplish a (moral) order shows how my 
study answers Schütz’s (1970) call for a sociology of the mundane, of questioning 
unquestionable assumptions about the constancy of our structure of the world, of 
the validity of our experience, and our ability to act upon the world and within the 
world. This means treating the obvious as a phenomenon (‘topic’) as opposed to an 
‘unexplicated resource’ by examining how people ‘assemble particular scenes so as 
to provide for one another evidence of a social order as-ordinarily-conceived’ 
(Zimmerman and Pollner 1970: 81-83). Such arguments replicate that of Douglas 
(1966) who describes ‘dirt’ as too mundane to be explicit, a ‘thing’ too true to 
warrant contemplation. Douglas recognises how the mundane must be unpacked 
in order to make sense of the world. Similarly, I recognise the value of analysing 
the taken-for-granted and for embracing multiplicity rather than attributing social 
life – contextual, historical, local, and specific – to universal laws. By analysing how 
meanings, orders, and routines are produced and reproduced in a clinical setting, I 
identify how expectations and values at the micro-level are consolidated into 
wider normative codes of conduct which appear as ‘natural’ and ‘real’ (Scott et al. 
2013). 
 
Additionally, I capture how professionals, primarily though their interactions with 
parents-to-be, engage in identity-work (Goffman 1959). The social audience is 
important for identity construction since the self and any adjustments thereof is 
not a property of the individual but arises through interactions with other people 
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(Thomas 2014). People share a world with others in which there is an ongoing 
correspondence between each person’s meanings and interpretations. I agree with 
Goffman that these meanings and interpretations are located in historical time and 
space and circulate in social and cultural meanings. As such, I explore how 
professionals accomplish order by managing, performing, and directing interaction 
(Scott et al. 2013), that is, how they take account of others and reaffirm their 
identity in relation to the conventions of the clinic. Within such situated occasions, 
identity is relational, amorphous, and routinely created in the reflexive actions of 
people. Against the notion of the self-as-consumer, the collective rather than the 
individual is the primary site for identity-work and for making the world together. 
As such, I examine how professionals create their identity and how parents-to-be, 
as patients, are used for this construction (Latimer 2000). 
 
Related to professionals’ identity-work is their ‘accounting’ practices (Garfinkel 
1967). Accountability refers to the ways people, as ‘members’, signify, describe, or 
explain the properties of conduct in a social situation (Garfinkel 1967). They make 
what they do and who they are appear grounded, reasonable, and rational to 
others. People work to maintain consistency, order, and meaning in their lives, that 
is, to accomplish identity and membership within given groups. It is principally via 
language, as ‘situated practices of looking-and-telling’, that this is accomplished 
and members subsequently create a sense of reality (1967: 1). Accounts, therefore, 
are essential to maintain stable grounds 'in the social structures of everyday 
activities' (1967: 185). This is important for this study since I examine how 
professionals account for the conduct of both themselves and others, that is, how 
they describe interactions with parents-to-be, validate their actions within such 
occasions, and use this to construct and reconstruct their identity. 
 
Power relations, discourse, materials 
Another intention for this study is to explore how the micro-physics of power are 
enacted in Freymarsh and Springtown. The arguments of Foucault (1967, 1972, 
1983) are a valuable asset here. Foucault argues that power is not concentrated in 
one space or possessed by one person but rather is localised and fragmented, with 
people becoming conduits through which power is exercised. Modern power, for 
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Foucault, is more efficient and productive than its predecessor. Invisible yet potent 
in its effects, power is realised in its reach ‘into the very grain of processes and 
everyday life’ (Foucault 1980: 39). As a productive network, power is a practical 
accomplishment which ‘produces and traverses things, it induces pleasure, forms 
of knowledge, produces discourses’ (1980: 119). Agreeing with Foucault power is 
not repressive but productive, not coercive but legitimate, I explore how power 
works in Freymarsh and Springtown, namely by examining how it facilitates, 
mobilises, and elicits the actions of those subjected to it. This focus on disciplinary 
power – working consciousness through, and controlling the operations and 
positions of, the body (Foucault 1973) – means I can analyse how professionals 
formulate, disperse, and use power and knowledge within and across settings to 
organise activities and assign meanings to the conduct of themselves and others. 
 
More specifically, I capture how power is expressed and meanings are distributed 
in the clinic via ‘discourse’ (Foucault 1972), that is, in the language and practices of 
embodied individuals (Scott 2010). Lessa (2006: 285) defines Foucault’s notion of 
discourse as ‘composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices 
that systematically construct the subjects and the worlds of which they speak’. 
Following Foucault, I capture the role discourse plays in power relations and the 
production of current truths, suggesting discourse is a culturally constructed 
representation as opposed to an exact replica of reality. In the antenatal clinic, 
discourse constructs knowledge and disciplines via the production of categories 
and assemblages of text (Foucault 1967, 1983). As such, I identify how discourse 
constitutes categories in Freymarsh and Springtown, particularly around – putting 
it simply – the ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ body. People are constituted via ‘dividing 
practices’ (Foucault 1983: 208) which, as forces of ‘normalising judgement’ 
(Foucault 1973: 177), produce classifications. People can be divided, for instance, 
into ‘the mad and the sane, the sick and the healthy, the criminals and the “good 
boys”’ (Foucault 1983: 208). Thus, I attend to how in Freymarsh and Springtown, 
professionals’ knowledge finds consistency and stability in categories of certain 
people – or future people – to help construct ‘the order of things’ (Foucault 1970). 
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Through a Foucauldian lens, we see how people internalise discourses and impose 
such discourses on themselves (Scott 2009). Discourse can be used to produce and 
reproduce dominance or resistance and make explicit taken-for-granted rules 
facilitating both inclusive and exclusive practices (Foucault 1967, 1979). However, 
agreeing with Foucault that discourse is never limited to ‘words’ or people alone, a 
key feature of this research is how materials are invoked, ‘aligned with’ (Latimer 
2004), and resisted in different moments (White 2007). That is, I recognise how 
power is transmitted via materials and the spatial organisation of Freymarsh and 
Springtown. Drawing on her work in a hospital setting, a site of multiple discourses 
(Silverman 1987), Latimer (2004) argues discourse extends to materials involved 
in producing and reproducing dominant relations. She claims that doctors make 
‘moves’, sometimes figurative and sometimes literal, which ‘align’ social practices 
and cultural materials to re-accomplish asymmetrical power relations (2004: 757). 
One example provided by Latimer involves a doctor overruling a physiotherapist 
by placing a zimmerframe in front of a patient. On such occasions, the doctor can 
‘move’ the patient and colleague around by using materials as well as accounts. 
 
During this study, I take heed of Latimer’s contentions by paying attention to the 
use of and ‘extension’ (Munro 1996) with cultural materials, alongside whether 
professionals ‘attach’ or ‘detach’ (Latimer 2004) themselves or others to/from 
such materials, in constituting power relations. By recognising the importance of 
materials when analysing the social, my arguments are not unlike actor-network 
theory. However, this is not an actor-network theory study. Unlike Callon (1987) 
and Latour (1987), I suggest meanings are not given but are constructed post hoc 
in relation to other people and materials (Garfinkel 1967; Geertz 1973; Latimer 
2004). This is not to say, however, I have not found actor-network theory useful. 
Indeed, I cite Latour on several occasions to think with and through my data, 
particularly when I treat materials and space seriously rather than as ‘second class 
citizens’ (Law 1991: 6). By thinking socio-technically (Law 1991), I view the 
antenatal clinic as a site of ‘simultaneous and imbricated material and discursive 
construction’ (Rapp 2000: 194). The materials of the clinic – ultrasound machines, 
medical records, furniture, and so forth – are drawn upon and aligned with by 
professionals which brings into play a whole set of relations. Thus, I show how 
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alongside interactions and accounts, materials make the clinic ‘durable’ (Latour 
1991). 
 
Motility, typifications, disposal 
As stated, I explore professionals’ ‘accounts’ with regards to Down’s syndrome 
screening. Crosschecking accounts with observations of professionals’ everyday 
practices means I am able to reveal the discrepancies between what they do and 
what they say. I do not treat such inconsistencies as ‘infractions’ (Garfinkel 1971) 
or as ‘breaches’ (Garfinkel 1967) or, at worst, as untruths. Rather, I view them as 
instances of ‘motility’, referring to how people or things are moved in different 
spaces of discourse (Latimer 2013; Latimer and Munro 2006; Munro 2001). What 
is made important or unimportant, present or absent, changes from moment to 
moment, helping ‘re-accomplish socio-cultural relations of power’ (Latimer 2008a: 
2). Thus, I capture what professionals make present and absent, what they view as 
important and unimportant, and who or what they categorise as normal and 
abnormal, at different moments, in Freymarsh and Springtown. 
 
In the thesis, the notion of motility is explored – particularly in chapter seven – 
through an analysis of how professionals produce and reproduce ‘typifications’. 
Typifications refer to how people establish schemes of meaning (typify) by 
categorising and classifying things which, in turn, seem ‘natural’. This subsequently 
allows people to find and make meaning and order (Douglas 1966; Garfinkel 1967; 
Schütz 1962). For Latimer (1997: 160), processes of typification also entail 
‘systems of distinction’ which can be used to ‘bring things together and hold things 
apart’. In Freymarsh and Springtown, I capture how certain clinical duties and 
unborn babies are, in certain situated occasions, classified and categorised in 
particular ways. This is particularly true in the constitution of both ‘normal’ and 
‘abnormal’ babies and the enactment of exclusion, though this claim is built on 
more extensively later in the thesis. 
 
The typification/classification of certain persons/future persons and things relates 
to the concept of ‘disposal’ (Latimer 1997, 2000). I understand disposal as the 
means through which professionals engage in ordering work to help maintain 
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order in the clinic, that is, how they place, displace, and replace certain persons, 
ideas, or things (Munro 2001). I relate the concept of disposal to how professionals 
classify certain tasks (i.e. Down’s syndrome screening) in everyday practice, in 
relation to identity-work and membership, and how they erect an understanding 
of certain persons/future persons (Goffman 1963). Berg (1992) claims that within 
medicine, physicians construct medical disposals, that is, they dissemble patients 
into traits so they can be classified and subsequently disposed of. He claims 
medical criteria and disposal options are not ‘givens’ which lead a physician 
towards a certain decision (1992: 168). Rather, the physician actively moulds and 
reconstructs the patient so their problems are solvable. In this study, I explore how 
professionals – with reference to certain classificatory systems – ‘detach from’ 
(Latimer 2004) and transform problem bodies into the other. Specifically, I show 
how they make problems solvable, that is, how certain persons or future persons 
are made disposable in the clinic. 
 
Summary of the study 
In this chapter, I have identified the key theoretical undercurrents which inform 
my approach and implicitly highlighted how ethnographic fieldwork is a detailed 
search in which deductive orientations, with loyalties to theory, and indicative 
orientations, with loyalties to the field, ‘join in a dialectical fashion’ (Desmond 
2007: 296). Nonetheless, I underline the virtues found in practicing theoretical 
pluralism in opposition to developing a ‘grand narrative’ (Law 1991). Pinch (2010) 
suggests researchers need to combine more conventional sociological approaches 
like Goffman’s (1959, 1963, 1983) with an analysis of materials and space. I argue 
my work – taking the ordinary seriously as a category of analysis and showing how 
social relations, practices, and materials are equally mundane and dynamic – offers 
this possibility. Whilst specific theories are not explicitly cited or deployed as a 
framework for interpreting the data, they are deeply embedded in the fabric of my 
arguments. Martin (2010: 24) claims attending to the interplay of practice, 
discourse, and materials ‘provides a window into the coming-into-being of novel 
scientific facts and entities’. Whilst I detract focus from the novel by analysing the 
old frontier of Down’s syndrome screening, Martin’s focus on the relations 
between practices, discourses, and materials becomes essential in contemplating 
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the everyday politics of antenatal care and particularly of prenatal screening 
practices. 
 
In sum, with reference to the theoretical tropes above, I explore the ways in which 
order and realities are accomplished and how matters are decided locally. 
Replicating Garfinkel’s (1967) charge for studying everyday affairs, my research 
fleshes out the specific socially-embedded concreteness of situated occasions, that 
is, the taken-for-granted and mundane rhythms of hospital life which ‘combine to 
create and sustain a sense of order, stability, and predictability’ (Scott 2009: 5). 
Interested in the ‘content’ of medical action (Berg 1992: 151), my study is a story 
of how Down’s syndrome screening is ‘done’ (Garfinkel 1967) and how the clinic is 
a site in which ‘people do (perform, reproduce, and occasionally challenge) social 
life, day to day’ (Scott 2009: 1). 
 
More specifically, guided by an interest in professionals’ conduct in the context of 
Down’s syndrome screening, I capture the significance of interactions, accounts, 
discourses, identity-work, power relations, materials, typifications, motility, and 
disposal practices – all of which produce social, moral, and cultural contexts – in 
the clinic (Latimer 1997; Silverman 1993). In so doing, I identify who or what is 
privileged/trivialised and made absent/present, how resources are distributed, 
what or who is ‘normal’, how professionals ‘do member’ (Garfinkel 1967) and 
learn technical knowledge, and how hierarchies, as cultural forms, are erected, 
legitimated, and mutated in antenatal care (Latimer 1997; Silverman 1993; White 
et al. 2012). This involves a focus on how cultural assumptions are embedded in 
the metaphors and discourse of biology (Martin 1991; Martin 2010) and how 
reproductive technologies have dominant pictures of norms surrounding bodies, 
families, and desires built into them. By carrying out my very own ‘breaching 
experiment’ (Garfinkel 1967)8, I show how reproductive politics, in the context of 
                                                     
8 This corresponds to Stengers’ (2005: 994) discussion of Deleuze’s ‘idiot’,  he or she ‘who always 
slows the others down, who resists the consensual way in which the situation is presented and in 
which emergencies mobilize thought or action’. The idiot, for Stengers (2005: 996), demands 'we 
slow down, that we don't consider ourselves authorized to believe we possess the meaning of what 
we know’. As an ethnographer, I conduct a breaching experiment by similarly not asserting my own 
knowledge about proceedings and by my interests contravening, and making visible, the ordering, 
underpinnings, and conditions of possibility of the clinic. 
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screening for Down’s syndrome, are worked through in the familiar scenes of 
everyday affairs and practical accomplishments of professionals in antenatal care. 
This involves pressing how situated encounters are both social and technical 
accomplishments (Law 1991; Mol 2002). Making the materiality of peoples’ worlds 
explicit and central, rather than implicit and marginal, is of paramount importance 
for grasping everyday life in the hospital (Sandelowski 2003). 
 
This chapter has set up my grounds for the following two chapters, namely, for 
describing how Down’s syndrome screening has become a site of critical attention 
(chapter three) and how my theoretical thinking has influenced how I carried out 
fieldwork (chapter four). 
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Chapter Three 
The Critical Site of Down’s Syndrome Screening 
 
A SHORT SOCIO-HISTORY 
This chapter begins by outlining a short socio-history of Down’s syndrome in the 
UK and beyond. It follows previous socio-historical analyses of medical conditions 
including cystic fibrosis (Kerr 2005), diabetes (Hedgecoe 2002), cancer (Fujirama 
1996), and atherosclerosis (Mol 2002). Starting from the position that one must 
have a firm comprehension of the past in order to understand the present and 
ponder the future, I piece together key developments, inside and outside the UK, 
within the last two-hundred years which have contributed to Down’s syndrome 
being subjected to the reproductive gaze. A range of technological, scientific, legal, 
economic, political, and cultural developments over many years have stimulated 
new research and clinical tools around Down’s syndrome and prenatally detecting 
the condition, from the contested to the mundane. Far from the dramatic 
discoveries attributable to medical progress, Down’s syndrome and its intersection 
with antenatal care evolves in a gradual and often ordinary fashion ‘as new 
techniques and social mores are incorporated within existing epistemological and 
technological frames’ (Kerr 2005: 874). 
 
Casper and Clarke (1998: 255) show how the pap smear became the ‘right tool for 
the job’ for cervical cancer screening; technical manipulation, the automation of 
record-keeping, the proliferation of health activists, public pressure following high 
rates of incorrect readings, and the creation of the American Cancer Society, among 
other trends, created an environment necessary for supporting its development 
and subsequent diffusion. Similar to Casper and Clarke, I identify how Down’s 
syndrome screening has become a routine procedure, that is, the ‘right tool for the 
job’ in antenatal care. This socio-history is loosely chronological but often messy 
and convoluted, reflecting the immense complexity of how the diagnostic category 
of Down’s syndrome and screening for the condition has come into being. In this 
chapter, I draw on ideas from medical historians (Cowan 1994; Wright 2011), 
healthcare practitioners (Nancollas 2012; Reynolds 2010), anthropologists (Rapp 
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2000), and disability activists (Logan 2011). This small but comprehensive 
collection of material – which I am indebted to for formulating this short history – 
is a product of failing to unearth similar sociological accounts. As such, one can 
recognise this chapter not only as reflecting the interdisciplinary nature of my 
work but also as rectifying an inadequacy in the sociological literature.  
 
The making of mongolism 
The inception of the category ‘mongolism’ or ‘idiocy’9 (or what is now referred to 
as Down’s syndrome) seemingly began in 1838 with the publication of Jean-
Étienne Dominique Esquirol’s Des Maladies Mentales Considérées Sous les Rapports 
Médical, Hygiènique et Médico-Légal, Volume 1 (1838). A psychiatrist by trade, 
Esquirol described a collection of certain people as ‘idiots’, roughly translating as 
those with intellectual and developmental disabilities. This work was developed by 
Édouard Séguin, a physician and educationist working with children who had 
cognitive impairments. His book Traitment Moral, Hygiène et Éducation des Idiots 
et des Autres Enfants Arriérés (1846) was dedicated to the diagnosis and treatment 
of such children. However, the notion of mongolism specifically was more 
famously developed by English physician John Langdon Down in 1866. Working at 
the Royal Earlswood Asylum for Idiots, Down ([1866] 1997) was the first person 
to extensively describe a group of people sharing anatomical and behavioural 
characteristics, a group he described as ‘mongoloids’ since their facial features 
paralleled people of Mongolian descent (Starbuck 2011). 
 
Pueschel (2000) offers three reasons for why mongolism was not recognised as a 
clinical entity prior to 1866. First, few physicians before the nineteenth century 
were interested in children with developmental conditions. Second, the prevalence 
of many diseases and conditions would have overshadowed mongolism. Third, 
only half of women aged above thirty-five survived during this period, arguably 
resulting in lower amounts of late-aged pregnancies in which women were likely 
to have a child with mongolism. Regardless of this, it is within this time period that 
                                                     
9 I am fully aware the terms mongolism and idiocy are likely to cause great offence to UK (and 
perhaps other international) advocacy organisations and parents of children with the condition. 
However, their use here is integral to fully outline the history and making of Down’s syndrome. I 
return to the importance of the discourse surrounding Down’s syndrome later in the thesis. 
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mongolism as a diagnostic category was made, namely, that it was constituted by 
social and medical/scientific discourse10. 
 
Eugenics and institutionalisation 
So how were people with ‘mongolism’, recognised by Down, Esquirol, and Séguin 
as a clinical entity deserving its own status (Starbuck 2011), treated by society 
when their work was published? According to Logan (2011), ‘training schools’ in 
the nineteenth century in Germany, Switzerland, England, and the US were opened 
for those with learning disabilities (mongolism included). Whilst not offering a 
cure and abuse being reported, improvements in the behaviour, physicality, and 
social competence of people with ‘mongolism’ were described. However, a sudden 
economic downturn offered no opportunity for employment for those housed in 
training schools. As such, schools expanded but quickly became asylums providing 
basic levels of care for its inhabitants. Such institutions were also soon colonised 
by medicine with doctors and custodians working inside the premises. Rather than 
being educated and returned to the community, inhabitants were identified as sick 
and needing treatment/cure. The medicalisation of training schools subsequently 
produced systemised prejudices of people with disabilities, including those with 
mongolism, as sick and in need of medical management. This reflected a shift in 
public consciousness from compassion and care to burden and segregation, that is, 
from education to protecting society from social undesirables (Wright 2011). 
 
Whilst originally designed under idealistic aspirations of providing asylum 
(Giddens 1991), schools became ‘total institutions’ (Goffman 1961) built on the 
premise of maintaining order among disorder with simple custody becoming a 
dominant feature. Bauman (1993: 163) claims social space is controlled through 
both ‘phagic’ (‘inclusivist’) and ‘emetic’ (‘exclusivist’) strategies. Schools quickly 
became emetic institutions for nonconformists. Giddens (1991: 165) describes this 
process as ‘sequestration’, a contrived consequence of a culture in which ‘moral 
and aesthetic domains are held to be dissolved by the expansion of technical 
                                                     
10 Although the diagnostic category of Down’s syndrome/mongolism was first described in the 
nineteenth century, Starbuck (2011) identifies skeletal remains and different forms of material 
culture (paintings, figurines, and pottery) that may depict Down’s syndrome well before this time 
period. 
26 
knowledge’, in which the sick and dying are separated from ‘normal’ members of 
society. The sequestration of people with mongolism or other conditions meant 
their fate became a ‘technical matter’, handled by medical experts with inhabitants 
‘routinely hidden from view’ (1991: 161). 
 
I return to the institutional confinement of those with the condition later in this 
chapter. Nonetheless, by the early twentieth century, mongolism became the most 
commonly recognised learning disability and many people with the condition lived 
their (short) lives in institutions (Wright 2011). The forced institutionalisation of 
people with mongolism was closely linked to racial and eugenic theory in the early 
twentieth century. Eugenics, a term developed by Galton (1883), represents a 
theory and practice of improving the genetic quality of humans through pursuing 
the reproduction of people with desired attributes and reducing the reproduction 
of those with undesirable attributes. The eugenics movement gained popularity in 
the early twentieth century in the UK and US scientific and medical community 
(Cunningham-Burley and Kerr 1999). This is reflected most profoundly not only by 
institutionalisation but also by enforced sterilisation programmes being performed 
worldwide – the UK included – for people with mongolism and other learning 
disabilities (Selikowitz 2008). 
 
Although eugenics eventually lost scientific credibility, this was not before many 
had been sterilised in the name of social purity and before Nazi Germany embraced 
the strategy. The relationship between mongolism and the eugenic movement was 
most profoundly represented in the rise of Nazi Germany and the implementation 
of Aktion T4, a euthanasia programme officially running from 1939 to 1941 – 
though said to continue unofficially thereafter – whereby physicians murdered 
individuals ‘judged incurably sick by critical medical examination’ (Proctor 1988: 
177). People with mongolism, along with other conditions or diseases (e.g. 
hydrocephaly, cerebral palsy) and physical malformations (e.g. missing limbs), 
were characterised in a highly medicalised system as incurably sick (Lifton 1986) 
and categorised as ‘untermensch’, a term integral to Nazi racial ideology referring 
to those deemed to be life unworthy of life. Even after the war and rebuffing of 
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eugenic policies, people with conditions like mongolism were still encouraged to 
be incarcerated within institutions well into the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
The French connection: clinical genetics 
The rise of eugenics and institutionalisation of people with mongolism coincided 
with great strides being made in medical genetics. Despite invaluable contributions 
from mid-to-late-nineteenth century scientists and medical practitioners, it was 
not until 1932 where significant progress in medicine and genetics concerning 
mongolism was made. At the International Congress of Genetics, Davenport (1932) 
suggested non-disjunction, an error in cell division in which an embryo has three 
copies of a chromosome instead of the usual two, as a cause of mongolism. A year 
later, Penrose (1933), an English geneticist and psychiatrist, identified a partial 
correlation between mongolism and maternal age. 
 
However, it took another sixteen years for the next major landmark in the genetic 
legacy of mongolism to be established. In 1949, Barr and his colleagues discovered 
cells of male and female mammals could be distinguished by the presence or 
absence of a small, cellular body known as the sex chromatin. Present in females 
and absent in males, it could be used to determine sex in humans and animals 
when sex chromosomes were unclear under the microscope (Cowan 1994). One 
year later, medical specialists and geneticists became interested in ascertaining the 
sex of unborn babies in cases of sex-related conditions such as haemophilia. This 
was possible using a new technology called amniocentesis, a diagnostic test carried 
out during a pregnancy to assess whether an unborn baby developed a condition 
or any adverse health outcome. Diagnoses of haemophilia, for example, were little 
more than tentative probability statements but Barr and his colleagues’ discovery 
– and the use of amniocentesis –  held promise for geneticists predicting with 
greater certainty whether unborn babies had the disorder (Macintyre 1973). Sure 
enough, in 1955, a number of different researchers in the USA, Denmark, and Israel 
were credited with discovering that the sex of unborn babies could be predicted 
through analysing cells in the amniotic fluid (Cowan 1994). 
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Four years or so later, Dr Jerome Lejeune (1959), a French physician and disability 
advocate, and colleagues discovered mongolism was a chromosomal abnormality 
caused by the presence of three copies of chromosome 21, that is, those with the 
condition have forty-seven chromosomes rather than forty-six chromosomes. This 
discovery, giving rise to the name ‘Trisomy 21’ rather than mongolism or idiocy, 
was important in ‘dramatising the medical value of human genetics’ since doctors 
learned many disorders had a genetic/chromosomal origin (Kevles 1995: 254). 
Although the culturing of foetal cells following an amniocentesis was initially 
difficult since cells in amniotic fluid are neither abundant nor in active division (so 
mitotic figures became few and far between), this was resolved in 1966. As well as 
the development of amniocentesis, researchers in the early 1960s (Clarke et al. 
1961; Polani et al. 1960) identified two rarer types of Down’s syndrome other than 
the common form discovered by Lejeune et al. (1959): Translocation Trisomy 21 
and Mosaic Trisomy 21 (both conditions are discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter). 
 
Giving birth to Down’s syndrome and amniocentesis 
The capacity to test in utero for chromosomal conditions, according to Kevles 
(1995) and Rapp (2000), legitimised amniocentesis and conferred on it the 
necessary value for scientific recognition as an integral tool for genetic diagnosis. 
Indeed, in 1960, the first amniocentesis was used in Copenhagen to determine the 
sex of an unborn baby and subsequently offer a termination of pregnancy since the 
mother was identified as a carrier of haemophilia (Cowan 1994). The amniotic tap 
itself, what Cowan (1994: 36) refers to as the ‘low-tech part of the procedure’, had 
become a routine part of obstetric medicine by the mid-1950s since it was used to 
relieve patients with hydramnios11 and test the incompatibility between mothers 
with Rh-negative blood types and their unborn babies (Fuchs and Cederqvist 
1970). However, it is at this point in the 1960s that amniocentesis was recognised 
as a possible mechanism for prenatal diagnosis. It remained in its developmental 
stages for around fifteen years since techniques and safety needed improving and 
because Scandinavia – where the first amniocentesis was used to terminate a 
pregnancy – was the only place, for much of that time, where ‘eugenic therapeutic 
                                                     
11 Hydramnios is a build-up of too much amniotic fluid. 
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abortions’ could be legally accessed (Callahan 1970; Cowan 1994). Still, similar 
abortions were reported in 1968 and a cooperative registry established to ensure 
the safety of the procedure began in the USA in 1971 (Cowan 1994). 
 
In conjunction with the development of amniocentesis for prenatal detection, the 
Abortion Act was implemented in the UK in 1967. Additionally, abortion laws were 
liberalised throughout several Western democracies in the 1960s and 1970s (Rapp 
2000). Under section 1(1)(d) of the 1967 Abortion Act, a pregnancy could be 
terminated ‘up to term’ where there is a risk that the child, if born, would be 
severely disabled and would endanger the mental and physical health of the 
mother. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 amended the Abortion 
Act 1967 by creating a general upper-limit of twenty-four weeks for lawful 
terminations except in circumstances where there was a serious risk to the 
pregnant woman’s life or health or there was a substantial risk of ‘serious foetal 
abnormality’. 
 
Regardless of the amendment, terminating an unborn baby who would ‘suffer from 
physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped’, using the 
discourse of the 1967 Act, was (and still is) considered to be appropriate grounds 
for legal abortion in the UK, although what constitutes a ‘serious handicap’ is 
debated and challenged (McGuinness 2013; Savulescu 2001). Such reflections on 
discourse were also evident when an illustrious group of biomedical researchers 
(Allen et al. 1961: 426) signed a letter in 1961 objecting to the ‘embarrassing term’ 
mongolism, proposing the use of ‘Trisomy 21’, ‘congenital acromicria’, or ‘Down 
syndrome or anomaly’ after John Langdon Down. Similarly, in 1965, a Mongolian 
delegation approached the World Health Organisation to stop using the term 
‘mongolism’. Whilst this change was accepted and the term was removed from all 
references to the condition, it was evident in scientific literature during the 1970s 
(Global Down Syndrome Foundation 2012)12. Nonetheless, it is at this point where 
one can claim ‘Down’s syndrome’ was born. 
 
Deinstitutionalisation and community care 
                                                     
12 Notably, the term ‘mongolism’ has been used in recent leading medical texts (Underwood 2004). 
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This birth of Down’s syndrome and onset of genetic testing coincided not only with 
abortion laws but also with the continued institutionalisation of people with the 
condition (Nancollas 2012). Prior to the 1970 Education Act, people with Down’s 
syndrome mostly lived in state institutions (Lewis 2008). According to Buckley 
and Buckley (2008), it was between 1920s and 1960s that healthcare professionals 
widely encouraged institutionalising children with the condition. Despite such 
institutions being nationalised and transformed after the foundation of the NHS in 
1948, the experimental treatments, sterilisation, lobotomies, and physical abuse 
persisted (Logan 2011). Although institutions were originally designed for moral 
treatment, they were crowded, overstretched, non-therapeutic, devoid of extensive 
funding, and isolated in location (Wright 2011). The moral therapy promised by 
the institutions was supplanted by the custodial treatment of those detained. Their 
mission moved from curing to mitigating and maintaining, therapeutic 
considerations receding into the background with institutions becoming dumping 
grounds for ‘social undesirables’; the ‘once-grand asylums deteriorated into snake 
pits and hellholes worthy of exposés’, warehouses for the discarded isolating them 
physically and symbolically from the larger society (Geller and Morrissey 2004: 
1128). 
 
Over the course of the 1960s, people with disabilities – Down’s syndrome included 
– were liberated from asylums in a process of ‘deinstitutionalisation’, essentially ‘a 
policy designed to reorganise mental health resources away from the institutions 
and into the community’ (Wilson 1999: 252). The motives for this move are 
multiple and contested though Durham (1989) offers three reasons: humanitarian 
concern for people with disabilities, the emergence of drug therapy, and economic 
factors. Arguably, deinstitutionalisation was further influenced by backlashes 
against abuse, growing anti-psychiatry and pro-disability movements, evidence of 
cognitive improvement of people with access to a steady caregiver and consistent 
stimulation, and the rise of the popular premise that communities hold the 
capacity to de-stigmatise and advance the lives of those previously detained 
(Goffman 1961; Stedman and Eichorn 1964; Szasz 1961; Wilson 1999). In the UK 
alone, the number of asylum residents dropped from 154,000 in 1954 to 100,000 
in 1982 (Pilgrim and Rogers 1993). By the 1980s, people with conditions such as 
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Down’s syndrome were moved into the community under post-war policies of 
inclusion and community provision (Nancollas 2012). 
 
Down’s syndrome and diagnostic testing 
The inception of deinstitutionalisation overlapped with developments in prenatal 
genetic testing. In 1968, Down’s syndrome was detected via amniocentesis for the 
first time, although the use of this diagnostic technology was still sporadic owing to 
its ‘experimental’ status (Nadler 1968). In the same year, researchers in 
Copenhagen experimented with chorionic villus sampling (CVS) to identify genetic 
conditions – Down’s syndrome included – in the first trimester of a pregnancy 
(Global Down Syndrome Foundation 2012). Like amniocentesis, CVS is a diagnostic 
test carried out during a pregnancy to assess whether an unborn baby has 
developed a condition or any adverse health outcome. Widespread diagnostic 
testing via CVS and amniocentesis was adjourned at this stage but scientific 
research on Down’s syndrome continued. In 1974, Down’s syndrome was 
identified as possibly pathogenetic (Neibuhr 1974) and the first mouse model of 
Down’s syndrome, Ts16, was created (Gropp et al. 1974). Gropp et al. (1975) 
developed a new systematic model for studying chromosomal trisomies in mice 
one year later, although it was discovered in 1980 that this proposed mouse model 
failed since mice frequently died at/near birth (Polani and Adinolfi 1980). The 
development of mouse models, as with much of other medical research, was to 
determine whether specific treatment options were effective in animal models and 
if they could translate to the human race. 
 
Eight years after Down’s syndrome was first detected using amniocentesis in 1968, 
the procedure came into common use in the USA and the first abortions following 
mid-trimester procedures were reported (Global Down Syndrome Foundation 
2012). According to Cowan (1994), it is in 1975 and 1976 that amniocentesis could 
be said to be extending beyond the developmental and into the diffusion stages. 
Rapp (2000: 33) highlights how the widespread deployment of prenatal diagnosis 
‘only became conceivable and possible when enrolled by and through legal access 
to abortion’. Since laws were reformed and therapeutic abortion, following the 
Abortion Act 1967, had become legal in the UK (and other countries), diffusion of 
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amniocentesis was rife. With it established as an acceptable part of reproductive 
practice, larger amounts of potential patients were anticipated after a presenting 
symptom of ‘advanced maternal age’, identified years earlier by Penrose (1933), 
was recognised more extensively in comparison to the previous indicator of a 
family history of sex-linked hereditary conditions (Cowan 1994). With the risk of 
miscarriage akin to the chance of having an unborn baby with Down’s syndrome, 
offering diagnostic testing to mothers-to-be at an advanced maternal age was seen 
as ‘worthwhile’ (Buckley and Buckley 2008: 80).  
 
Notably, the widespread inception of amniocentesis was implicated in a number of 
legal cases during the late 1970s. In 1978 in the USA, a couple sued a hospital for 
malpractice because the mother – aged over thirty-five – was not referred for 
amniocentesis and had a child with Down’s syndrome (Global Down Syndrome 
Foundation 1982). In 1983, the American Congress of Obstetrics and 
Gynaecologists and the American Academy of Paediatrics advised members that 
women over thirty-five years old should be mandatorily offered prenatal testing 
for genetic conditions including Down’s syndrome (Global Down Syndrome 
Foundation 2012). Additionally, Hook et al. (1983) published a paper suggesting at 
a maternal age of thirty-five, the risk of having a baby with a chromosome problem 
and the risk of having a miscarriage from an amniocentesis were both around 1 in 
200. As such, the age of thirty-five was designated as the ‘cut-off’ for diagnostic 
testing, that is, of being offered an amniocentesis since the risk of discovering a 
condition (0.5%) matched that of causing a miscarriage. Amniocentesis was 
subsequently offered exclusively to mothers-to-be aged thirty-five or above as 
opposed to all pregnant women (Wald et al. 1988). 
 
It was not until the early-to-mid 1990s that CVS came into common use (Cowan 
1994). The first efforts to biopsy the chorion were made in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s by Mohr (1968) and Hahnemann (1974) in Copenhagen. Their reason 
for exploring a diagnostic technique carried out in the first rather than second 
trimester corresponded to carrying out this procedure – given potential legal, 
physical, and mental implications – as early as possible. Their trials were largely 
unsuccessful as were other efforts using the technique. Only in the early 1980s was 
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CVS recognised as a possibly effective procedure for prenatal diagnosis, with a 
flurry of researchers enjoying success with diagnosing sex and genetic conditions 
(e.g. sickle-cell disease), obtaining tissue, and not causing miscarriages (Cowan 
1994). However, development of the technology stalled for many years owing to 
the technique of chorion biopsy being difficult to learn (meaning amniocentesis 
was preferred) and the obstruction of research with prohibitions against the use of 
federal funds, in light of the anti-abortion politics of the 1980s, to finance research 
in this area (Cowan 1994). In recent years, the technology has been improved and 
is currently used in obstetric practice. 
 
Prenatal screening for Down’s syndrome 
Whilst diagnostic testing for Down’s syndrome was developed and diffused from 
the late-1950s and early 1960s onwards, prenatal screening for the condition 
entered medical and scientific worlds in the latter stages of the twentieth century. 
Such procedures were largely introduced as an extension of earlier screening 
programmes for neural tube defects. Screening for Down’s syndrome, one of the 
first instances of mass population testing to detect and possibly prevent a genetic 
condition, began in the late 1980s following the discovery that low maternal serum 
alpha-fetoprotein in the second trimester is associated with the condition (Cuckle 
et al. 1984) and the publication of Wald et al. (1988) on the possibility of serum 
screening for Down’s syndrome. From this point onwards, Down’s syndrome 
screening was subsequently introduced as a clinical service with research carried 
out on data collected by patients following a screening procedure (Reynolds 2010). 
As such, according to Reynolds, research was often implemented without approval 
from research ethics committees and with little governmental pronouncement on 
the issue of screening for Down’s syndrome. Nonetheless, the first routine 
screening programme for Down’s syndrome in the NHS began in February 1990 in 
Newport and Cardiff (Wales) during a one-year trial reported on three years later 
(Reynolds 2000). Reynolds (2010) notes how, then, it took just two years of 
research indicating the effectiveness of serum screening before the technique was 
introduced as an accessible test. 
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By 1998, many health authorities in the UK offered prenatal screening for Down’s 
syndrome via serum screening for all parents-to-be regardless of age, although 
some only offered age-restricted screening, that is, only for mothers-to-be aged 
thirty-five and above (Reynolds 2000). Most authorities offering screening used a 
double screen which, rather than relying on maternal age or a history of a 
previously afflicted born or unborn baby (Shaw et al. 2008), involved measuring 
two biochemical markers in the second trimester: alpha-fetoprotein (AFP)13 and 
total or free-beta human chorionic gonadotrophin (hCG)14. Regardless of the 
screening method, parents-to-be were categorised as ‘screen-positive’ (higher-
risk) or ‘screen-negative’ (lower-risk) which guided decisions around diagnostic 
testing (Buckley and Buckley 2008). The performance of Down’s syndrome 
screening was established by measuring a detection rate and false-positive rate. 
The false-positive rate was crucial since it indicates the number of unaffected 
pregnancies subjected to potentially dangerous diagnostic tests (Harrison and 
Goldie 2006)15. However, due to the low detection rate and poor cost-effectiveness 
of the double screen (Shaw et al. 2008), the triple screen was developed to identify 
mothers-to-be who should be offered diagnostic testing to detect Down’s 
syndrome or another chromosomal condition (Reynolds 2010)16. The triple screen, 
first described in the UK in 1988 but implemented years later (Canick et al. 1988), 
improved the double screen by measuring ue3 (unconjugated estriol)17, alongside 
AFG and hCG, and offered an improved detection rate and reduced false-positive 
rate (Wald et al. 1988). 
 
The double screen was initially opted for over the triple screen since the slight 
increment in detection, without increasing the false-positive rate, was viewed as 
unworthy of additional costs (Reynolds 2010). However, the triple screen was 
more widely used between 2000 and 2010, becoming the most commonly offered 
                                                     
13 Alpha-fetoprotein (AFP) is a protein in humans encoded by the AFP gene produced during foetal 
development. 
14 Total or free-beta human chorionic gonadotrophin (hCG) is a hormone produced following 
pregnancy conception. 
15 The selection of a cut-off is decided by a choice between affected live births prevented and 
unaffected unborn babies lost (Buckley and Buckley 2008). 
16 A large body of literature reports many discrepancies in the performance of different screening 
programmes, with a range of projects using distinct cut-off rates and often analysing a small 
amount of data (Harrison and Goldie 2006; Malone et al. 2005). 
17 Estriol is one of the main three oestrogens produced by the human body. 
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prenatal screening for Down’s syndrome technique in the UK (NHS FASP 2012). 
This emerged despite developing the quadruple screen which involves measuring 
the same biochemical markers as the triple screen plus inhibin-A18 around 15-18 
weeks into a pregnancy. This was reported to have an improved detection rate and 
false-positive rate in comparison with the triple screen (Malone et al. 2005). In 
2006, the UK National Screening Committee (NSC) – implementing a national 
screening policy – recommended using quadruple screening for achieving a 75% 
detection rate and 3% false-positive rate for Down’s syndrome at a cut-off rate of 1 
in 250 (Harrison and Goldie 2006; Wald et al. 2003). Quadruple screening did not 
initially surpass triple screening since the only assay commercially available for 
inhibin-A was not suitable for use in a laboratory owing to it being inefficiently 
stable and the intra-batch assay variation being excessive (Reynolds 2010). The 
reluctance to embrace quadruple screening fully in the UK, according to Reynolds, 
could also be attributed to diminishing returns in relation to economic cost, an 
incremental improvement of detection being less with each extra analyte being 
added, and the wishes of parents-to-be to undertake an earlier test (in the first 
trimester). Nonetheless, in more recent years, the inhibin assay has been being 
automated and so quadruple screening has subsequently been used ahead of triple 
screening in clinical practice (Harrison and Goldie 2006; Reynolds 2010). Indeed, 
triple screening has not been offered anywhere in the UK since 2012 (NHS FASP 
2012). 
 
Despite improvements in biochemical serum screening, there were calls for first 
trimester screening for Down’s syndrome to be offered in the UK, primarily 
because it was predicted it could help fulfil the NSC’s desire to develop a screening 
programme offering a 75% detection rate and 3% false-positive rate (Harrison and 
Goldie 2006). The initial development of first trimester screening for Down’s 
syndrome followed research by Nicolaides et al. (1992) and Snijders et al. (1998) 
who suggested a nuchal translucency19 measurement via an ultrasound scan could 
be used as a possible marker for the condition and other chromosomal conditions. 
 
                                                     
18 Inhibin-A is a hormone made by the placenta during a pregnancy. 
19 A nuchal translucency is the fluid thickness in the nape of an unborn baby’s neck. Enlarged fluid 
is associated with chromosomal conditions including Down’s syndrome. 
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 The first screening programme developed for the first trimester of pregnancy was 
combined screening which involved combining the results from an ultrasound scan 
and biochemical serum screening – hCG and pregnancy associated protein A 
(PAPP-A)20 – around eleven to fourteen weeks into a pregnancy. The association 
between Down’s syndrome and low levels of PAPP-A and high levels of hCG during 
the first trimester was reported during the early 1990s (Wald et al. 1992). The 
ultrasound scan involved measuring the crown rump length (CRL)21 and depth of 
the nuchal translucency. Combined screening, in sum, offered improved detection 
and false-positive rates in comparison to all methods of second trimester screening 
(Malone et al. 2005) and made early results possible since CVS could be carried out 
in the first trimester (Shaw et al. 2008).  
 
In the 2000s, whilst other screening methods were developed (serum integrated 
screening, integrated screening, contingent screening), these were not widely used 
in the UK (Shaw et al. 2008). Despite often promising higher detection rates and 
lower false-positive rates, such techniques were overlooked since they were costly, 
could delay results since it requires collecting data in both trimesters, required 
parents-to-be to attend the clinic on at least two occasions (risking dropouts), and 
could involve withholding information about a first-trimester result, a move often 
described as unethical practice (Reynolds 2010). In the UK, Down’s syndrome 
screening standards imposed by the NHS Foetal Anomaly Screening Programme 
(NHS FASP 2012), an organisation dedicated to ensuring access to a uniform 
screening programme, claims screening should currently be carried out using the 
combined screen, serum integrated screen, or integrated screen in the first 
trimester or the quadruple screen in the second semester (Reynolds 2010). An 
annual report produced by NHS FASP (2012) suggests in 2011 and 2012, the 
primary screening method offered by hospitals in England alone was combined 
screening (86% and 96% respectively), with parents-to-be booking too late for 
combined screening (first trimester) alternatively being offered a quadruple 
screen (second trimester). 
                                                     
20 Pregnancy associated protein A (PAPP-A) is the largest pregnancy associated protein produced 
by the embryo and placenta. 
21 Crown rump length (CRL) is the measurement of the length of unborn babies from the top of the 
head to the bottom of the buttocks. 
37 
 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have outlined a short socio-history of Down’s syndrome and 
screening/testing for the condition. I show how Down’s syndrome has become a 
critical site in antenatal care and how it has been drawn into reproductive politics 
through entwining social (institutionalisation and deinstitutionalisation, eugenics), 
medical (the growth of genetics, amniocentesis, screening), and legal (abortion law 
reforms, legal cases) developments. By studying Down’s syndrome historically, I 
highlight the practices and values we now take-for-granted. The likes of Lejeune 
and Penrose were unlikely to be aware in the first instance of the potential their 
findings had for detecting and terminating unborn babies with Down’s syndrome. 
However, this is the situation antenatal medicine now finds itself in, with prenatal 
screening and testing for Down’s syndrome being established as an accepted and 
routine component of antenatal care. 
 
DOWN’S SYNDROME SCREENING/TESTING: 
FREYMARSH AND SPRINGTOWN 
Following a short socio-history of Down’s syndrome and screening/testing for the 
condition, I begin this section by describing the origins and possible symptoms of 
the condition itself. I subsequently outline current screening and testing practices 
in Freymarsh and Springtown and how maternal age is implicated in an increased 
chance of having a baby with Down’s syndrome. To conclude, I contextualise my 
study and draw attention to current practices establishing Down’s syndrome as a 
critical site of sociological attention. 
 
Down’s syndrome: the condition 
The human body is made up of cells containing genes. Genes are enclosed within 
thread-like structures referred to as chromosomes, that is, the packages of genetic 
material or deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) stored within the nucleus of each cell. 
These contain instructions of how the body’s cells develop, eye colour, and the sex 
of the unborn baby (NHS 2013). A human usually has forty-six chromosomes 
organised into twenty-three pairs (twenty-two autosomal pairs and one pair of sex 
chromosomes) inherited from the mother-to-be and father-to-be. Genetic diversity 
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among different people is generated via the exchange of genetic material between 
homologous chromosomes (meiosis I) and the separation of chromosome pairs 
(meiosis II). When an egg becomes fertilised to create a new cell called a zygote, 
new pairs of chromosomes are created in which each parent-to-be contributes one 
chromosome to each pair. On occasions, an error in meiosis (non-disjunction) 
occurs in which there is a failure of the chromosomal pairs to separate. This causes 
an imbalance of chromosomes in the gamete (‘aneuploidy’). A cell losing a 
chromosome (‘monosomy’) is likely to be lethal. This may not always be the case 
when a cell gains a chromosome (‘trisomy’), causing three copies of a chromosome 
instead of a usual pair (CARIS 2012). 
 
According to CARIS (2012), trisomies are the most common anomaly in which 
there are more or less than forty-six chromosomes. One such trisomy is Down’s 
syndrome (or Trisomy 21) caused by the presence of an extra chromosome on the 
twenty-first pairing. It is the most common aneuploidy detected during pregnancy 
followed by Edward’s syndrome (Trisomy 18)22 and Patau’s syndrome (Trisomy 
13)23. Down’s syndrome is an incurable chromosomal condition which occurs in 
one to two of every 1,000 live births in the UK (NHS 2013). It is one of the most 
common genetic causes of learning disability and the National Down Syndrome 
Cytogenetic Register (NDSCR) reports most people with the condition (94% of all 
cases) have Full Trisomy 21 Down’s syndrome, whilst 4% of cases have 
Translocation Down’s syndrome and 2% of cases have Mosaic Down’s syndrome. 
Children with Translocation Trisomy 21 have extra chromosome 21 material 
attached to another chromosome (Buckley and Bird 2002). Only Translocation 
Down’s syndrome can be hereditary. Some people do not have symptoms of 
Translocation Down’s syndrome but they can be a ‘carrier’, meaning they have 
                                                     
22 Edward’s syndrome (Trisomy 18) is a chromosomal condition affecting three of every 10,000 live 
births. It is caused by an extra copy of chromosome 18 in each cell. There are three forms of 
Edward’s syndrome: complete trisomy, mosaic trisomy, and partial trisomy. According to NHS FASP 
(2012), complete trisomy 18 is fatal. Babies with partial and mosaic trisomy 18 may survive to 
adulthood but this is rare. The condition is associated with intellectual disability and physiological 
impairment, although the prognosis of a partial or mosaic trisomy 18 is less clear. 
23 Patau’s syndrome (Trisomy 13) is a chromosomal condition affecting two of every 10,000 live 
births. It is caused by an extra copy of chromosome 13 in each cell. There are three forms of Patau’s 
syndrome: complete trisomy, mosaic trisomy, and partial trisomy. According to NHS FASP (2012), 
complete trisomy 13 is fatal. Babies with partial and mosaic trisomy 13 may survive to adulthood 
but this is rare. The condition is associated with intellectual disability and physiological 
impairment, although the prognosis of a partial or mosaic trisomy 13 is less clear. 
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altered genes triggering the condition in their unborn children (NHS 2013). The 
risk of ‘passing on’ the condition depends on the sex of the carrier (with mothers-
to-be more likely to ‘pass’ the condition onto a child). Mosaic Down’s syndrome is 
caused by the mis-division of chromosomes after fertilisation during early cell 
division. Whilst children with Full Trisomy 21 have an extra copy of chromosome 
21 in every cell, children with Mosaic Trisomy 21 have forty-six chromosomes and 
some cell lines with an extra chromosome and some cells lines which are not 
similarly affected (Buckley and Bird 2002).  
 
Whilst symptoms of the condition vary between each case, common symptoms of 
Down’s syndrome include an upward eye slant, large tongue, clinodactyly of the 
fifth finger, single or transverse palm crease, sandal gap toe, excess skin on the 
back of the neck, a flat profile of the face, brushfield spots, hypotonia, and umbilical 
hernia (CARIS 2012). People with condition may also have impaired cognitive 
abilities, a reduced IQ, learning difficulties, shortened limbs, poor muscle tone, and 
restricted physical growth. They may also be susceptible to colds, ear infections, 
bronchitis, and pneumonia. Females with Down’s syndrome can have fertility 
problems and males with the condition are frequently infertile (CARIS 2012). The 
outlook of life for a person with Down’s syndrome can vary widely depending on if 
a child develops other serious health conditions such as sight and hearing loss, 
intestinal problems, hearing and vision problems, thyroid complications, dementia, 
Alzheimer’s disease, and leukaemia (Buckley and Buckley 2008; NHS 2013). 
Around 50% of children with Down’s syndrome have a congenital heart defect and 
around 60% of this group require treatment in hospital. By contrast, the condition 
appears to offer protection against some cancers and cardiovascular disease 
(Buckley and Buckley 2008). Importantly, people with Down’s syndrome may 
experience few or several of these complications (NHS 2013). 
 
There is no ‘cure’ for the condition but Down’s syndrome is frequently demarcated 
as ‘not lethal’ (Ivry 2009), meaning individuals with the condition are likely to 
survive childbirth and can enjoy a good ‘quality of life’ (Buckley and Buckley 2008; 
CARIS 2012; NHS FASP 2012). NHS (2013) reports there are a number of ways in 
which children with the condition can develop into ‘healthy and fulfilled 
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individuals’ who can achieve independence and enjoy access to healthcare and 
early intervention programmes. Similarly, Buckley and Buckley (2008) suggest 
support for people with the condition is much better than in earlier years and their 
current medical needs are largely understood; several healthcare professionals 
may monitor and treat people with Down’s syndrome including physiotherapists, 
speech and language therapists, ophthalmologists, occupational therapists, general 
practitioners, audiologists, dieticians, paediatricians, and cardiologists (NHS 2013). 
Adults with Down’s syndrome can pursue further education, gain employment, and 
live independently (Buckley and Buckley 2008). Additionally, according to Buckley 
and Buckley (2008: 84), people with the condition are rarely anti-social or violent 
and whilst they can experience challenges, they can ‘make positive contributions to 
family and community life and often form loving and caring relationships’. 
 
However, whilst the progress of people with the condition has been remarkable in 
the past fifty years, the prognosis of the condition is uncertain and it is impossible 
to predict how a child will be affected (NHS 2013). Nonetheless, due to medical 
advancements and better knowledge regarding treatment and care, children born 
with Down’s syndrome – most of which are diagnosed postnatally – are likely to 
survive beyond sixty years today (CARIS 2012). This has significantly increased 
from nine years old in 1929, twelve years old in 1946, twenty-five years old in 
1983, and forty-nine years old in 1997 (Penrose 1949; Yang et al. 2002). 
 
The object of screening at Freymarsh and Springtown 
In the UK, all parents-to-be are offered prenatal screening for Down’s syndrome 
which cannot establish a diagnosis but can assist reproductive decision-making 
regarding diagnostic testing (NHS 2013). Screening should take place in a window 
of ten to twenty weeks during a pregnancy although the preferred period of time is 
by the end of the first trimester (thirteen weeks and six days gestation). During my 
fieldwork at two institutions – Freymarsh (NHS hospital) and Springtown 
(privately-funded clinic) – two screening methods were used: quadruple screening 
(Freymarsh) and combined screening (Springtown). The quadruple screen, using a 
risk threshold of 1 in 150, can detect approximately 75% of affected pregnancies 
with a 3% false-positive rate. In contrast, combined screening, also using a risk 
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threshold of 1 in 150, can detect around 85% of affected pregnancies with a lower 
false-positive rate (CARIS 2012). 
 
Irrespective of the screening method, parents-to-be receive a ‘risk factor’, namely a 
numerical ratio establishing the odds of an unborn baby having the condition. Both 
screening methods are based on the same mathematical principle and work by 
combining a prior probability – maternal age at expected date of delivery – with a 
likelihood ratio based on a range of factors such as blood proteins, hormones, and 
a nuchal translucency measurement (Reynolds 2010). Taken together, these create 
an estimate of whether the unborn baby has Down’s syndrome.  At Freymarsh and 
Springtown, this is calculated using computer software combining a risk factor 
with other characteristics including maternal age, weight, gestation, ethnicity, 
pregnancy history, smoking habits, the number of unborn babies, and whether it is 
an assisted conception. At Springtown, these factors are combined with the size of 
a nuchal translucency24. Parents-to-be receive three risk factors at Freymarsh: a 
background risk (based on age, ethnicity, previous history, etc.), a biochemistry 
risk (based on measurements of four biochemical markers), and an adjusted risk 
(based on combining a background risk and biochemistry risk). At Springtown, 
parents-to-be receive these three risk factors alongside an ultrasound risk (based 
on the nuchal translucency size alone). In Freymarsh and Springtown, only the 
adjusted risk factor is referred to when delivering a result. In addition, whilst only 
a risk factor for Down’s syndrome is given to parents-to-be in Freymarsh, parents-
to-be in Springtown also receive risk factors for Edward’s syndrome and Patau’s 
syndrome. This reflects a shift in modern biomedical practice from the actual to 
the potential, redefining the idea of ‘the patient’ to include those ‘at risk’ alongside 
those who are ‘sick’ (Gross and Shuval 2008; Scott et al. 2005). 
 
In Freymarsh and Springtown, the cut-off point for this categorisation is 1:150 (a 1 
in 150 risk of having a baby with Down’s syndrome). If parents-to-be receive a risk 
factor numerically higher than 1:150 (e.g. 1:250), they are categorized as ‘lower-
risk’ and receive a letter notifying them of this information (at Springtown, they 
                                                     
24 Some institutions will also take account of the presence/absence of a nasal bone, another marker 
of Down’s syndrome and other genetic conditions (Cicero et al. 2001). However, Springtown do not 
usually offer this service owing to a lack of training among sonographers. 
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receive a telephone call). At this point, parents-to-be are not offered or advised to 
have further treatment other than an ultrasound scan at twenty weeks to check for 
potential problems (an ‘anomaly scan’). In contrast, if parents-to-be receive a risk 
factor numerically lower than 1:150 (e.g. 1:100), they are categorised as ‘higher-
risk’ and diagnostic testing (amniocentesis/CVS) is offered to prove or refute a 
suspected diagnosis. Around three to five percent of pregnant women in England 
and Wales consenting to screening receive a higher-risk result (NHS FASP 2012) 
and according to Buckley and Buckley (2008), between 1 in 20 and 1 in 30 higher-
risk (screen-positive) results detect an unborn baby with Down’s syndrome. For a 
timeline and flowchart of Down’s syndrome screening in Freymarsh/Springtown 
and the UK more generally, see Appendices 1-325. 
 
The object of testing at Freymarsh and Springtown 
Diagnostic testing for Down’s syndrome involves undertaking an amniocentesis or 
CVS.  During CVS, a small sample of placenta is taken either by passing a small 
needle through the abdomen of a mother-to-be or by passing a small tube through 
a vagina and the neck of a womb (NHS 2013). During an amniocentesis, a small 
sample of amniotic fluid is taken by passing a fine needle through the abdomen of a 
mother-to-be and drawing the fluid out using a syringe. CVS is carried out in the 
first trimester after ten weeks of a pregnancy and an amniocentesis is commonly 
carried out in the second trimester between fifteen and twenty weeks gestation 
(NHS 2013). An amniocentesis can also be carried out late in a pregnancy to check 
the unborn baby’s wellbeing and potentially diagnose a condition (although not for 
the purpose of termination). Amniocentesis and CVS provide an accurate diagnosis 
but have a few possible complications including miscarriage, infection, heavy 
bleeding, premature labour, and postural deformities. The risk of miscarriage 
following amniocentesis is 1% and is 2% following CVS (Buckley and Buckley 
2008). The move toward first trimester screening, together with detecting more 
unborn babies who may not have naturally survived to term than biochemical 
serum screening, may trigger an increase in the miscarriage of unborn babies who 
do not have Down’s syndrome since CVS, which has a higher-risk of miscarriage 
                                                     
25 Suspicions of Down’s syndrome can also be established during an ‘anomaly scan’ performed at 
twenty weeks gestation. The absence of a nasal bone, an increased nuchal translucency, cardiac 
defects, or an echogenic bowel can indicate a potential diagnosis of the condition. 
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than amniocentesis, can also be performed in the first trimester (Buckley and 
Buckley 2008). Diagnostic testing is offered because of an indication of a condition, 
previous pregnancy complications, a family history of a particular condition, and 
an advanced maternal age (although this last option is currently not common in UK 
medicine). 
 
After diagnostic testing is completed, samples are sent to a cytogenetic laboratory. 
Cytogenetics is concerned with the function and structure of cells, especially 
chromosomes. Two results are possible following testing: a QF-PCR (quantitative 
fluorescence polymerase chain reaction) result and a full karyotype. A QF-PCR 
result includes amplification, detection, and analysis of chromosome-specific DNA 
sequences. This provides a conclusive diagnosis for Down’s syndrome, Edward’s 
syndrome, Patau’s syndrome, and sex chromosome ‘aneuploidies’ such as Turner 
syndrome26 or Klinefelter’s syndrome27. A diagnosis of cystic hygroma might also 
be possible via QF-PCR testing. Since QF-PCR misses some chromosomal 
conditions, it is followed by a full karyotype which involves analysing all 
chromosomes in detail at the microscopic level including deletions and 
duplications, translocations, mosaicisms, and inversions and insertions. This 
reveals chromosomal conditions other than those specified above together with 
any abnormal genes. Although a QF-PCR result is usually available in less than two 
days following a procedure, a full karyotype is available approximately two weeks 
after this period. 
 
After a result is established, this information is returned to professionals who must 
deliver this news to parents-to-be. If a diagnosis is established, counselling is 
offered to parents-to-be before a decision is made about whether to continue or 
terminate a pregnancy. The main objective of screening is to identify women in 
whom a risk factor is deemed high enough to warrant offering them diagnostic 
testing.  
 
 
                                                     
26 Turner syndrome is a genetic disorder which only affects females. A female with the condition 
will have all or part of one X chromosome missing. 
27 Klinefelter’s syndrome is the set of symptoms resulting from extra X genetic material in males. 
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Maternal age and Down’s syndrome 
While it is not fully understood why some babies are conceived with abnormal 
copies of chromosomes, maternal age is the only clear factor which increases the 
chance of having a baby with Down’s syndrome (NHS 2013). Whilst the reason for 
this relationship remains unclear, what is observable is despite higher pregnancy 
rates among mothers under thirty-five years old (ONS 2011), more babies with 
Down syndrome are born to mothers aged thirty-five and above (CARIS 2012). 
This could reflect the increasing numbers of women delaying childbearing for 
reasons including increased participation in higher education and the labour force, 
the rising opportunity costs of childbearing, labour market uncertainty, housing 
factors, and instability of partnerships (ONS 2011). Nevertheless, according to a 
handbook published for professionals at Freymarsh, a mother-to-be who is sixteen 
years old has a maternal age risk of 1:1509, that is, there is a 1 in 1509 chance the 
unborn baby has Down’s syndrome. This increases to 1:1476 at the maternal age of 
twenty, 1:1339 at twenty-five, and 1:937 at thirty. At the age of thirty-five, a 
maternal age risk prior to any form of screening is 1:352. This increases to 1:266 at 
thirty-six, 1:199 at thirty-seven, 1:148 at thirty-eight, 1:111 at thirty-nine, and 1:85 
at forty. At the age of forty-five, the maternal age risk is 1:35. 
 
A report conducted by the National Down’s Syndrome Cytogenetic Register 
(NDSCR) claims in 2011 in England and Wales, 119 mothers-to-be aged twenty-
four and below (6% of all cases) received a prenatal or postnatal diagnosis of 
Down’s syndrome (Morris and Springett 2013). This increased to 183 for mothers-
to-be aged twenty-five to twenty-nine (10% of all cases), 331 for mothers-to-be 
aged thirty to thirty-four (18% of all cases), 622 for mothers-to-be aged thirty-five 
to thirty-nine (33% of all cases), 450 for mothers-to-be aged forty to forty-four 
(24% of all cases), and 50 for mothers-to-be aged forty-five and above (3% of all 
cases)28. The mean age of mothers with a prenatal diagnosis was 36.7 compared to 
34.4 of mothers with a postnatal diagnosis. According to the NDSCR report, 64% 
(N=1122) of mothers with a known age and who received a diagnosis of Down’s 
syndrome were thirty-five years old and above (Morris and Springett 2013). 
 
                                                     
28 According to Morris and Springett (2013), 118 (6% of all cases) cases are missing. 
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Summary 
In this section of the chapter, I have described Down’s syndrome, its (possible) 
symptoms, how it is screened and testing for at Freymarsh and Springtown, and 
how maternal age is associated with the condition. Alongside the socio-history 
provided at the beginning of the chapter, this section has identified how screening 
for the condition has become a routine practice in NHS medicine. By outlining the 
history and recent developments regarding Down’s syndrome and its intersection 
with medical and scientific worlds, I have recognised how a mundane procedure 
has been widely accepted and embraced by the public and medical communities, 
particularly Freymarsh and Springtown. After identifying how Down’s syndrome 
screening represents a key site for sociological attention, I spend chapter four 
situating the study by discussing my entry to the field, how data was collected, 
fieldwork, data analysis, and both ethnographic and my study’s limitations. 
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Chapter Four 
Situating the Study (Notes on Method) 
 
This chapter situates my study by discussing my entry to the field, what/how data 
was collected, the fieldwork process, analysing data, and the limitations of my 
study and of ethnography more generally. I begin by reflecting on gaining access 
and NHS ethical approval by drawing on the notion of ‘preliminary field-work’ 
(Caine et al. 2009: 491), a supplement to Cohen’s (1992) ‘post-fieldwork fieldwork’ 
concept. In what follows, I outline my field entry and how data were collected 
during my stay at Freymarsh, a large NHS teaching hospital in a metropolitan area, 
and Springtown, a privately-funded fertility clinic in an affluent area. I reflect on 
how I was positioned by professionals during fieldwork, that is, my identity-work 
both performed and ascribed. I subsequently describe my data analysis strategy 
based on Clarke’s (2003: 571) ‘situational analyses’, an approach holding clear 
links with the theoretical tropes outlined in chapter three. Finally, I flesh out the 
underlying problems of my research and, in grander terms, the ethnographic craft. 
 
In sum, I sketch out my approach and recognise self-conscious reflexivity – urging 
us to think critically about roles and relationships, about ethics and responsibilities 
– as a fundamental feature of ethnography. Reflexivity should not be confused with 
self-disclosure. Whilst self-disclosure concerns confusions and repentant accounts 
constructed through acts of contrition, reflexivity refers to objectifying the subject 
of our attention by analysing the researcher’s own thinking and how this is the 
product of complex social, political, cultural, and moral relations (Desmond 2007). 
Rather than burying my fieldwork experiences within a methodological epilogue as 
an apologetic afterthought, I interweave them with a discussion of my methods of 
choice, recognising this as a valuable statement about the ethnographic craft 
(Smith and Kornblum 1996).  
 
Constructing a site 
Data are drawn from my fieldwork at two settings: Freymarsh and Springtown. 
Before describing how data was collected, I explain how I gained access to such 
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privileged environments. To begin, I initially planned to conduct research only in 
Freymarsh (I explain access to Springtown later) which was selected for two 
reasons. First, the hospital has a large influx of people from a variety of social and 
ethnic backgrounds. Second, and most importantly, Down’s syndrome screening 
was offered to parents-to-be here. In order to secure access to Freymarsh, I had to 
undertake NHS ethical approval. This involves being granted or declined ethical 
clearance for a study by an independent collection of people from medical and 
nonmedical backgrounds. 
 
Ethnographic research has a considerable history in medical settings (Atkinson 
1995; Bosk 1979; Latimer 2000; Silverman 1987; Strong 1979). However, access 
to NHS settings to carry out ethnographic work is a difficult, lengthy, and complex 
exercise (Reed 2007). The ethnographer must know, respect, and comply with the 
rules of the field prior to official entry, with the success of research depending on 
outside forces such as other people accepting the project as meaningful. Attaining 
ethical approval is one instance in which an ethnographer must perfect their ‘art’ 
(Wolcott 2005). Extending beyond information sheets, box-ticking, and attending 
meetings, all fixtures of the ethics landscape, securing access begins well before 
navigating the treacherous waters of the application process. It is accomplished in 
interactions with medical and nonmedical professionals, recruiting gatekeepers, 
and engaging with the necessary literature, all of which precede the juridical 
review. This spadework reveals how fieldwork begins long before entrée is 
secured and ‘field data’ is gathered. One may consider Rabinow’s (1977: 11) 
reflections on his fieldwork in Morocco: 
 
‘In Morocco only several days and already I was set up in a hotel, an 
obvious remnant of colonialism, was having my coffee in a garden, and 
had little to do but start ‘my’ fieldwork. Actually, it was not exactly clear 
to me what that meant, except that I supposed I would wander around 
Sefrou a bit. After all, now that I was in the field, everything was 
fieldwork’. 
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Whilst Rabinow’s contention that ‘everything was fieldwork’ certainly holds sway, 
the essence of fieldwork is revealed by intent as opposed to location.  For Wolcott 
(2005: 58), fieldwork constitutes a form of inquiry in which one is ‘immersed 
personally in the ongoing social activities of some individual or group for the 
purposes of research’ in order to acquire a level of understanding to share with 
outsiders. Accepting this definition, ethnographic fieldwork is not consigned to 
data collection but begins much before this often prolonged process. One of the 
most vexing tasks for researchers has been to establish the exact definition of 
ethnography. It is an ambiguous term, having been simultaneously viewed as a 
means and an end or both process and product. At times, ethnography has been 
used interchangeably with ‘participant observation’ and ‘fieldwork’ in reference to 
the empirical observation of people’s lives broadly defined as ‘ways of life’ (Denzin 
1997). However, ethnography should not be confined to concerns solely over 
methodological preferences; it is both a practice and an emergent relation to the 
domain of study. Whilst the data collection process is certainly one of its key 
features, ethnography is processual, accomplished in both writing and rewriting 
our tales from the field (Clifford and Marcus 1986). To interpret ethnography 
exclusively within methodological confines is to limit understanding by incorrectly 
focusing entirely on collecting ‘field data’. Consider the following definition of 
ethnography provided by Reeves et al. (2008: 512): 
 
‘Ethnography is the study of social interactions, behaviours, and 
perceptions that occur within groups, teams, organisations, and 
communities […] The central aim of ethnography is to provide rich, 
holistic insights into people’s views and actions, as well as the nature 
(that is, sights, sounds) of the location they inhabit, through the 
collection of detailed observations and interviews’. 
 
This common description fails to account for ethnographic beginnings, that is, the 
practical and personal labour preceding entry into the field, labour which we must 
distinguish as data equal to that gathered during fieldwork; ‘an individual presents 
a finished product to an audience, it is that what is judged [...] what is hidden is the 
long journey leading up to it' (Goffman 1959:52). Caine et al. (2009: 491) describe 
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this process as ‘preliminary field-work’, referring to the decisive early stages of 
research involving – prior to developing official protocols and ethics applications – 
‘exploration, reflexivity, creativity, mutual exchange and interaction through the 
establishment of research relationships with local people’. In outlining my own 
preliminary fieldwork prior to collecting field data at Freymarsh, I recognise the 
importance of gatekeepers, making connections, and understanding the culture of 
the setting in the ongoing and partial process of fieldwork (Caine et al. 2009). This 
allows me to construct the subject of interest at the boundaries. Without relying on 
preconceptions of the field or where I should be conducting research, I discuss 
how particular people enrol me into their world prior to collecting ‘field data’ in 
various ways (Latimer 1997). In what follows, I describe the mundane efforts and 
struggles preceding my entry into Freymarsh (and later Springtown). 
 
Preliminary field-work: the application process 
My study began by my doctoral supervisors organising a meeting with Dr Huston, a 
paediatric geneticist in Freymarsh. At this point, I had vague and ambitious plans 
for exactly what I intended to study. In the meeting, advice was tendered, naive 
objectives were suitably quashed, and recommendations were either accepted or 
politely rejected. A week later, Dr Huston organised a visit for me to meet Dorothy, 
a member of a governing body establishing policies for antenatal practice. Again, 
suggestions were offered and considered, with Dorothy expressing some concerns 
which I either accepted or rejected. Dorothy was nothing short of enthusiastic and 
generous with her time but the meeting was overwhelming and I soon realised 
how little I knew about the antenatal process. Only after these meetings, and a few 
weeks of intensive labour, did I feel confident enough to approach healthcare 
professionals with a relatively concrete idea for comment. Dorothy’s attempts to 
enrol me in her agenda – she felt a study exclusively on Down’s syndrome 
screening would be too narrow and so recommended researching prenatal 
screening more generally – accentuate how a researcher must grapple, negotiate, 
and articulate the trials and tribulations of both their own and other peoples’ 
agenda. Nonetheless, Dorothy arranged for me to attend a training event organised 
by the Down’s Syndrome Association (DSA) for assisting professionals in 
delivering information about Down’s syndrome and screening for the condition in 
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antenatal care. In addition, I began to make contact with healthcare professionals, 
recommended by Dorothy, who could assist me with my endeavours. Three of 
these contacts – Jennifer, Carol, and Dr Karman – were indispensable figures in my 
preliminary field-work. Jennifer, a PhD student and former clinical geneticist, 
described her project and tendered advice about attaining NHS ethical approval. 
She claimed involving a charity organisation adds credibility to one’s application 
by soliciting (lay) user involvement. In response, I pursued and gained sponsorship 
from two charity organisations: the Down’s Syndrome Association (DSA) and 
Antenatal Results and Choices (ARC). 
 
The other two suggested contacts were Carol, the Freymarsh antenatal department 
(FAD) manager, and Dr Karman, a consultant at the Freymarsh foetal medicine 
department (FMD). I approached Carol and after two meetings, she agreed to 
support the study. I additionally approached Dr Karman who responded 
immediately and enthusiastically, claiming I was welcome to conduct research at 
Freymarsh pending successful ethical approval since it would be in the interests of 
both parents-to-be and the institution. Prior to ethical approval, Dr Karman invited 
me to attend a multi-disciplinary meeting in which many Freymarsh professionals 
(consultants, sonographers, midwives, surgeons, cardiologists, neuroscientists) 
discussed the most recent ‘cases’ in which an unborn baby or mother has been 
identified as either having, or being suspected of having, a problem. After an hour, 
the meeting ended and I accepted Dr Karman’s invitation to observe some 
consultations and ‘get a taste’ of life at FMD. Following my day spent with Dr 
Karman, I decided it would benefit my project and ethical approval application to 
receive the input of other healthcare professionals at Freymarsh. 
 
During the next six months, I met several professionals – together or separately 
and by telephone or email – such as managers, consultants, midwives, geneticists, 
and obstetric sonographers. Each offered support for the project, tendered 
guidance, established what they deemed the most suitable strategies for recruiting 
participants, and highlighted their concerns meriting attention, in their view, in 
antenatal care. Many professionals also proposed colleagues who may bestow 
advice regarding, and participate in, my study. This process had a snowballing 
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effect in which I gathered a glut of suggestions regarding what to research and the 
best means of doing so. This was vital for formulating my final research protocol.  
 
One recommendation from professionals was that I should recruit someone within 
Freymarsh to champion my study since the NHS research ethics committee (REC) 
welcomes researchers having some level of support. Dr Karman assumed this role; 
I had my gatekeeper. Johnson (1990: 10) describes how gatekeepers are often 
selected on the basis of their attributes; access to privileged knowledge, for 
instance, can be a function of ‘social status, position in an organisation, or 
comprehension of cultural knowledge’. This role of the gatekeeper – as an architect 
of trust and linchpin of a cohort – has been well-rehearsed within qualitative 
inquiry (Whyte 1955) yet their importance cannot be overestimated. Although 
access to hospital settings may not always be problematic, those unable or 
unwilling to go through gatekeepers may find it difficult (Pope 2005). Forging 
alliances with powerful gatekeepers in the organisation, together with influencing 
how group members perceive the research and enhancing the credibility of the 
project (and researcher), lessens the chance of an NHS ethics application rebuttal 
by enlisting the help of someone better placed in order to ‘play the ethics games’ 
(Reed 2007). As an ‘outside ethnographer’, namely as someone with no medical 
background and limited ties to Freymarsh, developing a level of intimacy, rather 
than being accrued through accumulating hours in the field, must be ‘cultivated 
before the fieldwork proper begins’ (Desmond 2007: 285). I concluded Dr 
Karman’s sponsorship, acquired in my preliminary field-work, would undoubtedly 
ease this process. 
 
Before, during, and after contacting and/or meeting with key contacts in the field, I 
developed my documents for submission to the NHS REC. I offered a breakdown of, 
among other things, what data would be collected, where this would be collected, 
how many site visits were expected, how participants would be approached, and 
how many participants would be recruited (Appendices 4-8). Completing the 
application proved to be a trying task. Some authors have associated the difficulty 
of gaining ethical approval with rigid stipulations ill-suited to qualitative projects 
and particularly observational work being enforced (Boden et al. 2009; Bosk and 
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De Vries 2004; Dingwall 2006; Pope and Mays 1995), although Hedgecoe (2008, 
2012) disputes such claims. However, my research was approved pending minor 
amendments a few months after submission. The application culminated in a REC 
meeting (September 2011) in which questions were asked, and a decision was 
made, by people from medical and nonmedical backgrounds about the proposed 
study. My own meeting lasted fifteen minutes. Corrections were made following 
some minor concerns being raised and after resubmission in early November 
2011, approval was granted two weeks later. 
 
Fieldwork 
After gaining ethical approval, I made contact with Dr Karman who identified a day 
to begin collecting field data at Freymarsh. On this day, we discussed my research 
and what I intended to analyse. I provided some general areas of interest and Dr 
Karman introduced me to some midwives in the Freymarsh antenatal department 
(FAD). The midwives and Dr Karman explained that FAD is essentially the ‘home’ 
of Down’s syndrome screening in Freymarsh. Whilst NHS ethical approval was 
based largely on producing a formulaic and rigid protocol, I decided to enter the 
field with some flexible research interests, intended as a guideline rather than 
fixed stipulations, to guide initial observations. As Whyte (1955: 280) claims: 
 
‘I am convinced that the actual evolution of research ideas does not take 
place in accord with the formal statements we read on research method. 
The ideas grow up in part out of our immersion in the data and out of the 
whole process of living’. 
 
Whyte’s contentions correspond to my own approach. Ethnographers frequently 
enter the field as if it is pre-constructed. However, for Latimer (2008a), this is 
problematic since the field is a lived as well as a political and contested space, that 
is, it is experienced by people in very specific ways. Ethnographic accounts often 
treat the field as ‘existing’ (Latimer 2003) and people as ‘cultural dopes’ (Garfinkel 
1967). This risks making a Procrustean bed for data, imposing an unwarranted 
order drawn from an analyst’s own interpretations about wider structures and 
context (Horlick-Jones and Prado 2009). 
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As such, I reject the notion that Down’s syndrome screening is self-evident or an 
effect of things which are given in the world. Instead, I performed a break from my 
own knowledge gathered during preliminary field-work and embraced the idea of 
Down’s syndrome screening as a practice fragmented across different spaces. This 
epitomises Marcus’ (1995: 95) description of ‘multi-sited ethnography’ in which 
ethnography moves from its conventional single site location to multiple sites of 
observations crosscutting and fracturing dichotomies such as local/global and 
micro/macro. Reformulating the micro-macro puzzle, Callon and Latour (1981) 
claim only micro-actors associating with other micro-actors construct networks. 
What we call a ‘global economy’, for instance, is a network of a large number of 
local economies. Conceiving of micro-macro in dynamic terms, they maintain an 
analyst cannot distinguish between macro-actors (institutions, organisations, 
social classes, states) and micro-actors (individuals, groups, families) on the basis 
of their dimensions. They are all the ‘same size’ (1981: 279), the difference 
between them brought about by the power relations and the construction of 
networks escaping our attention if we assume a priori that macro-actors are bigger 
to, superior to, and more complicated than, micro-actors; ‘it is no more difficult to 
send tanks into Kabul than to dial 999’ (1981: 299). I suggest, therefore, with 
Callon and Latour, an integrated micro-macro approach should be embraced by 
sociologists, with ‘multi-sited ethnography’ providing a means through which this 
can be accomplished; the macro, in turn, is always local and specific. 
 
By ‘tracking’ (Marcus 1995: 95) Down’s syndrome screening inside and outside the 
clinic walls, I am able to map its trajectory (Latimer 2008b). This reflects how the 
body in modern medical practice is fragmented and transformed into different 
‘representations’ across sites (Atkinson 1995: 88). During fieldwork, I entered 
consultation rooms, offices, laboratories, hospital meetings, seminars, public 
symposiums, and several sites where Down’s syndrome screening is ‘done’ 
(Garfinkel 1967). However, the vast majority of my fieldwork was spent observing 
the ‘routine activities’ (Garforth and Kerr 2010) of professionals in three places: 
Freymarsh antenatal department (FAD), Freymarsh foetal medicine department 
(FMD), and Springtown antenatal department (SAD). Crucially for my arguments 
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here, I show how conducting fieldwork at Springtown is attributable to ‘tracking’ 
over any active selection procedures. After attending FAD and FMD for one week, 
Dr Karman invited me to attend a privately-funded fertility clinic (Springtown) 
which also offered screening for Down’s syndrome. Dr Karman runs the antenatal 
department at Springtown and believed I would benefit from conducting research 
here. Thus, Springtown was constructed by Dr Karman, not me, as a key site of 
interest. 
 
Whilst carrying out fieldwork at two healthcare institutions was not my initial 
intention, it held significant benefits, the primary advantage being it allowed me to 
analyse the routines and repetitions of two settings over an extended period of 
time. In addition, it allowed me to comprehend the complexities, breadth, and 
richness of screening practices across different sites. Given recent indications that 
the NHS could be privatised (Campbell 2013), this fieldwork could take on even 
greater significance in future UK reproductive politics. Nonetheless, conducting a 
study in more than two institutions, particularly with only one researcher 
available, would have provided been overwhelming and would not have provided 
the level of detailed ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973), of explaining human actions 
with as much detail as possible, necessary for conducting this research. Limiting 
my focus to two institutions, however, provided ample time and space to formulate 
deep, rich insights into the social life of each setting. In what follows, I describe the 
three settings where I spent most of my fieldwork. 
 
Freymarsh antenatal department (FAD) 
Freymarsh is an NHS institution. Alignments to notions of welfare are considered 
one of the key features of NHS hospitals in the UK since services are essentially 
‘free at the point of delivery’ (Klein 2006: v). Access to free healthcare is viewed as 
the right of a citizen (Alderson et al. 2004) yet since the 1980s this alignment to 
welfare has been viewed as an anachronism (White et al. 2012). NHS hospital 
services have been increasingly inscribed with a political and economic rationality 
and confined by bureaucratic principles designed to achieve goals as precisely, 
unambiguously, and efficiently as possible. Rather than attempting to critique this 
rationalisation of the NHS, however, I reveal how such principles are enacted in 
55 
everyday interactions and the effect this has on both professionals and parents-to-
be in antenatal care (more on this later). 
 
Freymarsh’s antenatal department (FAD) is located near other departments such 
as the delivery suite, maternity department, FMD, early pregnancy assessment, and 
gynaecology department. On arrival at the FAD, parents-to-be are greeted by a 
large open area beginning either with a small cafe to the right or a reception desk 
directly meeting one’s gaze depending on which entrance is used. The loud and 
hectic room – professionals can experience slack periods with alternating episodes 
of chaos – is flooded with chairs frequently filled with mothers-to-be accompanied 
by both or neither partners and children. The walls are relatively drab excepting 
two television screens constantly displaying BabyTV, a channel played in antenatal 
waiting rooms nationwide, on the monitor. The channel advertises itself as sharing 
relevant information which helps parents-to-be ‘make informed decisions for the 
health, welfare, safety and happiness of both themselves and their future baby’. 
Advertised with the tagline ‘keeping you informed’, the channel includes adverts 
for baby items (e.g. cots), advice (e.g. bullet-pointed guidance for reducing the risk 
of cot death), safety advice (e.g. scalds), and video clips of breastfeeding correctly. 
Near this waiting room are nine other rooms: an office for professionals/admin 
staff, a cloakroom, a medical supplies closet, a room dedicated to staff meetings, 
and five consultation rooms (three of which contain ultrasound equipment). Whilst 
many professionals enter FAD during each shift, midwives are those primarily 
occupying this space. FAD employs around fifteen to twenty midwives (see ‘Table 
1’), three maternity care assistants (Jennifer, Michelle, Rosie), and three admin 
staff (Pauline, Whitney, Yvonne). Approximately eight to ten midwives, two 
maternity care assistants, and two admin staff work one shift. 
 
Freymarsh foetal medicine department (FMD) 
Freymarsh’s foetal medicine department (FMD) is located a short walk from FAD. 
A relatively small department, FMD is a referral unit providing a service to the 
local/regional population for those with a previous history of maternal/foetal 
conditions or whose current pregnancy requires intervention. It has close working 
links with many departments including FAD, genetics, radiology, cardiology, and 
56 
neonatology. Parents-to-be consenting to Down’s syndrome screening are referred 
here if they opt for diagnostic testing following a ‘higher-risk’ result and/or if they 
choose to terminate a pregnancy following a diagnosis. When attending FMD, 
parents-to-be enter into a small waiting room located outside of six other rooms: 
two consultation rooms (where parents-to-be receive information about their 
unborn baby and consent is gained if a procedure is undertaken), an ultrasound 
scanning room (where most procedures take place), a rarely used small office with 
space for one person, a small consultation room now used as storage space, and 
the largest office where most professionals gather. One wall in the waiting room is 
adorned with a large picture display of recently born babies with cleft lip/palate 
and other conditions (the ‘cleft board’). FMD is run by two consultants (Dr Karman 
and Dr Cassidy) and employs three head midwives (Elena, Francine, Joanna), four 
midwives (Emma, Lois, Nancy, Robyn), and one receptionist (Fiona)29. One 
consultant, one head midwife, two midwives, and one receptionist will typically 
work one shift. 
 
Springtown antenatal department (SAD) 
Springtown is a privately-funded fertility clinic located in a grand building situated 
in an affluent area. It provides a service for pregnant and non-pregnant women 
including those concerned about miscarriage, fertility, sexual health, and ovarian 
cancer. Parents-to-be attending the antenatal department (SAD) can pay for many 
ultrasound scans including early pregnancy scans, nuchal translucency scans30, 
growth/wellbeing scans, and cardiac scans. Diagnostic procedures (amniocentesis 
and CVS) can be offered although parents-to-be are recommended, if consenting to 
this test, to undertake it in the NHS (as no payment is required). On entry, clients 
approach the reception desk and are directed to the waiting area containing one 
television, ten chairs, and a water cooler. SAD is a tiny space with plain corridor 
walls adorned with pictures of both unborn and newborn babies. SAD contains 
three rooms: an ultrasound room, a bloods room, and a consultation room. The 
                                                     
29 Professionals from other departments such as cardiology, radiology, or neuroscience are called 
upon to help with certain cases. In this thesis, only four such professionals are cited: 1) Annie, a 
sonographer; 2) Jodi, a cardiac physiologist; 3) Roxanne, a sonographer; 4) Dr Torres, a 
cardiologist. They are cited as ‘Annie (FMD sonographer)’, ‘Jodi (FMD cardiac physiologist)’, 
‘Roxanne (FMD sonographer)’, and ‘Dr Torres (FMD cardiologist). 
30 Hereafter, I use the term ‘NT scan’ when referring to a nuchal translucency ultrasound scan. 
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ultrasound room, where many parents-to-be spend most of their stay in SAD, is a 
dark space containing a large ultrasound machine, two chairs, a large television 
monitor, a computer, and two photographs of water babies31. The ultrasound 
machine consists of a transducer, a central processing unit, a monitor, and a 
keyboard. The machine displays body tissue in shades of grey according to its 
density. The ultrasound scan allows for the visualisation of unborn babies and the 
measurement of their anatomy (and so the gestational age). Among other factors, 
the gestation time determined here is used for medical decision-making. 
 
The SAD employs two consultants (Dr Finley and Dr Karman), five sonographers 
(Esther, Heather, Lisa, Olivia, Sophie), four nurses (Francine, Isobel, Keri, Victoria), 
and four admin staff (Bethan, Dominique, Hannah, Juliana). One consultant or 
sonographer and one nurse will work each shift. At least two admin staff work a 
shift in an office located near SAD. The vast majority of Springtown professionals 
also work in Freymarsh. For the most part, they employ the same roles in 
Springtown as in Freymarsh even if bestowed with different titles. For example, 
Francine – a ‘nurse’ in SAD and ‘head midwife’ in FMD – performs similar roles at 
each institution (see ‘Table 1’). 
 
There are two clear or rather medically-based reasons why parents-to-be choose 
to pursue Down’s syndrome screening in Springtown (privately-funded clinic) 
rather than Freymarsh (NHS institution). First, Down’s syndrome screening in 
Springtown is promoted as more clinically accurate (i.e. better detection rate and 
lower false-positive rate) than Freymarsh. Second, parents-to-be may want to have 
Down’s syndrome screening and receive a result as early as possible, with 
Springtown offering the procedure earlier in the pregnancy than in Freymarsh. I 
am clearly simplifying complex decision-making processes here. There are likely to 
be several other justifications for consenting to Down’s syndrome screening in a 
privately-funded clinic such as parents-to-be worrying after previous pregnancy 
complications and/or pursuing more ‘personable’ care. However, earlier and more 
                                                     
31 The pictures show a young Caucasian male smiling and holding his newborn child. Both are 
photographed underwater. Lisa (SAD sonographer) explains unborn babies have a natural diving 
reflex and so avoid inhaling water into their lungs. 
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accurate results are two reasons why parents-to-be would choose to screen for 
Down’s syndrome in Springtown rather than Freymarsh. 
 
Professionals in Freymarsh and Springtown 
A table specifying each professional’s role in the Freymarsh antenatal department 
(FAD), Freymarsh foetal medicine department (FMD), and/or Springtown 
antenatal department (SAD) is provided below: 
 
Table 1: Professionals in FAD, FMD, and/or SAD 
Name FAD role FMD role SAD role 
Amy Midwife - - 
Angela Midwife - - 
Annie - Sonographer - 
Bethan - - Admin staff 
Camilla Midwife - - 
Dr Cassidy - FMD consultant - 
Dominique - - Admin staff 
Elena - Head midwife - 
Emma Midwife Midwife - 
Esther - - Sonographer 
Eve Midwife - - 
Dr Finely - - Consultant* 
Fiona - Admin staff - 
Francine  - Head midwife Nurse 
Gail Midwife - - 
Hannah - - Admin staff 
Heather - - Sonographer* 
Isobel - - Nurse 
Jennifer Maternity care assistant - - 
Joanna - Head midwife - 
Jodi - Cardiac 
physiologist 
- 
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Juliana - - Admin staff 
Dr Karman - Consultant Consultant 
Keri - - Nurse 
Lindsay Midwife - - 
Lisa Radiographer* - Sonographer 
Lois Midwife Midwife - 
Maggie Midwife - - 
Marianne Midwife - - 
Martha Midwife - - 
Michelle Maternity care assistant - - 
Nancy Midwife Midwife - 
Nicola Midwife - - 
Olivia Radiographer* - Sonographer 
Pauline Admin staff - - 
Rita Midwife - - 
Robyn - Midwife - 
Rosie Maternity care assistant - - 
Roxanne - Sonographer - 
Sophie Radiographer* - Sonographer 
Susan Midwife - - 
Tara Midwife - - 
Terri Midwife - - 
Toni Midwife - - 
Dr Torres  - Cardiologist - 
Victoria - - Nurse 
Whitney Admin staff - - 
Yvonne Admin staff - - 
 
*This professional had no major involvement in Down’s syndrome screening in the 
respective institution. 
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Collecting data 
I spent approximately one year collecting field data. Over two-hundred hours of 
observations are supplemented with document analysis (e.g. policy documentation 
and antenatal leaflets) and sixteen interviews with professionals. Whilst my 
fieldwork can be described as a triangulated approach, the crux of my data stems 
from observing the ‘front-stage’ (medical consultations, waiting rooms) and ‘back-
stage’ (offices, professional-to-professional interactions, small talk) of antenatal 
care (Goffman 1959). In his exposition of how spaces are arranged socially into 
front and back regions, Goffman (1959) explicates the spatial dimensions of 
interaction and the subsequent negotiation of roles; one might accomplish an 
identity in the presence of others during a front-stage interaction yet conduct 
themselves differently during back-stage interactions. The doctor, for instance, 
may manage and negotiate their performance by appearing empathetic in a patient 
consultation but complain to colleagues about that very patient in the (safe) back-
stage of an office. Observing the front-stage alone, as such, is a grave sampling 
error since it mistakes a part for the whole (Bosk 1992). By observing both the 
front-stage and back-stage, I reveal how the front-stage of a consultation is only 
one component of Down’s syndrome screening and is not, on its own, a microcosm 
for all aspects of medical work (Atkinson 1995). 
 
Selecting observations as my primary method of gathering data is grounded in the 
theoretical foundations identified in chapter two. Rather than gathering stories via 
interviews alone, my strategy of entering the field and tracking Down’s syndrome 
screening is grounded particularly in ethnomethodology. The approach is often 
sceptical of methods and claims abstracted from the lived experience and ordinary 
world of people (Garfinkel 1967). Ethnography and particularly observational 
data, for ethnomethodologists, are viewed as the best means through which one 
can analyse people’s methods and accounts (Garfinkel 2002; ten Have 2004), that 
is, how social activities are done within interaction and how social order is made 
‘observable-and-reportable’ in such interactions relative to their practical 
purposes (Garfinkel 1967: 1). In sum, I selected observations as my main method 
for collecting field data since I was guided by an interest in producing an in-depth 
description of a research site and the working lives of people within it. By 
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including what other methods exclude (an analysis of situated occasions), I do not 
view individuals as suspended in a single context within a single time frame but 
rather as situated beings whose interactions with both human and nonhuman 
elements (such as materials) are embedded with, and draw upon and circulate, 
social and cultural meanings. 
 
The majority of my field data is taken from observations of consultations between 
professionals and parents-to-be dedicated to Down’s syndrome screening. These 
consultations took place in both FAD and SAD. As such, FMD and other medical 
worlds (e.g. laboratories) were observed less frequently. During the fieldwork, I 
observed one-hundred-and-fifty consultations (seventy-five in each institution) in 
which screening for Down’s syndrome was discussed and/or carried out. Whilst 
the vast majority of my arguments in this thesis stem from fieldnotes of such 
encounters, I spent much of my time in Freymarsh and Springtown ‘deep hanging 
out’ (Geertz 2000: 107), immersing myself into the culture of each setting on an 
informal level. This mainly involved frequenting offices, loitering, and chatting. 
Such actions are necessary throughout the fieldwork but particularly in the early 
stages so as to comprehend the general mechanics and processes of each setting. 
Whilst I was often an active participant in various scenes (such as engaging in 
conversations), refraining from asking outright questions and remaining fairly 
muted produced details which I would not have thought to ask myself. In so doing, 
I observed and retained information which others in the settings often deemed 
trivial or taken-for-granted. 
 
So how were data specifically gathered? During my first few days in Freymarsh 
and Springtown, I was consistently asked about my presence. I provided a short 
‘cover story’ (Bosk 1979: 194) – along the lines of ‘I am a PhD student in sociology 
interested in Down’s syndrome screening’ – which was often met with enthusiasm 
and invitations to accompany each professional into consultations. In the following 
months, I was regularly invited by professionals to escort them around the clinic 
and into consultations. During fieldwork, I observed Down’s syndrome screening 
consultations, cytogenetic and biochemistry laboratory work, phone calls made to 
parents-to-be, administrative duties, amniocenteses, ‘4D baby-bonding’ ultrasound 
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scans, multi-disciplinary meetings, and other medical procedures. My involvement 
in the majority of consultations unfolded in the same way: professionals would 
notify me about a potential ‘case’, parents-to-be would be asked if I could observe 
the encounter, consent would be provided, and I would scribble fieldnotes during 
the consultation and after it had concluded. Outside of consultations, my daily 
routine would consist of attending the clinic, greeting professionals, and engaging 
in conversation whilst occasionally leaving to write up fieldnotes. 
 
As time progressed, I became interested, in unison with the theoretical traditions 
inspiring my intellectual philosophies, not in peoples’ actions as individuals or in 
their supposed failings but rather as situated social and cultural beings enacted 
and positioned by routine and institutional discourses (Foucault 1983; Garfinkel 
1967; Goffman 1959). Rather than assessing professionals as failing to live up to 
preconceived set ideals posited by models and theories of best practice, I asked 
what professionals’ conduct is accomplishing, why they are accomplishing these 
matters over others, and what socio-cultural effects they are embedded within 
(Latimer 2008b). Acting ‘according to the emergent logic of the situations in which 
they found themselves’ (Horlick-Jones 2005: 297), professionals are concurrently 
treated as both active participants in the world and as restricted, that is, as not free 
agents positioned in certain ways (Latimer 2003). 
 
What becomes most important, then, are not exclusively the professionals’ 
‘accounts’ (Garfinkel 1967) of what they do, as in the interview, but rather what 
they do, that is, their shared rhythms and routines which may support/negate 
accounts and illustrate how Down’s syndrome screening is done ‘in action’ (Latour 
1987). This doing of screening is also a technical accomplishment; the materiality 
and spatial arrangement of Freymarsh and Springtown enacts particular relations 
and performs certain roles (Sandelowski 2003). By focusing on the social practices 
and cultural materials of Freymarsh and Springtown, thus, I explore who or what is 
privileged and/or excluded, who is made accountable, what is figured as good or 
bad medical practice, the extent of ‘slippage’ between ‘informal’ ways of working 
and ‘formal’ accounts (Horlick-Jones 2005), how identity-work is accomplished, 
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and what/how ‘typifications’ (classifications or categorisations) are produced and 
reproduced in everyday practices. 
  
My (weekly) presence at each setting would depend on three criteria. First, I would 
observe one setting on the basis that specific ‘cases’ would attend the department 
on that day or when a large influx of parents-to-be was expected. Springtown and 
FMD, for instance, only performed certain procedures on specific days. Second, I 
would wait for the manager of a department to invite me, or accept my request, to 
observe the setting. In such instances, my access can be described as opportunistic. 
Third, I would temporarily withdraw from settings to avoid intellectual fatigue and 
refine my focus by performing an in-situ analysis of previous observations. On my 
return, routine affairs were once more thrown into a new relief. In many ways, my 
approach can be compared to Duneier’s (1999: 342) ‘diagnostic ethnography’ in 
which he observes the symptoms characterising people, gains knowledge of these 
symptoms, and returns to the field with new diagnostic tools (such as refined 
questions) to grasp symptoms. This straightforward amalgam of explain, interpret 
and render meaningful was my primary strategy for making sense of the worlds I 
observed. 
 
After one year, I felt I had reached the point of data saturation and diminishing 
utility of fieldnotes. In addition, I feared the effects of research fatigue both for 
myself and participants (Clark 2008). In retrospect, I was guilty of compulsive data 
collection, compelled and inhibited by the prospect of omitting any possible detail 
which would further my analysis (Ortiz 2004). Still, having become a fixture of the 
scene (Duneier 1999) – as ‘part of the furniture’ according to Bethan (SAD admin 
staff) and as a ‘member of the family’ as defined by Robyn (FAD midwife) – I 
decided to leave the field. 
 
Fieldnotes 
I carried a notepad and made fieldnotes during consultations. On occasions during 
the fieldwork where I did not have my notepad, I made fieldnotes using my mobile 
phone. In the office or other less organised encounters, I relied on memory and 
created fieldnotes as accurately as possible in the setting itself or immediately 
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after fieldwork concluded. Whilst consultations seemed to constitute an acceptable 
environment in order to construct fieldnotes, I felt doing so within conversations 
would have made professionals curious and threatened by what I was writing. 
Writing fieldnotes meant on many occasions, I temporarily withdrew from the 
action moments after it occurred. Although observational work is sacrificed during 
such occasions, it is certainly more beneficial to have fewer well-recorded and 
illuminating observations rather than more half-reported and less-developed 
observations (Atkinson 1995). 
 
My fieldnotes contain exhaustive descriptions of interactions, discourses, verbal 
and nonverbal practices, inanimate materials, the organisation and space of the 
setting, and some personal reflections. According to Latimer (2008a: 9), these can 
all be treated as textual matter since they are ‘read’ and interpreted; the spatial 
arrangement of the clinic and material objects contained within it, for instance, 
‘have a symbolic and an expressive dimension, that is, they are interpreted by 
social beings as conveying meaning’. Fieldnotes were mostly transcribed within 
twenty-four hours of an observation. I opted not to use a tape-recorder when 
observing as I feared it would over-formalise and disrupt the natural order of the 
clinic (though arguably, my presence already denaturalised the setting). In 
addition to worrying an overreliance on the recorder may have caused me to miss 
events not captured on tape, I felt the invasive presence of a tape-recorder could 
derail the natural sequence of talk and the rhythms of social life, with professionals 
reluctant to reveal information otherwise shared. This could lead, thus, to securing 
‘an accurate representation of a misrepresentation’ (Desmond 2007: 292). As such, 
the majority of quotations presented in this thesis rely on my own memory and 
fieldnotes taken whenever appropriate and possible. 
 
Interviews 
Single interviews were conducted with eleven midwives, three sonographers, and 
two head midwives (N=16). The views of parents-to-be with respect to screening 
for the condition are undeniably valuable and a key locus enquiry which has 
flooded the sociological, psychological, and medical literature in particular (Aune 
and Möller 2012; Bryant et al. 2010; García et al. 2008; Gottfreðsdóttir et al. 2009a; 
65 
McNeill et al. 2009; Press and Browner 1998; Santalahti et al. 1998; Williams et al. 
2005). In addition, the experiences of parents who have a child with Down’s 
syndrome and had prenatal screening for the condition during the respective 
pregnancy are important if less common, though there are exceptions (Korenromp 
et al. 2007; Reist 2006; Van Riper and Selder 1989). Nonetheless, in order to tackle 
a subject area rarely addressed in sociology (an ethnographic analysis of Down’s 
syndrome screening, its situated occasions, and the conduct of professionals), I 
draw on observations, document analysis, and interviews with professionals in the 
thesis which, taken together, embody the bulk of my fieldwork. 
 
During fieldwork, interviews with professionals were largely used as confirmatory 
devices, that is, to balance and verify observational data and informal interviews 
(or what can be called conversations with a purpose). Atkinson and Delamont 
(2006: 166) claim it is a common failing of the social sciences to claim participants’ 
voices ‘speak for themselves’; they are not transparent indices offering a privileged 
route to the private domain of authentic personal experience. Similarly, I argue, 
drawing on ethnomethodological sensibilities (ten Have 2004), interviews can 
become speech acts producing versions of events, justifications of actions, and 
identity enactments. Such ‘accounts’ (Garfinkel 1967) should not be taken at face 
value – what Duneier (1999: 343) refers to as the ‘ethnographic fallacy’ – but as 
devices creating ‘the realities they purport to describe’ (Atkinson and Delamont 
2006: 167). Rather than considering the output of interviews as a resource through 
which to make sense of the world, they represent a topic of study in their own 
right, a constructed account dislocated from ordinary life circumstances (ten Have 
2004). This corresponds to Jerolmack and Khan’s (2013: 1) idea of an ‘attitudinal 
fallacy’, of how researchers wrongly assume a consistency between attitudes and 
situated action. What people say, according to Jerolmack and Khan (2013: 13), is 
frequently a poor predictor of what they do; ‘to escape the attitudinal fallacy, we 
must study interaction’. 
 
In response, I rely not on a quotation-driven study which explains action at the 
individual level but rather on context-driven fieldwork. Observations put us 
directly in touch with social life in a way no other method can achieve, allowing a 
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researcher to seize ‘the unscripted, unrepeatable, and often unutterable stuff of 
existence beyond the grasp of interview-based inquests’ (Desmond 2007: 288). I 
do not, however, discount interviews as a method. I mirror Walford’s (2009: 118) 
claim that one of the central tenets of ethnography is that multiple methods of data 
collection should be used. I highlight the value of carrying out observations in 
conjunction with interviews in which claims can be verified or refuted. This is not a 
question of truth or untruth. Rather, it reflects an attempt to comprehend 
contextually constructed meanings in interaction with one another and, in turn, to 
be aware of the asymmetry of power relations between researcher and researched. 
Indeed, whatever dispositions or repertoires of thought and action people bring to 
a social situation or reveal to an interviewer, their in situ actions are enhanced or 
constrained by the situation itself (Garfinkel 1967; Goffman 1983). 
 
Face-to-face interviews with professionals were conducted between five and eight 
months into the fieldwork. Interviews were conducted later in the study for two 
reasons. First, I wanted to refine questions and identify the key points of enquiry 
before recruiting professionals for interviews. Second, I wanted to establish their 
trust before asking questions perhaps unsuitable were I not a regular fixture in 
their lives (Bourgois 1995). This meant I was able to create a comfortable ‘back-
stage’ area for participants (Goffman 1959). Interviews were conducted at either 
Freymarsh or Springtown in order to capture context(s) and to allow professionals 
to draw on materials perhaps overlooked on leaving the respective institution. 
Susan (FAD midwife), for instance, suggested she preferred being interviewed at 
Freymarsh since she ‘forget[s] all about this place when I go home and I would 
probably not be able to answer your questions!’ These situated interviews were 
conversational, audio-recorded, and ranged from thirty minutes to over two hours 
in length. The litheness of the interview schedule, a guide rather than a formal 
instrument (Bosk 1979), permitted the probing of responses for expansion if 
required. Questions invited professionals to reflect on their working practices, a 
means of observing how they ‘see their own experiences, their own lives, and their 
interactions with others’ (Atkinson 1998: 74). Examples of questions included 
‘what in your opinion are the major issues with screening for Down’s syndrome?’, 
‘how do you describe screening to parents-to-be?’, and ‘do you currently consider 
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prenatal screening for Down’s syndrome as sufficient for the needs of parents-to-
be and clinical practice?’ Appendix 8 is a flexible interview schedule containing a 
number of questions which may or may not have been asked (depending on the 
answers of professionals). 
  
I informed professionals they were to be recorded for transcription purposes, they 
were to remain anonymous, they could refuse to answer questions, and they could 
stop the tape-recorder and/or withdraw from the interview at any time. During 
interviews, it seemed professionals were sincere, direct, and eager to participate. 
Professionals sometimes used interviews as venting sessions or, as Elena (FMD 
head midwife) and Martha (FAD midwife) claim, to share information they had not 
previously discussed with colleagues or others. I now reflect on this openness and 
why I believe I was afforded seemingly unbridled access to their working worlds.  
 
Researcher relations: gatekeepers, students, and toy-boys 
During fieldwork at Freymarsh and Springtown, professionals were predominately 
unobtrusive and engaging on both a professional and personal level. I offer five 
intertwining reasons for this. First, my study was championed by Dr Karman and 
Carol. Neither Dr Karman nor Carol rarely, if ever, had to explicitly vouch for my 
presence around the respective institution yet my affiliated status was enough to 
limit questions regarding my presence and give me, inter alia, ‘the authority to be 
present in the hospital settings’ (Atkinson 1995: 13). Atkinson claims this position 
was justified further by displaying an identification card; I similarly made an effort 
to dress smartly and acquire an identification card, both ‘props’ (Goffman 1959) 
symbolising and legitimising my presence (Desmond 2007; Stephens et al. 2008). 
Second, although no expectations were made of me by professionals – at times the 
demands of medical work rendered me ornamental and extraneous (Bosk 1979) – 
I made active efforts to keep out of the way, to fill downtime with interesting 
conversation, and to be helpful by fetching drinks, directing people to the toilet32, 
switching off the lights prior to an ultrasound scan, disposing of waste, and, in 
some cases at SAD, collecting parents-to-be from the waiting room. These efforts 
                                                     
32 Ultrasound scans often require a full bladder in order to capture a detailed representation of the 
unborn child on the computer screen. As such, several mothers-to-be needed to use the toilet 
following a scan. 
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helped maintain relationships and assisted in gaining trust (Ayala 1996). An 
ethnographer can never know how much he/she is trusted but offering something 
is valuable currency when seeking observing rights (Duneier 1999). 
 
Third, I entered a female-dominated environment as a twenty-three year old male. 
In Springtown and Freymarsh, the vast majority of professionals are female and 
aged approximately thirty to sixty years old. The disadvantages and advantages of 
being a female researcher inside and outside largely male settings have been well-
rehearsed (Mazzei and O’Brien 2009; Pope 2005; Poulton 2012; Sallee and Harris 
2011). However, little attention has been afforded to considerations of gender 
when males study settings containing a large majority of women, although Warren 
and Rasmussen (1977) and Ortiz (2004; 2005) offer exceptions. During fieldwork, 
I was commonly ascribed an identity as an adoptive son or a ‘toy-boy’. Each label 
resulted in playful comments or crude jokes being made at my expense, with some 
conversations clearly designed to embarrass me. At times, I often played up to this 
role, responding with quips and jestingly embracing each ascribed identity33. At 
other times, I practiced what Ortiz (2005: 265) refers to as ‘muted masculinity’, 
reducing traits such as conversational dominance often associated with hegemonic 
masculinity (a trait many professionals seemed to dislike); ‘put purely negatively, 
[female professionals] should not feel that you are an additional agent of medical 
authority’ (Silverman 1987: 18). In sum, whilst there were some circumstances in 
which my male status was problematic such as trans-vaginal ultrasound scans 
whereby observing the invasion of bodily space was prohibited, my performative 
identity-work (Goffman 1959) as a young heterosexual male, involving the 
‘emotional labour’ as described by Hochschild (1983), helped secure access and 
develop constructive research relationships. 
 
                                                     
33 During early fieldwork at FAD, I was in the toilet when I was invited by another man to engage in 
‘cottaging’ (anonymous sex between homosexual men in a public lavatory). I declined the invitation 
and on returning to the FAD office, I informed some professionals about the situation. This became 
a huge resource of humour for many midwives and other staff members, culminating in many jokes 
being made at my expense over the following weeks. The story became a source of rapport with 
professionals I had met and those I had yet to encounter, facilitating my access and becoming an 
icebreaker when forming relationships with professionals. I had, unwittingly, followed Goffman’s 
(1989: 128) advice to be ‘willing to be a horse’s ass’. In sharing this story, I also hope to have 
answered Scott et al’s (2011: 718) appeal for confessional tales from researchers about ‘performing 
in (and messing up) their own shows’. 
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A fourth reason why my access was easily secured in the field relates to my status 
as a student. Whilst the researcher arguably occupies a more powerful position 
than participants in research, this is commonly reversed in medical settings with 
the researcher being the more junior party in terms of both age and status (Pope 
2005). My junior status was confirmed by frequently being cited in the front-stage 
of consultations and back-stage of clinical life as ‘the student’. Some FAD midwives 
recommended referring to me within consultations as a student, not a researcher, 
since it was felt the latter was, in the words of Nicola (FAD midwife), ‘too formal’ 
and ‘sounding too much like you’re scrutinising the actions of [professionals and 
parents-to-be]’. Professionals openly framed me as a student, arguably affording 
me a leniency and juvenile status which legitimised my presence. In addition, as a 
young smartly-dressed male with an ID badge and notepad, I was vulnerable to 
problems of mistaken identity as a medical student (Bosk 1979). On occasions, I 
was openly referred to in consultations as a medical student. This misidentification 
not only troubled me ethically (I often accepted this label without correction, 
compromising my role performance as a sociological researcher) but also may 
have led to me, as part of the assembled throng, to conduct research fairly 
uninhibitedly (Silverman 1987). 
 
A final reason why I was able to gather data so un-problematically is my relatively 
unattached ‘outsider’ status. I use this term loosely. The positions of ‘insider’ and 
‘outsider’, used so frequently in ethnographic accounts, should not be framed as 
fixed positions but rather as ever-shifting and permeable locations experienced 
differently by both researchers and participants (Desmond 2007). Still, I note that 
although Dr Karman and Carol sponsored my study, I had few alliances. One of the 
great successes of qualitative research stems from the fortunate willingness of 
other people to talk about their lives not only with friends and family but also with 
a relative stranger. Although in-depth fieldwork discredits the stranger label, I did 
seem to become a convenient ‘sounding board’ where professionals could air 
grievances, uncertainties, and discontents withheld from colleagues and intimate 
others (Bosk 1979: 196). It seems playing the quasi-therapeutic role – with few 
ties, devoid of judgement, and listening rather than talking (Thomas 2012) – 
contributed to my approval in the field. This explanation of the ‘dramaturgical 
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complexity of role performance in the field’, for Scott et al. (2011: 730), should not 
be viewed as unnecessarily self-indulgent but rather as valuable for revealing how 
emotion and identity-work are managed and negotiated during fieldwork. 
 
The ethics of ethnography 
Despite remarking on the rapport I believe was achieved, it is best to be humble 
about this since one never really knows how participants view the ethnographer. 
Indeed, Eve (FAD midwife) often quipped in the early stages of the study that I was 
‘spying’ on her and her colleagues and intent on airing their dirty laundry. I took 
Eve’s comments as jest but cannot say with complete confidence I have interpreted 
her claims correctly. This corresponds to a concern with ‘ethics in practice’, of the 
everyday ethical concerns emerging during a study, rather than ‘procedural ethics’, 
of acquiring formal ethical approval (Guilleman and Gillam 2004: 261). Bosk 
(2001) claims ethnography frequently becomes a morally problematic activity; we 
do not inform subjects they are revealing data perhaps not in their best interests, 
we encourage discrepancies enriching analysis, we disclose but only incompletely, 
and we betray our subjects by manipulating relationships to collect data and by 
retiring to the office to convert experiences into text. For Reinharz (1984: 95), 
ethnographic writing often involves (symbolic) violence; we ‘intrude into [our] 
subjects’ privacy, disrupt their perceptions, utilise false pretences, manipulate the 
relationship and give little or nothing in return’. I do not subscribe to recognising 
social research as a take-hit-run approach yet I do recognise my ethnography, like 
all others, raises ethical concerns. 
 
One problem of my fieldwork and of ethnography more generally is I assumed 
those who do not wish to be observed found ways to avoid this. However, this may 
not have been the case. Professionals could merely have exercised politeness yet 
silently objected to my presence. Similarly, if professionals were wary of my 
presence and desisted from behaving naturally, I might wonder how much was 
staged for my benefit. Whilst I believe our relationship was strong enough to 
withstand this possibility, its manifestation cannot be completely discounted. In 
addition, the notion of informed consent was problematic throughout fieldwork. 
Conforming to the extensive rigidity promised by research protocols is more of an 
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aspiration than a reality in hospital settings; plans must be modified after certain 
situations and the actions of the researcher and participants. Bosk (2001: 211) 
claims it is impossible to do a hospital-based ethnography ‘without both violating 
informed consent and without breaking promises made to subjects about 
confidentiality and anonymity’. In Freymarsh and Springtown, it was unfeasible to 
inform every person walking into the clinic that they had entered a research zone 
and that recordings may be converted into publically-available information. Such a 
rigorous conformity to consent would produce repeated disruptions to interaction, 
heighten self-consciousness of participants, and would be socially peculiar (Bosk 
2001). 
 
Another problem of any qualitative study concerns the notion of anonymity and 
whether this is fully achievable. Since ethnographers have a duty to make the 
decoding process as difficult as possible, I provide pseudonyms for participants 
and the research settings together with an omission of minor details and changing 
some key attributes of participants with a view to preserving anonymity. This can 
be viewed as a remedy to the apprehension one faces when ‘making private words 
public’ in the context of a relationship based on trust between researcher and 
researched (Bourdieu 1999: 1). Despite pseudonyms transforming the specific into 
the general, those close to the scene may unmask these light cloaks. They may read 
it as a roman à clef and whilst social life provides wiggle room for evading previous 
claims, permanent texts do not. This is an enduring, if not unsolvable, problem of 
ethnography.  
 
Whilst the preceding paragraphs focus on participants, one must recognise how 
ethnography is not just an intellectual/practical accomplishment for researchers 
but also an emotional accomplishment. Emotionality is often framed as a threat to 
research and gathering data (a loss of objectivity) rather than the potential harm to 
a researcher. However, qualitative research, and ethnographies in particular since 
they confront a researcher with a setting and its occupants for an extended period 
of time, can have emotional consequences for researchers perhaps affected by 
being directly implicated as a protagonist within the drama (Bloor et al. 2010; 
Coffey 1999; Scott et al. 2011). An ethnographer, or ‘researcher-as-person’ (Scott 
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et al. 2011: 718), can never be fully passive and objective since he/she has a 
personal investment in fieldwork and in building relationships. 
 
In an analysis of the AIDS epidemic, Ayala (1996) describes his horror on entering 
a hospital (the fieldwork setting) and the emotional difficulties he encountered 
when confronting such suffering. Whilst I did not suffer from sleepless nights like 
Ayala, encounters in Freymarsh and Springtown – particularly in the challenging 
environment of FMD which, as Dr Karman (FMD consultant) claims, ‘deals with the 
doom and gloom’ – could be emotionally draining. At times I was uncomfortable as 
an impartial ethnographer who must neutralise the melodramatic quality of the 
drama and quash my usual urges (such as to offer help or comfort). I could become 
overwhelmed and troubled by the enormity of some decisions of parents-to-be and 
professionals, with one specific observation of a feticide34 disturbing many people 
– myself included – for hours after the procedure. Whilst of course my own trial 
cannot be compared to parents-to-be receiving devastating information or to 
professionals conveying this news, I sometimes felt I had stumbled into intensely 
personal moments. I left on such occasions after feeling too uncomfortable to 
remain present. Thankfully, for the vast majority of parents-to-be, pregnancies 
proceed without any major complications for them or the unborn baby. 
 
In extending this focus on the emotional dimensions of fieldwork, I also highlight 
how despite largely being an uninvited intruder into Freymarsh and Springtown, I 
became fond of the vast majority of professionals who were the object of my gaze 
for so long. Our interactions were never limited to what can loosely be described 
as professional talk; we discussed television programmes, food, love lives, family, 
books, hospital and celebrity gossip, and on one occasion, erotic novels. During 
such instances, it was easy to ‘settle down and forget about being a sociologist’ 
(Goffman 1989: 129). After analysing data, however, I became aware that I might 
release details occasionally reflecting unfavourably on professionals. Bourgois 
(1995: 18) worried his work would be misread as reinforcing negative stereotypes 
of participants; ‘under an ethnographic microscope everyone has warts and 
anyone can be made to look like a monster’. Similarly, I was anxious my work 
                                                     
34 Feticide is an act which causes the death of an unborn baby prior to termination. 
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would be interpreted as a criticism of professionals. However, as will be shown in 
later chapters, I claim they are frequently positioned by organisational constraints 
inhibiting their practices in various ways. My intention is not to snatch secrets and 
put them in the public domain; healthcare institutions are dense environments, too 
complex to be normatively assessed and depicted as a tale of heroes and villains or 
saints and sinners. In keeping with Goffman’s (1989) policies, thus, I suggest my 
role is to provide a clear analytical account as opposed to passing judgement on 
settings, conduct, or situations. I hope my ethnographic account, in viewing the 
social life of Freymarsh and Springtown unsentimentally and without any obvious 
bias, is both a fair and accurate portrayal. 
 
Data analysis 
Data are analysed using ‘situational analyses’ which captures the complexities and 
instabilities of everyday working life in Freymarsh and Springtown (Clarke 2003: 
571). Situational analyses is a renovation of grounded theory in which the 
researcher ‘becomes not only analyst and bricoleur but also a cartographer of 
sorts’ (2003: 571). Clarke (2003: 553) offers ‘situational maps and analyses’ as 
supplements to the basic social process analyses typical of grounded theory, a 
‘very popular and epistemologically sound approach to qualitative research’. 
Grounded theory involves coding data, determining if codes appear elsewhere, 
condensing codes into stable and analytically ambitious categories, and integrating 
categories into a theoretical analysis of an area or a ‘substantive theory’ (Glaser 
and Strauss 1967). With deep roots in interactionist sociology and pragmatist 
philosophy, grounded theory could be interpreted as a theory/methods package 
with an interpretive, constructionist epistemology (Clarke 2003). 
 
Clarke (2003) claims grounded theory, however, is not sophisticated enough to 
‘fully take into account the sea of discourses in which we are continually awash in 
the postmodern era’ (2003: 559). She suggests situational analyses – paralleling 
Geertz’s (1973) ‘thick descriptions’ and influenced by the postmodern turn yet still 
‘epistemologically/ontologically based in the pragmatist soil that has historically 
nurtured symbolic interactionism and grounded theory’ (Clarke 2003: 555) – 
draws attention to irregularities, fragmentations, positionalities, and instabilities 
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in which to comprehend complex worlds. For Clarke, the approach can be used to 
analyse observations, interviews, documents, and other discursive materials. Since 
the codes and categories of my analysis can be generated and applied across many 
data sources, the new mapping approaches are especially useful for multi-site 
research (Clarke 2003; Marcus 1995; Rapp 2000). This became particularly useful 
for cross-comparisons between Freymarsh and Springtown (Silverman 1993). 
 
Throughout the fieldwork, material was grouped together to establish connections 
and disconnections in observations and the accounts of participants. One of the 
main benefits of ethnography is that the final product is compiled of a collection of 
material across many situated occasions (Latimer 2008a; Silverman 1993). These 
data – fieldnotes, interview transcripts, secondary document analyses, reflections 
about events – are ‘made up’ (Latimer 2008a) by the researcher. As such, although 
materials are often qualitatively different, crosschecks are possible. Rather than 
offering a truer representation of reality, crosschecking provides an analysis of 
how a reality is constructed via multiple voices, positions, and so forth (Latimer 
2008a). In this study, for example, interview transcripts were treated not as voices 
expressing individual needs but as ‘accounts’ (Garfinkel 1967) involving identity-
work and strategic performance (Goffman 1959). Additionally, they were materials 
to crosscheck with fieldnotes for capturing patterns and identifying any deviations 
(Silverman 1993) to upset original interpretations or provide further explanations. 
What one ‘reports’ at one moment, in turn, may not be ‘observable’ in another 
(Garfinkel 1967), meaning ‘shifts’ (Latimer 1997, 2000) and multiple discourses 
circulating different ideas, rather than merely routines and repetitions, come into 
view. These shifts are not merely ‘infractions’ (Goffman 1971) but reveal how 
professionals make their ‘moves’ and account for their conduct when screening for 
Down’s syndrome. This reveals the dynamism of our supposedly stable social life, 
adds rigour to arguments so we can make claims on strong grounds, and thickens 
our descriptions as well as interpretations (Geertz 1973; Latimer 2008a). 
 
Data were read alongside literature, allowing for an inductive and processual 
approach, until intricacies and relationships were identified. During fieldwork, I 
developed categories, interpretations, and crude inferences highlighting key areas 
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of enquiry and where my future focus could be directed. By saturating categories 
and grounding my theory, I fashioned findings into a coherent pattern and 
continued fieldwork until, perhaps, some chance occurrence cast light on a new 
way of analysing the data created. Data were initially analysed using a computer 
software package. I abandoned this tactic shortly after an unsuccessful attempt to 
manage data. I opted for analysing data by hand since computer technology, by 
allowing me to manage large volumes of data, threatened to trade resolution for 
scope (Seidel 1992). Throughout the thesis, I mostly provide quotes lifted out of 
fieldnotes/interviews and extensive sequences of data rather than short snippets 
to avoid fragmenting my account of professionals’ daily activities (Atkinson 1995). 
Fieldnotes and transcripts are also presented as polished editions of messier 
collections. The fillers, incomplete thoughts, and pauses common in the speech of 
professional and parents-to-be are deleted to recover the articulate and often 
poetic character it fulfilled in its original oral performance (Bourgois 1995).  
 
Explicating explications: a problem of ethnography? 
Carrying out this fieldwork required great flexibility, patience, and a serious 
investment in time and energy. Consultations could be long and frustrating, I could 
find myself waiting for hours with little to occupy myself with, appointments were 
cancelled at the last moment, observations could become tedious, interviews were 
rearranged when professionals were summoned for work elsewhere, fieldnotes 
could be overwhelming in length and intricacy, and so on. The ethnographer, it 
seems, must be prepared to ‘cut [themselves] to the bone’ (Goffman 1989: 127). 
Alongside such practical difficulties are some clear limitations with ethnography 
more generally. For instance, it remains difficult to discuss situations and conduct 
for a universal professional service on the basis of one study (Bosk 1992). 
However, it should be noted Freymarsh is an NHS institution and, as such, shares 
similarities, in spite of local effects and variations, with other hospitals, an example 
being the universality of policy stipulations for Down’s syndrome screening across 
NHS hospitals. I argue Freymarsh constitutes a situated example of NHS screening 
in the UK (although some parents-to-be screen in privately-funded clinics, the vast 
majority – as statistics reveal – screen in NHS institutions). My analysis of two local 
and specific settings, therefore, answers broad universal questions about the place 
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of Down’s syndrome in reproductive politics. That said, I must leave it to others to 
test my observations against their own and hope they translate to other venues 
(Duneier 1999). 
 
Another issue is ethnography is highly interpretive. Many of the details explicated 
in the fieldwork are interpreted and not objectively described (Clifford and Marcus 
1986). Here, one may face accusations of ‘explicating explications’ (Geertz 1973: 
9). Fieldwork cultivates in the construction of the ethnographic text, a construction 
of social history containing interpretations of behaviour created by the researcher. 
Appreciating the deconstructionist cliché of ‘culture as text’, I am aware this text is 
created and not objectively reported, an impressionistic sketch laced with my own 
interpretations as opposed to a perfect snapshot (Bosk 1992). This, however, does 
not translate to ethnography having reached a point in paralysis in which we 
cannot trust ourselves to collect data and offer findings with useful applications. 
Instead, ethnographers should proceed with an awareness of the debates around 
ethnographic authority, the limits to their claims, and the situated nature of their 
findings. 
 
Summary 
In this chapter, I described my approach and some of the practical, ethical, and 
social issues emerging during fieldwork. I provided details on my preliminary 
field-work, my entry into the field, the three main sites of interest (FAD, FMD, and 
SAD), my experiences of conducting fieldwork, how I crafted and used fieldnotes, 
why I used certain methods, my relationships with participants, and the ethics of 
ethnography. After describing my strategy of ‘situational analyses’ (Clarke 2003) 
and the data yielded from this analytic approach, I outlined the limitations of both 
my own research and of ethnography as a whole. In what follows, I produce a 
written representation of two healthcare institutions. In this frontline account, I 
describe my attempts to uncover the everyday pattern of professionals’ working 
lives and particularly how they go about their everyday business of communicating 
information to parents-to-be about Down’s syndrome screening. Interested in 
everyday working practices and general types rather than specific people, I reveal 
how screening for Down’s syndrome occupies a key position in the ‘politics of 
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reproduction’ (Ginsburg and Rapp 1991), invigorates parental expectations, and 
highlights the significance of dominant body-society relations (Latimer 2013). 
Over the next four chapters, I show how producing soft data makes for rethinking 
hard questions about some of the most important and profound dilemmas of 
antenatal medicine and, in turn, the human condition. 
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Chapter Five 
The Organisation of Down’s Syndrome Screening 
 
The following four chapters outline some key findings of my study. In the next two 
chapters, I explore how Down’s syndrome screening is organised (chapter five) 
and performed (chapter six) in Freymarsh and Springtown. In chapter five, I show 
how the sedimentation of Down’s syndrome screening in antenatal care as a 
routine practice contributes to it being ‘downgraded’. I define downgrading as 
practices which denigrate and minimise the importance, value, and reputation of 
someone or something. This is particularly common in Freymarsh in comparison 
to Springtown. At Springtown, parents-to-be are offered an appointment time. 
Only one sonographer and one nurse work during a shift so professionals do not 
have the opportunity to prioritise one procedure over another. Whilst they 
certainly value some working practices over others, this rarely manifests itself in 
practice. As such, the majority of my arguments in this chapter concern Freymarsh. 
 
I capture how Down’s syndrome screening is made routine and undervalued as a 
trivial, non-prioritised task in the organisation of clinical life in three interrelated 
ways. First, I identify how the task of conducting Down’s syndrome screening 
consultations is relegated to midwifes and sonographers who act, using Bosk’s 
(1992: 63) definition, as an (unwitting) ‘mop-up service’, that is, as cleaning up the 
dirty work of the clinic. Undesirable tasks, Down’s syndrome screening included, 
pollute the purity of the clinical space. As such, they become reassigned to non-
consultants. Second, I explore how professionals implicitly and explicitly define 
Down’s syndrome screening, both inside and outside consultations with parents-
to-be, as a routine affair. Third, Down’s syndrome screening consultations, as 
everyday encounters, are categorised by midwives and sonographers as tedious 
duties not permitting the performance of an authentic midwife/sonographer role. 
These practices, as well as having clear crossovers with my arguments in chapter 
six, play a key role in downgrading Down’s syndrome screening at Freymarsh and 
Springtown. 
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To be clear, I am not laying the blame for the downgrading of Down’s syndrome 
screening exclusively at the feet of professionals. Indeed, it is over-simplistic and 
offensive to conclude professionals deliberately downgrade this procedure. As a 
collective, Freymarsh and Springtown professionals are conscientious, working 
tirelessly at difficult and complex tasks, and committed to the cause of parents-to-
be. The ongoing classifications of screening for Down’s syndrome are therefore 
attributable to the organisation of healthcare and how professionals, positioned in 
particular ways, are frequently victims of various pressures, not least time 
restrictions and the threat of legal action. Their work, in turn, is inhibited and 
patterned according to each institution and the various negotiations, routines, and 
stipulations enacted in the clinic (Kerr 2009; Timmermans and Berg 1997). 
 
Down’s syndrome screening in Freymarsh and Springtown 
In Freymarsh, Down’s syndrome screening is located, for the most part, in the 
antenatal department (FAD). The first interaction parents-to-be have with FAD is 
when attending a ‘booking clinic’ around ten weeks into a pregnancy. This involves 
a community midwife performing a dating ultrasound scan35 and providing 
parents-to-be with information on prenatal screening and aspects of pregnancy 
management including but not limited to alcohol intake, exercise, and the 
consumption of folic acid. It is at this point parents-to-be are offered screening for 
Down’s syndrome and a range of diseases including HIV36, syphilis37, hepatitis38, 
and rubella39 (I return to the meaning of categorising Down’s syndrome alongside 
diseases later in the thesis). Parents-to-be who accept Down’s syndrome screening 
                                                     
35 A dating scan is an ultrasound scan occurring around eight to fourteen weeks into a pregnancy. 
The scan is used to check how many weeks pregnant a mother-to-be is, whether it is intrauterine, 
whether it is viable, and whether it is a multiple pregnancy. Sonographers will also check the 
ovaries for cysts. Parents-to-be often receive a picture of the unborn baby at the end of the scan. 
36 HIV (human deficiency virus) is a virus causing the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). 
It attacks the immune system, allowing opportunistic infections and cancers to thrive. 
37 Syphilis is a sexually transmitted bacterial infection which mothers-to-be can pass onto their 
unborn baby. 
38 Hepatitis is a condition defined by liver inflammation and characterised by inflammatory cells in 
the tissue of an organ.  
39 Rubella is a viral infection. It is usually a mild condition but can be more serious during a 
pregnancy. 
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in Freymarsh, around 65% according to Dr Karman (FMD consultant)40, will return 
to the department approximately six weeks later to undertake the quadruple test. 
 
On entry to the department, parents-to-be approach the reception desk, account 
for their visit, and are told to take a seat before being collected by the midwives or 
maternity care assistants (MCA) depending on their care trajectory. Before moving 
to the seating area, the receptionist asks parents-to-be to hand over their red 
folder containing personal and physiological details of the parents-to-be, screening 
leaflets, and pregnancy management information on, for example, diet and travel 
safety. The folder is collected by an MCA who delivers it to a trolley holding a blue 
box. The blue box is positioned directly in front of the midwifery office door so 
midwives can notice a folder once delivered. Folders, as material extensions of 
parents-to-be, are collected by a midwife who, on reading the details inside the 
folder, determines which professional should meet with parents-to-be and the 
timing/immediacy of their appointment. Once midwives collect a folder, the 
respective parents-to-be are summoned to one of five rooms, each a short walk 
away both from the waiting area and office. Parents-to-be who accept Down’s 
syndrome screening are invited by a midwife into a small room to discuss the finer 
details of the procedure. The small room contains a two-piece sofa, three plastic 
chairs, a desk, and a computer. Chairs are commonly occupied by a midwife and 
parents-to-be with the sofa, set against the back wall, occupied by myself and 
occasionally children. After a midwife describes the procedure and gains consent 
for screening, parents-to-be are led into a different room where a nurse extracts 
blood from the arm of a mother-to-be. It is here, according to FAD midwives, where 
Down’s syndrome screening is ‘done’. 
 
Parents-to-be at Springtown book a nuchal translucency ultrasound scan (referred 
to hereafter as ‘NT scan’), usually ten to eleven weeks into the pregnancy after a 
dating ultrasound scan, by telephone. Appointments are logged by administrative 
                                                     
40 As a reminder, many professionals working at Springtown also work at Freymarsh. However, the 
reference to Freymarsh or Springtown in parentheses is used to signify where I observed the vast 
majority, if not entirety, of each respective professional’s work. As an example, Dr Karman is a 
consultant in both Freymarsh and Springtown but was observed most frequently in the Freymarsh 
foetal medicine department. Hereafter, I use FMD when referring to the Freymarsh foetal medicine 
department. 
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professionals (hereafter referred to as ‘admin staff’) who offer an appointment slot 
and notify parents-to-be of other ultrasound scans available at Springtown. 
Around twelve to fourteen weeks into a pregnancy, parents-to-be attend 
Springtown antenatal department (SAD) for an NT scan. After alerting 
professionals of their presence, parents-to-be are told to sit in the waiting area. If 
parents-to-be are waiting for a long time, they are offered drinks and an apology 
by the nurse. 
 
Parents-to-be are eventually collected by a nurse, or occasionally the sonographer 
or myself, who leads them into the clinic. After having their blood withdrawn, 
mothers-to-be consenting to an NT scan enter the ultrasound room – often 
alongside partners and other family members – to undertake the procedure. A 
sonographer sits on one chair and the mother-to-be is invited to lie on the bed with 
a partner commonly sitting on the remaining chair. Family members and/or 
friends can stand beside the bed. Paper towels are placed around the abdomen of 
the mother-to-be, ultrasound gel is applied, and the sonographer switches on the 
large television screen connected to the ultrasound machine. This produces a 
larger image of the womb for parents-to-be and others to see as the sonographer 
focuses on the smaller monitor. A sonographer describes the procedure, measures 
the anatomical features of the unborn baby, and explains a result will be delivered 
in a few days time. Once more, sonographers acknowledge SAD as primarily where 
Down’s syndrome screening is ‘done’. 
 
Hand me Down’s41 
The modern hospital is a complex organisation in which the work of medicine is 
distributed to different people and across departments (Atkinson 1995). This is 
certainly true in pregnancy/childbirth which have been increasingly medicalised 
in the twentieth century as part of the obstetrics project. Responsibility for much 
of this care has been seized by (technical) consultants from (nontechnical) 
midwives (Olarte Sierra 2010). Hiddinga and Blume (1992) show whilst twentieth 
century obstetrics concerned itself initially with what it categorised as pathological 
                                                     
41 ‘Hand me Down’s’ is my own term. It is a play on Down’s syndrome and the idiom ‘hand me 
down’ referring to how something is passed on to one person after being discarded from another. 
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births, it slowly colonised the entire process of pregnancy by perceiving mothers-
to-be as abnormal and by defining pregnancy as inherently pathological, that is, a 
crisis requiring intervention. Although midwives reclaimed aspects of pregnancy 
and childbirth following backlashes about this increasing intrusion, commentators 
suggest the (male) appropriation and medicalisation of pregnancy, rooted in a 
patriarchal model centuries in the making, persists today (Cahill 2001). 
 
So what about Freymarsh and Springtown? Who performs what care (particularly 
Down’s syndrome screening) and why? Previous research identifies how Down’s 
syndrome screening is carried out by midwives (Dormandy et al. 2006; Ekelin and 
Crang-Svalenius 2004; Samwill 2002), doctors (Burton Jeangros et al. 2013; 
Driscoll et al. 2009; Marteau et al. 1993), or midwives and doctors interchangeably 
(Pilnick 2004; Smith et al. 1994; Williams et al. 2002a) rather than genetic 
counsellors and clinical geneticists. In Freymarsh, Down’s syndrome screening 
belongs to a midwife. If parents-to-be receive a lower-risk result, this is confirmed 
via a letter with no further screen or test recommended. If receiving a higher-risk 
result, they are invited into the FAD by telephone for counselling with a midwife. In 
Springtown, Down’s syndrome screening is primarily the role of sonographers. 
Delivering news of a lower-risk result for Down’s syndrome to parents-to-be by 
telephone is the duty of admin staff with no medical education or training. For a 
higher-risk result, counselling is done via telephone by a nurse (Francine)42 or 
admin staff member with no medical training (Bethan). 
 
In both institutions, consultants’ involvement in Down’s syndrome screening is 
often limited to performing diagnostic tests (amniocentesis/CVS) and managing 
parents-to-be with previous pregnancy complications. Parents-to-be are shifted 
from the antenatal departments at Freymarsh and Springtown to FMD at 
Freymarsh once a problem is suspected, such as those with a higher-risk result for 
Down’s syndrome following screening and who subsequently consent to diagnostic 
testing. Whilst Springtown is not officially affiliated with FMD, parents-to-be who 
have had an NT scan, received a higher-risk result for Down’s syndrome, and have 
consented to diagnostic testing are referred to FMD because they do not have to 
                                                     
42 Francine is also an FMD midwife. FMD is where I observed her working life most frequently. 
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pay for the procedure and because they are under the care of the same consultant 
as in Springtown (Dr Karman). During a conversation with Springtown (SAD) 
admin staff, they explain to me why sonographers, not consultants, are assigned 
the task of screening for Down’s syndrome via an NT scan: 
 
Gareth: So how do you decide who does the NT scans? 
Dominique: It’s just one of the sonographers. 
Hannah: Whoever it is who works on that day does them. 
Dominique: But we usually do them on Fridays and Saturdays when Dr 
Karman isn’t working43. 
Juliana: Everyone wants Dr Karman for their NT scans but we don’t want 
to clog up Dr Karman’s clinic with NTs and all that easy stuff. Dr Karman 
does ‘Care Package’ clients too. 
 
When asked how the fate of NT scans is decided, the SAD admin staff suggest they 
are delegated to the days a sonographer, not Dr Karman, is working. This 
allocation of care is based on the reluctance to ‘clog up Dr Karman’s clinic with NTs 
and all that easy stuff’, the classification of ‘easy stuff’ translating to tasks not 
requiring Dr Karman’s expertise. The efforts of Dr Karman are better placed 
elsewhere in taking charge of cardiac scans44, diagnostic testing (amniocentesis 
and CVS), and ‘Care Package clients’, namely parents-to-be paying for fixed 
ultrasound scans and counselling sessions (Care Package clients often have earlier 
pregnancy complications such as recurrent miscarriages). 
 
In Freymarsh, the task of carrying out Down’s syndrome screening consultations is 
similarly demoted to midwives or, more accurately, the ‘couch’. In an interview, 
Lois (FAD midwife45) describes a couch’s function when discussing her daily work: 
                                                     
43 This also explains why many of the extracts cited in this thesis involve Esther (SAD sonographer). 
Whilst other sonographers (Olivia, Lisa, and Sophie) also conduct NT scans during their shifts, 
Esther often works on Friday and Saturday when many NT appointments are allocated. This means 
Esther conducts a large amount of NT scans during her shifts. Heather (sonographer) was not 
trained in NT scans but was trained in 4D scans. 
44 A cardiac scan involves a sonographer, via an ultrasound scan, examining the two outflow tracts 
and four chambers of the unborn baby’s heart. In Springtown, the scan is offered around twenty-
four weeks into a pregnancy. 
45 Lois is also an FMD midwife but I observed her most frequently in FAD. 
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I like doing hands-on midwifery with women because sometimes in 
clinic, you can be in the office doing results, you can be answering 
phones, and you’re not doing much midwifery. One of the job roles that 
we do when we have an antenatal clinic is when the midwife is a couch, 
so they will do what the doctor wants like stretch and sweeps46 or 
discuss things with the women and do CTG’s47. It’s hands-on midwifery 
work I like doing. The prepping for the clinic – its paperwork which is 
essential because it runs a lot smoother – but it’s not what I feel part of 
what is a midwife’s job and there’s a lot of admin work involved. I don’t 
think we’re being utilised enough and they could be getting more admin 
staff in who could do that and release us a little more. 
 
The typification of couch is both a noun (a piece of furniture) and a verb. To couch 
something is to arrange, to place and situate in a particular way. Lois defines the 
couch as someone who performs various duties on demand, that is, as someone 
who contributes to the arrangement and placing of Down’s syndrome screening 
and other forms of care in the hospital. The role of the couch includes assisting 
doctors during the later stages of a pregnancy and, in Lois’ own words, ‘discuss[ing] 
things with women’, roughly translating as conducting consultations in which 
information about a pregnancy is communicated to parents-to-be. FAD midwives 
are allocated roles including a ‘couch’ and working with doctors in a ‘specialist 
clinic’, roughly defined as consultations – frequently in conjunction with doctors – 
whereby they interact with parents-to-be who have specific pregnancy concerns. 
FAD speciality clinics include breastfeeding, haematology, substance misuse, 
diabetics and thyroids, asylum seekers, cardiac issues, twinned pregnancies, HIV, 
and recurrent miscarriages. 
 
The specific roles – or temporal identities – of a couch and specialist clinic midwife, 
among others, are displayed on a whiteboard in FAD. This reflects a Taylorist 
distribution of tasks in which professionals are allocated to particular roles; the 
                                                     
46 A stretch and sweep, also known as membrane sweeping, is a technique of labour stimulation.  
47 Cardiotocography (CTG) is a technical means of recording the heartbeat of an unborn baby and 
uterine contractions during pregnancy. This is typically performed in the third trimester.  
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role of the couch, in turn, extends to what is commonly described by midwives as 
‘doing a Down’s’, namely conducting consultations in which Down’s syndrome 
screening is explained to parents-to-be. Nancy describes the couch role as a ‘sort of 
second hand woman’. Since midwives rotate their primary job each shift, they take 
on the role of couch at different periods of time and, according to Nancy, ‘it is the 
couch’s duty to do the Down’s’. In the absence of a couch (if they are performing 
another task), the duty of conducting a screening consultation falls essentially to 
any midwife who, in Nancy’s words, is ‘free to do it’. This lack of formality in the 
professional delegation of Down’s syndrome screening consultations is reflected in 
the following exchange between Lois and Susan (FAD midwives): 
 
Camilla, Rita, Lois, and Susan (midwives) are in the office. Camilla and Rita are 
exchanging stories of today’s ‘misses’48. Two red folders have been waiting in 
the blue box for ten minutes. Lois turns to Susan: 
 
Lois: Susan, are you free to do a Down’s? 
Susan: Yes, no problem. 
Lois: There’s another one after as well. I know you’re not couch but 
Lindsay (FAD midwife) is busy doing a scan at the moment. Can you do 
that one too? 
Susan: Yes that’s fine. 
 
Camilla and Rita overlook the presence of two red folders in order to discuss 
miscarriage cases. Since Lindsay, the ‘couch’, is occupied with other tasks, Lois asks 
Susan if she would ‘do a Down’s’ despite not being ascribed the couch role. Susan 
accepts this since she is currently liberated from other tasks, a common trend in 
FAD where calls of ‘who is free to do a Down’s?’ and ‘there’s a Down’s in the box if 
anyone’s available’ commonly fill the office air. Dingwall and Murphy (1983: 143) 
describe how in accident and emergency departments, ‘bad patients’ can be 
‘detained until there is sufficient slack for the doctor to attend to them’. Whilst 
parents-to-be who opt to undertake screening are not ascribed the status of bad 
patients, they are similarly ‘filtered’ by midwives under ‘a rule of clinical priority’ 
                                                     
48 Parents-to-be who have had a miscarriage in their pregnancy. 
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(1983: 144). On a number of occasions, clinical tasks such as counselling parents-
to-be following a miscarriage, or even discussing miscarriage cases as Camilla and 
Rita do in the extract above, took priority over conducting Down’s syndrome 
screening consultations. Additionally, structural changes in FAD toward the end of 
my fieldwork lead to greater uncertainty about who was conducting screening 
consultations. The following extract illustrates how this ambiguity is played out: 
 
Eve, Rita, and Camilla (midwives) are completing paperwork in the office. 
Camilla tells me she is ‘way behind on the bookings for my breastfeeding 
speciality clinic’: 
 
Camilla: I’m the afternoon couch but I’m going to be very busy. I doubt I’ll 
have the chance to even do the Down’s. 
 
After completing paperwork, Camilla leaves the office to attend to another 
matter. Jennifer (MCA) enters with a red folder: 
 
Jennifer: I’ve got a Down’s and I have no idea who is doing them at the 
moment. There’s a few just waiting there to be collected. 
Eve: [Curtly] Well I’m not doing them today. 
Rita: I have no idea who is supposed to be doing them actually. 
 
Frustrated, Jennifer leaves the room and returns the red folders to the blue 
box. She leaves to find a midwife who can carry out the consultation. Eva and 
Rita debate who should perform this task: 
 
Eve: Camilla is too busy so she can’t do them obviously. 
Rita: Shouldn’t it be Toni or Emma (midwives)? 
Eve: It should be Toni doing them if Camilla’s not around. What is she 
doing otherwise? Where has she been? 
 
Eve and Rita return to their paperwork. The folders are not attended to for 
another ten minutes. 
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Camilla’s exclamation that she may not have an opportunity ‘to even do the Down’s’ 
implies screening consultations are ‘done’ in a restricted timeframe. In addition, 
they are unworthy of her time which is better allocated elsewhere by preparing 
‘[her] breastfeeding speciality clinic’ and performing other duties. In response to 
Jennifer’s irritation about who is ‘[doing] a Down’s’ (midwives usually collect red 
folders but MCAs occasionally have to remind them there are folders waiting to be 
collected), Eve and Rita distance themselves from this role by attributing 
accountability to Toni and Emma. In Springtown, the notion that screening 
consultations can be done ‘on a whim’ is essentially impossible since only one 
sonographer ever works a shift. However, the following extract between Sophie 
(SAD sonographer) and Mr and Mrs Brown (parents-to-be) reveals how Down’s 
syndrome screening can be performed on demand: 
 
Mr and Mrs Brown attend clinic for an early pregnancy scan49. During the 
scan, it transpires that the unborn baby is twelve weeks and five days old, not 
eleven weeks and six days old as Mrs Brown thought. This means the 
pregnancy is at enough gestation for Mrs Brown to undertake an NT scan: 
 
Sophie: If you want, we can do the NT scan now [Mr and Mrs Brown look 
surprised and seem unsure]. The reason I say this is because if you have 
to book another appointment, you might be too late to do the NT scan 
since we need to do it before fourteen weeks really. They both cost the 
same. 
Mrs Brown: I think you can just do it now, right [turns to Mr Brown]? 
Mr Brown: That’s fine by me. 
Sophie: [Sophie starts measuring the NT] That looks lovely and small. 
Mrs Brown: Is that a good sign then? 
Sophie: Yes. 
Mrs Brown: What about my bloods then? 
                                                     
49 An early pregnancy scan is an ultrasound scan performed between seven and eleven weeks of a 
pregnancy to confirm the number of unborn babies, the presence of a heartbeat, the size of a 
sac/unborn baby, and the possible presence of internal bleeding. 
88 
Sophie: We can do them today if you want. I’m just going to take the 
measurements because baby is lying perfectly for it so it makes sense to 
do it now [Sophie measures the NT which is 1.52mm]. That’s lovely and 
small. That means it will come back as a lower-risk [for Down’s 
syndrome] based on the scan alone. Obviously we match that with the 
bloods and stuff though and this gives you a result. But based on the 
scan, it’s good news [Mr and Mrs Brown smile]. You’ve got an active baby 
in there. 
Mr Brown: At least one of them is! 
Mrs Brown: Thanks love! 
 
Since Mrs Brown calculated her pregnancy dates incorrectly, Sophie offers her and 
Mr Brown the opportunity to screen for Down’s syndrome instead of having the 
consented-to early pregnancy scan. Sophie claims this is possible not only because 
the week of gestation is appropriate for the NT scan, but also because both 
procedures ‘cost the same’ amount of money. After consenting to the NT scan, Mr 
and Mrs Brown are reassured they have received a lower-risk result owing to a 
‘lovely and small’ measurement, the former teasing the latter towards the end of 
the scan about her lethargy during the pregnancy (the significance of humour is 
explored further in chapter six). Here, performing a procedure without delay and 
without parents-to-be necessarily receiving any information about it unwittingly 
accomplishes the downgrading of screening and the reduction of its value as a 
medical procedure. It is hard to imagine (and I did not observe) a more invasive or 
complicated procedure would merit such casualness about its execution. 
 
Training practices 
This downgrading of Down’s syndrome screening is further reflected by how 
midwives and sonographers are taught to conduct this care, namely the product of 
lay pedagogy rather than structured and formal training. Knowledge production, in 
this instance, is tacit, embodied, and passed on to from professionals to untrained 
professionals (Garforth and Kerr 2010). This corresponds to what Gail (FAD 
midwife), during one conversation, playfully describes as ‘see one do one’. This 
occurrence suggests an observation of a solitary consultation qualifies a midwife 
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for performing this role independently once a similar case presents itself in clinic. 
Such occasions become vocabulary lessons in which professionals gain knowledge 
of the appropriate vernacular for these consultations. 
 
However, the little attention paid to training professionals in Down’s syndrome 
screening consultations downgrades its importance and highlights how training is 
not a priority in this area (Cleary-Goldman et al. 2006; Sandall et al. 2001). In 
addition, only a few FAD midwives have received training in delivering a higher-
risk result for Down’s syndrome yet they are ascribed primary responsibility for 
this care. They are frequently eager to attend consultations in which parents-to-be 
receive a higher-risk for Down’s syndrome with the intention of learning how to 
perform this transaction. The following extract illustrates a similar occurrence: 
 
Terri, Susan, Maggie, and Rita (midwives) are in the office. Angela (midwife) 
enters: 
 
Angela: We’ve got a higher-risk [for Down’s syndrome] in today. Who 
can do a higher-risk? 
Susan: I’ve never done one but I’m happy to do it. 
Angela: OK. Well is it Terri or Rita who have done the higher-risk before? 
Rita: I can do it [Rita collects the folder from Angela]. 
Maggie: Can I sit in on the phone call Rita? I’ve never done one before. 
Susan: Me too. 
Rita: Bloody hell, I’ll have an audience [laughs]. Yes that’s fine, girls. The 
risk factor is 1:17 so the woman shouldn’t be too surprised anyway 
because of her age. I’ll call her in twenty minutes as I have some other 
work to do and the woman might not answer until after nine [a.m.] 
anyway. 
  
Both Susan and Rita volunteer to ‘do a higher-risk’, a consultation in which parents-
to-be are told they have received a higher-risk result for Down’s syndrome. The 
parents-to-be have to be notified of this appointment by telephone, hence Maggie’s 
request to ‘sit in on the phone call’ since she has not previously been privy to this. 
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Here, higher-risk consultations seem to represent a task which is highly valued, a 
duty contrasting with the treatment of everyday, routine screening consultations. 
Simultaneously, with few FAD midwives receiving training in delivering a higher-
risk result and little resources being dedicated to this practice, Down’s syndrome 
screening is subsequently accomplished as a downgraded practice. The following 
interaction between Sophie (SAD sonographer) and Isobel (SAD nurse) after an NT 
scan underscores one of the major issues this lack of training can provoke: 
 
Isobel and I are in the bloods room. Mr and Mrs Sutton (parents-to-be) leave 
the ultrasound room. Mrs Sutton is crying and Mr Sutton looks upset. They 
leave the clinic: 
 
Sophie: I had a bad feeling about that one. As soon as I saw it on the 
screen, I thought there was a chance she had miscarried and she had. 
Isobel: Poor girl. 
Sophie: It’s really bad for the girl as it’s Friday and now she’s got the 
whole weekend knowing this news before she can talk to anyone. I’m not 
qualified to discuss this with her and her partner and neither is Isobel. 
Isobel: No. 
Sophie: This is why it’s problematic to have NT scans on the Friday. I feel 
bad with miscarriages because we just give them a form and send them 
on their way. 
 
After the Suttons learn of a miscarriage, Sophie bemoans the ‘problematic’ nature 
of organising NT scans before a weekend, resulting in her ‘just [giving] them a form 
and [sending] them on their way’. Here, Sophie is ‘stepping out of a routine’, 
implying that the ‘correctness of the action needs to be explicitly renegotiated’ 
(Berg 1992: 171). The legitimacy granted with routine articulations is absent, 
meaning Sophie has to account for her non-routine conduct (of allowing parents-
to-be to leave the clinic without anyone ‘[discussing] this with [Mrs Sutton]’). Sophie 
further criticises the organisation of care since she is unqualified to ‘discuss’ the 
miscarriage with Mr and Mrs Sutton yet she has been assigned the duty of carrying 
out NT scans for parents-to-be. The demotion of Down’s syndrome screening down 
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the medical hierarchy, a hierarchy produced and reproduced precisely by these 
practices, to midwives and sonographers triggers profound (negative) affects for 
parents-to-be and further downgrades the importance and regard of the procedure 
in antenatal care. 
 
The constituting of classes 
Such practices correspond to what Latimer (1999: 179) calls the ‘constituting of 
classes’. Latimer identifies how older people in acute medicine are not interpreted 
as appropriate medical material. Patients are categorised into a hierarchy of values 
constituting a moral order. Here, the complaints of older patients, positioned at the 
bottom of this moral order, such as breathlessness and chest pain are refigured 
from the medical into the social, that is, into discourse of the personal and psycho-
social (Latimer 1997, 1999). This reclassification and (re)production of hierarchies 
of value means patients are discharged or made ‘disposable’ (Latimer 1999: 176) 
since they do not belong to the technical terrain of medicine. Disposal, for Berg 
(1992) and Latimer (1999), refers to how professionals engage in a mode of 
ordering which helps them keep their world in order and square accounts to 
themselves and others. According to Latimer (1999: 180), shifting a patient’s 
identity does not mean disposing of people but rather part of their responsibility to 
categories of patients who they must, to some extent, ‘give up’ so they can care for 
those with whom they feel compelled to work. This constituting of classes, in turn, 
is endlessly accomplished. For Latimer (2008b: 164), it is ‘what helps keep the 
medical domain in order’. 
 
Such ‘moves’ (Latimer 1999: 180) are also evident in Freymarsh and Springtown. 
In the extracts above, it is clear Down’s syndrome screening is constituted as a 
trivial procedure which can be performed on demand and as a non-prioritised task 
in the hierarchy of clinical value (shown not least by its relegation down the 
professional pecking order). It is ‘easy stuff’ which ‘clogs up’ the precious time of 
consultants since parents-to-be undertaking Down’s syndrome screening, at least 
in the early stages, are yet to attain the status of clinical interest (Bosk 1992). 
According to Strong (1979: 225), doctors ‘tend to prefer acute medicine’ since they 
are ‘trained to cure’ and derive satisfaction from ‘the speedy resolution of organic 
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problems’. Since Down’s syndrome screening consultations do not promise this 
feat, their ‘special skills’ are reallocated to contexts in which they can be put to 
‘much greater use’ (1979: 225). Although falling under the remit of obstetric care, 
it is relegated by consultants to midwives, thus establishing their territory and 
protecting the purity of the clinical space by consigning the polluting work of 
screening down the division(s) of labour. Screening consultations, as such, become 
downgraded as non-technical tasks which represent ‘trivia’ (Dingwall and Murphy 
1983: 144) or ‘matter out of place’ (Douglas 1966: 36) in obstetric care unless 
diagnostic testing (amniocentesis or CVS) is required, namely, when screening 
becomes diagnostic. 
 
‘We do normality, we don’t do pathology’ 
In the first part of this chapter, I identified how screening for Down’s syndrome is 
downgraded through consultations, polluting the purity of the clinical space, being 
relegated to midwives and sonographers. In what follows, I describe how it can be 
further downgraded through how professionals classify this care and what such 
modes of organising, in turn, accomplish. In Freymarsh and Springtown, midwives 
and sonographers regularly describe Down’s syndrome screening as a routine and 
expected component of a pregnancy trajectory. Speaking of her impending exit 
from FMD50 during one conversation, Elena (FMD head midwife) claims: 
 
There’s just more misery walking through the door every day. I’ve had 
enough. I’ll go back to FAD to do the ordinary stuff. It’ll be nice to go back 
to that as I’ve done it all before. 
 
Elena claims her imminent departure from FMD is due to the increasing ‘misery 
walking through the door’. Relocating to the FAD, for Elena, represents a return to 
the ‘ordinary stuff’. This classification of ‘ordinary stuff’ parallels Dr Karman’s (FMD 
consultant) distinction during one conversation between the ‘routine stuff’ of the 
FAD and the ‘weird stuff’ of FMD, the latter referring to treating and managing 
                                                     
50 As a reminder, FMD is a referral service. In the context of Down’s syndrome screening, parents-
to-be will only be referred to FMD from FAD if they decide to pursue diagnostic testing. This is 
where CVS or an amniocentesis is performed, where parents-to-be will be counselled about a result, 
and where parents-to-be can have a termination of pregnancy. 
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certain defects in unborn babies. In Freymarsh and Springtown, Down’s syndrome 
screening is categorised as routine and ordinary stuff, a mundane component of 
antenatal life. For Berg (1992: 170), a routine refers to a set of actions ‘repetitively 
carried out with a certain automatism’ without explicitly reflecting on or 
legitimating the actions involved. In the medical problem-solving process, ‘routines 
are of major importance’ (1992: 170). The routine of Down’s syndrome screening, 
by interconnecting with the routines of other tasks in the respective institution 
(creating organisational routines), can be classified as what Nancy (FAD 
midwife)51, in the following extract, defines as ‘normality’: 
 
Rosie (MCA) and Nancy are in the office. Nancy is on the telephone to Mrs Earl 
who is part of Nancy’s specialist clinic for mothers-to-be with twin 
pregnancies. The conversation ends. Nancy turns to me: 
 
Nancy: [Mrs Earl] is having a real rough time of it at the moment. Her 
feet, legs, and thighs have swollen massively. She’s only a petit lady so it 
looks terrible. Her skin around there is rock hard too. I just hope it isn’t 
anything serious like preeclampsia52. I recommended she should see 
someone. I said to her I’m a midwife, I’m not a doctor. But I would feel 
awful if I didn’t say anything and then something happened to her or the 
baby. It doesn’t sound right, does it? It does happen to women but at 
what point does it become pathological, you know? We do normality, we 
don’t do pathology. Doctors do all the oedema53, preeclampsia, and stuff. 
I’m not medical but that worries me, you know, is it physiological or 
pathological? Can you imagine what would happen if I didn’t say 
anything? 
Rosie: You’d get in a lot of trouble! 
                                                     
51 Nancy is also an FMD midwife but I observed her most frequently in FAD. 
52 Preeclampsia is a condition characterised by high blood pressure and a large amount of protein 
in the urine of a pregnant woman. It affects up to 10% of pregnancies and severe cases develop in 
1-2% of pregnancies. Although most cases of preeclampsia cause no problems and improve soon 
after the baby is delivered, there is a risk of serious complications affecting the mother and her 
baby. 
53 Oedema is the medical term for fluid retention in the body. 
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Nancy: That’s my official licence gone. And I couldn’t live with myself if 
something happened. Some of the women we have are a bit precious and 
demand our care but at the end of the day, you understand it because 
they want their babies to be healthy and who wouldn’t? 
 
After finishing her conversation with Mrs Earl, Nancy describes her symptoms and 
refers Mrs Earl onwards in hope ‘it isn’t anything serious like preeclampsia’. Unsure 
when Mrs Earl’s problems ‘become pathological’, Nancy downplays her 
professional competence by deferring authority to doctors who ‘do all the oedema, 
preeclampsia, and stuff’. Importantly, Nancy claims ‘we do normality, we don’t do 
pathology’; distancing herself from ‘medical’ and ‘physiological or pathological’ 
matters, she worries a failure to ‘say anything’ would constitute both an emotional 
burden and potential loss of employment. Since Mrs Earl does not integrate into 
the category of normality, she is referred to a doctor. 
 
However, since Down’s syndrome screening is performed by midwives, it is not 
classified as pathological or as meriting the intervention of doctors. Positioned as 
an unproblematic and natural enterprise, screening consultations fall to midwives 
dealing with ‘normality’, that is, to borrow Dr Karman’s term, the ‘routine stuff’. 
This framing of Down’s syndrome as a routine practice and non-technical matter 
often manifests itself in screening consultations. Toni (FAD midwife), for instance, 
describes the consultation to parents-to-be as ‘just a chat’, whilst the likes of Tara 
(FAD midwife) frequently describe the procedure to parents-to-be as a ‘simple 
blood test’. The following fieldnotes are taken from a consultation between Lois 
(FAD midwife) and Mrs Patel (mother-to-be): 
 
Lois: Today we’re going to chat about the Down’ syndrome test. Have 
you had Down’s syndrome screening before? 
Mrs Patel: Yes. 
Lois: Do you understand it then? 
Mrs Patel: I just had it last time, I didn’t know anything about it. I wasn’t 
told I was having it and I was just told that nothing is good news. 
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Lois: OK. So do you know much about Down’s syndrome and affects it 
has? 
Mrs Patel: Yes. 
Lois: Well this is a blood test which doesn’t affect the baby. You’re 
provided with a lower-risk or higher-risk result. A lower-risk result 
means no further testing but it doesn’t mean the baby definitely doesn’t 
have Down’s syndrome. The screen has a 70% detection rate and if 
you’re lower-risk, you receive a letter saying this within ten working 
days. A lower-risk result can be 1 in 200 or something like 1 in 1000. The 
cut off is 1 in 150. So anything above that is a higher-risk and you’d get 
that within five working days so it’s done quite quickly. You’d be offered 
an appointment within twenty-four hours and we’d offer you an 
amniocentesis where we check the fluid around the baby. It has a 
miscarriage rate though of 1 in 100. But if you do have a higher-risk 
result, we invite you in and we have a good chat about what you want to 
do about it. Have you thought about what you would do? Would you 
want to know whether you’re a lower-risk or higher-risk? 
Mrs Patel: Yes I want to know. 
Lois: OK. 
 
Lois fills in Mrs Patel’s medical record. Lois leads Mrs Patel to another room 
for the quadruple screen. 
 
After Mrs Patel accounts for her lack of knowledge regarding Down’s syndrome 
screening (‘I just had it last time, I didn’t know anything about it’), Lois accepts Mrs 
Patel’s claim that she knows about the condition itself (I return to knowledge of 
the condition in chapter 7) and subsequently provides information constituting the 
staple diet of Down’s syndrome screening consultations: its non-invasiveness, the 
production of a lower-risk or higher-risk result, the source and timeframe of news, 
the prospect of diagnostic testing, confirming that parents-to-be want to undertake 
screening, and the accuracy of the procedure (admittedly the latter point is rarer). 
I suggest defining screening consultations as ‘simple’ or as ‘a chat’ reflects how 
midwives and sonographers constitute Down’s syndrome screening in everyday 
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clinical life and how this downgrades it as an unproblematic practice. As a simple 
procedure, its value is downgraded. This can explain why parents-to-be consent to 
screening, naturalising and normalising what is supposed to be an opt-in rather 
than opt-out practice (Tsouroufli 2011). 
 
The routinisation of Down’s syndrome screening is reflected in the material and 
spatial organisation of antenatal care. Earlier, I referred to how structural changes 
in FAD caused confusion regarding who carried out screening consultations. This 
confusion also translated to the location of such consultations. When asked who 
carries out screening consultations (and where) following such changes, for 
instance, Camilla (FAD midwife) claims: 
 
We haven’t really figured that one yet! The couch starts doing Down’s, 
then they come over to clinic [with doctors], and then they do some 
clinic stuff [with doctors]. I don’t think any of us know about it. It 
changes every week and we just end up doing them in whatever room 
we can get. 
 
Camilla identifies how the couch, namely an allocated midwife conducting specific 
duties (including screening consultations), initially performs consultations until 
the classification of ‘clinic stuff’ takes priority. In contrast, Down’s syndrome 
screening is not allocated, at least at this moment, a permanent ‘home’ for carrying 
out consultations nor is repairing this seen as a priority. This lack of prioritisation 
is reflected in FAD by folders, on many occasions, resting in the blue box whilst 
other clinical tasks took priority. The blue box and red folders, in such instances, 
remain symbolic and are mobilised in ordering who or what is deserving of 
primary attention (White et al. 2012). Here, the hospital functions as a space of 
prioritisation. The following fieldnotes were taken during a morning at Freymarsh: 
 
I enter the office. Lindsay, Lois, and Rita (midwives) are busy at their desks. 
Lois is today’s couch: 
 
Lois and Lindsay: Good morning! 
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Gareth: Morning! How are you both doing? 
Lindsay: All good. 
Lois: Good thanks. You? 
Gareth: Good thanks. So I was told yesterday you’ve got ten consultations 
for Down’s syndrome screening today, Lois. Is that right? 
Lois: [Looking surprised] Really? I’ll check but I haven’t received any yet. 
 
Lois leaves the office and returns from reception smiling with four folders in 
her hand. It is 09:15 and there were appointments at 08:00, 08:10, 08:20, 
08:30, 08:40, 08:50, 09:00, 09:10, 09:30 and 10:00. It later transpires two 
consultations were carried out by another midwife. Lois leaves the office to 
collect the first parent-to-be. 
 
It is in such situations that Down’s syndrome screening becomes disposed of as not 
a priority. It is constituted as a trivial duty performed by a couch or the unattached, 
with other tasks becoming prioritised in the organisation of care. In addition, 
consultations are performed, as Camilla explains to me during one conversation, ‘in 
whatever room we can get’. The importance of material objects, or ‘props’ (Goffman 
1959), in healthcare work has been explored elsewhere (Hillman 2007; Latimer 
2004; Sandelowski 2003; White et al. 2012). Such casual attention to the 
significance of materials and space in the delivery of care is reflected during one 
consultation between Toni (FAD midwife) and Mr and Mrs Hayes (parents-to-be): 
 
Mr and Mrs Hayes enter the room and sit on the chairs. Toni follows them into 
the room. The door is left propped open by a bin: 
 
Toni: So are you OK? 
Mrs Hayes: Yes but I’ve seen so many different midwives. I’m so 
confused. 
Toni: Well today you’re seeing me for your Down’s syndrome screening. 
So you know this does not provide a yes or no answer? 
Mrs Hayes: It’s just the blood test, yes? 
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Toni: Yes. Your result has to be a 1 in 150 result or less to be considered 
higher-risk and so be offered an amniocentesis. 
Mrs Hayes: So the figure has to be 1:151 or above for me to get away 
with it and 1:149 or less to not get away with it? 
Toni: Yes. 
Mrs Hayes: So a higher-risk can be a 1 in 150 or 1 in 2 then? 
Toni: Yes. If you’re higher-risk, we contact you and invite you into clinic. 
If you’re lower-risk, we send you a letter telling you this. 
Mr Hayes: So the letter is for good things and the phone call is for bad 
things? 
Toni: Yes. If you’re higher-risk, we call you in 3-4 working days but if 
they don’t hear anything, this is a good thing. 
 
Toni takes some details about future antenatal bookings and asks Mr and Mrs 
Hayes if they have more questions. Toni leads Mr and Mrs Hayes to the bloods 
room for their quadruple test. 
 
Mrs Hayes conveys her confusion at meeting a multitude of midwives during her 
pregnancy care. Toni notifies Mrs Hayes she will be screened for Down’s syndrome 
today, later providing information on the outcome of the procedure and the 
possibility of diagnostic testing should a higher-risk result be established. Mr and 
Mrs Hayes often crave and distinguish binaries in their accounts, with risk factors 
amounting to ‘[getting]’ or ‘not [getting] away with it’ and contact being established 
in the case of either ‘good things’ or ‘bad things’. Whilst Toni does not seek 
reassurance from Mr and Mrs Hayes that they wish to undertake screening, an 
action encouraged by many midwives at Freymarsh (i.e. the notion that parents-to-
be can opt out of the procedure should be reiterated), the importance of the door 
being propped open during the consultation highlights the informality and routine-
ness of screening consultations. 
 
Importantly, this shifts in FMD. Here, much more attention is paid to ‘performative 
architecture’ (Stephens et al. 2008). Developing Thrift’s (2006) concept of the 
‘performative building’, Stephens et al. describe how the physical space of a stem 
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cell bank becomes central to its performance as a sterile and scientifically-
legitimate institution. Ritualistic treatments of technologies and geographies act 
‘as accrediting artefacts of the Bank’s legitimacy within a diversity of social 
networks and affiliations’ (Stephens et al. 2008: 89). In FMD, the space is similarly 
inscribed with symbolic meaning by professionals. Consider the following 
fieldnotes from a consultation between Dr Karman (FMD consultant) and Mr and 
Mrs Parnell (parents-to-be): 
 
I follow Dr Karman into the room. As I enter, Elena (FMD head midwife) is 
sitting with Mrs Parnell. Dr Karman asks me to close the curtain. Mr and Mrs 
Parnell’s unborn baby has been previously diagnosed with a heart defect. Dr 
Karman tells Mr and Mrs Parnell whilst the defect is ‘manageable’, the unborn 
baby requires surgery after childbirth and delivery at another hospital better-
equipped to handle the case is recommended. Elena leaves the consultation 
and ensures the curtain remains closed. 
 
Dr Karman similarly reflects on spatial organisation in accomplishing care during a 
conversation we have in the early stages of my fieldwork: 
 
Dr Karman leads me to a large room, telling me it is dedicated to performing 
an amniocentesis or CVS as well as other procedures. Dr Karman explains 
parents-to-be are later invited back to FMD should a diagnosis be established 
and then shows me the room where this news is delivered. The room is large 
containing a desk, three chairs, and a bed: 
 
Dr Karman: The room for delivering the news is much bigger than we 
used to use. It was the size of a cupboard. Now when you’re delivering 
news of this nature, that’s inappropriate isn’t it? 
 
In the first extract, Dr Karman and Elena are vigilant in ensuring the curtain 
remains closed during the consultation. In her study of a maternity unit, Burden 
(1998: 15) describes how curtains are used to maintain or preserve privacy, with 
patients positioning them as a form of ‘signalling’ to both peers and professionals 
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in an attempt to seek information or support. In FMD, the use of curtains 
corresponds to delivering appropriate care, that is, of ensuring it remains closed in 
the consultation involving Mr and Mrs Parnell. In the second extract, Dr Karman 
highlights the inappropriateness of a room ‘the size of a cupboard’ when ‘you’re 
delivering news of this nature’. The performative architecture of Freymarsh and 
Springtown involves technologies not only demarcating divisions of labour (e.g. 
FAD maternity care assistants deliver the folders to the blue box to be collected by 
FAD midwives) but also signifying privacy and the constituting of classes in the 
clinic. 
 
In FMD, FAD, and SAD, care becomes a social and material achievement, with the 
materiality of the space often being conducive to the nature of the consultation 
(González-Santos 2011). For Down’s syndrome screening, whilst doors were not 
always propped open during consultations, such an incident is indicative of its 
downgrading in the clinic since little attention is afforded to the environment in 
which consultations take place. The triviality of Down’s syndrome screening can 
also be reflected by my relatively unproblematic access to consultations. Without 
introduction but with consent, midwives/sonographers and parents-to-be always 
accepted my presence without objection. In contrast, procedures which were 
categorised as ‘serious’ (such as feticides) or ‘invasive’ (such as amniocentesis or 
trans-vaginal ultrasound scanning) required a more active engagement with issues 
surrounding my entry. This observation shows how Down’s syndrome screening is 
downgraded as a routine and unproblematic procedure for which I am bestowed 
entry. Indeed, Down’s syndrome screening is constituted as a devalued and 
downgraded task. Positioned lowly in a hierarchy of clinical priorities (Latimer 
1997) and classified as a chat or simple test, it is upheld as a routine component of 
antenatal care. Tsouroufli (2011) similarly concludes that the fast processing of 
women, promotion of screening as a safe test, and professionals’ expectations that 
parents-to-be would opt for the procedure routinises the offer of screening. 
 
‘Hands-on midwifery work’ 
I have described how midwives and sonographers do not prioritise Down’s 
syndrome screening in their daily work. In the clinic, patients are subjected to 
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categorisation processes, an (unofficial) taxonomy commonly corresponding to 
perceived moral fitness demarcating the appropriateness of their presence (Becker 
1993; Berg 1997; Hillman 2007; Jeffery 1979; Latimer 1999; Dingwall and Murphy 
1983; White et al. 2012). Whilst moral and critical appraisals of patients in FAD 
and SAD are rarely observed, certain tasks are preferred and thus prioritised. This 
highlights another way in which the organisation of antenatal care downgrades 
Down’s syndrome screening, namely, by routine screening consultations being cast 
as mundane and tedious duties not allowing professionals to fulfil integral 
components of their identity-work. Classifications of desired and undesired roles 
are highlighted during a conversation with Lisa (SAD sonographer) about her 
imminent shift at Freymarsh54: 
 
Lisa: I’ve got my kidneys, gall bladders, and livers now. I hate them. I 
spent the morning doing prenatal stuff but we change it up so I’ll be 
stuck doing them now.  
Gareth: So you don’t like them? 
Lisa: You just don’t enjoy them as much. It’s not pregnancy stuff. It’s 
boring, you know? Instead I’m going to be doing all of the yuk stuff 
[laughs]. 
 
Lisa complains about carrying out consultations which involves ‘all of the yuk stuff’, 
translating to patients who have problems with their kidneys, gall bladder, or liver. 
She prefers the ‘pregnancy stuff’, a role she defines as a more enjoyable component 
of her daily routine. Similarly, we can return to Lois’ (FAD midwife) distinction 
cited earlier in the thesis between ‘hands-on midwifery work’ against tasks which 
she says do not reflect ‘part of what is a midwife’s job’. So what work constitutes 
hands-on midwifery work compared to tasks which are not part of what is a 
midwife’s job? Whilst Lois includes the task of ‘discuss[ing] things with women’ as 
normal midwifery, small acts of separation – often ‘buried in habit’ (Douglas 1966: 
9) – are made within this more condensed network of professional tasks. Down’s 
syndrome screening, in turn, often falls short of being hands-on midwifery work. 
                                                     
54 Lisa works in both SAD and the Freymarsh radiology department. Our conversation follows an 
interview which was organised during her lunch break. 
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Consider how Lindsay (FAD midwife) describes Down’s syndrome screening 
consultations during an interview: 
 
[Consultations] are repetitive. [...] I wouldn’t say it was boring but it does 
get a bit repetitive. You’re just providing information. 
 
Similar to Lindsay, other midwives and sonographers have described Down’s 
syndrome screening consultations as dull and routine, a pedestrian component of 
their working practice. For Lindsay and other professionals, boredom stems from 
the repetitive nature of consultations since their care is limited to providing 
factually correct medical information (Bosk 1992). During a conversation, Esther 
(SAD sonographer) describes the discrepancies potentially emerging since Down’s 
syndrome screening represents a routine practice: 
 
I get bored of saying the same thing over and over. You have to try and 
make it sound different and interesting every time. It’s like a 
performance. [...] The difficulty is sometimes you’re saying the same 
thing over and over again. Sometimes you can’t remember whether 
you’ve said certain things or not, so it absolutely is a performance. It 
does become routine. And you’ve got be very careful that it doesn’t come 
across to the women that you’re scanning which is why I couldn’t do it 
day in, day out. 
 
Esther claims she is ‘bored of saying the same thing over and over’, identifying the 
professionals’ labour in ensuring the ‘performance’ of a ‘routine’ procedure is never 
fully revealed. The tedium cited by Esther is reflected in the following fieldnotes 
taken from a consultation between Jackie (FAD midwife) and Mr and Mrs Wotton 
(parents-to-be): 
 
Jackie: Let me weigh you first [Mrs Wotton is weighed]. Are you here for 
the Down’s syndrome screening? 
Mrs Wotton: Yes. 
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Jackie: Do you know that you’re not going to find anything from this test? 
It is only going to tell you whether your baby has a high or low chance of 
Down’s syndrome. 
Mrs Wotton: Yes. 
Mr Wotton: Yes that’s all in the information anyway. 
Jackie: OK. Amniocentesis will be offered if you come back as a higher-
risk. The cut off here is 1:150 which means if you’re 1:150 or higher, 
you’re a higher chance. 
Mrs Wotton: So if it’s higher than 1 in 150, that means I have a high 
chance? 
Jackie: Yes. With the amniocentesis, a needle is put in the stomach and 
this takes out some fluid which is sent to the labs and this can say 
whether your baby is affected. Do you have any more questions? 
Mr and Mrs Wotton: No. 
 
Jackie fills in some details on the medical record. She takes Mrs Wotton to the 
bloods room to have the quadruple screen. I return to the office. As I write up 
notes, Jackie enters the office. Angela (midwife) is working at another desk: 
 
Jackie: [Turning to me] You can sit in with me on more if you want. You’ll 
get bored of hearing the same thing over and over eventually. It gets 
repetitive and boring after a while. The brain shuts down and the mouth 
starts playing when doing Down’s syndrome screening! 
Angela: Yes [laughs]! 
 
The ‘repetitive and boring’ nature of screening consultations, Jackie quips, gives 
rise to ‘the brain [shutting] down and the mouth [starting] playing’. A similar 
sentiment is expressed by the admin staff at Springtown who describe themselves 
as ‘parrots’ and ‘like recorded messages’ (Hannah, SAD admin staff), signifying the 
rudimentary and anodyne nature of communicating information around Down’s 
syndrome screening. 
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Professional identity-work 
It seems the reason why Down’s syndrome screening is constructed as boring and 
routine is because it is not part of the highly valued hands-on midwifery work 
which becomes important for performing a meaningful professional identity. This 
is particularly vital for FAD midwives since the entirety of midwifery, according to 
Elena (FMD head midwife), constitutes ‘a Cinderella of the whole antenatal service’ 
since ‘the big guns are up on the delivery suite’. Elena highlights how some aspects 
of antenatal care are professionally impure and regularly promise a low intra-
professional status. Some midwives claimed they ‘bear the brunt of complaints’ 
(Francine, FMD head midwife) and doctors do not receive the same (negative) 
treatment which she and other midwives experience, attributing this to ‘the doctor 
midwife psychology’. During one exchange, Amy (FAD midwife) suggests ‘other 
departments don’t actually get that midwifery is a really important part of antenatal 
care’ whilst Rita (FAD midwife), after I asked her during one conversation how her 
day was progressing, answered ‘understaffed, underpaid, and working with new 
systems that no-one knows how to follow!’ 
 
Although Rita’s complaint was light-hearted, it reflects other complaints made by 
midwives and sonographers. Several professionals, though particularly midwives 
positioned arguably as ‘gatekeepers without turf’ (Bosk 1992: 72) and part of an 
unwitting mop-up service, often distinguish themselves as occupying an unsteady 
or at least undervalued role in antenatal care. In his study of genetic counsellors, 
Bosk (1992) suggests such professionals are fully aware they are a mop-up service 
and acknowledge the tasks which fall within their demoted role. In contrast, FAD 
midwives and SAD sonographers do not seem to openly identify themselves as a 
mop-up service. Nonetheless, constructing and retaining a meaningful professional 
identity is of paramount importance since midwives commonly view their role as 
undervalued. As such, hands-on midwifery work provides crucial material for this 
construction. Asked about her job roles, Susan (FAD midwife) explains:  
 
You do a lot of screening, a lot of deciding if people are higher-risk or 
lower-risk pregnancies, you do speciality clinics which are really 
interesting like diabetics, anti-D clinic, and rheumatology clinics. There 
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are loads of positives working in FAD. [...] I’m not a fan of looking at 
blood results, checking them off, and sending out letters. I feel like it’s a 
waste of a midwife’s role. But I like doing my haematology clinic because 
I get to know my women as well. Because they’re such high-risk women, 
we work quite a lot together and if they get any problems, they can call 
me. 
 
Susan describes the ‘positives’ of working in FAD together with the less desirable 
roles of ‘looking at blood results, checking them off, and sending out letters’. She 
defines the latter tasks as ‘a waste of a midwife’s role’ whilst conveying the 
enjoyment of her own haematology speciality clinic. On a number of occasions, 
FAD midwives claimed ownership over their own ‘speciality clinics’ which are 
valued as enjoyable tasks appropriate for identity-work. Susan’s enjoyment stems 
from ‘[getting] to know my women’, claiming ownership over ‘high-risk women’ 
who she is able to establish a relationship with. Lindsay (FAD midwife) similarly 
identifies the opportunity to help parents-to-be and ‘sort out their problems’ as one 
key component in formulating a meaningful identity. Camilla (FAD midwife) 
likewise claims she likes speciality clinics since ‘you get to know women and their 
case’. During one conversation, Francine (FMD head midwife) describes how she 
would not want to work in FAD since her role in FMD involves ‘more rewarding 
work’: 
 
We all have our own areas of interest. I don’t like kidneys. They don’t 
interest me very much. But I like everything else. They’re a bit, it sounds 
awful, but a bit common and mundane. I like the cases that you can 
actually feel that you’re offering the families support and advice so they 
can get some benefit, however hard the decision they’re making is. 
Whether it is to continue or not to continue [a pregnancy], they feel 
they’ve got someone to turn to. It’s a really nice feeling to be able to do 
that. It is very satisfying which I don’t really get as much in normal 
midwifery because if it’s normal, a lot of women just go through 
pregnancies and don’t really need extra support. I like to feel more useful 
really. [...] Not to sound morbid or sick but I almost prefer it when there 
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are problems so we can help them rather than when the baby is normal 
and healthy and we’re all forgotten about. 
 
Francine suggests professionals ‘have our own areas of interest’, claiming kidneys 
are ‘a bit common and mundane’ whilst placing value on care which offers 
embodied opportunities of ‘[feeling] more useful’ and ‘offering the families support 
and advice’. Such opportunities, for Francine, are not accessible in ‘normal 
midwifery’. This shows how professionals embrace tasks providing them with an 
opportunity to help and work in a manner they imagined prior to qualification. 
During an interview, Sophie (SAD sonographer) similarly describes her preference 
for undertaking ‘tough cases’ which offer a chance to ‘reassure’ parents-to-be if 
‘things are not going to plan’. Similar to Sophie’s classification of the ‘bad things’, 
roughly translating to tasks tendering a space in which professionals actively assist 
help parents-to-be, Gail (FAD midwife) describes cases in which ‘there is not a good 
outcome’ as ‘interesting’: 
 
These make the work a little bit more interesting if you like than where 
you’ve got the run of the mill stuff. When you’ve got some things a little 
bit more out of the ordinary, it can make it a little bit more interesting, 
can’t it? We all need variety and if you’re doing the same things day after 
day, you can get a little bored or it can get a little samey. 
 
Gail crafts a distinction between the ‘interesting’ work which offers ‘variety’ and 
the ‘run of the mill stuff’ which breeds boredom and is ‘a little samey’. Such tasks 
often translate to care professionals define as ‘emotional’ (Elena, FMD midwife). 
The same professionals reflect on the emotionality of their work, exerting great 
efforts to sustain a distinction between home-life and work-life. When asked about 
her job during an interview, Elena (FMD head midwife) explains: 
 
It is a very emotional job. I’m not saying you don’t get involved with 
patients but when you’re delivering bad news to someone, there’s 
another ten women out there and you’ve got to do exactly the same thing 
with them. The unthinkable is a reality here and it relates to a lot of stuff 
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that happens in [FMD]. [...] It’s challenging for you and it’s challenging for 
the parents. [...] I always make a point of not wearing my uniform when I 
leave for home and it was a little change I did. Because I used to do take 
the emotions of the work home but then, I did that sort of very physical 
thing of taking the uniform off and putting my clothes on before going 
home. Because a lot of it is protecting yourself as well as sort of giving 
the information. [...] There are still times that you still get stuck up on 
some patients but I think we’re all human. It’s natural. 
 
In an environment in which, according to Elena, ‘the unthinkable becomes a reality’, 
professionals must adopt tactics to manage this ‘emotional job’. Elena suggests her 
uniform sustains a physical barrier between work life and home life. Many other 
professionals say they had self-protecting strategies for preserving emotional and 
moral distance from their work. Gail (FAD midwife), for instance, suggests 
developing ‘a dark or black sense of humour’ as a ‘way of coping with things’. Whilst 
Elena’s role is in FMD, a department in which ‘bad news happens’ (Francine, FMD 
head midwife), such contentions can be extended to include FAD midwives and 
SAD sonographers. Professionals claim that in order to avoid undermining the 
principles of professionalism, they have to ‘be detached from patients in some 
respects’ (Rita, FAD midwife) and ‘draw the line and still be a professional’ (Martha, 
FAD midwife) even if it is ‘hard to switch off’ (Susan, FAD midwife). 
 
The ‘emotional labour’ (Hochschild 1983) involved for professionals in healthcare 
institutions (Kerr 2013; Larson and Yao 2005) and midwifery specifically (Deery 
2009; Hunter 2004) has been reported elsewhere. However, by considering what 
tasks professionals define as ‘emotional’ accomplish, I show how they are highly 
valued by midwives and sonographers and considered as an important component 
of becoming a competent professional. Duties which afford professionals an 
opportunity to invest in, help, and ‘get to know’ parents-to-be are often those 
preferred and prioritised in the clinic. Down’s syndrome screening does not tender 
this prospect. Professionals fail to build a relationship with parents-to-be during 
screening consultations because the latter commonly attend the clinic only on one 
occasion, meaning they rarely have a hospital career, and because consultations 
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are frequently conducted in a short timeframe. Others have identified the conflict 
between the time professionals have to explain Down’s syndrome screening and 
the time required to fully discuss the procedure (Sooben 2010; Williams et al. 
2002a). During a conversation, Esther (SAD sonographer) describes the difficulty 
of conveying empathy within a restricted encounter: 
 
You can’t show empathy during some procedures because you’ve only 
got ten minutes to do the scan and people get annoyed because when 
other people have problems which take up time and the clinic’s run over 
time, how can you possibly give compassionate care if you’re constantly 
thinking my time with patients is going to overrun? 
 
In FAD and SAD, the timeslots allocated for quadruple screens and NT scans are 
ten minutes and twenty minutes respectively. Consultations rarely extend beyond 
this period of time yet their premature conclusion is much more common. In FAD, 
more time is dedicated, for example, to counselling parents-to-be who experience a 
miscarriage in the current pregnancy and to managing parents-to-be attending 
speciality clinics. In SAD, more time is dedicated, as another example, to 
performing five-view cardiac ultrasound scans rather than NT scans. Within 
restricted encounters, the capacity to ‘show empathy’ (Esther, SAD sonographer) 
and invest in parents-to-be, that is, to establish ‘patient contact’ (Amy, FAD 
midwife) and ‘sort out their problems (Lindsay, FAD midwife) is not possible, tasks 
which are enacted by professionals as important to their working knowledge and 
self-understanding.  As a time-restricted and, in assuming the discourse of 
professionals, unemotional task, Down’s syndrome screening is thus downgraded 
in the clinic. 
 
Summary 
In this chapter, I captured how screening for Down’s syndrome is organised as a 
routine practice and how it is downgraded in many ways which accomplishes and 
re-accomplishes identities and hierarchies (mostly between the separate tasks in 
antenatal care and between foetal medicine and midwifery). Its downgrading is 
accomplished in three ways. First, Down’s syndrome screening is relegated from 
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consultants to midwives and sonographers not always officially trained in the 
practice. In developing Latimer’s (1999) ‘constituting of classes’, I revealed how 
parents-to-be are categorised into a hierarchy of values constituting order in the 
clinic. Since Down’s syndrome screening pollutes consultants’ technical world, it is 
reclassified as belonging to the realm of midwives and sonographers who ‘mop-up’ 
(Bosk 1992) the mess. However, my arguments go beyond Bosk’s (1992) work. 
Bosk shows how professionals have work shifted onto them because of a pre-
existing medical hierarchy; doctors (highly-esteemed) relegate tasks to genetic 
counsellors (lowly-esteemed). However, I captured how this medical hierarchy is 
accomplished and re-accomplished around the classification and subsequent non-
prioritisation of Down’s syndrome screening. Categorising screening, at least 
initially, as a nontechnical matter (and so not belonging to obstetrics) protects the 
purity and value of obstetric care. Through the constituting of classes, thus, Down’s 
syndrome screening is a resource for reproducing divisions between professionals 
and their tasks. 
 
Second, Down’s syndrome screening is downgraded through being constructed as 
a simple and routine component of antenatal care accomplished in both social 
processes (descriptions of being a ‘simple test’) and cultural materials (FAD doors 
being propped open and FMD curtains being closed).  FAD midwives particularly 
highlight how their work is concerned with ‘normal’ rather than ‘pathological’ (or 
technical) care. However, so much of midwives’ daily routines involve surveillance 
and monitoring mothers-to-be such as taking bloods and performing ultrasound 
scans, contributing to creating a pathological pregnancy. This relation between 
everyday midwifery work and Down’s syndrome screening shows how the latter is 
entangled in ‘motility’, referring to how people or things are moved in different 
spaces of discourse which invokes specific affects by altering the very essence of 
such entities (Latimer 2013; Latimer and Munro 2006; Munro 2001). Professionals 
shift the ‘world’ (Latimer 1999; Munro 1999) of screening through interactions 
whereby they switch discursive domains. Rather than interpreting this conduct as 
deviant or contradictory, I identify a motility in which professionals shift backward 
and forward between different spaces of discourse and possibilities for conduct, 
that is, shifts shifting the world (Latimer 2008b). 
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In the context of Down’s syndrome screening, professionals switch discursive 
domains to recognise how, in one moment, screening is a downgraded assignment 
(counselling parents-to-be before the procedure) but in another moment is 
upgraded work when it gets ‘serious’ (a higher-risk result requiring counselling). 
In many ways, Down’s syndrome screening occupies a liminal space; it is often not 
valued or deemed worthy of FAD midwives’ primary attention, for instance, but it 
is relegated from FMD consultants for whom it is not yet clinical enough to merit 
attention. Down’s syndrome screening is emplaced in midwifery and sonography 
yet, concurrently, it does not become their primary professional concern (at least 
in midwifery). Despite such shifts, Down’s syndrome screening is mostly produced 
and reproduced as a routine and ‘normal’ aspect of pregnancy, accomplishing its 
downgrading in the clinic. 
 
Third, in their ‘ordering work’ within the clinic (Latimer 1999: 160), midwives and 
sonographers produce and reproduce classifications which, in turn, cast Down’s 
syndrome as a familiar character in this drama. It is positioned as a trivial and non-
prioritised task which is not part of ‘hands-on midwifery work’. FAD midwives 
particularly, in a world in which they are asked to perform a wide range of duties, 
‘attach to’ (Latimer 2013) and invest value in tasks affording them a chance to 
become acquainted with parents-to-be. This sits alongside assignments commonly 
defined as ‘emotional’ such as delivering news of a miscarriage or helping parents-
to-be suffering a different yet equally serious setback in their current pregnancy. 
However, professionals frequently detach from Down’s syndrome screening who 
constitute it as an undesirable duty due to its monotony and incapacity to regularly 
offer the rewards identified above. Parents-to-be are often the ‘raw material’ 
(Becker 1993: 34) for professionals’ identity construction and performance of 
competence (Latimer 2000). As such, other clinical tasks, such as specialist clinics, 
which provide a ‘steady flow of interesting cases with sufficient time to savour 
each one’ are privileged (Dingwall and Murphy 1983: 143). Professionals align 
with and attach to a world in which screening is depersonalised, mundane, and 
banal. Hands-on midwifery work, as part of their domain of expertise, is elevated 
111 
to the heroic. Down’s syndrome screening, thus, is not ‘real midwifery’ (Hunter 
2004: 268) and is accomplished as a downgraded practice. 
 
In the following chapter, I describe the conduct of care when professionals offer 
Down’s syndrome screening. The routine nature of screening is produced and 
reproduced in two ways. First, professionals ascribe accountability to parents-to-
be under the rhetoric of ‘informed choice’ and ‘non-directive care’. Second, NT 
scans are reconfigured as entertaining opportunities to meet the unborn baby (the 
‘social’) over potentially detecting a chromosomal condition (the ‘medical’). 
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Chapter Six 
The Conduct of Care 
 
In chapter five, I explored how Down’s syndrome screening is downgraded and 
what this accomplishes in relation to hierarchies and identities in the clinic. In 
chapter six, I extend this focus by describing two ways in which the sedimentation 
of Down’s syndrome screening as a ‘routine’ aspect of antenatal care is produced 
and reproduced. First, midwives and sonographers reassign the responsibility of 
Down’s syndrome screening decisions to parents-to-be by citing governing 
professional discourses, namely informed choice (or reproductive choice55) and 
non-directive care, which frame intervention as flawed care. Adherence to these 
care-oriented principles not only performs ‘good care’ but allows midwives and 
sonographers, in their daily conduct, to ‘dispose’ (Latimer 1999) of screening and 
avoid responsibility for decision-making by assuming distance from the issues at 
hand. Second, ultrasound scans are frequently constructed, often by parents-to-be 
and on occasions by sonographers, as trouble-free and entertaining opportunities 
to meet the baby and reproduce kinship rather than to detect potential concerns. 
This emphasises the social over the medical dimension of the procedure. Taken 
together, such instances contribute to the naturalisation of Down’s syndrome 
screening in antenatal care. 
 
Regarding the chapter title, I opt for the term ‘conduct’ over ‘behaviour’. Conduct 
involves considering what professionals, primarily midwives and sonographers, do 
to organise the world, albeit not in any way they please (Latimer 2008b). Speaking 
on the notion of conduct, Garfinkel (1967) claims that the social is forever a matter 
of moral form whilst Foucault (1983) argues what counts as moral is always 
influenced by technologies of power or programs for conduct. Far from being free 
to conduct themselves as they please (they are not given carte blanche to always 
behave as they see fit), professionals become ‘conduits’ (Latimer 2008b) whose 
doing and being produces and reproduces power effects. This is clear in chapter 
                                                     
55 I use the terms reproductive choice and informed choice synonymously. Professionals in 
Freymarsh and Springtown recognised both terms as interchangeable. 
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five with how the process of Down’s syndrome screening is (de)valued and 
positioned as trivial. In chapter six and particularly during the focus on the 
rhetoric of informed choice, I show how professionals draw on discursive grounds 
and rules as well as cultural materials in order to legitimate and account for their 
conduct (rather than behaviour). 
 
‘It has to be your choice’ 
I begin this chapter by identifying how ‘informed choice’ and ‘non-directive care’, a 
transposable discourse infiltrating Down’s syndrome screening and antenatal care 
more generally, is enacted in the clinic and what this accomplishes. Notions of 
choice and autonomy are at the heart of current Western biomedical discourse. 
Reproductive technologies in particular are heralded as a route to liberation since 
they offer parents-to-be information about, and control over, offspring (García et 
al. 2008; Kerr and Cunningham-Burley 2000), although this may not always be 
empowering (Lippman 1994; Shakespeare 2011). In recent years, there has been a 
shift in Western healthcare systems from an overwhelmingly paternal medicine to 
an informed choice model (Mol 2008; Williams et al. 2002a), reflecting a departure 
from impersonal ‘corpse care’, of a clinician treating the body mechanically as a 
silent and docile object with personal markers stripped away (Foucault 1973; 
Leder 1992), to individualised ‘consenting care’ in which the responsibility of 
decision-making is usually assigned exclusively to patients (May 1992; Mol and 
Law 2004). This ‘logic of care’ (Mol 2008) places an emphasis on looking and 
listening to ‘grant patients their life as well as knowing them as if they were dead’ 
(Mol and Law 2004: 44). In a broader and more egalitarian view of (holistic) care, 
patients are to be considered as individuals with a right to participate in decisions. 
 
One way for understanding how professionals define informed choice and non-
directive care is to look at the information provided to parents-to-be and what 
details are omitted from consultations (Bosk 1992). In a setting in which the 
enactment of bureaucratic regulations transforms work into a distinct ceremonial 
order (Strong 1979), one must attend to how policy is translated and gets talked 
into practice and how it is enrolled, enacted, or deferred by professionals during 
care. In both Freymarsh and Springtown, both midwives and sonographers 
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emphasise their alignment with the entwining principles of non-directive care and 
informed choice when screening for Down’s syndrome. In FAD, parents-to-be are 
tendered a multitude of booklets and information on this procedure. One booklet 
reads: 
 
Only you can decide whether to have the test or not. Some women want 
to find out if their baby has Down’s syndrome, and some don’t. All 
women are offered a screening test for Down’s syndrome but the 
decision whether to have the test or not is yours. You can discuss with 
your midwife what you want to do. They will support you whatever you 
decide. 
 
This booklet, much like similar literature and policy documents, highlights whilst 
parents-to-be ‘can discuss’ procedures with midwives, they are the ‘only’ ones to 
decide about screening. Individual choice is a common rhetorical device in policy 
frameworks for Down’s syndrome screening, focusing on the individual rather 
than the social context of screening and testing (Kerr 2003). Professionals claim 
they abide by such stipulations, with Nancy (FAD midwife) emphasising during a 
conversation that parents-to-be ‘should make their own personal choice and be true 
to themselves’. I asked Camilla (FAD midwife) during an interview how she defines 
informed choice: 
 
Informed choice is giving them as much information as you can, the pros 
and cons, looking at the whole thing, what the consequences are of 
having it or not having it and what it’ll mean to them. Once you feel 
you’ve given the information and they seem to understand what you’re 
saying, and they can give you that back, then I’d say they’re making an 
informed choice. [...] [Parents-to-be] sometimes ask me if many people 
have the test. So I say “some people will do this” and try to show them 
there are different outcomes and you don’t have to just say yes or no. 
 
Camilla describes informed choice as ‘giving them as much information as you can’ 
including the advantages/disadvantages and outcomes of screening. Camilla claims 
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this offers parents-to-be a chance to ‘[make] an informed choice’. However, her 
suggestion of telling parents-to-be ‘some people will do this’ arguably undermines 
the ideal of informed choice by influencing the decisions of parents-to-be. This is 
made more explicit elsewhere. In NT scans, for instance, Esther (SAD sonographer) 
regularly suggests amniocentesis is ‘advised’ if a higher-risk result for Down’s 
syndrome is established. Esther’s comments, intended or not, can undercut the 
principle of informed choice. Describing amniocentesis as ‘advised’ does not 
constitute a ‘choice’, advice being translatable to subtly disciplining parents-to-be 
into making certain choices. Advice, then, can be explicit (Silverman 1987; Strong 
1979) or implicit (Latimer 2007; Pilnick and Zayts 2012). However, as 
Schwennesen and Koch (2012: 283) note, undercutting the rhetoric of informed 
consent does not always translate to bad practice. Whilst not always immediately 
compatible with the non-directive ethos, professionals’ conduct can constitute 
‘good care’ by supporting parents-to-be to make meaningful choices often on the 
basis of uncertain knowledge, for example, telling parents-to-be, as claimed in 
Camilla’s account, ‘some people will do this’. Rather than this being described as a 
serious problem of oppressive power resulting in coercive moments of decision-
making, such actions are categorised as ensuring informed choice since non-
directive care may not always be the most suitable response (Burton-Jeangros et 
al. 2013; Ivry 2006; Williams et al. 2002b). 
 
Despite Camilla’s account showing how policies are made and unmade in everyday 
affairs, she aligns with definitions of informed choice and non-directive care as 
defined by other professionals, policies, and booklets. Amy (FAD midwife) likewise 
suggests to parents-to-be during one screening consultation: 
 
Our job is to give information to make an informed choice. Because it has 
to be your choice because then you have to live with the choice 
afterwards. 
 
This is not to say, however, this is always an easy task. Midwives and sonographers 
commonly identify the difficulties of ensuring fully informed choice. Sophie (SAD 
sonographer), for instance, claims parents-to-be ‘will have their own interpretation 
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of the facts’. Along with citing the discrepancies of ‘interpretation’ between parties 
(Gammons et al. 2010) and how conveying information to parents-to-be is difficult 
(Heyman et al. 2006; Pilnick et al. 2004), Sophie suggests parents-to-be often 
solicit advice. In response, Sophie suggests her care is limited to ‘[telling] them the 
facts’ since ‘it’s an individual decision’ and ‘I can’t tell [parents-to-be] the answer’. A 
similar sentiment is expressed by many other midwives and sonographers. 
 
Professionals’ criticisms of Down’s syndrome screening 
This alignment with promising informed choice and non-directive care, however, 
sits uncomfortably alongside three criticisms midwives and sonographers have of 
Down’s syndrome screening: 1) quadruple screening is not as accurate as an NT 
scan; 2) screening creates undue anxiety; 3) screening reflects eugenic purposes 
since Down’s syndrome is categorised as ‘compatible with life’. Whilst I discuss the 
latter criticism in chapter seven, I address the first two criticisms here. 
 
Quadruple screening in FAD is criticised by some professionals for its inaccuracy. 
During one conversation, Maggie (FAD midwife) claims: 
 
It just seems quite a strange test. I wouldn’t have it. I might have the 
nuchal translucency scan. I don’t really think the quad test really tells 
you anything anyway, does it? You’ve got your low-risk result so you are 
low-risk but you can still have your baby with Down’s syndrome or you 
can be high-risk and you can still have a baby with Down’s syndrome. I 
don’t really think it makes much difference in my opinion. 
 
Maggie doubts the quadruple screen ‘really tells you anything’. Her criticisms are 
shared by many professionals who quote quadruple screening as approximately 
80% accurate, meaning around 80% of unborn babies of Down’s syndrome receive 
a screen-positive result. The remaining 20% of women with pregnancies affected 
with Down's syndrome will receive a screen-negative result (so only four out of 
five women undertaking screening and having baby with Down’s syndrome will 
find out prenatally via the quadruple screen). The NT scan in SAD, in contrast, is 
quoted as being around 90% accurate. Maggie subtly refers to this when claiming 
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that she ‘might have the nuchal translucency scan’. Much like Maggie, Amy (FAD 
midwife) says she would not undertake quadruple screening herself, although she 
is careful to reiterate ‘it is an individual choice’ and ‘my opinion doesn’t mean I 
should influence anyone else not to have the test done’. Eve goes a step further by 
referring to quadruple screening as ‘rubbish’ since ‘you don’t get definite answers’, 
although reiterates she would not reveal this criticism to parents-to-be since ‘I 
can’t put my opinion across to someone’. 
 
The accuracy of the screening test is an important criticism. However, a more 
common denouncement from professionals concerns how screening, in their view, 
needlessly solicits anxiety and unpredictable trouble for parents-to-be. As such, I 
focus on this criticism for much of the chapter. Feelings of fear and anxiety among 
parents-to-be before, during, and/or after Down’s syndrome screening have been 
recognised in previous accounts (Aune and Möller 2012; Burton-Jeangros et al. 
2013; Green and Statham 1996; Heyman et al. 2006; Hunt et al. 2005; Ivry 2006; 
Markens et al. 1999; Marteau 1995; Pilnick et al. 2004; Remennick 2006; Williams 
et al. 2005). Clarke (1991) argues that the implicit assumption of screening is that 
parents-to-be will find the resulting information powerful and beneficial. However, 
this is challenged by Clarke on the premise that it can produce serious dilemmas 
for parents-to-be. Similarly, Williams et al. (2002b) claim professionals in their 
study viewed the very offer of screening as limiting women’s choices. In Freymarsh 
and Springtown, Down’s syndrome screening is often classified as what Camilla 
(FAD midwife), among others, refers to as a ‘can of worms’: 
 
After a consultation, Camilla tells me she has thought about what she’d do if 
she ‘came back as a higher-risk [for Down’s syndrome]’: 
 
Camilla: Most [parents-to-be] are just like “oh I’ll have [screening] 
anyway”. I don’t think most of them realise it can open up a can of 
worms. If they’re not going to have the amniocentesis if they’re a higher-
risk result, what’s the point in having the test in the first place? 
Otherwise they’re just going to have a worrying pregnancy. I couldn’t 
believe it when I found out that three out of four kids with Down’s 
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syndrome came back as a lower-risk result. The lower-risk isn’t really 
that reassuring then is it? It makes you think what is lower-risk? 
 
Camilla criticises Down’s syndrome screening since it can ‘open up a can of worms’. 
If parents-to-be would not entertain the prospect of agreeing to diagnostic testing 
if a higher-risk result is established, Camilla doubts the suitability of undertaking 
screening since it could promise a ‘worrying pregnancy’. Together with Camilla 
highlighting how the production of scientific artefacts requires interpretation (‘it 
makes you think what is lower-risk?’), Susan (FAD midwife) similarly associates the 
naturalisation of screening, of parents-to-be accepting screening since it is widely 
perceived as ‘just an extra test so I’ll have it done’, with a lack of perception among 
parents-to-be regarding the procedure as having ‘huge implications’. This arguably 
contradicts the work of Cunningham-Burley and Kerr (1999) who claim clinicians 
and scientists retain their own cognitive authority and avoid criticisms of their 
practice by stressing the benefits of choice and how new technology in this area 
can potentially alleviate disease. The following extract illustrates this difference: 
 
The consultation is over. It lasted twenty to twenty-five minutes (longer than 
usual). Mr and Mrs Ingram seemed unclear as to why they attended clinic 
today and what Down’s syndrome screening entails. After they leave, Lois 
turns to me. She says ‘well that was difficult’ and laughs whilst shaking her 
head: 
 
Lois: The absolute classic is parents having these tests just because they 
can. Just because they’re available, they’re like “I might as well have it”. 
And they don’t really think about what might happen afterwards with 
these results. They don’t think about whether they want an 
amniocentesis or think they might be a higher-risk. It’s a can of worms 
really. It’s the same with other testing as well like HIV, rubella, syphilis, 
and that. They’re like “oh we might as well”. Well, no, not you might as 
well! These tests have massive implications. And with the amniocentesis, 
they can have a full test and discover other things aside from Down’s 
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[syndrome]56. It’s a minefield really. If you detect something else, do you 
tell them? There was a woman last week who had a one in thirteen result 
for Down’s [syndrome]. When we told her that she had a one in thirteen 
chance, she said “I just thought I’d come back as a low-risk. Now I don’t 
have a clue what to do”. If people are going to have the test, they should 
probably know what they’d do with that result afterwards. 
 
In this account, Lois claims the ‘classic’ is parents-to-be undertaking screening 
compliantly ‘because they can’. Citing the case of a mother-to-be who received a 
1:13 risk factor, she accuses parents-to-be of not considering the ‘massive 
implications’ of screening for a range of conditions and adverse health outcomes. 
According to some midwives and sonographers, accusations can be directed to 
parents-to-be who accept screening uncritically on account of its availability. They 
charge parents-to-be with not engaging with the relevant antenatal literature and 
their docile acceptance of screening programmes, Down’s syndrome particularly, 
without considering the potential consequences of their actions (i.e. receiving a 
higher-risk result and having to make a decision regarding diagnostic testing). 
Nonetheless, for many professionals, screening/testing can ‘discover other things 
aside from Down’s [syndrome]’ and so, in turn, ‘poses more questions than answers’ 
(Gail, FAD midwife), ‘causes a lot of stress’ (Francine, FMD head midwife), 
constitutes a ‘slippery slope’ (Rita, FAD midwife), and ‘alters the course of pregnancy 
completely and can leave [parents-to-be] in a position of whether or not they want to 
continue with the pregnancy when initially it started out for them as a simple test for 
Down’s syndrome’ (Lois, FAD midwife). By identifying Down’s syndrome screening 
as inducing undue anxiety, midwives and sonographers subtly condemn it. 
 
Informed choice in everyday practice 
In this chapter, I have identified a contradiction in the accounts of professionals: 
they condemn screening yet spend much of their day aligning with principles of 
                                                     
56 After an amniocentesis, a sample of amniotic fluid is sent to a cytogenetics lab for analysis where 
chromosomes are analysed. This potentially leads to the detection of conditions including, but not 
limited to: Down’s syndrome, Edward’s syndrome, Patau’s syndrome, cystic fibrosis, muscular 
dystrophy, sickle-cell disease, neural tube defects (spina bifida and anencephaly), and Tay Sachs 
disease. 
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informed choice and non-directive care. Personal criticisms are suppressed by 
citing such rhetoric as taking priority in antenatal care. Sooben (2010) describes 
how professionals remain detached when delivering screening information, with 
Clarke (1991) suggesting this is so they do not become legally accountable for the 
decisions of parents-to-be. Professionals are encouraged to suspend all values and 
judgement about how they believe one should behave and how a decision should 
be made (Bosk 2001; Cunningham-Burley and Kerr 1999). This is announced 
explicitly in the following fieldnotes taken from a consultation between Susan 
(FAD midwife) and Mr and Mrs Payton (parents-to-be), an extract atypical in 
length yet typical in its depiction of professionals aligning with the rhetoric of 
informed choice and non-directive care: 
 
Susan: So do you know anything about this Down’s syndrome test? 
Mrs Payton: No. 
Susan: Well if you wish, we can check your bloods today using your age, 
whether you smoke, the results of the blood test, and your weight to 
calculate a risk factor for Down’s syndrome. It’s not definite in that it 
won’t give you a diagnosis. You’ll just be put into a category of higher-
risk or lower-risk. A lower-risk result which is a 1 in 150 result or more 
means you’ll get a letter. But it’s important to remember that you could 
have a 1 in 100,000 risk of having a child with Down’s syndrome but it 
doesn’t mean the baby definitely doesn’t have the condition. It just 
means there’s a 1 in 100,000 chance it will. A higher-risk result is on the 
other side, so a 1 in 150 or less result. So you could have a 1 in 12 risk or 
1 in 30 risk of having a kid with Down’s syndrome, for example. But if 
you do have a 1 in 30 risk, the baby is still unlikely to have Down’s 
syndrome. Do you understand? 
Mrs Payton: Yes. 
Susan: So if you’re higher-risk, an amniocentesis is offered. Do you know 
about amniocentesis? 
Mrs Payton: Yes. 
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Susan explicates the finer details of screening after Mrs Payton claims she knows 
little about it. In many consultations, parents-to-be recurrently appeared confused 
about their presence in clinic (‘I can’t remember why we’re here to be honest’), were 
unaware of what the procedure entails (‘I just said yes for every test’; ‘I haven’t 
really thought about it’; ‘I don’t know about it but my brother and his wife had it so I 
thought we would have it too’), and had not considered the implications or 
possibility of diagnostic testing (‘so what is amniocentesis?’; ‘I don’t really know 
what I’d do but I’ll have the test now as I just want to know if something’s happened 
or if something’s wrong’). In addition, much like the participants in Pilnick et al’s 
(2004) study, many decisions to accept screening seemed to be accounted for as a 
formality in the hope everything would be well. Nonetheless, in this consultation, 
Susan explains Mrs Payton will be ‘put into a category of higher-risk or lower-risk’ 
since a diagnosis is not provided and that a lower-risk result does not necessarily 
translate to not having a child with Down’s syndrome. After offering more 
examples of risk factors, Susan continues: 
 
Susan: So would you go on to have an amniocentesis, and do you want 
the blood test or not? [Mrs Payton hesitates]. 
Mr Payton: I would want to know [if the baby had Down’s syndrome] but 
she wouldn’t want to do anything so it’s pointless even having this test. 
Mrs Payton: Do lots of people have the test? 
Susan: It depends. 
Mr Payton: I’d have the test if I was a woman. 
Susan: If you have a higher-risk result and decide not to have an 
amniocentesis, the result might stress you out for the rest of the 
pregnancy. You’ll spend the rest of the pregnancy worrying [Mr and Mrs 
Payton pause]. 
Mr Payton: It’s a catch twenty-two really. 
Susan: We can only give all of the information and it’s up to you whether 
you decide to have the test. 
 
Mrs Payton appears hesitant to answer after Susan asks whether she would ‘go on 
to have an amniocentesis’ and whether she would ‘want the blood test or not’, with 
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Mr Payton claiming he would ‘want to know’ yet his partner would ‘not want to do 
anything’ (presumably meaning Mrs Payton would not opt for terminating a 
pregnancy following a positive diagnosis). It is clear Mr and Mrs Payton have not 
previously thrashed out the finer details of Down’s syndrome screening, a trend 
reported elsewhere (Gottfreðsdóttir et al. 2009b). Susan’s account at the end of the 
extract involves the first explanation that after ‘[giving] all of the information’, it is 
‘up to you whether you decide to have the test’. This, however, is supplemented with 
a warning that a result could ‘stress you out for the rest of the pregnancy’ (what Mr 
Payton calls a ‘catch twenty-two’). The consultation resumes: 
 
Mrs Payton: [Turns to Susan] What do you think? 
Susan: I can’t decide for you. An amniocentesis provides a definite 
diagnosis and means you could either continue or terminate the 
pregnancy. Obviously the termination would be offered for medical 
reasons. 
Mr Payton: So it’s a personal preference, [Mrs Payton]. 
Mrs Payton: [Anxious. Turns to Susan] What do you think? 
Susan: It’s your choice. 
[...] 
Mr Payton: You’ll probably be alright, [Mrs Payton]. You’re young. 
Susan: Yes. If you do want the test, you’ll have to do it soon as you’re 
already eighteen weeks and four days pregnant and we can’t offer the 
test after about nineteen weeks. Remember the only way you’ll know for 
sure is through amniocentesis. This is only screening today. 
Mr Payton: It’s only a blood test, [Mrs Payton]. 
Mrs Payton [After a long pause] I think it’d be good to know if I was 
higher-risk. So quite a lot of people have this test? 
Susan: I don’t know the exact statistics but it’s a personal choice whether 
or not to have the test. 
 
Mrs Payton seeks advice by asking Susan once if other mothers-to-be undertake 
screening and twice what Susan ‘[thinks]’. She responds by once more emphasising 
‘it’s your choice’. She later agrees with Mr Payton’s claim that Mrs Payton is young 
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so she will ‘probably be alright’ and claims a decision needs to be made promptly 
since the test will not be available soon owing to the current weeks of gestation. It 
continues: 
 
Mrs Payton: [Unsure] There’s lots of decisions to be made. It adds stress 
doesn’t it? I’d rather not have it done. 
Susan: OK. Well you’d probably end up in the lower-risk category 
anyway with your age and weight. 
Mrs Payton: So what would you do? 
Susan: I can’t say. 
Mr Payton: [Irritated] Love, she’s already told you twice that she can’t 
say and it’s a personal decision! 
Susan: Why don’t you go for a walk and come back in ten minutes to see 
what you want to do? 
Mr and Mrs Payton: OK. 
 
Mr and Mrs Payton leave. Susan turns to me and breathes a sigh of relief:  
 
Susan: That’s why we do these consultations. Otherwise she would have 
the bloods and not know what they were for. 
 
Mrs Payton returns after one minute without her partner and tells Susan she 
will not have the blood test. 
 
Mrs Payton cites the ‘stress’ accompanying the ‘decisions to be made’, with Susan 
reassuring her ‘you’d probably end up in the lower-risk category anyway with your 
age and weight’. Susan once more rejects Mrs Payton’s question about what she 
would do in this situation, with Susan telling the Payton’s to ‘go for a walk’ and 
return to let her know ‘what you want to do’. After their departure, Susan outlines 
the benefits of consultations for ensuring parents-to-be ‘know what [screening is] 
for’. There are many acts of negotiation taking place here between each party. Mrs 
Payton tries to enrol Susan in decision-making by emplacing trust in Susan to 
make the decision for her. This is a trend I noticed in other consultations at FAD. In 
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patient-centred consultations, parents-to-be sometimes seem reluctant to engage 
in individual decision-making and take the role ascribed to them, preferring to 
defer authority to the expert professional (Pilnick and Dingwall 2011). However, 
Susan disposes of her responsibility for Down’s syndrome screening with broad 
references to the rhetoric of choice. This choice must be reached after Susan has 
performed her primary duty of communicating medically-based information about 
the procedure and its outcomes (Bosk 1992). This is similar to Springtown in 
which care is primarily confined in perimeters of tendering medically accurate 
information. Sonographers regularly provide the same (medically-based) account 
for Down’s syndrome screening during an NT scan: they say they are measuring 
the nuchal translucency, how its enlargement is connected to chromosomal 
conditions, how this results in the production of a risk factor, and how diagnostic 
testing can be offered should a higher-risk result be established. In doing so, they 
can avoid responsibility for decision-making. Such strategies involve professionals 
taking comfort in the principle of ‘safety in numbers’; their care is suitable since 
colleagues do the same thing and ‘[normalise] the action as legitimate within their 
shared universe of meaning’ (Scott et al. 2013: 431). 
 
Despite the high ideals of informed choice, the practical realities of information 
provision, shaped by the emergent logic of everyday rituals, delivers an encounter 
perhaps contrary to professionals’ intentions (Strong 1979). In the clinic, the 
‘messiness of mundane practices fail to submit to theoretical ideals’ (Mol 2008: 
43). Indeed, the stating of options does not always amount to the neutral provision 
of advice since some options have the force of a directive (for instance, to draw on 
an example used earlier, ‘advising’ an amniocentesis). Professionals’ methods of 
information provision – embedded and consumed in a complex array of cultural, 
medical, political, economic, and social practices and pressures – is very likely to 
influence certain decisions (Browner et al. 1996; Kerr et al. 1998; Lippman 1994; 
Pilnick 2008; Rapp 2000). Some commentators have censured professionals for 
providing information which is far from neutral and nondirective when screening 
for Down’s syndrome (Marteau et al. 1993; Shakespeare 2011; Skirton and Barr 
2007; Tsouroufli 2011). Others doubt whether fully autonomous and informed 
decision-making within the context of Down’s syndrome screening can ever exist 
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(Pilnick 2004; Williams et al. 2002a, 2002b) whilst some are sympathetic for 
professionals who struggle with balancing professional and private moral values 
(Farsides et al. 2004; Williams et al. 2002a). 
 
This points to how care is accomplished in the interactions, materiality, and 
practices of the antenatal space. It is only possible in a heterogeneous collective 
human and nonhuman network with decisions made in interdependent relations 
(Schwennesen and Koch 2012); care is something you do as opposed to something 
which is (Latimer 2000; Mol 2002). At its heart inter-subjective and a matter of 
process, care is commonly an open-ended and unsettled entity involving the body, 
emotions, and identity-work, a practice stratified and distributed across time and 
place which is always achieved and never attributable to an impartial account (Mol 
2008). Since knowledge is produced and reproduced during interactions, what we 
regard as a choice is never a value-free activity and is always subjected to various 
influences, few of which are straightforward or transparent. 
 
Rather than repeating well-established arguments around how non-directive care 
and informed choice is or is not achieved in practice, however, I elucidate what this 
rhetoric accomplishes. The rhetoric of informed choice and non-directive care 
produces and reproduces the naturalisation of Down’s syndrome screening as a 
‘normal’ part of pregnancy. In addition, professionals align with this discourse and 
use it as a resource to effectively dispose of screening in antenatal care. Parents-to-
be are instituted as rational decision-makers who, provided with clinically correct 
information, are able to choose between alternative courses of action (Silverman 
1987). They are enrolled in and subjected to disciplining practices (Foucault 1972) 
which encourage self-management. In their descriptive accounts, professionals 
such as those cited in previous extracts are upfront in bestowing responsibility to 
parents-to-be, though particularly mothers-to-be, who should consider the 
consequences of their actions. Once positioned as active decision-makers, parents-
to-be ‘gain autonomy at the cost of being morally responsible for their actions’ and 
are accountable when ‘a gap exists between their knowledge of the parameters of 
good management and actual behaviours’ (Allen 2013: 42). 
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Language barriers 
Professionals’ detachment from Down’s syndrome screening and their relocation 
of responsibility to parents-to-be are evident in interactions between professionals 
(midwives/sonographers) and parents-to-be whose first language is not English. 
The difficulty of communicating information about Down’s syndrome screening if 
the first language of parents-to-be is not English has been reported elsewhere (Hey 
and Hurst 2003). This is particularly a challenge for Freymarsh which serves a 
large population whose first language is not English. The problems a language 
barrier can create are outlined during an exchange following a consultation 
between Toni (FAD midwife) and Mrs Garcia (mother-to-be): 
  
The consultation has ended. Mrs Garcia seemed confused throughout the 
encounter. After Toni leads Mrs Garcia into another room for the quadruple 
screen, she returns to the room and turns to me: 
 
Toni: I’m not sure if she understood that. There was a bit of a language 
barrier. 
 
During the consultation, Toni appears more concerned with providing medically 
correct information rather than ensuring Mrs Garcia has correctly understood the 
procedure. In FAD, a translator is not offered, or at least immediately available, 
once undertaking Down’s syndrome screening (partners sometimes translate for 
their partner). Following a similar consultation with a mother-to-be whose first 
language is not English, Emma (FMD midwife)57 tells me: 
 
When the woman and the partner are foreign, it makes me a bit uneasy. 
You have to question whether they really fully understand the 
information you are giving to them. We get a lot of people in here, some 
from very different religious backgrounds, and they might not abort the 
baby because of their religious beliefs. But if they don’t speak very good 
English, they may not know about this screening and if they wouldn’t 
                                                     
57 Emma is also an FMD midwife but I observed her most frequently in FAD. 
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have the amniocentesis anyway, then they may not want screening in the 
first place. But they may not know about this if they don’t understand. 
 
Once again, the professionals’ priority is providing clinically correct information, in 
line with organisational recommendations (Hillman 2007), over ensuring this data 
has been fully comprehended by parents-to-be. Although language barriers are a 
relatively extreme example, it highlights how Down’s syndrome screening is 
downgraded in the clinic. It is interpreted as a procedure which does not demand 
the use of translators for potentially repairing fractured interactions. Resources, 
important indicators for what clinical tasks and/or patients are valued (Dingwall 
and Murphy 1983), are not allocated here. Instead, care is commonly constricted to 
providing clinically accurate information on what is as opposed to what ought to 
be. Professionals’ criticisms of screening are made absent in everyday practices 
whilst alignment with the rhetoric of informed choice and non-directive care are 
made present. Once more, Down’s syndrome screening is entangled in ‘motility’ 
(Latimer 2013; Latimer and Munro 2006; Munro 2001). In their ‘moves’ (Latimer 
1999), professionals switch grounds to accomplish screening, in one instance, as a 
problematic practice (as not very accurate and as opening a can of worms) and in 
other instances, namely ‘front-stage’ (Goffman 1959) screening consultations with 
parents-to-be, as an acceptable and mostly trouble-free exercise. 
 
It is this latter shift which accomplishes care as located within abstract medical 
categories and parents-to-be as fully responsible for decision-making in screening 
practices. Midwives and sonographers successfully ‘dispose’ (Latimer 1999: 177) 
of screening figuratively if not physically. Since Down’s syndrome screening does 
not belong to the domain of professionals, parents-to-be are made accountable for 
decisions and, in turn, may feel to blame if any problems occur for not seriously 
considering the consequences of consenting to the procedure. In a healthcare 
system increasingly shifting responsibility, the ‘responsible citizen’ is reproduced 
in the actions and interactions of both professionals and parents-to-be (White et al. 
2012: 72). Strategic boundaries are drawn between knowledge and its application, 
that is, professional expertise and the ignorance of parents-to-be allegedly not 
considering the wider consequences of their actions (Cunningham-Burley and Kerr 
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1999). Responsibility, as such, is deflected onto parents-to-be, reifying this 
dichotomy and detracting attentions from a critical consideration of professionals’ 
responsibilities (Kerr et al. 1997). This nonalignment with parents-to-be and 
detachment from, and disposal of, Down’s syndrome screening allows 
professionals, as I have shown in chapter five, to pursue and attach themselves to 
tasks which they invest with value and classify as favoured material for 
constructing a meaningful identity. 
 
Sonography and sociality: visualising the unborn 
In this chapter, I have captured how professionals detach from screening and how 
the ensuing responsibilisation of parents-to-be means professionals accomplish 
both the downgrading and disposal of the procedure. Many of the examples cited, 
however, concern FAD. In SAD, Down’s syndrome screening is also downgraded by 
NT scans being constructed and reconstructed from occasions designed to 
distinguish defects into encounters tendering opportunities to meet the baby and 
reproduce kinship. This argument also extends to ultrasound scans with no 
association to Down’s syndrome screening, namely a dating scan (roughly ten 
weeks into a pregnancy) and anomaly scan (roughly twenty weeks into a 
pregnancy). The dating scan and anomaly scan are available in both FAD and SAD. 
However, they are mostly undertaken in FAD since as an NHS hospital, each scan is 
free-of-charge. During interviews and in the ‘back-stage’ (Goffman 1959) of the 
clinic, midwives and sonographers often accuse parents-to-be, regardless of the 
ultrasound scan consented to, of not fully comprehending the implications of such 
procedures. In an interview, Rita (FAD midwife) describes her experiences after 
recent medical training in dating scans: 
 
I think women who haven’t had a pregnancy before or whose 
pregnancies have always been fine almost see it as just a chance to see 
the baby and to find out when the due date is and how many weeks 
[pregnant] they are. They don’t see it as a medical examination to make 
sure the baby is fine or to see if we can see any problems. 
 
During an interview, Lindsay (FAD midwife) similarly claims: 
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Some people are asking you “can you tell us the sex” [during a dating 
scan] and I haven’t even flipped the monitor around yet to show 
everything’s OK. It’s part of the routine. I don’t think people really think 
about what we’re doing it for. [...] Women often bring toddlers and 
partners too because they see it as a nice scan and as getting a nice 
picture but it can be problematic if there’s no heartbeat or something. 
But lots of them are quite sensible. They just want to know everything’s 
OK on the scan so a lot of them just come as two really. 
 
Although Lindsay classifies a range of parents-to-be as ‘quite sensible’, she suggests 
some parents-to-be do not ‘really think about what they’re doing [the dating scan] 
for’. She attributes this to the ‘routine’ element of ultrasound scanning, that is, the 
expectation among parents-to-be that an ultrasound scan is designed to obtain a 
‘nice picture’ of the unborn baby. According to Lindsay, this becomes ‘problematic’, 
however, when partners and family members attend only to discover the absence 
of a heartbeat. Similarly, Eve (FAD midwife) establishes a discrepancy between lay 
and professional knowledge; whilst most women ‘come in with half their family’ 
and ‘don’t know what they’re coming to clinic for half the time’, professionals are 
‘more interested in whether [the unborn baby has] two arms, two legs, and all its 
anatomy in the right place’. Eve further highlights misconceptions of anomaly 
scanning since women view them exclusively as encounters which confirm the sex 
of the unborn baby. Olivia (SAD sonographer) similarly charges parents-to-be with 
constructing anomaly scans as ‘sexing scans’, expressing her disapproval that they 
interpret the procedure as ‘[having] a little look at the baby’. Francine (FMD head 
midwife), privy to anomaly scans in her previous role in FAD, claims during an 
interview that an unborn baby’s sex is often the first question posed by parents-to-
be: 
 
Very few people appreciate we’re looking for abnormalities. Even if you 
say we’re looking for abnormalities, they still don’t take it on board. It’s 
reassurance for a lot of people and to get their pictures and to find out 
the sex of the baby because a lot of women will bring in half the family. 
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The majority of the time this is fine but unfortunately, when you haven’t 
got a good result, it’s all the more devastating when it’s not normal 
because you’ve got your extended family there. That’s anomaly scans, NT 
scans, and dating scans. 
 
Francine suggests anomaly scans are constituted by parents-to-be as opportunities 
to ‘get their pictures and to find out the sex of the baby’. She claims despite explicit 
reference to its main purpose, ultrasound scans are so engrained in the pregnancy 
imaginary that parents-to-be ‘still don’t take it on board’, opting to invite family 
members to attend which becomes problematic once a ‘good result’, translated as 
the presence of ‘normal’ markers, is not delivered. 
 
Francine’s criticism extends to both anomaly and dating scans together with NT 
scans for Down’s syndrome. Martha (FAD midwife) suggests scans, as ‘the glory 
bits of clinic’, are craved by mothers-to-be in particular since they ‘are much more 
interested in having a scan and pictures generally than having anything else’. Fears 
among professionals about parents-to-be imposing personal interpretations on the 
function and significance of ultrasound scans have been identified (Draper 2002; 
Mitchell 2001; Sandelowski 1994a). Ultrasound scans have long been recognised 
as a ‘hybrid practice’ (Taylor 1998) with medical and social meanings incorporated 
into consultations (Müller-Rockstroh 2011; Roberts 2012), not least in installing 
an extra monitor for parents-to-be to watch the unborn baby’s movement and the 
subsequent production of ‘baby’s first picture’ (Mitchell 2001). Draper (2002: 787) 
refers to this as a potential ‘clashing of world-views’ between the lay paradigm of 
the ultrasound scan as a social event and the expert paradigm of it as a screening 
event. 
 
In Freymarsh and Springtown, whilst many of the professionals’ accusations of 
parents-to-be misinterpreting the true intention of ultrasound scans are valid, they 
play an implicit contributory role. In unison with parents-to-be, sonographers play 
their part in configuring the NT scan, first and foremost, as a straightforward and 
entertaining opportunity to meet the unborn baby rather than detecting potential 
concerns. This mixing of biomedical purposes with social matters is accomplished 
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in two ways: 1) scans become a ‘day out’; 2) scans offer a chance to reproduce 
kinship. This shows how ultrasound scans are not limited to providing information 
but also involve sharing meaning in which the logics of ‘care’ and ‘choice’ 
interconnect (Mol 2008). Since my focus is mostly on Down’s syndrome screening, 
I mostly cite extracts taken from SAD observations and interviews with 
sonographers for the remainder of this chapter. 
 
A day out 
The personal and social implications of ultrasound scans, more than whether they 
are clinically effective (Müller-Rockstroh 2011), have been previously identified. 
Commentaries on visualising the pregnant-body interior claim they offer a chance 
for meeting the baby (Williams et al. 2005), medicalise a pregnancy and erase 
women in favour of the unborn baby (Martin 1998), devalue women’s knowledge 
(Franklin 1991; Sandelowski 1994b), force parents-to-be to tackle moral dilemmas 
around their unborn baby (Gammeltoft 2007; Rapp 2000), make pregnancies seem 
more ‘real’ in the absence of embodied knowledge (Heyman et al. 2006; Williams 
et al. 2005), and prompt appropriate behavioural changes in a partner befitting 
that of a future parent (Draper 2002). Parents-to-be can experience a range of such 
conflicting emotions, with enthusiasm and enjoyment often sitting uncomfortably 
alongside fear and anxiety during a scan (Williams et al. 2005). 
 
In Freymarsh and Springtown, ultrasound scans are constructed as important and 
meaningful events for visualising an unborn baby. I illustrate this point by citing 
fieldnotes taken during an echocardiography scan performed by Dr Torres (FMD 
cardiologist) in which a baby is suspected as having a heart defect: 
 
Dr Torres, Jodi (FMD cardiac physiologist), Mr and Mrs O’Neill (parents-to-
be), and their three daughters (Cassie, Nina, and Sian) are in the scan room. 
Dr Torres begins and, after a few minutes of scanning, turns to the children]: 
 
Dr Torres: Now you have to pay me for this show [Mr and Mrs O’Neill, 
Cassie, Nina, and Sian laugh]. And if you can’t pay, you’ll have to do your 
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mum’s chores. You’ll have to do the washing, cook the food, and massage 
her feet. 
Mrs O’Neill: Not my feet, they wouldn’t want to go anywhere near them! 
 
During the scan, Dr Torres utters ‘it looks good so far’, ‘it all looks fine’, ‘there’s 
nothing abnormal here’, and ‘there’s nothing to be concerned about’: 
 
Dr Torres: [Pointing and turning to Cassie, Nina, and Sian] Do you see the 
head and the brain there, girls? 
Cassie: Is that the brain [points]? 
Dr Torres: That is the brain. There’s the head, the brain, two little legs 
trying to kick mommy [all laugh]. 
Jodi: Baby’s legs are all stretched out there! 
Dr Torres: I’m just trying to get a good profile. The girls came here for a 
show and mum has come here for a show, so let’s give them a day out! 
You have a shy baby here, like you girls I think [turns to Cassie, Nina, and 
Sian].  
 
Dr Torres scans for another few seconds: 
 
Dr Torres: I think we can stop the scan there. Everything is fine though. 
Mrs O’Neill: I’m so relieved. Thank you so much. 
Mr O’Neill: Brilliant. Thanks doctor. 
 
Following the suspicion of a heart defect being disproved, Dr Torres describes to 
Mr and Mrs Neill (parents-to-be), alongside their daughters who have attended the 
scan, how the daughters must ‘pay a fee for the show’, how failure to pay will result 
in ‘doing your mum’s chores’, and how the unborn baby is ‘shy’ and ‘trying to kick 
mommy’. Whilst Dr Torre’s playfulness can also be attributed to an attempt to relax 
the O’Neill’s following a suspected defect (Dr Torres also reassures the O’Neill’s 
with utterances such as ‘it looks good so far’ and ‘there’s nothing abnormal here’), it 
additionally points toward how ultrasound scans, used principally for detecting 
potential defects in unborn babies, can be configured as what Dr Torres refers to as 
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‘a day out’. Later in the day, Dr Torres is explaining a suspected large inlet 
ventricular septal defect58 and dextro-transposition of the great arteries59 to Mr 
and Mrs Hall (parents-to-be). After explaining the situation ‘is incredibly rare and 
most cardiac specialists don’t even have a clue about this’, Dr Torres draws a picture 
of the heart and associated defect to explain the situation. 
 
Here, cultural materials are produced and utilised in the production of care, with 
sketches of cardiac defects and ultrasound scans becoming physical resources of 
knowledge and comfort. In the absence of a suspected defect, however, an 
ultrasound scan can be constructed as a day out, an entertaining and enjoyable 
excursion where parents-to-be can interact with their unborn baby. In SAD, the NT 
scan is commonly afforded such a reconstruction. The following fieldnotes are 
taken from the opening exchanges of a NT scan between Olivia (SAD sonographer), 
Mr and Mrs Fox (parents-to-be), and Mrs Fox’s mother: 
 
Olivia: Baby’s trying to stand up by the looks of things! Do you see the 
hand? 
Mrs Fox: Yes! 
Mother: Aw look at that. The heart looks like it’s going well. 
Olivia: Yes it is.  
Mrs Fox: Aw I can see it moving! 
Olivia: Baby’s having a little wriggle. 
Mrs Fox: Look at the arms there! 
Mother: He’s doing the Usain Bolt [celebration]!  
Mr Fox: Flipping heck, this is amazing. 
Olivia: Seeing is believing isn’t it? 
Mrs Fox: You don’t think it’s real until you see it like this. 
Mr Fox: It probably just feels like you’ve eaten too much curry! 
[Everyone laughs]. 
                                                     
58 An inlet ventricular septal defect is a hole in the septum near where the blood enters the 
ventricles through the tricuspid and mitral valves. 
59 Dextro-transposition of the great arteries is a cardiac defect in which the two main arteries 
carrying the blood out of the heart – the main pulmonary artery and the aorta – are switched in 
position. 
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Mrs Fox: It definitely makes it more real. [...] Is that a hand there?  
Olivia: Yes. 
Mrs Fox: Wow. I didn’t know you could see so much at this stage. 
Olivia: Baby’s having a little dance in there now! 
Mr Fox: Having a bit of fun! 
Olivia: Do you see the arms moving? Baby looks like it’s doing 
backstroke. 
Mr and Mrs Fox: Yes [Mr and Mrs Fox laugh]! 
Olivia: And the head there too. There’s the nasal bone [points]. That’s a 
good sign that it’s there because if it’s absent, that can be a sign of a 
problem. 
Mrs Fox: OK. 
Olivia: So what we’re looking at today is the nuchal fold which is the fluid 
which collects at the back of your baby’s neck. 
 
Olivia proceeds to explain the NT scan, its outcomes, and the implications of 
such outcomes. Measurements are taken at an average of 1.06mm. Olivia 
explains a measurement under 3mm is ‘good’. 
 
Olivia begins the scan by suggesting the unborn baby is ‘trying to stand up’ and 
asks Mr Fox, Mrs Fox, and Mrs Fox’s mother whether they ‘see the hand’. The 
explosion of visualisation technologies in medicine equally relies on professionals 
who must make imaging meaningful for everyone involved. Parents-to-be and 
sonographers engage in ‘collaborative coding’ (Roberts 2012: 299), fashioning 
meanings out of signs and symbols forged in conjunction with one another. Mr and 
Mrs Fox – in accord with Olivia and Mrs Fox’s mother – describe the unborn baby 
as ‘having a little wriggle’, as ‘[dancing]’, as ‘having a bit of fun’, and as ‘doing the 
Usain Bolt’ together with identifying anatomical landmarks (e.g. ‘look at the arms’, 
‘is that a hand?’). Mr Fox describes the NT scan as ‘amazing’, with his partner 
suggesting the pregnancy does not seem ‘real until you see it like this’. Olivia finally 
draws attention to the primary purpose of the scan with reference to the nasal 
bone, its presence reducing the prospect of a ‘problem’ being found in the unborn 
baby. 
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As highlighted above, there is frequently a large degree of humour and informality 
during NT scans. The casualness is perpetuated further via chit-chat during scans 
such as professionals asking parents-to-be about plans for the weekend and how 
many other children parents-to-be have (or are planning to have). Whilst this 
informality and joviality occasionally emerges in screening consultations at FAD, 
this increases in SAD on receipt of a visual representation of an unborn baby at 
play on a large television monitor (not available at SAD). In the extract described 
above, Olivia and the Fox’s prioritise the entertaining component of an ultrasound 
scan over establishing the purpose of this procedure. Such playful encounters are 
arguably harmless yet they reconstruct the NT scan as a fun day out. This reflects 
how parents-to-be occasionally claim they are unaware of what procedure they 
have undertaken. During one NT scan, for instance, Mrs Jackson (mother-to-be) is 
accompanied by her sister and mother and claims she ‘does not know anything’ 
about the procedure. After Sophie (SAD sonographer) describes the scan, Mrs 
Jackson’s sister video-records the imaging displayed on the monitor. After 
measurements are defined by Sophie as ‘nice and small’, Mrs Jackson seems rather 
uninterested in this information and enquires as to the unborn baby’s sex which 
Sophie claims she cannot determine at this early stage of a pregnancy. 
 
The Jackson’s pursuit of acquiring a material memory of the unborn baby and 
unmasking its sex, together with the sheer presence of other family members 
during the procedure, shows how scans can mostly become a day out rather than 
ensuring – drawing on Eve’s earlier contentions – ‘whether [the unborn baby has] 
have two arms, two legs, and all its anatomy in the right place’. During other 
occasions, parents-to-be (or a mother-to-be) are accompanied by friends. The 
following fieldnotes are taken from a NT scan involving Esther (SAD sonographer), 
Mrs Fowler (mother-to-be), and two of Mrs Fowler’s friends:  
 
Esther: Do you know much about the NT scan? 
Mrs Fowler: No, not really. 
Esther: Do you know it’s a screening test for Down’s syndrome? 
Mrs Fowler: Yes. 
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Esther: Well this screening test gives you a risk of having a baby with 
Down’s syndrome. It measures a pad of fluid which collects at the back of 
the baby’s neck. It appears between ten and fourteen weeks and 
disappears after fourteen weeks but we’re still not quite sure why. But 
when it’s enlarged, it’s associated with chromosomal abnormalities. 
Mrs Fowler: Is it just Down’s syndrome? 
Esther: No. It also looks for two other chromosomal abnormalities. Your 
bloods are taken and these are combined with the size of the baby, your 
age, and the NT which is calculated into a risk factor. This gives you a 
risk factor for Down’s syndrome, Edward’s syndrome, and Patau’s 
syndrome. We can’t screen for all abnormalities so we test for three of 
the most common, two of the most lethal. We like the NT under three 
millimetres and we need baby to be still so we can measure it. The good 
thing about this test as well is the false positive rate is lower60. That’s 
one of the benefits you get of having the scan done earlier. You’ll get the 
results on Thursday. Our cut-off here for a high-risk and a low-risk is 1 in 
150. So if you get lower than 1 in 150, you’ll get a higher-risk result and 
you’ll be advised to have an amniocentesis. Baby gets a gold star because 
it’s been the best behaved we’ve had tonight [Mrs Fowler and friends 
laugh]. 
Mrs Fowler: Good! 
Esther: Baby’s using your cervix as a bouncy castle there! 
Mrs Fowler: I can see! 
Esther: There are the eyes, nose, the Buddha belly [Mrs Fowler and 
friends laugh], arms, bum, legs, back of the head too. We check the back 
of the head to look for other abnormalities too. 
Mrs Fowler: But is everything looking OK? 
Esther: Everything is looking normal. The NT is nice and small. Oh look, 
there’s two legs there! 
 
                                                     
60 In screening, a false-positive means a mother-to-be receives a positive result but does not have 
an unborn baby with Down’s syndrome. 
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After Mrs Fowler claims she does ‘not really’ know about this screening procedure, 
Esther provides an explanation. After fulfilling her duties of providing medically 
correct information under the governing principles of non-directive care and 
informed consent, although the notion of ‘[advising]’ Mrs Fowler to have an 
amniocentesis may breach this rhetoric, Esther quips Mrs Fowler’s unborn baby 
‘gets a gold star because it’s the best behaved we’ve had tonight’. Esther 
subsequently claims the unborn baby is using Mrs Fowler’s cervix ‘as a bouncy 
castle’ before making the imaging on the monitor meaningful for Mrs Fowler and 
her guests by establishing anatomical features such as the eyes, nose, and ‘Buddha 
belly’. 
 
Throughout NT scans, sonographers and parents-to-be identify physical features 
or movements of the unborn baby and ascribe these to personality traits (‘what a 
poser’, ‘you’ve got a stubborn one’, ‘baby is well-behaved tonight’, ‘it’s a very 
photogenic baby’, ‘cheeky baby just flicked us the finger!’, ‘you’ve got a very chilled 
out baby’; ‘the muppet won’t behave, that little joker!’; ‘the baby’s been very active so 
can you check it’s not a frog instead of a baby!?’), a favourable physical appearance 
(‘what a cutie’, ‘our baby’s beautiful’, ‘you’ve got such a little doll there’, ‘so pretty’, 
‘beautiful’), and certain conduct such as dancing (‘baby’s doing a little jig’, ‘you’ve 
got a baby Michael Flatley in there’, ‘baby’s doing a bit of ballet’) and playing sports 
(‘you’ve got a rugby player in there’, ‘baby’s going to be a footballer with a kick like 
that’, ‘we’ve got a future gymnast’). The description of an unborn baby as a rugby 
player or gymnast often corresponds to hetero-normative gender ideals. During an 
NT scan, before determining the sex of an unborn baby, hetero-normative gender 
roles and expectations are often erected. Nonetheless, the ascription of personality 
traits, gender expectations, and behaviour – alongside the presence of friends 
during NT scans – frames the procedure as an enjoyable expedition as opposed to, 
in Rita’s (FAD midwife) words, a ‘medical examination’. 
 
Reproducing kinship 
Ultrasound scans, particularly NT scans, are often attended by parents-to-be and 
other family members (most likely children). The attendance of children may be 
due to circumstance, rather than an active choice, such as not being able to hire a 
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babysitter. However, children often still attend the procedure along with fathers-
to-be. In FAD, fathers-to-be and children – if present at all – regularly remain in the 
waiting room whilst mothers-to-be are invited for a consultation. In contrast, at 
SAD, they often attend the procedure. Their presence undoubtedly stems from NT 
scans being reconstructed as events in which parents-to-be welcome a new family 
member. Accounting for his and his wife’s presence during an NT scan, for 
instance, Maurice (grandfather) claims his attendance can be attributed to 
‘[wanting] to come along today to meet our latest grandchild’. The following 
fieldnotes are taken from an NT scan between Olivia (SAD sonographer) and Mr 
and Mrs Carlisle (parents-to-be): 
 
Olivia: Baby’s swimming! There’s the arm stretched right above the head, 
the stomach, and the leg [pointing]. 
Mr Carlisle: Wow. 
Mrs Carlisle: Aw. This is much better than the last scan. We got such a 
terrible picture last time! 
Mr Carlisle: That is amazing. 
Olivia: So we’re looking at the NT here. Do you see these white lines and 
the black fluid black in-between [points]? That’s the NT and I can see it is 
tiny. We want it under three millimetres and it definitely is. Now are you 
going to turn over and give mum a good picture? 
Mrs Carlisle: He’s being shy! 
Olivia: Baby’s being difficult! I’ll try and coerce baby into moving. Which 
way are you going to go, baby? 
Mr Carlisle: The baby must be like me. Never listens!  
Mrs Carlisle: He’s got that from you! [Olivia takes measurements of the 
NT as 1.64mm and 1.70mm]. 
Olivia: Lovely, fantastic, that’s miles under. Are you going to roll over, 
baby? 
Mr Carlisle: He doesn’t want to play at all does he? 
Mrs Carlisle: He’s going “get off! Who the hell is that?” 
Mr Carlisle: He’s stubborn. 
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Olivia: Yes, it definitely is a boy! [All laugh] Baby is being very naughty 
now. 
Mr Carlisle: Come on! I think he’s moving. Or she. 
Mrs Carlisle. It’s definitely a boy. He’s just like his Dad! 
Olivia: He’s being very lazy. You can sleep all night, can’t you baby?! I 
want to get a picture. Come on stop teasing! Baby’s a little rascal. 
 
After a few seconds, the unborn baby’s face appears on the monitor. This is 
met with cheers from Olivia and Mr and Mrs Carlisle. Some pictures are taken 
and handed to Mr Carlisle. 
 
Olivia identifies the unborn baby’s movement as ‘swimming’ and confirms some 
anatomical features for the benefit of Mr and Mrs Carlisle. Throughout much of the 
scan, Mr and Mrs Carlisle engage in what Kroløkke (2011: 26) defines as ‘ultra-
gasms’, namely utterances or ‘response cries’ (Goffman 1981) conveying a sense of 
awe or amazement at the imaging on the monitor (‘wow’, ‘aw’). Prior to soliciting 
any information regarding the screening procedure, Mrs Carlisle praises the clarity 
of the imaging in contrast to the ‘terrible picture’ she received following her 
previous scan. After establishing a seemingly small NT, Olivia urges the baby to 
‘turn over’ and ‘give mum a good picture’. Mrs Carlisle associates her unborn baby’s 
movements to ‘being shy’, referring to the baby as a ‘he’ throughout much of the 
consultation in the absence of knowledge regarding the baby’s sex. Mr Carlisle 
playfully associates the lack of movement to his own personality characteristics 
(‘he must be like me. Never listens!’), before Mrs Carlisle confirms ‘he’s got that from 
you!’ This is what Becker et al. (2005: 1300) term ‘resemblance talk’, meaning the 
words and discussions about relatedness establishing what family is within a given 
family and which become an outward bodily expression of biological relationships. 
Mrs Carlisle later assumes the voice of the silent unborn baby by playfully urging 
Olivia to ‘get off’. Mr Carlisle attributes the lack of movement to a refusal to ‘play’ 
and to the baby’s ‘[stubbornness]’, with Olivia accrediting this ‘[naughtiness]’ and 
‘[laziness]’ to being male in her pursuit of a picture of the ‘rascal’ to memorialise 
the occasion. 
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In the consultation between Olivia and Mr and Mrs Carlisle, the focus appears to be 
on ascertaining pictures of the unborn baby, on ascribing gender expectations, and 
on reproducing family. Morgan (1996) identifies family relationships as processes 
which are fluid, complex, and subject to adjustment. Kinship is a symbolic rather 
than ‘natural’ or exclusively biological driven cultural system (Franklin 1997; 
Strathern 1992) yet great significance is still attached to genetic or ‘blood’ 
relationships (Duster 1990; Rapp 1995). Such ‘family practices’ (Morgan 1996) 
emerge in the ultrasound room. Sonographers construct the imaging on screen into 
a baby by drawing on visible markers of personhood and familial resemblances, 
thereby ‘weaving the foetus into a network of kinship relations’ (Mitchell 2001: 
134). 
 
Along with attributing agency to the unborn baby (ascribing movements to human 
attributes including stubbornness, naughtiness, and gender), parents-to-be are 
bestowed an arena in which other family members not only attend but assist in 
welcoming a new family member. Familial exchanges are encouraged via the 
identification of anatomical features replicating either or both parents-to-be. In 
one example, Esther points out the ‘nasal bone’ to which Mr Dalton replies ‘I hope 
the baby has got [Mrs Dalton’s] nose!’ Esther laughs but responds ‘the nasal bone 
being absent can have problems linked with Down’s syndrome so it’s good it’s there’. 
Whilst Esther ascribes to the medical dimension of ultrasound scanning, Mr Dalton 
constructs a personal nonmedical interpretation. This is supplemented in offering 
parents-to-be an ultrasonic picture of their unborn baby, a material souvenir not 
only ascribing agency (and an identity) to the unborn baby but also reproducing 
kinship by creating a material memory of a new family member. 
 
‘A very different atmosphere’ 
I have outlined midwives’ and sonographers’ accounts which identify the problems 
caused by treating an ultrasound scan as a social event (such as when there is a 
miscarriage). However, sonographers routinely participate in constructing and 
trivialising Down’s syndrome screening as an opportunity to meet the unborn 
baby. Esther (SAD sonographer) claims parents-to-be ‘don’t realise the NT scan is a 
diagnostic test’ since ‘this is not relayed to women as a diagnostic tool’, meaning 
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parents-to-be undertake scans ‘willy-nilly’. If midwives and sonographers express 
such concerns, why do they continue supporting the practice? Why do they persist 
in promoting a jovial and informal atmosphere? If parents-to-be truly expect the 
output of NT scans to exclusively be the acquisition of ‘pretty pictures’ (Lisa, SAD 
sonographer), why are they not scrapped? During an interview, Sophie (SAD 
sonographer) describes her approach when performing NT scans: 
 
People do have ultrasound scans just for fun. Personally, I always try and 
check everything’s OK first because it’s a very different atmosphere in 
the room if you’ve got a nuchal fold measuring 4.0mm to one that’s 
measuring 1.2mm and you’ve got a baby lying there kicking its legs and 
waving because a nice small nuchal fold is very good news on a scan. I 
know we’ve got to check all other factors but if it’s good news and it’s 
positive, as long as everything’s OK, I usually am quite relaxed and chat 
with people as that’s what they want. They do want a first scan, they 
want nice pictures, and they want the baby waving. 
 
Sophie suggests the perceived absence of any serious concern (‘[a nuchal fold] 
measuring 1.2mm’) allows her to create an appropriate atmosphere in which an 
unborn baby is not only announced when there is ‘very good news’ but is also 
coded according to movements (‘a baby lying their kicking its legs and waving) and 
validated through producing material memories (‘they do want a first scan, they 
want nice pictures, and they want the baby waving’). Sophie, however, suggests the 
absence of ‘good news’ would create ‘a very different atmosphere’, intimating she 
would not produce ‘waving’ images of the baby should a problem be suspected. 
There were occasions in which NT scans were utterly or relatively devoid of 
positive utterances framing it as an enjoyable day out. I observed only one NT scan 
where a problem was suspected. Esther (sonographer) told Mr and Mrs Tomkins 
(parents-to-be) she believed the unborn baby had cystic hygroma, a congenital 
multiloculated lymphatic lesion usually found in the left posterior triangle of the 
neck. Esther informed Mr and Mrs Tomkins cystic hygroma is linked to Turner 
syndrome. As Sophie intimates, the scan took on a ‘very different atmosphere’ in 
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which playful exchanges, regularly a staple of the ultrasound encounter, became 
absent. 
 
During such events, sonographers adjust their body language and interpretation of 
the screen image to the emerging results. They distance themselves from parents-
to-be and initially do not ‘engage in any dialogue about what is seen on the 
ultrasound image’, hopefully protecting them from a future surprise (Schwennesen 
and Koch 2012: 290). They attempt, in such instances, not to contribute to ‘the 
enactment of the image on the screen as a living child’ (2012: 290). However, even 
when the unborn baby is classified as ‘normal’, this does not mean the atmosphere 
is always jovial and informal. The following fieldnotes are taken from an NT scan 
between Esther (SAD sonographer) and Mr and Mrs Williams (parents-to-be): 
 
Mrs Williams: I’m a bit nervous because we’re IVF61. 
Esther: OK. Let’s have a look. Do you see this black gap between these 
two white lines? That’s the NT. When it’s enlarged, it’s associated with 
chromosomal abnormalities. We want the NT below three millimetres. 
[Esther continues to describe the procedure] There’s the little Buddha 
belly there! 
Mrs Williams: Like mine then [smiles]. 
Esther: Now let’s look at that NT. 
Mr Williams: It’s that bottom black line, is it? 
Esther: Yes. It’s this line here to this line here [pointing]. We take three 
measurements and usually take the largest of them all. 
Mrs Williams: It’s quite scary isn’t it? 
Mr Williams: Just relax. 
Esther: Yes just relax. Where are you going to deliver? 
Mrs Williams: Watermont. Is this OK? 
Esther: Of course! 
Mrs Williams: We’re consultant-led care as well. Does the baby have 
enough room in there? 
                                                     
61 IVF (in-vitro fertilisation) is a process by which an egg cell is fertilised by sperm outside of the 
body. It is a major treatment for infertility once other methods of assisted reproductive technology 
have failed. 
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Esther: Yes, baby’s got plenty of room. And baby looks to have the 
hiccups now! 
Mrs Williams: But he definitely has enough room? 
Esther: Yes. That’s just me pressing down with the transducer so don’t 
worry. 
Mr Williams: So on looking initially, it’s the size of [pause]. 
Esther: Small. It’s a small size which is good. 
Mrs Williams: Good. 
Mr Williams: Great. 
 
During the scan, Mrs Williams becomes ‘nervous’ owing to her IVF treatment. Mrs 
Williams describes the scan as ‘scary’, twice questions whether the unborn baby 
‘has enough room’, and solicits a response from Esther on the suitability of another 
hospital (‘Watermont’) for delivery. A number of parents-to-be are anxious prior to 
the scan and, admittedly, do not necessarily ascribe to constructing the procedure 
as an enjoyable excursion. This worry was most common in mothers-to-be over 
the age of thirty-five who, at a ‘higher-risk’ of having an unborn baby with Down's 
syndrome, frequently accounted for their decision to have screening by citing their 
age. When parents-to-be had previous pregnancy complications or other concerns, 
sonographers – explicitly or implicitly – toned down the enjoyable component of 
NT scans and prioritised medical information ahead of the personal and social 
meanings of the procedure. This is reflected in Dr Karman (FMD consultant) only 
undertaking NT scans, admittedly a rare occasion, with parents-to-be who have 
current/previous pregnancy complications such as recurrent miscarriages or a 
history of chromosomal conditions. Otherwise, Dr Karman is granted immunity 
from, to return to an earlier sentiment, the easy stuff which clogs up the clinic. Thus, 
NT scans are expected to proceed without a setback by producing a lower-risk 
result. 
 
However, whilst not all screening consultations in Springtown are reconstructed as 
enjoyable days out and opportunities to welcome new family members, this is a 
common situation. The boundaries between the medical and social components of 
a scan are often shifting, permeable, and difficult to untangle (Roberts 2012). In 
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SAD, this can certainly be linked to sonographers working in a privately-funded 
institution. In exploring the concept of ‘body work’ offered by Twigg et al. (2011: 
171), roughly defined as ‘paid work on the bodies of others’, Kerr’s (2013) analysis 
of assisted conception suggests in privately-funded settings, care is overtly 
organised, more than NHS hospitals, around an ethos of individual consumption. 
Similarly, Strong (1979) argues doctors in privately-funded practice are more 
likely to personalise their communication, and be prepared to have their 
recommendations questioned, than in state-funded care. In the context of 
increasingly marketised healthcare, professionals must thus negotiate the tensions 
between medical care and consumer choice (Kerr 2009, 2013). 
 
In SAD, sonographers were encouraged by admin staff to engage in marketing and 
customer relations by promoting or ‘selling’ (Bethan, SAD admin staff) further 
ultrasound scans to parents-to-be following an NT scan. Indeed, Bethan frequently 
emphasises that Springtown is ‘first and foremost a business’. Such an ethos of 
individual consumption arguably leads sonographers to tailor their treatment and 
invoke greater empathy for clients in offering a service. In doing so, NT scans are 
constructed as ‘consumable’ (Taylor 2008). Consumption is part of a way of life, a 
series of rituals related to identity-work, membership, and belonging (Douglas and 
Isherwood 1979). In arguing that consumption is a collective and communicative 
rather than individual endeavour, Douglas and Isherwood show how people use 
goods to provide information about themselves and how patterns of consumption 
reveal the pattern of society. What is more, consumption habits, deemed as natural 
as skin, are ‘criteria for membership and become weapons of exclusion’ (1979: 59). 
In SAD, people are exercised as consumers so the scan becomes another occasion 
for consumption, that is, an enjoyable day out where parents-to-be meet a new 
family member. I discuss the notion of ‘exclusion’ and how certain identities are 
produced and reproduced – specifically the ‘identity’ of an unborn baby – further 
in chapters seven and eight. 
 
Summary 
I began this chapter by identifying the contradictions between the accounts and 
practices of professionals. They identify the substance of aligning with the rhetoric 
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of informed choice and non-directive care but concurrently criticise screening for 
Down’s syndrome for its inaccuracy and its capacity to open a can of worms. 
However, professionals’ conduct in practice shows how during consultations with 
parents-to-be, the discursive ‘resource’ (Garfinkel 1967) of informed choice and 
non-directive care is drawn upon to make their claims. That is, they bestow a glut 
of information to parents-to-be and, in essence, see what happens. For Bosk (1992: 
10), the rhetoric of choice is a ground for ‘patient abandonment’; the satisfaction of 
their care obligation is not ‘taking charge of decision-making’, acting but not acting 
decisively (1992: 27). In Springtown and Freymarsh, similarly, policies of informed 
choice and nondirective care, enacted by professionals by communicating neutral 
scientific representations of bodily processes, allows professionals to strategically 
distance themselves from full responsibility for screening whilst actively playing a 
key role in shaping this practice. In Konner’s (1988: 366) terms, its description 
constitutes ‘the safety of the norm’, that is, one ‘feel[s] safe because you do what 
everybody else is doing'. 
 
Once more, my analysis goes beyond Bosk (1992) by identifying and exploring 
what this ‘abandonment’ specifically accomplishes, namely, that parents-to-be are 
enacted as rational and logical decision-makers. Professionals can subsequently 
detach from screening and accomplish it as a matter of concern for parents-to-be 
rather than themselves. As the decision for having screening or not rests with 
parents-to-be, professionals are not responsible and screening is therefore 
constructed as a matter of personal rather than professional concern (Latimer 
2000). However, parents-to-be are often described as not being attuned to the 
seriousness of Down’s syndrome screening and so submissively opt for the 
procedure. This trend has been recorded in this fieldwork and in the literature, 
with parents-to-be seemingly consenting to Down’s syndrome screening as an 
instance of conformity rather than any active decision-making processes (Heyman 
et al. 2006; Lippman 1994; Marteau 1995; Pilnick et al. 2004; Santalahti et al. 
1998; Tsouroufli 2011). This means choices are far from free, with the divide 
between voluntary choice and socially enforced coercion becoming blurred (Kerr 
et al. 1998). Combined with the reallocation of responsibility for decision-making 
to parents-to-be, this produces circumstances in which screening, performed via 
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locally-situated routines, is accomplished as an expected procedure in pregnancy 
rituals. The conduct of care, thus, produces the downgrading of screening (with 
decision-making not part of professionals’ role) and, in turn, the naturalisation of 
screening as a ‘normal’ part of pregnancy. 
 
In the second part of this chapter, I revealed how ultrasound scans are constructed 
as enjoyable days out where parents-to-be and family members meet an unborn 
baby and reconstruct kinship rather than occasions in which medical concerns 
about an unborn baby are identified. This accomplishes two things. First, Down’s 
syndrome screening is produced and reproduced as a routine part of pregnancy. 
The rituals of opting for ultrasound scans, obtaining pictures, and inviting family 
and friends – as well as recreating family narratives – accomplish disengagement 
with the technology’s main function. Professionals’ imperative to merge medical 
information with a consumer-friendly performance implicitly, and inadvertently 
one suspects, trivialises Down’s syndrome screening and downgrades its value as a 
medical procedure. 
 
Second, Down’s syndrome screening – by becoming constructed as a day out and 
particularly as a chance for reproducing kinship – accomplishes the production of 
(ideal) bodies and families. The ascription of physical features and movements of 
the unborn baby to personality traits, favourable physical appearances, and certain 
gendered conduct such as dancing and playing sports constructs certain types of 
expected bodies. This is reflected in NT scans becoming either ‘days out’ or 
encounters taking on ‘a very different atmosphere’. Whilst the former reinforces 
ideas of a ‘normal’ body, the latter strengthens the category of an ‘abnormal’ or 
‘potentially abnormal’ body. I build on this point more in chapters seven and eight 
where I attend to how Down’s syndrome itself is classified within antenatal care. In 
chapter seven, I identify how Down’s syndrome is made absent during screening 
consultations and is substituted with discourses of ‘risk’, ‘problem’, and 
‘abnormality’ which accomplish and re-accomplish the condition as a negative 
pregnancy outcome. In chapter eight, I explore how such constitutions connect 
with cultural ideologies of perfection, how this implicates and disciplines mothers-
to-be (particularly those aged thirty-five and above) into making certain choices, 
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and how the classification of the unborn baby with Down’s syndrome as a ‘foetus’ 
dehumanises, and can lead to the effacement of, the ‘baby’ with Down’s syndrome. 
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Chapter Seven 
Constituting Down’s Syndrome and Risk in the Clinic 
 
In chapter six, I explored the conduct of care with respect to screening for Down’s 
syndrome. I have shown how informed choice and non-directive care are used as a 
rhetoric which allows professionals to detach from and dispose of screening. This 
both institutes parents-to-be as rational decision-makers and naturalises Down’s 
syndrome screening as a ‘normal’ practice. Additionally, I captured how ultrasound 
scans are cast as enjoyable days out and opportunities to produce and reproduce a 
future family. This accomplishes the naturalisation of screening as an expected 
routine and the promotion of ideal bodies and families. The identification of 
physical features and personality traits produces ideas around what bodies – in 
relation to biological kinship and wider cultural values – are prized. 
 
I extend this latter argument in chapters seven and eight by exploring how Down’s 
syndrome itself is classified in Freymarsh and Springtown. In chapter seven, I 
reveal how professionals often identify Down’s syndrome screening as ‘eugenic’ 
and the condition itself, using their discourse, as ‘viable’ and ‘compatible with life’. 
However, I show that the condition (and so its definition as a ‘viable’ pregnancy 
outcome) is rarely discussed during screening consultations. This relative silence 
is upheld owing to three observations: 1) the UK public is interpreted as ‘knowing’ 
what Down’s syndrome is; 2) the organisation of care dictates that the condition is 
not important enough to justify explanation within consultations; 3) professionals 
frequently admit to holding minimal knowledge of Down’s syndrome. In addition, I 
show how Down’s syndrome, absent yet present, is organised and constructed 
within universalising discourses of ‘risk’, ‘problem’, and ‘abnormality’ which, 
perhaps inadvertently, fashion and sustain a pessimistic outlook of the condition. 
In sum, I argue the mundane interactions and implicit yet deeply embedded ideals 
emerging in Freymarsh and Springtown can highlight one reason why termination 
rates have remained between 89% and 94% for over twenty years across both 
England and Wales (Morris and Springett 2013). 
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Answering why termination rates remain high would be best addressed by seeking 
out parents-to-be with first-hand experience of receiving a diagnosis and having a 
subsequent termination of pregnancy. However, there are several potential pitfalls. 
How would one access such people? If they were located, would they participate? 
Would their consent be fully ‘informed’? Would delving this deep into such 
personal worlds constitute unethical practice? Regardless of how sensitively a 
project is planned, one must be cautious of such topics, notwithstanding the 
emotional impact such a study has on a researcher (as discussed in chapter four). 
However, there are examples of previous studies exploring how and why parents-
to-be choose to terminate or continue a pregnancy following a Down’s syndrome 
diagnosis (Helm et al. 1998; Korenromp et al. 2007; Olarte Sierra 2010; Reist 2006; 
Skotko 2005; Tymstra et al. 2004). 
 
‘Compatible with life’ 
In Freymarsh (both FAD and FMD) and Springtown (SAD), professionals denounce 
Down’s syndrome screening owing to the limited accuracy of screening and the 
creation of undue anxiety. Another criticism extends to the supposed eugenic 
purposes it satisfies. The troubled relationship between science, medicine, and 
eugenics in the context of reproductive technology has been previously recognised 
(Cunningham-Burley and Kerr 1999; Kerr et al. 1998; Kevles 1995), with some 
sceptical of the disassociation between scientific innovation and an old eugenics 
(Jones 1994; Shakespeare 1995). In FAD and SAD, a number of midwives and 
sonographers claim Down’s syndrome screening, a practice they are primarily 
responsible for, represents a eugenic service. This mirrors Duster’s (1990) claim 
that whilst the ‘front door’ to eugenics seems closed, the ‘back door’ of disease and 
disability prevention remains ajar. During a conversation after an NT scan, Esther 
(SAD sonographer) denounces screening as serving eugenic purposes: 
 
Mr and Mrs Jansen (parents-to-be) leave the room. Esther comments Mrs 
Jansen appears primarily concerned with obtaining pictures of the unborn 
baby. I ask if she thinks Mrs Jansen was ‘formally informed about screening’: 
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Esther: The only difference between eugenics and screening is informed 
consent. I have a real problem with screening for Down’s [syndrome] 
because there’s much worse out there. I fear it’s eugenic. More severe 
conditions like Patau’s [syndrome] or Edward’s [syndrome] are rare but 
not compatible with life whereas Down’s is compatible with life. 
Everyone wants the perfect pregnancy these days. In my grandmother’s 
generation, they didn’t expect healthy babies every time. Miscarriages, 
stillbirths, it was expected babies wouldn’t always make it. But these 
days, we have all the technology to know about babies and their 
potential problems. We’ve experienced a cultural shift towards 
perfection. [...] What makes this a non-eugenic service is the idea of 
getting informed consent. But informed consent is not consent at all. It’s 
not informed if parents do it as part of the routine of pregnancy. Parents 
are in a culture where they’re expected to have all these tests and stuff. 
Scans like these and this care has been routinised so it’s just consent, it’s 
not informed consent. A number of patients still have no idea why 
they’re in the hospital for a screen for Down’s because it’s so routinised 
and seen as what people are supposed to be doing. 
 
Esther’s rich and passionate denigration of screening practices corresponds to its 
naturalisation in the clinic and its ‘eugenic’ agenda. Current measures supposedly 
securing parent-to-be approval for screening, for Esther, provide and promote an 
illusion of consent. For Esther, the rhetoric of choice is commonly and narrowly 
conceived as informed consent. She also identifies Patau’s syndrome and Edward’s 
syndrome as ‘severe’ and ‘rare’ conditions which are ‘not compatible with life’; 
Down’s syndrome, in contrast, is ‘compatible with life’, leading Esther to stress that 
‘there’s much worse out there’. Drawing on experiential and historical knowledge of 
family members, Esther positions prenatal technology as prompting a ‘cultural 
shift’ fuelling parental expectations of predestined perfection during a pregnancy. 
She concludes informed consent is ‘not consent at all’, with parents-to-be 
perfunctorily and inertly undertaking screening practices as ‘part of the routine of 
pregnancy’. Since they are ‘expected to have all of these tests and stuff’, the notion of 
informed consent is farcical since parents-to-be, in Esther’s view, become docile 
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bodies towing the line of expectations. This mirrors Bosk’s (1992: 141) claim that 
what makes such practices acceptable is ‘the high degree of individual choice that 
appears to be exercised’ yet ‘how fragile that choice might be’ is unappreciated. 
During a later interview, Esther similarly suggests ‘medicine takes over at the cost 
of quality of life’ and ‘it’s not us in the medical profession who should be denoting 
what quality of life is’. 
 
Here, Esther produces classifications and divisions between ‘compatible’ and ‘non-
compatible’ conditions, the former becoming a catch-all term for an unborn baby 
who is ‘viable’ (who can live) and who can enjoy a good ‘quality of life’. In FAD and 
SAD, professionals construct Down’s syndrome as ‘compatible with life’, commonly 
with reference to the separate conditions of both Edward’s syndrome and Patau’s 
syndrome which are ‘incompatible with life’62. During a higher-risk screening 
consultation, Nancy (FAD midwife) describes these, along with Turner syndrome, 
as ‘the nasty ones’ which are ‘pretty much incompatible with life’. In an interview, 
Amy (FAD midwife) claims whilst she would not terminate an unborn baby with 
Down’s syndrome, she ‘probably wouldn’t continue with Patau’s [syndrome] or 
Edward’s [syndrome]’. Wertz (2000) reports how professionals differ in their 
perceptions of how ‘serious’ a condition like Down’s syndrome is. However, 
Freymarsh and Springtown professionals seem unanimous in identifying the 
condition as ‘viable’ and as offering a good ‘quality of life’. During an interview, 
Francine (FMD head midwife) suggests that diagnoses of Patau’s syndrome and 
Edward’s syndrome are ‘easier’ for parents-to-be when they must make a decision 
regarding a termination following a diagnosis: 
 
I think a misinterpretation some women have is even if they’re told 
they’ve got a baby with Down’s [syndrome], we’ll be able to tell them 
what degree of Down’s they have, the severity, which obviously we can’t. 
                                                     
62 Wilkinson (2010), a practicing physician, reminds the medical profession that a small proportion 
of children with Edward’s syndrome, a supposedly ‘non-viable’ condition, survive to middle or late 
childhood or even adulthood. Criticising professionals who question the decision to continue a 
pregnancy following a diagnosis of Edward’s syndrome, Wilkinson (2010) argues they should 
instead support and engage with parents-to-be who make this decision. His discussion revolves 
around a case in which a woman reports feeling abandoned and criticised by professionals for 
continuing a pregnancy following a diagnosis of Edward’s syndrome (Thiele 2010). 
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That’s very difficult because a couple may be able to cope with a mildly 
affected Down’s baby. But if they’ve then got behavioural problems, and 
cardiac issues, you can’t give them that answer of to what degree the 
baby will be affected. Edward’s [syndrome] and Patau’s [syndrome] is 
easier. The people I’ve counselled with abnormal results or with a 
higher-risk result, if they know or if they’ve been told that they’ve got a 
baby that’s incompatible with life, it’s like having your 1 in 3 chance 
[result of having a baby with Down’s syndrome] compared to your 1 in 
100. They may not decide to terminate the pregnancy but they know in 
the back of their minds what’s likely to happen to the baby whereas with 
Down’s, they haven’t got that. It’s still in that grey area. 
 
Francine highlights how the uncertain prognosis of Down’s syndrome, a condition 
compatible with life yet one that varies considerably between each case in relation 
to a person’s mental and physical condition (Tymstra et al. 2004), causes problems 
for parents-to-be in decision-making processes. She recognises although parents-
to-be may choose not to terminate a pregnancy following a diagnosis of Edward’s 
syndrome or Patau’s syndrome, this diagnosis is ‘easier’ than Down’s syndrome 
since the latter is ‘in that grey area’. A minority of midwives and sonographers 
admit they would have screening as a gateway to diagnostic tests for information-
gathering purposes rather than for terminating the pregnancy. However, the vast 
majority of midwives and sonographers condemn such practices owing to the 
compatibility of Down’s syndrome and the need to direct resources elsewhere. 
During an interview, Lois (FAD midwife) explains: 
 
It is surprising we test for Down’s syndrome when there are lots of 
things worse than it. For example, cystic fibrosis63, and it’s something 
like one in twenty people are carriers. I know the risk is lower of your 
child having cystic fibrosis but that would be a massive thing. It shortens 
your life expectancy a lot more than Down’s syndrome does. So I do find 
it surprising in a way that there’s so much onus on the Down’s test. But 
                                                     
63 Cystic fibrosis is an autosomal recessive genetic disorder critically affecting organs including the 
lungs, pancreas, liver, and intestines. 
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once a screening test has been introduced, it’s unlikely they’d take it 
away. 
 
Lois categorises cystic fibrosis as a ‘massive thing’ which is ‘worse than’ Down’s 
syndrome, before concluding the naturalisation of Down’s syndrome screening 
prevents its withdrawal from medical practice. Amy (FAD midwife) similarly 
questions why Down’s syndrome screening ‘is highlighted because there are loads 
of other conditions out there that can be picked up’. She predicts parents-to-be 
undertake screening because ‘they probably just feel that since the test is there and 
we’re offering it, they should take it’. Likewise, Francine (FMD head midwife) 
suggests the routinisation of screening, at the expense of ‘forgetting that a child 
could be born with cerebral palsy or autism’, shapes it as an ‘anticipation engrained 
in them’ which ‘cannot be taken away because we’ve started it’. Nonetheless, 
professionals often embrace discourses such as ‘compatible with life’ and ‘viable’ 
as catch-all categories for criticising and downgrading screening practices. 
 
The most common complaint, however, is that screening for heart defects, cited in 
Freymarsh and Springtown as the leading cause of death for unborn and newborn 
babies, is overlooked in favour of Down’s syndrome screening. Dr Karman (FMD 
consultant) is critical of Down’s syndrome screening, suggesting resources would 
be better allocated elsewhere since the condition is ‘compatible with life’. Bethan 
(SAD admin staff) likewise claims that when parents-to-be contact Springtown, she 
informs them that cardiac issues are more common than Down’s syndrome with a 
view to ‘selling the cardiac scans’. This offer is frequently rebuffed, however, since 
‘it is all Down’s, Down’s, Down’s!’ In an interview, Lisa (SAD sonographer) suggests: 
 
The NHS and a lot of people have a bee in their bonnet about Down’s 
syndrome when the baby is far more likely to have a heart defect. But 
people have this big thing like it’s terrible that the baby has Down’s 
syndrome, whereas they’re much more likely to have a baby with a heart 
defect. For the number of Down’s syndrome babies you’re detecting, they 
should put more money into screening for heart defects. 
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Lisa suggests extensive screening for heart defects – a more pressing concern for 
reproductive medicine – is disregarded in favour of detecting the ‘terrible’ outcome 
of Down’s syndrome. During an interview, Elena (FMD head midwife) dislikes 
screening not only because it detracts from more pressing clinical concerns, but 
also because Down’s syndrome is a condition which is compatible with life: 
 
I think just because we can screen for Down’s [syndrome], why should 
we? The money would be better spent elsewhere on cardiac issues and 
other problems. Because [people with Down’s syndrome] are the 
gentlest, most loving people in the world. I wouldn’t personally 
terminate a pregnancy for the condition but I wouldn’t deny access to 
information. [...] I think Down’s screening is a waste of time, effort, and 
money which could be well spent somewhere else for the sake of 
detecting how many Down’s children [via prenatal testing]. And you 
could spend that money on giving them the most appropriate support 
and the family the most appropriate support you can get rather than just 
killing another human being because they just happen to be a bit 
different. I think it’s just eugenics by another name. Enough is enough. I 
think having Down’s syndrome has been demonised. 
 
After suggesting monetary and professional investment should be focused on other 
screening programmes or raising awareness of the condition, Elena produces a 
generalising account of people with Down’s syndrome as ‘the gentlest, most loving 
people in the world’. Although she remains detached by pledging allegiance to 
principles of nondirective care and informed choice, Elena claims she would not 
personally terminate a pregnancy following a diagnosis of the condition. She 
denounces it with reference to the estimated number of live births of babies with 
Down’s syndrome in the UK. Elena claims ‘enough is enough’, citing screening as 
‘eugenics by another name’ and concluding Down’s syndrome ‘has been demonised’. 
 
Such recommendations arguably extend the medical gaze by realigning a focus on 
surveillance practices other than Down’s syndrome screening (Armstrong 1995; 
Foucault 1973). However, such recommendations are used here by professionals 
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as a resource for criticising screening and the provision of services. The positive 
image of Down’s syndrome conjured up by Elena is reflected in her recognition 
during another conversation that Down’s syndrome ‘is nowhere near as bad as the 
other stuff’, the other stuff referring to occasions in which a condition becomes 
categorised, using professionals’ discourse, as ‘incompatible with life’ or ‘non-
viable’. The following fieldnotes were taken at a multi-disciplinary team meeting64 
organised by FMD: 
 
Around fifteen professionals – obstetric consultants, head midwives, cardiac 
specialists, neurologists, and alike – are in the meeting. Dr Karman begins by 
welcoming staff and directing their gaze to the large projector screen in FMD 
displaying ‘cases’. [...] Dr Karman provides an update on a case where the 
child of a couple was postnatally diagnosed with Down’s syndrome. Dr 
Karman informs attendees ‘they were disappointed but positive. They said “it’s 
a shame but we’ll love him anyway”, so there you go’. This was met with smiles 
from most attendees. Some called out ‘that’s great’ and ‘good for her’. 
 
Such meetings frequently provoke disagreement yet equally become a mechanism 
in which forms of knowing are affirmed and reproduced (Latimer 2013). During 
this particular meeting, professionals applaud the absent parents for their attitude 
toward a Down’s syndrome diagnosis. This echoes midwives’ and sonographers’ 
accounts when they construct a positive image of the condition owing to its 
compatibility with life. In their study on how scientists and clinicians understand 
the new genetics, Cunningham-Burley and Kerr (1999) identify how participants 
assemble strategic rhetorical boundaries between science and society. They 
subsequently direct attention to the valuable social implications of intervention, 
rather than to the science and technology itself, and subsequently protect their 
cognitive authority whilst distancing the new genetics from charges of repeating 
                                                     
64 Meetings are held monthly. A wide range of specialists gather in FMD to discuss hospital ‘cases’ 
(parents-to-be attending the clinic). Dr Karman governs proceedings and directs the gaze of 
attendees at a large screen displaying a list of cases. The cases are recorded in a number of ways, 
including whether they are under the care of Freymarsh or referred from another hospital, the 
condition in question, the tests already undertaken, the ‘next move’, whether the baby has a chance 
of survival, the outcome (whether the baby has died and/or been delivered), and any other 
noteworthy contributions. The respective parents-to-be are not physically present in the meeting. 
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an old eugenics. Whilst the new genetics produces and communicates neutral 
information offering greater choice, eugenics is framed as a feature of totalitarian 
regimes and a politically distorted pseudo-science constituting a knowledge abuse 
(Cunningham-Burley and Kerr 1999; Kerr 2003; Kerr et al. 1997). 
 
However, in Freymarsh and Springtown, professionals often align with a similar 
charge aimed at Down’s syndrome screening, censuring the practice for its alleged 
eugenic agenda. Rather than appearing to hold negative views of Down’s syndrome 
as previously claimed (Sooben 2010), these professionals seem to accept Clarke’s 
(1994: 19) suggestion that Down’s syndrome is ‘one way, among others, of being 
human’. Such positive framings outwardly correspond to other research and 
autobiographical accounts of parents who have a child with Down’s syndrome 
which recognise their situation as not one which should always be viewed as 
unwanted and tragic (Alderson 2001; Clark 2008; Groneberg 2008; Hodapp 2007; 
Lewis 2008; Skotko 2005; Thomas 2014; Van Riper and Choi 2011; Van Riper and 
Selder 1989; Voysey 1975). 
 
Absence in antenatal encounters 
So if professionals, as well as research and autobiographical literature, account for 
Down’s syndrome in positive terms, how is it constituted in everyday affairs, that 
is, in screening consultations? Sooben (2010) claims that professionals provide a 
functional and brief description of Down’s syndrome during screening which 
conforms to a biomedical problem orientation, with Bryant et al. (2006) similarly 
arguing antenatal settings provide little opportunity for people to discuss and 
explore their beliefs surrounding disability. In analysing the information provided 
around Down’s syndrome in antenatal leaflets, Bryant et al. (2001) and Murray et 
al. (2001) likewise suggest that they contain false, misleading, and inconsistent 
information which fashion a negative image of the condition. 
 
Interestingly, in Down’s syndrome screening consultations in FAD and SAD, the 
condition is seldom addressed in explicit detail. At most, Down’s syndrome is cited 
without any further clarification. The following fieldnotes are taken from an NT 
scan between Esther (SAD sonographer) and Mr. and Mrs. Jones (parents-to-be): 
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Esther: So here’s your baby. You can see the heart beating away there. 
Little one’s hiccupping as well [Mr. Jones and Mrs. Jones laugh]. 
Mrs. Jones: Maybe it’s that sausage and chips I just had! [All laugh]. 
Esther: So we measure the nuchal translucency which is the pad of fluid 
at the back of baby’s neck. When it’s enlarged, it increases the risk of 
baby having a chromosomal abnormality. We do the measurement in 
combination with your blood-work so you will have some bloods done 
today. So the nuchal translucency and your age and your biochemical 
bloods and the length of the baby will give you a definite risk of three 
chromosomal abnormalities. We only screen for three, one of which is 
Down’s [syndrome] which I’m sure you know but also we look at Patau’s 
[syndrome] and Edward’s [syndrome]. Now I don’t know if you’ve seen 
about these on the internet but they’re three of the most common, two of 
the most lethal. During this screening, you’ll be placed in either the 
lower-risk or higher-risk bracket and if you’re higher-risk, you’re 
advised to have an amniocentesis. Oh God you’ve got a wriggly one here! 
Mrs. Jones: It looks like it’s doing the splits [laughing]. 
Esther: Yes, baby’s doing a dance! We like the nuchal translucency to 
measure less than 3mm and your measurements are all under 3mm 
which is all great. 
 
Esther begins the scan by identifying the unborn baby’s position and its heartbeat, 
later interpreting its movement as a sign of ‘hiccupping’. Esther’s reading of 
movement as hiccupping means the unborn baby can be viewed as an entity 
separate to the mother (and also by its label as a ‘wriggly one’). Mrs Jones jokingly 
cites this as ‘the sausage and chips I just had’, demonstrating how Mrs Jones 
reclaims her and her baby as an integrated entity. Humour is littered throughout 
the encounter; Mr and Mrs Jones are amused by the unborn baby hiccupping which 
is attributed to Mrs Jones’ pre-scan conduct (eating), Mrs Jones frames the unborn 
baby’s movement as replicating the splits, and Esther describes the unborn baby as 
doing a dance routine. This collaborative coding, essential to making the imagery 
on the ultrasound monitor personally and socially meaningful, reflects the intricate 
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shifts between threat and thrill, that is, the (clinical) information communicated 
around screening practices and the (non-clinical) performances of a sonographer, 
parents-to-be, and the unborn baby. The threat involves divulging details of nuchal 
translucencies, chromosomal conditions, and diagnostic tests. In contrast, the thrill 
involves offering parents-to-be an entertaining experience. Ivry (2009: 195) refers 
to this as the ‘humour and horror’ of ultrasound scanning. 
 
But what happens to Down’s syndrome here? Throughout the encounter, whilst 
the condition is cited, no further details on it are tendered by Esther nor solicited 
by the Jones’. Assumptions govern proceedings; the condition is shaped as 
something which the Jones’ ‘know’. Interestingly, Esther describes the three 
syndromes screened for – Down’s syndrome, Edward’s syndrome, and Patau’s 
syndrome – as ‘chromosomal abnormalities’ and ‘three of the most common, two of 
the most lethal.’ Esther refrains from clarifying which syndromes are lethal but 
rather relies on Mr and Mrs Jones calling upon tacit assumptions regarding which 
conditions are lethal and which condition is not. Similar to Garfinkel’s (1967) ‘et 
cetera’ principal whereby people rely on others to understand the situation based 
on their own knowledge, Down’s syndrome is framed as a taken-for-granted 
category requiring no further explanation of symptoms, prognosis, and the ‘social 
realities’  of the child who may have the condition (Rapp 1988: 150). The following 
extract reports on a screening consultation between Tara (FAD midwife) and Mrs 
Leslie (mother-to-be): 
 
Tara: So you know that it’s a simple blood test, yes? 
Mrs Leslie: Yes. 
Tara: Great. Well we take your bloods and this will be sent off to the labs. 
You’ll receive a letter in about seven to ten working days telling you your 
result. And this test goes according to your age so the older you are, the 
higher your risk is for having a baby with Down’s syndrome. 
Mrs Leslie: OK. 
Tara: You will get a lower or higher-risk result. If your lower-risk, we 
won’t do anything else but that’s not to say that there’s no chance that 
your baby has Down’s syndrome. 
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Mrs Leslie: Yes [nods]. 
Tara: If you have a higher-risk result, we’ll call you up and invite you in 
to offer an amniocentesis. Have you had an amniocentesis before? 
Mrs Leslie: No but I’ve heard of it.  
Tara: Ok. Well it’s a large needle which goes into your tummy and this 
takes some fluid from around your baby which is sent off to be looked at. 
This is the test done to provide a proper diagnosis. 
Mrs Leslie: Yes. 
Tara: This test just tells you whether you have a higher-risk or lower-
risk. 
Mrs Leslie: Yes. 
Tara: OK then. So you don’t smoke and this isn’t an IVF, no? 
Mrs Leslie: No. 
 
Tara takes more details from Mrs Leslie. After this, both Tara and Mrs Leslie 
leave the room so Mrs Leslie can have blood withdrawn for the quadruple 
screen. 
 
The consultation begins with Tara describing Down’s syndrome screening as a 
‘simple blood test’. This constructs screening as a painless exercise, arguably 
threatening the principle of nondirective care designed to govern clinical practice. 
By framing screening as ‘simple’, Tara could, albeit unwittingly, induce Mrs Leslie 
to undertake screening. Additionally, although Mrs Leslie’s specific age is not 
highlighted, Tara’s claim that older women have a ‘higher-risk for having a baby 
with Down’s syndrome’ may influence her decision. Nonetheless, my intention here 
is to recognise how Down’s syndrome is overlooked during a consultation and is 
lost in the trappings of clinical jargon around risk results and diagnostic testing. 
Here, professionals concentrate on screening processes more than the condition 
itself (McCourt 2002; Williams et al. 2002b). 
 
But what about consultations in which a Down’s syndrome diagnosis is suspected 
after a higher-risk result is established? Within such consultations, the condition is 
rarely afforded much attention once again. Consider the following extract taken 
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from a consultation between Susan (FAD midwife), Mrs Garry (mother-to-be), and 
Mrs Garry’s mother: 
 
Susan introduces herself and tells Mrs Garry she has received a 1:87 result. 
She explains the process which led to this 1:87 result. Susan tells Mrs Garry 
she is ‘in the higher-risk group’ meaning she will be offered an amniocentesis. 
She explains the amniocentesis procedure whilst highlighting the 1% risk of 
miscarriage and other possible side effects including abdominal cramps and 
heavy bleeding. Susan then explains: 
 
Susan: The result will only tell you for sure about three main 
chromosomal abnormalities: Trisomy 21 which is Down’s syndrome, 
Trisomy 18 which is Edward’s syndrome, and Trisomy 13 which is 
Patau’s syndrome. Edward’s and Patau’s are serious chromosomal 
disorders and Down’s syndrome you already know about. It varies from 
mild through to quite severe. So this will come to you in the first three 
days of analysis but then the rest of your chromosomes are analysed 
over two weeks. This could bring out some unexpected results, even 
things we don’t know about yet. So you could know all of these things. 
How do you feel about having the test? 
Mrs Garry: I’d be more worried if it was a 1 in 30 result. But it’s 1 in 87 
isn’t it? 
Susan: Yes. The number does make a difference. [Mrs Garry looks 
anxious about what decision to make] It’s totally up to you. You don’t 
have to decide today. You have to consider your feelings and then decide. 
 
Mrs Garry’s mother asks how long they can wait before Mrs Garry can decide 
whether to have an amniocentesis. Susan explains there is currently an 
available timeslot for amniocentesis in two days’ time. Mrs Garry says she will 
not accept this timeslot yet and will go home to discuss options with her 
partner. Susan accepts this, hands Mrs Garry a leaflet on having a higher-risk 
result, and says Mrs Garry can telephone her at any time if she has any 
questions. Mrs Garry asks questions such as ‘who usually has amniocentesis’ 
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(Susan specifies ‘it’s totally up to you’) and claims the result was ‘not as high as 
I was expecting anyway’. She asks if the anomaly scan can detect Down’s 
syndrome (Susan answers it might if the unborn baby has a heart defect) and 
if there is a timescale for deciding whether to have amniocentesis: 
 
Susan: Not really. But we do say it’s better to have it sooner as it’ll get 
harder to make that decision as the pregnancy goes on and you start to 
feel the baby kick and stuff. 
Mrs Garry: So the sooner the better really? 
Susan: Yes. But take your time in making the decision. We can do 
whatever you need us to do. 
 
Susan asks if Mrs Garry has any more questions. She does not. Mrs Garry and 
her mother thank Susan before leaving the room. 
 
After describing to Mrs Garry how she is ‘in the higher-risk group’, Susan asks Mrs 
Garry how she feels about the test and reiterates this decision is to be made by her 
and her partner. Susan explains a timeslot for an amniocentesis has been booked, 
arguably dismissing the principle of nondirective care. Intimating that the gravity 
of the situation requires immediate attention could have an effect of disciplining 
Mrs Garry’s conduct to undertake the procedure. Arguably, such claims are a form 
of pastoral power which governs bodies and organises actions (Foucault 1979). 
Power relations are enacted subtly, implicitly disciplining Mrs Garry into – or at 
best advising her to – conduct herself in a particular way. This is reinforced by 
Susan suggesting whilst Mrs Garry has full jurisdiction in deciding if and when she 
would like an amniocentesis, it would be ‘better to have it sooner as it’ll get harder 
to make that decision’, a decision presumably regarding a termination of 
pregnancy, ‘as the pregnancy goes on and you start to feel the baby kick and stuff’.  
 
An important observation here involves Susan’s explanation that an amniocentesis 
will initially provide information on Down’s syndrome, Edward’s syndrome, and 
Patau’s syndrome. She also suggests amniocentesis can ‘bring out some unexpected 
results, even things we don’t know yet’. Whilst Susan uses this to ignite reflection by 
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Mrs Garry on whether to undertake diagnostic testing, it also points toward the 
significance of incidental findings within reproductive practice. Bernhardt et al. 
(2013: 142) refer to this as producing ‘toxic knowledge’, whilst Alderson et al. 
(2004: 75) also speak of this as the ‘dragnet’ effect of screening which can involve 
women in decision-making about the future of a pregnancy they had not expected 
when first consenting. At this point, Susan defines Edward’s syndrome and Patau’s 
syndrome as ‘serious chromosomal disorders’; in contrast, Down’s syndrome is 
framed as something Mrs Garry will ‘already know about’ and which ranges ‘from 
mild to quite severe’. Again, no further information on the condition is tendered. In 
consultations, attention is focused instead on the designation of a risk factor, 
diagnostic testing, and the timescale of decision-making processes. 
 
In such encounters, Down’s syndrome shares similarities to Latour’s (1999: 304) 
‘black box’, a metaphor referring to the way in which ‘scientific and technical work 
is made invisible by its own success’. In an analysis of how scientific knowledge is 
made durable, Latour (1991) suggests such work is only defined by its function; 
the complexity of a given system’s internal workings is redundant providing it 
continues to serve its primary purpose and allows people to proceed in their daily 
activities. The inner workings of a black box are not open for debate since it has 
been accepted by the scientific community and society alike. Its output, therefore, 
retains the status of truth. Similarly, I suggest within screening practices, Down’s 
syndrome becomes a curious black box, a ‘known’ entity remaining unopened and 
shrouded with the midwife/sonographer not providing, and the parents-to-be not 
soliciting or questioning, information around the condition. Following Latour, I 
turn my focus to unpacking how the black box of Down’s syndrome is solidified 
and darkened, who is involved in this, and what this accomplishes. 
 
The familiarity of Down’s syndrome  
Why is Down’s syndrome made absent during consultations? I offer three reasons 
for this silence: 1) the familiarity of Down’s syndrome; 2) the organisation of care; 
3) professionals’ limited knowledge of the condition. As alluded to in the extract 
between Esther and the Jones’, Down’s syndrome is constituted as a taken-for-
granted category which is recognisable to parents-to-be, with several professionals 
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suggesting the UK public, at large, know about Down’s syndrome. However, they 
claim this knowledge is limited to the noticeable anatomical features, or the ‘face’ 
(Latimer 2013), of people with the condition. During an interview, Amy (FAD 
midwife) explains: 
 
I don’t think they understand the syndrome much unless they have a 
family member or friend who has a Down’s syndrome person in the 
family. But I think they know what a Down’s syndrome person looks like. 
They don’t always know that a Down’s syndrome person can live until 
they’re sixty-five and seventy and they can live a relatively normal life in 
the sense that they get up in the morning, eat and dress, do all of the 
things that we tend to do. 
 
Amy doubts whether parents-to-be, unless they know someone with the condition, 
hold detailed knowledge of life expectancy and the capacity to ‘live a relatively 
normal life.’ Professionals feel mothers-to-be are not aware of the key features of 
Down’s syndrome, a trend reported elsewhere (Bryant et al. 2006; Williams et al. 
2002b) and which undermines the principle of informed consent. Amy suggests 
that despite a lack of awareness among parents-to-be, they often ‘know what 
someone with Down’s syndrome looks like’. Similarly, Rita (FAD midwife) claims 
parents-to-be often convey their knowledge of Down’s syndrome by stating people 
with the condition ‘look that way’, referring to the distinctive facial features caused 
by the presence of an extra chromosome. Susan and Maggie (FAD midwives), 
among others, credit such awareness of the Down’s syndrome ‘face’ to the familiar 
presence of people with the condition in UK society. In an interview, Camilla (FAD 
midwife) explains the difficulties of communicating information during a 
consultation to parents-to-be whose first language is not English: 
 
You often get women from other countries that don’t speak English as a 
first language and maybe don’t really understand what a baby with 
Down’s syndrome is because of language barriers and cultural 
differences. Whether they really understand what we’re asking of them 
or what we’re trying to explain in consultations, I’m not convinced. Some 
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people do say “I don’t know what a Down’s syndrome baby is.” And you 
think, gosh, really [laughs]? 
 
Camilla highlights the ‘language barriers and cultural differences’ inhibiting one’s 
knowledge of Down’s syndrome. This is best accentuated in Camilla’s concluding 
remark identifying her surprise at people not knowing ‘what a Down’s syndrome 
baby is’. Similarly, Rapp (1988) notes how many recent US immigrants had no 
recognition of Down’s syndrome whilst English-speaking communities generally 
knew about the condition. During consultations, my own observations reveal that 
Down’s syndrome, in turn, was rarely explicated in any detail. Considering that ‘it 
helps to know about Down’s syndrome as this would affect whether [parents-to-be] 
have the screening or not’, as Lois (FAD midwife) highlights, and professionals often 
accuse parents-to-be of not holding great knowledge of the condition excepting 
facial features, why are no further details tendered? Susan (FAD midwife), among 
others, admits to ‘not speaking about Down’s syndrome’ but why is this? 
 
One reason for this is the downgrading of Down’s syndrome screening; ensuring 
that information on Down’s syndrome is communicated is not a clinical priority. A 
second reason is the familiarity of the Down’s syndrome ‘face’ hinders a broader 
discussion of the symptoms, prognosis, and ‘social realities’ (Rapp 1988) of people 
with the condition. A third reason for not discussing the condition emerges on 
account of both parents-to-be and professionals not wanting to consider it as a 
possible pregnancy outcome. During an interview, Lisa (SAD sonographer) claims 
this is because despite its compatibility with life, Down’s syndrome is principally 
understood in negative terms: 
 
I think [parents-to-be] probably see [Down’s syndrome] as very negative 
by and large. I don’t think they know how much support they would get 
or if they’re told what life would be like if they’re given the diagnosis of a 
Down’s syndrome baby. How much they’re told will influence them 
whether they’d keep the pregnancy or not. 
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Whilst Lisa’s contentions (such as Down’s syndrome being seen as ‘very negative by 
and large’) relate to terminating or continuing a pregnancy following a diagnosis, 
her claims are appropriate for considering how Down’s syndrome is constituted in 
the early stages of antenatal care. Elena (FMD head midwife) conveys a similar 
thought by suggesting ‘people’s understandings’ reflect stereotypes such as ‘the 
older person walking behind their elderly parents with the ankle socks’. The 
following fieldnotes were taken in the Springtown office where parents-to-be book 
ultrasound scans: 
 
Gareth: Do you think people having the nuchal translucency scan know 
much about Down’s syndrome? 
Dominique: Not really. I think they know about the facial features. 
Hannah: I don’t think they want to know. 
Dominique: It’s not fully entered their heads. 
Juliana: And they know about them being retarded. 
Dominique: I don’t think they know because it’s such a broad spectrum 
of how they are affected too. 
Hannah: Unless they know someone in the family [with the condition]. 
Juliana: We get more questions about Patau’s syndrome and Edward’s 
syndrome. With these syndromes, they ask things like ‘well what are 
they?’ Because they aren’t as well known so we tell them about that and 
that’s it really. We bracket it in with Down’s syndrome. 
 
Dominique casts doubt on whether parents-to-be know about Down’s syndrome 
excusing ‘the facial features’, namely because the condition had ‘not fully entered 
their heads’ and there is ‘such a broad spectrum of how they are affected’. Juliana 
suspects parents-to-be are likely to know about people with Down’s syndrome 
having learning difficulties and so ask ‘more questions about Patau’s syndrome and 
Edward’s syndrome’, two conditions ‘bracket[ed] in with Down’s syndrome’. She 
attributes this to their unfamiliarity since the conditions are not ‘as well known’ as 
Down’s syndrome. Importantly, Hannah explains parents-to-be do not have much 
knowledge of Down’s syndrome since ‘I don’t think they want to know’. In a study 
on inflammatory bowel disease, Thompson (2013) describes the interactional 
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processes through which participants of a support group subvert the stigma of 
faecal matter. Members avoided soiled words involving direct references to faeces 
or defecation, silence thereby acting as a barrier against stigma, shame, and 
attributions of immorality. Similarly, Greenhalgh (1994) describes how Chinese 
women use silence as a means of resisting state policy around childbirth and 
maternal bodies. In Freymarsh and Springtown, Down’s syndrome is likewise 
subjected to ‘civil inattention’ (Goffman 1971) whereby professionals and parents-
to-be dis-attend to the condition; it is taboo, hidden, avoided, an elephant in the 
consultation room. Within screening consultations, the imagined damage caused 
by the potential presence of Down’s syndrome, as a future deviant body, initiates 
reluctance (rather than resistance as explicated by Greenhalgh) from parents-to-be 
and midwives/sonographers to openly discuss the basics of the condition. 
 
Down’s syndrome amounts to what Taussig (1999: 7) describes as a ‘public secret’, 
namely the ideas of shared knowledge in a society that is seldom described or 
explicitly acknowledged. Symbolically invisible and at its core banal, public secrets 
become a powerful social glue and knowledge of ‘knowing what not to know’ 
(1999: 6). Notably, Taussig focuses primarily on the defacement of public secrets. 
During most of the consultations I observed, Down’s syndrome was not defaced 
but rather remained a public secret. Although the condition was discussed with 
professionals in ‘back-stage’ (Goffman 1959) interviews, it was a hidden category 
rarely unmasked in consultations. The condition is made significant by its absence. 
At the crossroads between the unmentioned and unmentionable, it is subjected to 
a strange yet pervasive ‘degradation ceremony’; the character of Down’s syndrome 
is reduced to a lower social type since it is imagined as breaching normative 
expectations (Garfinkel 1956: 420). In sum, the condition is downgraded through 
its silence. It is in its familiarity (as a negative outcome) that Down’s syndrome, 
curiously, becomes invisible. 
 
The organisation of care 
A second reason why Down’s syndrome remains absent is that the organisation of 
care hinders interactions between parents-to-be and professionals. This is most 
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overt in FAD where a checklist is used to govern clinical practice. It includes eleven 
‘key points to discuss’, in Camilla’s (FAD midwife) words, during a consultation: 
 
After a consultation, Camilla fills in the checklist. Camilla asks if I have seen it 
and hands me the two-sided form. The first side of the form asks for details 
such as scan date, ethnicity, and weight. The second side contains a list of 
eleven points marked “Information Given” which must be clarified during 
consultations. These are: 
1. Gestation at the time of test 
2. Have you had any other screening test for Down’s syndrome? 
3. A low chance result ≥ 1:151 
4. Low chance does not mean NO chance 
5. Low chance result will be sent by letter within 10 working days 
6. The low chance letter will not state the risk ratio 
7. A high chance result ≤ 1:150 
8. High chance screening result will be provided within 5 working days 
9. An appointment will be offered within 24 hours of contact to discuss a high 
chance result 
10. Have you considered the amniocentesis test that will be offered following 
a high chance result? 
11. If you accept an amniocentesis diagnostic test an appointment will be 
offered as soon as possible following a recall 
 
Camilla suggests ‘in order to cover our backs’, midwives follow such rationalised 
stipulations with the intention of accomplishing appropriate care. Conformity to 
rationalised modes of conducting care – meaning care is essentially read off the 
page – arguably limits an extensive dialogue between each party. During an 
interview, Martha (FAD midwife) draws attention to the value of the checklist: 
 
It makes sure we’re all practicing to the same standard so that one 
midwife doesn’t go in and just skip through it. It standardises practice. 
With other things you can’t be all the same but with Down’s syndrome 
screening, what we say should be standardised before the test is done. 
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Martha suggests the checklist ‘standardises practice’, meaning ‘we’re all practicing 
to the same standard’. Lindsay (FAD midwife) similarly claims the new checklist is 
‘making a difference’ and suggests parents-to-be ‘might not assume it’s just a blood 
test and that people just have it’. Likewise, Lois (FAD midwife) explains many 
aspects of antenatal care are reduced to ‘tick-boxing, initialling, and that’s it’, citing 
this as a positive development in the ‘streamlining’ of tasks so there is not ‘too 
much paperwork’. Rita (FAD midwife) explains she likes the checklist since ‘you’ve 
got it all there ready to remind you’ and suggests the consultation is ‘just tick’, 
indicating her care is accomplished by ticking the specified boxes (Boden et al. 
2009). The checklist is an ‘immutable mobile’ (Latour 1987), a textual form which 
represents knowledge and remains constant as it flows through various networks. 
For Latour, this becomes crucial to the routinisation of scientific knowledge and 
techniques. The immutable mobile of the screening checklist, then, is translated 
into practical situations (consultations) and whilst subject to reinterpretation, is 
dutifully followed by FAD midwives with the intention of providing informed 
choice without their own intervention. It also represents a response to potential 
lawsuits; by communicating all of the ‘correct’ information at hand, midwives can 
‘back-up’ by engaging in ‘defensive practice’ (Gail, FAD midwife). 
 
Interestingly, however, a conversation about Down’s syndrome does not constitute 
one of the key points of interest on the checklist. With care increasingly structured 
on rational grounds in pursuing efficiency, standardised stipulations introduced by 
organisational cultures determine what information is necessary for sharing with 
parents-to-be (Bosk 1992). Although the checklist is exclusive to FAD, the absence 
of Down’s syndrome during consultations in SAD can also be attributed to an 
extensive deliberation of the condition being framed as non-essential or, rather, as 
not quite making the cut within slim encounters. Operating within strict time 
constraints, professionals condense information and only provide details deemed 
significant for parents-to-be. Their conduct is shaped by wider organisational 
cultures which ‘silence other cultural resources and world views’ (Rapp 1988: 
151). These limits, thus, lead to Down’s syndrome being made absent. 
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Professional knowledge 
A third reason for the absence of Down’s syndrome in consultations corresponds 
to several midwives and sonographers admitting to lacking extensive knowledge of 
the condition. When asked about the knowledge of parents-to-be regarding Down’s 
syndrome, Sophie (SAD sonographer) answers: 
 
I think a lot of them probably don’t really know about [Down’s 
syndrome]. I suppose it’s just what you read about or people or families 
you know. [...] I must admit we haven’t particularly been taught a lot 
about it. I know a lot to do about testing for it but I don’t know a huge 
amount about the actual condition. I think it goes back to if you know 
somebody with it and we’re taught things like the statistics, like 25% of 
them have cardiac problems. But you’re not particularly taught about 
that when you do training and stuff. 
 
After suspecting parents-to-be do not know much about the condition, Sophie 
associates her limited knowledge of Down’s syndrome with a lack of training and 
suggests her familiarity with it extends exclusively to screening practices and 
statistics (‘25% of them have cardiac problems’). According to several sources, 
however, the number of people with Down’s syndrome who have cardiac issues is 
closer to 50% (NHS FASP 2012). This reflects research suggesting some healthcare 
professionals hold limited knowledge of Down’s syndrome (Dormandy et al. 2006; 
Skirton and Barr 2010). This often includes little direct contact during medical 
training with people who have developmental disabilities (Cleary-Goldman et al. 
2006; Driscoll et al. 2009; Skotko 2005). Others have suggested professionals also 
have limited knowledge of screening for Down’s syndrome (Farsides et al. 2004; 
Hey and Hurst 2003; Samwill 2002; Smith et al. 1994; Williams et al. 2002c), but 
this was not observed at FAD or SAD. 
 
My intention here is not to shame or chastise midwives and sonographers for their 
flawed or lack of knowledge around Down’s syndrome. Rather, I intend to highlight 
that this knowledge is not attributable to incompetence but rather to relegating 
screening to professionals with – as they openly admit – limited knowledge of the 
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condition. In an interview, Francine (FMD head midwife), who spends much of her 
time in FMD, reflects on this lack of knowledge during an interview whilst 
discussing working in this department: 
 
I feel that in FMD, we are treated well by parents-to-be because they are 
sent to us having seen midwives or doctors [not in FMD]. And quite a lot 
of the time, the midwives and doctors will give them the very basic 
information and refer them here because most midwives and doctors 
don’t like abnormalities. It’s not in their realm of interest or knowledge 
so if an abnormality comes, I mean that is the best way because it’s 
better not to explain if you don’t know what you’re talking about rather 
than giving information we’re potentially going to contradict. 
 
Francine suggests parents-to-be welcome their referral to FMD because midwives 
and doctors not in FMD ’will give them the very basic information’ and ‘do not like 
abnormalities’. However, it is frequently FAD midwives (and sonographers in SAD) 
who communicate information on Down’s syndrome in the early stages of 
antenatal care. During one conversation in the office, Rita (FAD midwife) highlights 
the difficulties of explaining any condition without extensive knowledge of it: 
 
Even if you get a result meaning [parents-to-be] will be referred 
elsewhere, you’re the initial person to see them. Sometimes I find that a 
bit difficult because they start asking you questions and I cannot always 
answer them because I’m not specialised in that area. So I feel a bit bad 
then saying “I’m not really the best person to speak to but I will get 
someone to speak to you”. 
 
Rita describes how it is ‘a bit difficult’ when parents-to-be ‘start asking questions’ 
which ‘I cannot always answer because I’m not specialised in the area’. Such 
observations implicitly reflect how Down’s syndrome screening is downgraded in 
the clinic. It is cast as a mundane task relegated by professionals highly placed in a 
clinical hierarchy. Screening consultations are instead carried out by professionals 
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openly confessing to not possessing extensive knowledge of the condition; Down’s 
syndrome, thus, becomes absent. 
 
Notably, the condition may be afforded further details and reflection once a 
diagnosis is suspected and a higher-risk result must be explained to parents-to-be. 
However, similar to initial screening consultations, the majority of such encounters 
are conducted by midwives (SAD sonographers bestow this responsibility to a 
nurse or admin staff) who often claim they have a limited knowledge of Down’s 
syndrome. During a consultation in which Mr and Mrs Knight (parents-to-be) are 
told they have a higher-risk of Down’s syndrome, for instance, Eve and Amy (FAD 
midwives) describe what will happen after diagnostic testing: 
 
Eve: If the baby is diagnosed with Down’s syndrome, you can wait till 
your full karyotype is in to see whether it’s mild or severe. 
Mr Knight: What is severe then? 
Eve: I couldn’t tell you that. Not now anyway.  
Mrs Knight: I think what my husband is asking is what would mild be? 
Eve: Well a number of people with Down’s syndrome can go on to live till 
sixty years old, and [seems unsure and pauses]. 
Amy: Yes, they can sometimes have learning difficulties. But if mild, they 
can appear quite normal. 
Eve: Yes. They can have a similar IQ level to other children. They can live 
good lives, some can live independently. [Pauses] It depends really. 
Mr Knight: I do have another question: where does Down’s syndrome 
start? 
Mrs Knight: Where is it from? 
Eve: It’s an extra chromosome. That chromosome will be placed 
somewhere in the genes. We’re not sure why it happens. 
Mr Knight: I read it was when the cells were divided in the 
chromosomes. 
Amy: It’s a chromosomal thing, yes. It’s not genetic. 
Mrs Knight: [Turning to husband] There’s nothing we can do about it, it’s 
not one of us. 
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Eve: Yes it’s not a genetic thing. 
Amy: Yes. 
Eve: It’s a chromosomal thing. 
 
It is rare that two midwives are present during an encounter, either for Down’s 
syndrome screening or higher-risk results. On this occasion, Amy attended 
alongside Eve as a training exercise. During the consultation, Mr and Mrs Knight 
ask questions regarding Down’s syndrome. A higher-risk result commonly causes 
parents-to-be to ask further questions regarding diagnostic testing and risk factors 
during a consultation, with a discussion of the condition rarely extending beyond 
midwives or other clinicians offering them a leaflet providing further information. 
This is an atypical case, a ‘breach’ (Garfinkel 1967) or ‘infraction’ (Goffman 1971) 
because the parents-to-be do solicit details from the midwives in a manner which 
unmasks the elephant in the room, namely, that they have limited knowledge of the 
condition. Eve and Amy (though particularly Eve) seem unsure about the condition 
and subsequently provide vague information. When Mr Knight asks what 
constitutes a severe prognosis, Eve specifies the life expectancy of individuals with 
Down’s syndrome before Amy adds ‘they can sometimes have learning difficulties’. 
Towards the consultation’s conclusion, Eve and Amy, previously providing what 
may be perceived as a relatively positive outlook of the condition, describe Down’s 
syndrome as chromosomal but 'not a genetic thing’. The parents interpret this as 
the condition not being hereditary and as something they can ‘do [nothing] about’. 
 
Describing Down’s syndrome as ‘not genetic’ (although Mr and Mrs Knight rightly 
interpret this term as signifying hereditariness65) corresponds to an organisational 
structure in which screening, as discussed in chapter five, is downgraded by 
consultants and relegated to midwives and sonographers, namely, the unwitting 
‘mop-up service’ (Bosk 1992: 34). On rare occasions where information on Down’s 
syndrome is shared or solicited, not only do midwives and sonographers 
commonly admit to lacking great knowledge of the condition (outside of the ‘face’, 
heart defects, learning difficulties, viability, and causation by an extra twenty-first 
                                                     
65 As a reminder, there are three forms of Down’s syndrome: Trisomy 21 Down’s syndrome (94% of 
cases); Mosaic Down’s syndrome (2% of cases), and; Translocation Down’s syndrome (4% of 
cases). Only Translocation Down’s syndrome can be hereditary. 
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chromosome), but the finer details of symptoms, prognosis, and future prospects – 
physiological and social – are absent or at best vaguely present in consultations. 
The importance of knowledge about Down’s syndrome and other conditions for 
reproductive decision-making is emphasised by both professionals and other 
studies (Boardman 2010; Bryant et al. 2001), although this is usually discussed in 
relation to families with potentially hereditary conditions (Arribas-Ayllon et al. 
2008; Lock et al. 2007). Nonetheless, in FAD and SAD, Down’s syndrome – a 
predominantly non-inherited condition – is made absent in the early stages of 
antenatal care. 
 
Risks, problems, and abnormalities 
To recap, I have offered three reasons why Down’s syndrome is often avoided 
through absent or at least ambiguous engagements. Arguably, one might consider 
these reasons as useful excuses. Professionals do not necessarily view a lack of 
knowledge about Down’s syndrome, despite its widespread availability, as a deficit 
in performing duties. The absence of Down’s syndrome, consequently, becomes a 
natural and enduring condition. So with the condition spoken around as opposed 
to spoken about, what existing discourses shape Down’s syndrome in interactional 
exchanges? How is the condition discussed when, in turn, it is not discussed? 
 
The most common vernacular organising and constructing Down’s syndrome, a 
vernacular infiltrating prenatal screening practices (Heyman et al. 2006; Pilnick 
2008) and antenatal care generally (Possamai-Inesedy 2006), is ‘risk’: parents-to-
be receive a risk factor, diagnostic testing carries a risk of miscarriage (and heavy 
bleeding, abdominal cramps, infection, and premature labour), and older mothers-
to-be are at an increased risk of having a child with Down’s syndrome. Screening 
furthers a culture of risk within the clinic in which professionals and parents-to-be 
must embrace complex risk assessments before deciding whether to undertake 
screening (and perhaps diagnostic testing) and assessing the ultimate value of this 
intervention (Hallowell 1999; Rapp 2000). 
 
In a trend reflecting the wider development of ‘biomedicalisation’ (Clarke et al. 
2003), reproductive medicine positions mothers-to-be in a web of surveillance 
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wherein they monitor, measure, and seek knowledge of avoidable risks such as 
smoking and consuming drugs/alcohol during a pregnancy (Helén 2005). Lupton 
(1999: 60) identifies how pregnant women are subjected to advice and appraisal 
directed at ‘containing risks’, both those threatening their health and that of their 
unborn baby. She argues the female body is ‘constructed and experienced through 
discourses, knowledges and strategies of risk’, highlighting how risk emerges at 
various levels of meaning ‘from the social structural to the cultural and symbolic’ 
(1999: 61). Freeze (2008) similarly suggests that since childbearing is a public as 
well as private activity, pregnant women become vulnerable to advice, criticism, 
and surveillance, actively creating culture through their accountability and their 
need to rationalise conduct. Since Western society is preoccupied with trying to 
avoid risk (and thus blame), pregnancy involves heavily prescriptive codes of 
expected conduct administered via a scrutinizing public gaze (Lupton 1999). In 
FAD and SAD, for instance, mothers-to-be are burdened with information on risks 
including car safety, airline travel (DVT66), consumption (caffeine, alcohol, 
cigarettes, diet), sexual intercourse, exercise, parvovirus, breastfeeding, chicken 
pox, flu vaccines, and gardening (exposure to toxoplasmosis/manure). 
 
When screening for Down’s syndrome at FAD and SAD, risk becomes an accepted 
and privileged discourse, the commitment to which is exemplified in the following 
consultation between Lois (FAD midwife) and Mrs Roberts (mother-to-be): 
 
Lois: So this is just a chat about the Down’s syndrome test. Do you know 
much about Down’s syndrome screening? 
Mrs. Roberts: Not really. I know if it’s abnormal, they’ll offer me another 
test. 
Lois: Kind of. Do you know what Down’s syndrome is? 
Mrs. Roberts: Yes. 
Lois: OK. This is a screening test which won’t affect the baby. You’ll be 
placed in a higher-risk or lower-risk category. The test is 80% accurate 
so lower-risk does not mean no risk of having a baby with Down’s 
syndrome. If you’re higher-risk, we’ll offer you an amniocentesis. The cut 
                                                     
66 Deep vein thrombosis is the formation of blood clot in a deep vein, predominantly in the legs. 
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off is 1 in 150 so you could be 1 in 148, 1 in 149, 1 in 150, and all that is 
higher-risk. So we offer the amniocentesis which takes fluid from around 
the baby and this says for definite whether your baby has an 
abnormality. But it does have a risk of miscarriage of 1% so if 1 in 100 
women have the amniocentesis, one will miscarry. A higher-risk result 
will be given in five working days and an appointment will be offered 
within twenty-four hours. A lower-risk result will be given within ten 
working days and the letter will say how low-risk you are. But what I 
badly need to know is whether you want to know whether you’re a 
lower-risk or higher-risk.  
Mrs. Roberts: Yes, just so I can know. 
Lois: So you would consider having the amniocentesis? 
Mrs. Roberts: I’m not sure. I’d have to speak to my partner. 
Lois: But you’d like to know whether you’re lower-risk or higher-risk? 
Mrs. Roberts: Yes. I can do something about it afterwards then if 
something is wrong. 
Lois: OK. 
 
The consultation is described by Lois as ‘just a chat’, implicitly and immediately 
downplaying the significance of the event. Mrs Roberts acknowledges her lack of 
knowledge of screening which will detect anything ‘abnormal’, a definition Lois 
provisionally accepts. Importantly, after Mrs Roberts confirms she knows what 
Down’s syndrome is, no further details on the condition are offered; it retains its 
status as ‘abnormal’. Lois accepts this label and describes the screen as physically 
unproblematic (‘this is a screening test which won’t affect the baby’), glossing over 
the prospective ‘can of worms’, as outlined by midwives and sonographers earlier 
in the thesis, which screening practices threaten to expose. Lois recounts what she 
perceives as apt information for accomplishing appropriate care such as the 
accuracy of screening, risk factor cut-off rates, prospective diagnostic testing, and 
the risk of miscarriage (as outlined in the screening checklist discussed above). 
The consultation far from represents ‘a chat’ (a chat implies an inclusive two-way 
exchange), as described at the start of the encounter, with Lois one-sidedly reciting 
clinically correct information with the intention of promising the ideals of 
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reproductive choice and nondirective care (Bosk 1992). After Lois asks Mrs 
Roberts whether she wants screening, she claims she will ‘just so [she] can know’, 
in her words, ‘if something is wrong’. 
 
During the consultation, the discourse of risk is largely employed. The implicit 
assumptions shaping wider readings of risk paint a negative picture. A potential 
risk status not only shifts health(y) identities of mothers-to-be but also demarcates 
Down’s syndrome itself as a ‘risk’, in effect, a threatening possibility. Pregnancies 
become ‘tentative’ (Rothman 1986), marred by the risk of impending disability and 
provoking anxiety rather than reassurance for parents-to-be (Marteau 1995). 
Importantly, Lois and Mrs Roberts each define the condition as ‘abnormal’/an 
‘abnormality’, a deviation from normative assumptions. The word ‘risk’, however, 
principally shapes their understandings in this encounter. With Down’s syndrome 
lacking a language of its own, it becomes subsumed by the ‘linguistically and 
culturally more secure notion of risk’ (Scamell and Alaszewski 2012: 218). The 
widely-circulated term risk carries negative connotations; if something is a risk, it 
is to be feared and avoided (Lupton and Tulloch 2002). 
 
With risk indicative of a potential threat (Douglas 1992) and having ‘connotations 
of danger and negative outcomes’ (Shakespeare 1999: 673), its common use within 
screening encounters produces a negative portrayal of Down’s syndrome as a 
preventable and perilous conclusion to a pregnancy. The knowledge of Down’s 
syndrome as a ‘risk’ and ‘problem’, rather than as a ‘viable’ and variable condition, 
is therefore privileged. During consultations, much like clinicians in Cunningham-
Burley and Kerr’s (1999) study, there is little reflection among professionals, 
despite curbed protests of screening equating to eugenics, about the social aspects 
of disorder/disease definition and the social, rather than medical, problems of 
disability. In addition, during the consultation between Lois and Mrs. Roberts, the 
offer of an amniocentesis ‘within twenty-four hours’ not only highlights the gravity 
of the situation but also marks potentially detecting the condition as offsetting the 
possibility of miscarriage caused by diagnostic testing. Similar attempts to swiftly 
book diagnostic testing were observed in Freymarsh, sometimes occurring before 
professionals informed parents-to-be of their higher-risk result. Provisional 
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bookings are scheduled both for practical purposes, namely, to save time in a busy 
environment, and for ‘care’ purposes, namely, so they could inform parents-to-be 
that a timeslot for diagnostic testing is available should they want it. However, 
whilst such actions are meant to be harmless, they arguably discipline parents-to-
be into making decisions under the rhetoric of informed choice. Although hurrying 
the mother-to-be into making a decision may be defined as ‘good care’, it can also 
be construed as another system of disciplinary power (Foucault 1973). 
 
The negativity of the risk discourse is reflected further in recent efforts made by 
midwives/sonographers and antenatal governing bodies to replace the word ‘risk’ 
with ‘chance’; parents-to-be, for instance, should be told they receive a chance 
factor as opposed to a risk factor of having a child with Down’s syndrome. During 
one conversation, Amy and Gail (FAD midwives) reflect on why this is the case, 
with Amy concluding ‘risk sounds too negative’. During another conversation, Amy 
describes the word risk as ‘aggressive terminology’, with chance framed as ‘softer’ 
and not sounding ‘as much like a danger’. By highlighting during an interview how 
risk ‘is negative’ and that ‘low-risk and high-risk is not the nicest way of saying a 
result’, Camilla (FAD midwife) suggests she tells parents-to-be the test will ‘put you 
into one of two groups: one that we offer you the amniocentesis and one where we 
don’t’ since risk factors/statistics ‘can confuse people sometimes’. 
 
The discourse of chance is favoured by professionals not only because it is viewed 
as less aggressive than risk but also since, I suggest, it implicitly attributes a result 
to fate and luck. This potentially absolves parents-to-be (specifically mothers-to-
be) from feelings of responsibility for not preventing such a risk. Whilst risk holds 
connotations with danger and as something which can be minimised or avoided if 
only due attention is provided, chance is synonymous with luck and fate. Since risk 
itself holds negative connotations, chance is categorised as the more appropriate 
and, according to Amy and Gail, commonly used discourse in screening practices. 
However, my observational work reveals whilst risk/chance was sometimes used 
synonymously, ‘risk’ is employed far more frequently than ‘chance’ in screening 
consultations (the discrepancies between what one says and what one does 
highlights one of the benefits of observational data). This oversight did not appear 
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to emerge as a conscious decision but rather as a product of the integration of a 
risk discourse in the everyday work of professionals.  
 
Within screening practices, the figuring of Down’s syndrome as a risk is reinforced 
with similar pervading classifications. At Freymarsh and Springtown, Down’s 
syndrome – since it is not cited explicitly – becomes synonymous with ‘problems’, 
‘bad news’, ‘a bad scenario’, ‘something wrong’, and, most frequently, ‘abnormality’. 
The following fieldnotes taken from an NT scan between Olivia (SAD sonographer) 
and Mr and Mrs Burton (parents-to-be) highlights this: 
 
Olivia: Now the NT [scan] involves measuring the fluid at the back of the 
baby’s neck. This white line and this white line is where it is. We want 
that gap to be less than 3mm and I can say it looks tiny from first view.  
Mrs Burton: So that’s a good one? 
Olivia: It is [Mr and Mrs Burton smile]. 
Mr Burton: So getting to see all these babies must be quite a fun job. 
Olivia: Sometimes. It’s not always nice news but it’s usually all normal. 
Mrs Burton: So it’s a bad scenario if the bit at the back of the neck is not 
there then? 
Olivia: No. The more it is, the higher the chance of abnormality. So a 
small measurement is good. [...] I’ll get a picture of that now. The 
measurement is 1.6mm too which is brilliant. 
 
In this consultation, Olivia repairs the impending danger of a ‘bad scenario’ by 
highlighting the ‘brilliant’ measurement which, in all likelihood, points toward the 
absence not of Down’s syndrome but of the much vaguer ‘abnormality’. The nuchal 
translucency is categorised as a ‘good one’, with most unborn babies being ‘normal’ 
and falling under the rubric of ‘nice news’. Despite this reassurance being present 
in most consultations, a commitment to discursive categories of risks, problems, 
and bad scenarios – categories organising and shaping Down’s syndrome as a 
universal – takes on even greater significance once you consider Francine’s (FMD 
head midwife) suspicion that parents-to-be ‘only really pick up keywords’. Since 
professional conduct incites interpretive acts among parents-to-be, the discursive 
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categories tendered by them surrounding Down’s syndrome classify it as a 
negative outcome. Furthermore, it imposes a collective category on it which blurs 
the considerable variation not only of the condition but also between people with 
the condition. In FAD and SAD, a negative image of Down’s syndrome, coupled with 
no positive comments, seems to be presented (Sooben 2010; Williams et al. 
2002b), with Alderson (2001) similarly arguing that a negative image of Down’s 
syndrome can be frequently found in the medical literature. 
 
The positioning of Down’s syndrome as a risk, problem, or bad scenario (among 
others) is reflected, specifically in Freymarsh, in the early stages of antenatal care. 
Here, parents-to-be are offered screening for a multitude of conditions and 
diseases including but not limited to rubella, HIV, syphilis, rhesus disease67, sickle-
cell disease68, thalassemia69, hepatitis B/C, and Down’s syndrome. During an 
interview, Maggie (FAD midwife) describes the impact this may have on parents-
to-be: 
 
I think most people just assume [Down’s syndrome screening] is 
something they’re going to have. It’s like we check their blood, their iron 
levels, we check their blood group, and we’ll check their Down’s 
syndrome blood at the same time. It’s very common now. Everyone just 
takes it. 
 
Maggie describes how the naturalisation of Down’s syndrome screening can be 
attributed to parents-to-be assuming screening is ‘something they’re going to have’ 
along with other tests. Rita (FAD midwife) similarly says that screening is accepted 
by parents-to-be since it is offered together with screening for the likes of rubella 
and hepatitis B. She feels Down’s syndrome screening, viewed as ‘routine and what 
[parents-to-be] do’, should be ‘separated from the rest of them’, criticising current 
                                                     
67 Rhesus disease is when antibodies in the blood of a mother-to-be destroy her unborn baby’s 
blood cells. It only occurs when the mother-to-be has rhesus-negative blood and father-to-be has 
rhesus-positive blood, leading to an unborn baby with rhesus positive blood. 
68 Sickle-cell disease is an inherited genetic blood disorder in which red blood cells develop 
abnormally. This effects the capacity to carry oxygen around the body. 
69 Thalassemia are forms of inherited autosomal recessive blood disorders. It is caused by the 
weakening and destruction of red blood cells. This affects the capacity to carry oxygen around the 
body. 
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practice for not formulating distinctions between the former and the latter. Maggie 
and Rita, together with other midwives and sonographers, acknowledge this trend 
to highlight the problem of Down’s syndrome screening being framed as a routine 
practice. They suggest that parents-to-be do not critically reflect on its potential 
implications and lack an awareness of screening being an opt-in, rather than opt-
out, procedure. During an interview, Lois (FAD midwife) claims: 
 
I think people have a tendency to accept what is offered to them because 
they think you wouldn’t offer it if there wasn’t a good reason to have it 
but they don’t actually think about what can happen if they get a result 
they don’t like. [...] With the initial booking appointment, I sometimes 
feel that women are coming in feeling really excited because they’re 
pregnant and they have that first [dating] scan and most of the time, it’s 
OK and it’s all really lovely and happy. And then you go into a room and 
talk with them about all of the things that are not lovely and happy – HIV, 
syphilis, the Down’s test, sickle-cell disease and thalassemia – all of these 
things and by the time they leave [the clinic], they often feel a bit worried 
and anxious and that’s not the intention but it happens. 
 
After suggesting parents-to-be accept screening on account of its accessibility, Lois 
argues the prelude of a dating scan ignites excitement and this is threatened when 
‘you talk with them about all of the things that are not lovely and happy’, namely the 
likes of HIV, syphilis, and Down’s syndrome. The positioning of Down’s syndrome, 
a condition categorised by many professionals as ‘compatible with life’, with 
diseases/disorders such as HIV and hepatitis B/C accomplish and re-accomplish it 
as one part of the abnormal whole. If parents-to-be do truly ask midwives to ‘test 
me for everything’ as Eve suggests, Down’s syndrome is cast alongside the likes of 
‘disease’ and ‘disorder’, contradicting the positive imagery conjured up in the back-
stage accounts of professionals. 
 
The negative depiction of Down’s syndrome is further buttressed in antenatal 
materials, including leaflets distributed to parents-to-be when attending FAD or 
SAD, which describe Down’s syndrome solely pertaining to physiological defects 
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such as cardiac issues and, in one Springtown leaflet, the vaguely-defined ‘other 
health problems’. If parents-to-be read this literature which midwives and 
sonographers often accuse them of not doing, they are presented with a clinical 
representation constructing a narrow and adverse portrayal of the condition. It is 
not too fanciful to claim that offering Down’s syndrome screening in the first 
instance, by its very nature, categorises it in negative terms, that is, as something 
worthy of early detection and potential elimination (Alderson 2001; Asch 1999; 
Burton-Jeangros et al. 2013; Kerr et al. 1998). 
 
This supports the findings of Korenromp et al. (2007) who claim the decision to 
terminate a pregnancy is most frequently based on an understanding of Down’s 
syndrome as ‘an abnormality too severe’, a burden ‘too heavy’ for the child, and 
people with the condition as not being able to ever ‘function independently’. 
Similarly, Reynolds (2000: 894) claims that screening persists since ‘a child with 
Down’s syndrome is seen as a disaster by many potential parents’. In the early 
stages of antenatal care at Freymarsh and Springtown, regardless of professionals’ 
accounts identifying it as a condition which is compatible with life and screening as 
serving a eugenic agenda, Down’s syndrome is presented as an inevitable tragedy. I 
contend that this causes problems for parents-to-be once a diagnosis is suspected 
or established either prenatally or postnatally and offers a reason why, as specified 
at the beginning of the thesis, why roughly nine out of ten prenatal diagnoses of 
Down’s syndrome in England and Wales end in a termination of pregnancy (Morris 
and Springett 2013)70. 
 
Summary 
In this chapter, I have identified the discrepancies regarding the constitution of 
Down’s syndrome. Professionals often cite Down’s syndrome screening as eugenic 
with reference to discursive resources of the ‘compatible’ and ‘viable’ unborn baby. 
However, they frequently fail to discuss this, or Down’s syndrome itself, during 
                                                     
70 Independent termination statistics were not gathered at Freymarsh or Springtown. As such, I 
accept it is unjust to fully generalise extensive statistics on terminations following a diagnosis of 
Down’s syndrome in England and Wales to only two settings. However, since the termination rates 
have remained between 89% and 94% in England and Wales for over twenty years (Morris and 
Springett 2013), the negative constituting of Down’s syndrome in Freymarsh and Springtown 
suggests one plausible reason for this. 
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consultations. Down’s syndrome is made absent through its familiarity, the 
organisation of care, and a lack of knowledge among the necessary professionals 
about the condition. Absent yet present, Down’s syndrome is framed within the 
negative collectives of ‘risk’, ‘problem’, and ‘abnormality’. Shakespeare (1999: 673) 
explains how professionals and medical texts use negative language in public 
rhetoric and how their clear values, implicit and subtle as they may be, reflect a 
consensus that ‘disability is a major problem to be prevented by almost any means 
necessary’. Here, I capture how professionals talk this language into consultations. 
This challenges what I was told during interviews and conversations. Such formal 
encounters were not trouble-free gateways to truths but rather performative 
accounts. In these moments of disconcertment, I captured the discrepancies 
between what one says and what one does. I am not accusing professionals of 
purposefully distorting information and performing for my benefit. Rather, I claim 
how professionals’ accounts of their conduct – of what they think they do – may 
not always correlate with what happens on the shop floor. 
 
In the clinical setting, professionals communicate, do not communicate, or mis-
communicate medical information and ‘structural power arrangements, social 
knowledge, and popular meanings about medically defined disability’ (Rapp 1988: 
143). For Martin (1998: 125), the very language of biological science becomes ‘as 
real in their effects on the way doctors and patients act in the world as the effects 
of an antibiotic or scalpel’. This language, for Martin, reveals deep and powerful 
cultural assumptions. In Freymarsh and Springtown, the definition of Down’s 
syndrome as a risk or abnormality, defining the identity of the future child, is 
produced in medical discourse and is infused with values about what a ‘normal’ life 
entails (Olarte Sierra 2010). This, in turn, silences cultural norms and individual 
values which frame understandings of certain conditions (Shakespeare 1998). 
 
Once more, this reveals how Down’s syndrome screening is entangled in ‘motility’ 
(Latimer 2013; Latimer and Munro 2006; Munro 2001). It is this motility among 
professionals, particularly in their capacity to switch grounds (Latimer 2008b), 
which accomplishes Down’s syndrome, in one instance, as a condition which is 
compatible with life since there are ‘a lot of things worse than it’ (Lois, FAD 
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midwife) yet as a risk, problem, and abnormality in another. Presence is, at critical 
moments, magnified or diminished (Latimer 2008a; Strathern 1992). In the clinic, 
the viability of Down’s syndrome and the condition itself is diminished whilst 
discourses of risk, problem, and abnormality are magnified. This produces and 
reproduces a shift of Down’s syndrome from ‘compatible’ to being figured as one of 
the many risks in antenatal care. It is through this motility, and the most frequent 
shift to Down’s syndrome as a risk or problem, in which the condition is aligned, 
before a diagnosis is suspected or established, as an emotional tragedy and future 
family disruption. In the clinic, professionals make and unmake the family by 
constructing divisions of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’; the ‘abnormal’ person (with 
Down’s syndrome), in contrast to the ‘normal’ person (without Down’s syndrome) 
is imagined to be, and constructed as, unsettling biological kinship. This produces 
and reproduces, thus, an idealised version of what constitutes the ‘normal’ family. 
 
I extend my arguments in chapter eight by describing how Down’s syndrome is 
entwined in cultural ideologies of perfection, how mothers-to-be at an ‘advanced 
maternal age’ are implicated in this, and how the ‘human’ status of an unborn baby 
with Down’s syndrome can be made and unmade in antenatal care. 
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Chapter Eight 
Expectant Parents, Expecting Perfection 
 
In the previous chapter, I captured how the subject of Down’s syndrome is avoided 
in screening consultations and the discrepancies between professionals’ positive 
accounts of the condition and its negative description in routine clinical practices. I 
extend this analysis in chapter eight. I begin by exploring how Down’s syndrome is 
embroiled in cultural ideologies around perfection and imperfection. I encapsulate 
how these positions are created and replicated in the early stages of antenatal care 
in consultations (mostly NT scans) and via materials (performative architecture). 
These social practices and cultural materials accomplish Down’s syndrome as 
breaching normative expectations of perfection in a pregnancy outcome (Rapp 
2000; Remennick 2006; Rothschild 2005). 
 
In what follows, I describe how this emphasis on perfection institutes parents-to-
be as responsible for promising flawlessness in their unborn baby. Mothers-to-be 
are assigned primary accountability for decision-making processes (see chapter 
six). Confronted with endless reminders of ‘perfect baby’ outcomes, mothers-to-be 
over the age of thirty-five (at an ‘advanced maternal age’) are disciplined into 
considering their pregnancy as pathological and, potentially, screening for Down’s 
syndrome as one means through which they assure a ‘perfect’ outcome. Finally, I 
identify how constitutions of Down’s syndrome and cultural ideals of perfection 
are enacted by discursive shifts in FMD between ‘foetus’ and ‘baby’. Whilst 
ultrasound scans and/or foetal movement often gives rise to a foetus becoming a 
baby, the identification of a suspected diagnosis can involve re-figuring the baby 
as, once more, a foetus. This shift not only allows professionals to accomplish 
emotional and moral distance from the issues at hand but also highlights the 
malleability of the human category whilst transforming problem bodies – including 
those with Down’s syndrome – into potentially ‘disposable’ entities (Latimer 1997; 
Munro 2001; White et al. 2012). In this chapter, I will certainly not engage in moral 
arguments around abortion and whether terminating for Down’s syndrome should 
be classified as acceptable practice. Instead, I explore the conditions under which a 
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termination for the condition is made possible and recognise, with Shakespeare 
(2000), how debates are more nuanced than simplistic ‘pro-life versus pro-choice’ 
or ‘eugenics versus choice’ arguments. 
 
Producing perfection 
In the previous chapter, I described how discourses (risk, problem, abnormality) 
sustain a negative constitution of Down’s syndrome. These are commonly created 
and reinforced through the opposing and entwining discourses of ‘normal’ and 
‘perfect’. What constitutes normality and perfection is built into everyday language, 
particularly assumptions around how we organise particular bodies (Thompson 
2013). The dualism of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ is demarcated after twenty-four 
weeks of a pregnancy during which parents-to-be can legally terminate an unborn 
baby owing to, in the words of FMD, ‘medical problems’. However, as recognised 
elsewhere, a termination of pregnancy is a grey area owing to a lack of specificity 
in the Abortion Act 1967 about what pregnancies can be categorised as ‘viable’ or 
‘non-viable’ (HM Government 2014). Whilst a precise definition of what 
constitutes a serious ‘medical problem’ is difficult, its interpretation is not. Indeed, 
what is viewed as ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ is accomplished in the early stages of 
antenatal care before a diagnosis is suspected or established. In the following 
extract taken from an NT scan, Sophie (SAD sonographer) describes the procedure 
to Mr and Mrs Reed (parents-to-be): 
 
Sophie: Did you have the NT scan with your previous child? 
Mrs Reed: No. I’ve had it now because I’m a bit worried with being quite 
a bit older.  
Sophie: OK. [Sophie moves the transducer across the abdomen] There’s 
the baby’s head [pointing]. Baby is nice and flat here. And that’s a nice 
and small NT. 
Mrs Reed: Great. 
Sophie: [Nuchal translucency measures at 1.56mm]. We’re all fine here. 
It’s actually one of the clearest scans I’ve seen. That’s perfect that is. Baby 
is lying perfectly on its back. [...] That’s all looking very normal and 
lovely. The NT is 1.5mm and we want it below 3mm so that’s very good. 
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The actual measurement is 1.56mm. So there’s the little arm there, the 
hand there too. 
Mrs Reed: There’s a history of anencephaly71 in my family so could you 
check for that as well please? 
Sophie: Yes OK. [Mrs Reed turns to the monitor] That seems fine to me. 
Mrs Reed: Good. It’s just there are three cases in my Mum’s family. 
There’s a history of spina bifida72 and anencephaly.  
Sophie: [Looks back at Mrs Reed] That’s a very, very normal looking 
baby to me. I would normally be able to see anencephaly. It is a very 
obvious abnormality. It all looks fine. I can’t check for spina bifida though 
because it’s too soon. It’s a healthy looking baby there. 
 
After Mrs Reed accounts for her decision-making by citing the worry stemming 
from her ‘being quite a bit older’ than in her previous pregnancy, Sophie describes 
the baby’s attributes (specifically the neck fluid) as ‘nice and small’, ‘perfect’, and as 
‘looking very normal and lovely’. Sophie validates her contentions by referring to a 
measurement of 1.56mm as ‘very good’ since it falls under 3mm. Sophie then 
constructs other features of the baby as ‘normal’, with Mrs Reed seeking 
confirmation of this owing to a family history of other ‘cases’, albeit not Down’s 
syndrome. Sophie responds by telling Mrs Reed that she is carrying a ‘healthy’ and 
‘very, very normal looking baby’. Whilst Sophie discounts the ‘obvious abnormality’ 
of anencephaly, the perceived absence of markers for Down’s syndrome and any 
other ‘abnormality’ means the unborn baby is seen as ‘normal’. Since sonographers 
only detect markers for a condition rather than a concrete diagnosis only available 
via further diagnostic testing, they rely on the provisional absence of indicators as 
a likely sign of a disability-free outcome. Much like in FAD, Down’s syndrome, here, 
is categorised alongside other conditions (anencephaly and spina bifida) as an 
‘abnormality’. Prenatal technologies, thus, represent apparatuses through which 
the unborn baby is categorised as normal/abnormal and perfect/imperfect.  
                                                     
71 Anencephaly is a cephalic condition resulting from a neural tube defect in which a major portion 
of the brain, skull, or scalp is absent. With few exceptions, most babies with anencephaly will not 
survive birth. 
72 Spina bifida is a congenital developmental condition caused by the incomplete closing of a neural 
tube. 
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The standards of ‘normality’ imposed by and governing obstetrics and the close 
monitoring of both mothers-to-be and unborn babies resonate with an idea of 
perfect, or at least desirable, people/future people (Olarte Sierra 2010). Feminist 
and disability scholars have critiqued the role of prenatal technologies in fostering 
expectations to give birth to ‘perfect’ children (Buchbinder and Timmermans 
2012; Rapp 2000; Remennick 2006). But if technology is perceived as a resource 
that ‘promises to produce the perfect child’ (Landsman 1998: 77) and ensures a 
baby is healthy (Remennick 2006), one should ask what this category of perfection 
entails. If the perfect child represents an object of cultural desire, we must 
contextualise it to a particular society or institution. Buchbinder and Timmermans 
(2012: 61) suggest perfection, despite its ‘implied universality and normative 
power’, is a ‘deeply contextual concept contingent on its cultural and historical 
framing’, with children in diverse settings being evaluated on criteria ranging from 
aesthetic appearance (Rothschild 2005) to bodily proportionality (Stern 2002). 
Although Rapp (2000) and Buchbinder and Timmermans (2012) identify the quest 
for baby perfection as distinctly American, such an expedition is not confined to US 
waters. 
 
In Freymarsh and Springtown, the pursuit of perfection is accomplished and re-
accomplished in social practices, particularly NT scans. Since parents-to-be 
frequently struggle to establish the unborn baby’s physiological structure during 
an NT scan, the sonographer – as ‘host’ or ‘tourist guide’ – strategically performs 
and transforms the chaotic image into an unborn baby and parents-to-be into 
families (Kroløkke 2011). During an NT scan, Sophie (SAD sonographer) describes 
what she sees on the large monitor to Mr and Mrs Stock (parents-to-be): 
 
Sophie: You see these white lines here on the monitor [points]? We 
measure between those and that’s the nuchal translucency. We like them 
under 3mm. It’s 1.26mm on first measurement which is fine. 
Mrs Stock: That’s around the same as it was during the previous 
pregnancy. It was pretty small. 
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Sophie: Yes, perfect. It’s nice and small which is great. Based on the scan 
alone, that’s a very low-risk [Mr and Mrs Stock smile]. 
[...] 
Sophie: [Sophie prints pictures of the unborn baby] These pictures look 
absolutely fine scan wise. It all looks good. All fabulous.  
Mrs Stock: Good. 
Mr Stock: Great. 
Sophie: There we go [Sophie gives the pictures to Mr Stock]. It looks 
more human now. They move all over the place! [Mr and Mrs Stock 
laugh. Sophie continues the scan] Here you are; a beautiful baby. 
Mrs Stock: Oh let’s have a look then! [Takes picture from Mr Stock] It’s a 
baby! 
Mr Stock: How’s the size of the baby? 
Sophie: The size is fine and normal.  
[...] 
Mrs Stock: I was having it just for peace of mind really. I’m thirty-eight. 
Sophie: Well you’ve got a perfect baby so you’ve got nothing to worry 
about! Yours is a nice and small one. I can see the one in your last 
pregnancy was 1.02mm which is really small. The smallest I’ve ever seen 
here is 0.98mm so. 
 
Sophie ensures Mr and Mrs Stock can distinguish their unborn baby’s features on 
the monitor. She describes the unborn baby as ‘perfect’ with a ‘nice and small’ 
measurement which, according to Sophie, points toward a ‘very low-risk’. We can 
see how metonymy is at play here; the (‘nice and small’) measurement comes to 
stand for both the mother-to-be and the baby (‘yours’). Nonetheless, a perfect baby 
corresponds to imagining lower-risk futures. Reassuring utterances of  ‘it all looks 
good’ and ‘all fabulous’ collude to shape expectations of perfection and of a 
‘beautiful baby’, with Sophie joking the unborn baby ‘looks more human now’ since 
movement often obscures image quality. Ultrasound scans provide an ample 
opportunity for revitalising expectations among parents-to-be and for (hopefully) 
relieving their anxiety, particularly in the case of Mrs Stock who accounts for her 
reason to undertake screening (‘I’m thirty-eight’). Sophie reduces her angst by 
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shaping her understanding of the nuchal translucency as ‘nice and small’ with 
reference to her experiential knowledge (‘the smallest I’ve seen here is 0.98’). 
 
During NT scans, producing perfection emerges not only through the reassuring 
utterances of ‘normal’ and ‘perfect’ but also through the sonographer and parents-
to-be engaging in a process of ‘collaborative coding’ which becomes essential to 
making the imagery on the screen personally and socially meaningful (Roberts 
2012). Here, the physiological attributes of the unborn baby are primary markers 
of perfection. Ultrasound scans create an encounter in which participants can 
distinguish the unborn baby as a consumable entity, together with providing 
opportunities for gendered and good parental performances, constructing familial 
relations, and gazing at the ‘perfect’ child (Gammeltoft 2007; Kroløkke 2011; 
Müller-Rockstroh 2011; Roberts 2012; Taylor 2008). Observations reveal that the 
perfect unborn baby, a culturally-contingent category, possesses desirable 
physiological traits such as ‘cute toes’, ‘little hands’, ‘Buddha bellies’, ‘button noses’, 
and ‘big beautiful eyes’ among others. In addition, they ‘perform’ when the camera 
rolls with their movement being playfully attributed to being ‘active’, ‘cheeky’, 
and/or ‘naughty’. This contributes to creating and sustaining cultural ideologies of 
both perfection and imperfection in a pregnancy outcome. 
 
This culturally-contingent perfection is accomplished further in the cultural 
materials and ‘performative architecture’ (Stephens et al. 2008) of the clinic. This 
is particularly true in Springtown since it is a privately-funded company where 
there is more freedom, in comparison with Freymarsh, to encourage consumption 
(Kerr 2013) and pursue the objective of monetary profit through selling pregnancy 
goods such as 4D baby bonding scans, ‘5D-photo’ products, and ultrasound DVDs. 
Freymarsh, in contrast, was not allowed to offer commercially-available goods, nor 
was it permitted to adorn walls with photographs of its own choosing. However, 
the hospital still organises pregnancy around discourses of perfection via materials 
including antenatal literature and media tendering ‘advice’ to mothers-to-be. In 
Freymarsh and Springtown, the pathways and flows constituting the building’s 
physicality is symbolic in relation to the pursuit of perfection during a pregnancy. 
After every NT scan in Freymarsh and Springtown, for instance, parents-to-be are 
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tendered a picture of their unborn baby. Obtaining a picture is a key moment in the 
pregnancy ritual. Producing such materials not only help construct and maintain 
identities (Taylor 2008) but also accomplish ideas around the perfect baby. The 
following fieldnotes describe the SAD space, the first passage taken from my first 
day of fieldwork and the second passage taken from around five months into the 
study: 
 
Pictures of unborn and newborn babies are plastered around the clinic. [...] 
Lisa takes me into the room where ultrasound scans are performed. The room 
is approximately 4x4 metres with only four to five people able to comfortably 
occupy the space. The room is dark and contains three chairs, a trolley, a 
computer, and an ultrasound machine. The room’s walls are adorned with 
two images of ‘water babies’73. 
 
A ‘5D-photo stand’ greets me as I enter the clinic. I have not seen this before. 
The products on display are 3D-photo-laser engraved crystal glass objects, in 
a variety of shapes and sizes, depicting images of unborn babies, newborn 
babies, families, and a dog. 
 
With its walls adorned with newborn/unborn babies (e.g. ‘water babies’) and its 
offers of purchasable keepsakes to memorialise the unborn (e.g. ‘5D-photo stand’), 
SAD accomplishes ideals not only around the perfect baby but also around the 
‘normal’ future family. The combination of cultural materials and social practices 
in producing perfection is accentuated in the commercial availability of ‘4D baby-
bonding’ ultrasound scans which are performed around twenty-four to thirty-two 
weeks into a pregnancy. In SAD, this is advertised as having no benefit other than 
helping parents-to-be to ‘bond’ with their unborn baby, as providing reassurance, 
and as offering an entertaining experience for parents-to-be (Roberts 2012). In one 
flyer, Springtown describes the 4D scan as: 
 
                                                     
73 As a reminder, the pictures show a young Caucasian male smiling underwater whilst holding his 
newborn child. 
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[Producing] lifelike images like a moving statue allowing parents to clearly 
see their baby smile, yawn, blink or swallow etc. as they move inside their 
secret world. 
 
The unborn baby is categorised as a smiling, yawning, and blinking ‘moving statue’. 
In other artefacts distributed by Springtown, parents-to-be are told they will see 
‘their unborn child at play’, receive a ‘twenty minute video recording on a keepsake 
DVD and four to six colour photographs’, and that ‘bonding between parents and 
baby has been shown to be stronger when the 3D image is seen compared to the 2D 
image because the picture of the baby is more realistic’. Such materials, in unison 
with interactional exchanges in the scan room, organise the expected conduct of 
mothers-to-be – who can experience the benefit of ‘bonding’ from the scan – and 
produces the unborn baby as a consumable entity (e.g. receiving a DVD and 
photographs). 
 
But how does this relate to Down’s syndrome? The 4D scan blurs the boundary 
between medicine and consumption and contributes to changing an anticipation of 
the perfect child into a normative expectation. I claim that any deviation is viewed 
as an undesirable outcome and can become the grounds for exclusion. 
Consumption plays a key role for membership, belonging, identity-work, and 
dividing people and events into different classes or groups (Douglas and 
Isherwood 1979). As markers and classifiers, goods carry meaning and stabilise 
order. The consumption of the 4D ultrasound scan, thus, becomes a ritual in which 
certain people can be divided and excluded, namely, unborn babies not aligning 
with cultural categories of perfection. When discussing the idea of prenatal 
perfection during an interview, Esther (SAD sonographer) claims: 
 
We want everything to be perfect and it’s not. It’s about having 
compassion for things that aren’t necessarily perfect. [...] My experience 
has shown me once women are told there’s an anomaly, whether it’s an 
isolated cleft lip or club foot, the baby is no longer perfect. The women’s 
imagination is often a million times worse than the real thing. 
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Esther suggests the majority of parents-to-be ‘want everything to be perfect’ yet 
they should be equally prepared for situations in which ‘things aren’t necessarily 
perfect’. She highlights how any ‘anomaly’, regardless of prognosis, makes the 
unborn baby ‘no longer perfect’ since the image conjured up in the imagination of 
mothers-to-be is ‘often a million times worse than the real thing’. Martha (FAD 
midwife) similarly claims during an interview that when mothers-to-be receive a 
higher-risk result, this means ‘the fact that they’re high-risk and their baby might 
not be perfect is all that they can see’. In one conversation, Gail (FAD midwife) 
explains: 
 
The public don’t like the thought of something that’s not perfect. We 
want everything to be perfect. It’s like we can’t have anybody whose 
handicapped or not quite perfect. It’s quite sad then when you do have a 
baby with Down’s syndrome because of the way our culture is. It’s like 
shameful isn’t it? Like, this baby’s not perfect but it’s just life really isn’t 
it?’ 
 
Gail suggests ‘our culture’, referring to an abstract UK culture rather than medical 
culture, demarcates Down’s syndrome as ‘shameful’ and ‘not perfect’. For Gail, it is 
‘quite sad’ when an unborn baby has the condition because of ‘the way our culture 
is’. Here, I reveal what constitutes perfection is built into the interactions and 
materiality of FAD and SAD. Earlier, I highlighted the view of professionals that 
Down’s syndrome is familiar to parents-to-be because of its ‘face’ (Latimer 2013), 
that is, the distinctive anatomical features of people with the condition.  I suggest 
this also constitutes a reason why Down’s syndrome is seen as a non-perfect 
outcome (Thomas 2014). During a conversation with Dominique and Hannah 
(admin staff) in the Springtown office, Dominique recognises the popularity of NT 
scans over cardiac scans ‘even with educated women’. After she attributes this to 
people being ‘more frightened of Down’s syndrome kids, the costs and that’, Hannah 
suggests the ‘visible thing’ of Down’s syndrome is not wanted by parents; cardiac 
defects, however, are not immediately visual and so, she concludes, ‘the child 
becomes normal’. Here, the ‘face’ of Down’s syndrome is enacted as a metonym for 
disability more generally and, in turn, for a negative pregnancy outcome. 
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In a previous study, I described how feelings of ‘sadness,’ ‘grief,’ ‘sickness,’ ‘fear,’ 
‘failure,’ ‘blame,’ ‘anger,’ and ‘devastation’ were expressed by mothers when 
discussing initial reactions to their child’s diagnosis (Thomas 2014: 5). This often 
corresponds to mothers initially conceiving of their child as a ‘monster’, an 
individual outside the norm; ‘[i]t is only because, as human beings, we are living 
beings, that a morphological defect is, to our living eyes, a monster’ (Canguilhem 
2005: 187). The child with Down’s syndrome is constructed as monstrous in two 
ways: figuratively, in the process of othering any person/future person deviating 
from outside the norm; and literally, via the dysmorphic features of those with the 
condition. For many mothers, the physical markers of Down’s syndrome, a 
‘discredited stigma’ whereby the individual’s perceived stigma is visible (Goffman 
1963: 49), initially contributed toward feelings of ‘alien kinship’ since the child 
disrupted normative maternal/familial expectations and threatened their 
continual presentation of normality (Rapp 1995: 81). I suspect the imagined ‘face’ 
of Down’s syndrome, thus, represents an imperfect deviation in the embodiment of 
expectation (Rothman 1998; Rapp 2000). Since screening is based on the idea that 
we can prevent a life with Down’s syndrome (Asch 1999; Alderson 2001) and with 
such technologies growing from and enhancing ‘a set of ideals about a perfect 
health culture’ (Nelkin and Lindee 1995: 191), the condition represents an 
unvalued outcome. Thus, children with Down’s syndrome are viewed as ‘impaired, 
imperfect, damaged goods, unsatisfactory merchandise on the commodity 
exchange of conventional kid culture’ (Rapp 1999: xiii).  
 
Perfection and older mothers: ‘elderly primigravidas’ 
So how does this image of perfection and imperfection figure mothers-to-be and 
fathers-to-be? In chapter six, I suggested screening practices implicate parents-to-
be, though mothers-to-be more than fathers-to-be74, in relation to decision-making 
processes. Equally, mothers-to-be and especially those at an ‘advanced maternal 
age’ (Budds et al. 2013) are implicated in cultural ideologies around perfection 
during pregnancy. An increased maternal age, translating to women aged thirty-
                                                     
74 I realise this analysis is based on hetero-normative assumptions about partnerships. Only one 
consultation I observed involved a homosexual couple (Springtown). In this case, it would be more 
correct to say screening practices implicate the ‘carrier’ of the baby.  
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five and above, is the only known attribute increasing the risk of an unborn baby 
being diagnosed with Down’s syndrome. The NHS has produced data specifying the 
risk factor of women based on their maternal age alone independent of any 
screening/testing. Whilst twenty-year-old women have a standalone risk factor of 
1:1250 for having a baby with Down’s syndrome, women aged thirty-five have a 
standalone risk factor of 1:400 and women aged forty have a risk factor of 1:100. 
The discourse of ‘advanced maternal age’, reinforced through the production of 
these risk factors, positions mothers-to-be aged thirty-five plus at an increased risk 
of having a child with Down’s syndrome. Fieldnotes taken during an NT scan 
between Sophie (SAD sonographer) and Mrs Fallon (mother-to-be) illustrate this: 
 
Sophie: That’s the nasal bone [points]. It’s often absent in babies with 
Down’s syndrome so that’s good. 
Mrs Fallon: OK. I’m forty-two now so. 
Sophie: It’s depressing when you read the literature isn’t it? 
Mrs Fallon: Yes. I know I am a one in sixty-five risk on my age alone. 
That’s the trouble when you put off having another baby. 
 
Mrs Fallon’s risk status after ‘[putting] off having another baby’ troubles her, 
forcing her to act by undertaking screening. Sophie alleviates her anxiety by 
confirming the presence of a nasal bone, a positive statement contrasting with Mrs 
Fallon’s population risk factor (‘I am a one in sixty-five risk on my age alone’). Many 
mothers-to-be in Freymarsh and Springtown demonstrate little knowledge of their 
standalone risk factor but rather a vague awareness of an older mother-to-be 
being more susceptible to a Down’s syndrome diagnosis. For instance, Miranda 
(mother-to-be) justifies her decision to undertake a NT scan rather than quadruple 
screening (the former is more accurate than the latter) by suggesting ‘I had the 
blood test the last time I was pregnant but I’m older now so I got a bit worried’. Risk 
discourse brings out social accounting practices in particularly forceful ways 
(Horlick-Jones 2005); it becomes a ‘forensic resource [...] a language with which to 
hold persons accountable’ (Douglas 1992: 22). During an interview, Lisa (SAD 
sonographer) explains why older mothers-to-be attend Springtown rather than an 
NHS hospital: 
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The older you are, the more likely you are to have had more pregnancies 
with problems in. There’s a perception that being an older mother brings 
with it medical problems as well so older women want a bit more 
tender-loving-care than they’d get in the NHS. I think someone early on 
in the pregnancy tells them “you’re an elderly primigravida” [laughs] 
when you’re a certain age and you think “God, really?” And then you 
realise you’re suddenly categorised as higher-risk.  
 
Lisa claims older mothers-to-be are more likely to experience ‘medical problems’ in 
their pregnancy, meaning they often account for their attendance at Springtown 
with reference to their age. By light-heartedly citing the term ‘elderly primigravida’, 
defined as a woman who is pregnant with her first child after the age of thirty-five 
(primus being Latin for first and gravidus meaning pregnant), Lisa highlights how 
older mothers-to-be are ‘categorised as higher-risk’ during antenatal care. Armed 
with this risk knowledge, mothers-to-be may reconstruct their health identity as 
someone susceptible to having a baby with Down’s syndrome. Possamai-Inesedy 
(2006) suggests women respond as if risk, as a concrete entity, actually exists; 
risks become actualised through anticipation and call for a person to respond. In 
the context of Down’s syndrome screening, this response can involve undertaking 
a more accurate procedure, i.e., mothers-to-be aged over thirty-five having an NT 
scan at SAD rather than a quadruple screen at FAD. Mothers-to-be accounting for 
their decision to opt for screening by citing their age arguably points toward the 
procedure as one more facet of their regimes of ritual purity along with lifestyle 
choices (diet, taking folic acids, avoiding certain activities, and so on). Such rituals 
are produced and reproduced as part of, as Martha (FAD midwife) claims, their 
‘quest for the perfect child’. Other research has recognised, indeed, that parents-to-
be consent to screening as part of their pursuit of perfection, that is, by wanting to 
acquire reassurance that their unborn baby is healthy and disability-free (Olarte 
Sierra 2010; Lupton 2013; Remennick 2006). 
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Midwives/sonographers can additionally contribute to figuring older mothers as 
at-risk entities. Fieldnotes taken in a screening consultation between Toni (FAD 
midwife) and Mrs Hooper (mother-to-be) highlight this further: 
 
Toni: Have you thought about whether you want screening and testing? 
Mrs Hooper: To be honest, when I was offered screening, I just said yes 
for everything. But now I know about [the possibility of miscarrying 
after amniocentesis], I’ll probably not have the amniocentesis but I want 
to know about the risk factor. 
Toni: So you’re having the screening for informational purposes? 
Mrs Hooper: Yes.  
Toni: That’s fine. To be fair, you’re a good age anyway. When you get 
older, your risk of having a baby with Down’s syndrome increases. When 
you get to thirty-five, it all goes downhill and when you get to forty, it 
goes really downhill! 
 
Toni smirks as Mrs Hooper smiles uncomfortably. 
 
After Toni asks Mrs Hooper if she wants screening, Mrs Hooper accounts for her 
current knowledge and her choices. Importantly, Toni reassures Mrs Hooper by 
classifying her as a ‘good age’, supplementing physiological information with 
emotional responses. Toni also identifies those aged thirty-five and above as ‘going 
downhill’, that is, a bad age. Here, the older mother-to-be is figured as problematic, 
an at-risk figure who may be subjected, or at least advised to be subjected, to 
further medical intervention via diagnostic testing. 
 
In her work on paediatric and genetic medicine, Dimond (2013) claims that the 
category of (child) patient is ‘fuzzy’, extending to implicate a number of people 
including parents and family members. In Freymarsh and Springtown, a mother-
to-be and unborn baby are, at moments, reduced to a single entity. In this 
metonymical move, mothers-to-be are ascribed the provisional status of higher-
risk/lower-risk (Mrs Fallon: ‘I was a 1 in 65 risk’). Consider the following quotes 
taken from professionals during their interactions with parents-to-be: ‘you’ll be 
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placed in either the lower-risk or higher-risk bracket and if you’re higher-risk, you’re 
advised to have an amniocentesis’ (Esther, p. 157); ‘the older you are, the higher 
your risk is for having a baby with Down’s syndrome’ (Tara, p. 158); ‘what I badly 
need to know is whether you want to know whether you’re a lower-risk or higher-
risk’ (Lois, p. 175). Similarly, Maggie (FAD midwife) suggests older mothers-to-be 
in particular ‘have tended to look into [screening] probably a little bit more [than 
younger mothers-to-be] because they know they’re more at risk’. Mothers-to-be, 
thus, receive their risk; they are the ones at-risk in screening practices. 
 
As some of the extracts above highlight, tensions often emerge during screening 
consultations between a mother-to-be’s potential individual risk, her population 
age-related risk (e.g. ‘I am a one in sixty-five risk on my age alone’), and how she and 
professionals interpret risk (‘To be fair, you’re a good age anyway’). Nonetheless, 
with screening colonised by a risk discourse and both the mother-to-be and 
unborn baby being classified as one single entity, it is clear older mothers-to-be 
may feel anxiety and self-blame should expectations be breached (a higher-risk 
result and/or diagnosis). This depiction has been perpetuated by the media, with 
prevailing visual representations of pregnant women excluding the pregnant body 
of the older mother in favour of the younger, more ‘perfect’ mother (Budds et al. 
2013). It is illuminated further in Springtown through offering parents-to-be ‘Body 
Clock Testing’, a procedure which makes it possible, according to the advertising 
leaflet, ‘to predict future fertility’. The leaflet urges women, and specifically women 
‘leaving it late’, to ‘take control of their reproductive choices’ by undertaking a test 
which can cure ‘the unknown’ by ‘[taking] out the uncertainty’ which will help 
women to ‘understand [their] choices’. It reads: 
 
More and more women leave it until later to try for a pregnancy with nearly 
20% of women leaving it until after 35 to start a family. Many however find 
that they have left it too late, even with help from treatments like IVF. A 
woman’s natural conception rate falls from about 20% a cycle at 30 years old 
to 5% a cycle at 40. Although high profile celebrities like Amy Ryan, Madonna, 
Celine Dion and Halle Berry have had much publicised pregnancies in their 
late 30s and 40s, women’s biological body clocks have not changed and for 
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many it may be too late! The test has been developed amidst warnings of 
complacency from leading UK fertility experts. Couples are “sticking their 
heads in the sand” and one expert urged all 30-year-old women to take a 
“fertility MOT” test. 
 
After supposedly certifying their claims with reference to scientific knowledge, 
celebrities, and ‘leading UK fertility experts’, women are accused of ‘complacency’ 
and as ‘sticking their heads in the sand’ regarding reproductive decision-making. 
The leaflet draws on claims made by Professor Bill Ledger who urges all thirty-
year-old women to ‘take a “fertility MOT” test’ since ‘Britain is facing a fertility 
timebomb’ (Hill and Asthana 2009). The urging and disciplining of these women to 
make particular decisions is exemplified with the picture accompanying the text, 
specifically a woman sleeping holding an alarm clock whilst facing the reader. 
 
The social practices (e.g. screening consultations) and cultural materials (e.g. 
antenatal leaflets) of Freymarsh and Springtown accomplish the categorisation of 
‘at-risk’ older mothers who, at an ‘advanced maternal age’, become accountable for 
their conduct. Whilst the vast majority of antenatal literature urges choice and 
autonomy, these discourses become problematic once this is highlighted alongside 
the risks prevailing with an advancing maternal age (Budds et al. 2013). This 
illuminates the dominant ideologies of motherhood prevailing in our risk culture in 
which parents, and particularly mothers, are constantly (re)positioned and where 
children become expressions and extensions of the maternal self. Wolf (2011: 71) 
claims in an era of ‘total motherhood’, a mother must identify and eradicate every 
‘risk’ to their child regardless of the cost to themselves. In light of medical experts 
raising concerns about an increasing maternal age (Budds et al. 2013), although 
such claims have been disputed (Twenge 2012), moral codes discipline parents-to-
be into viewing risks as calculable and preventable, urging them to be reflexively 
vigilant about their bodies even before conception in anticipation of pregnancy and 
motherhood. 
 
As a reminder, in the waiting room of FAD, two televisions show BabyTV on repeat. 
Advertised as an information channel with the tagline ‘keeping you informed’, it 
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offers advice to parents-to-be on concerns such as appropriate cots, breastfeeding, 
and car safety. This depicts parenthood as something to be managed and 
disciplined into, a pedagogic accomplishment containing (moral) statements about 
the appropriate conduct of the ‘good parent’. The subtle coercion of mothers-to-be 
into particular patterns of conduct reflects a form of pastoral power (Foucault 
1979) whereby any deviation from what is interpreted as ‘normal’ is framed as 
irresponsible conduct. 
 
In the context of prenatal Down’s syndrome screening, the practice can be seen as 
the expected and responsible action for those at an ‘advanced maternal age’; to not 
engage in risk-avoiding conduct, as Greco (1993: 361) maintains, is considered ‘a 
failure of the self to take care of itself – a form of irrationality’. Responsible 
parenthood implies the acquisition of all available medical information about the 
health of an unborn baby (García et al. 2011), submitting to medical surveillance 
being perceived as potentially promising a healthy baby (Gottfreðsdóttir et al. 
2009b). This can explain why some mothers-to-be, responsible for ensuring a 
perfect outcome, can experience feelings of blame, discontent, and responsibility if 
this expectation is not realised (Alderson 2001; Buchbinder and Timmermans 
2012; Gross 2010; Ivry 2006; Landsman 2009; Latimer 2007; Rapp 2000; Thomas 
2014). 
 
Emphasising the health and ‘normality’ of the unborn baby, and the responsibility 
of mothers-to-be in ensuring this by conforming to medically ascribed standards, is 
grounded in an idea that an unborn baby is neither inherently perfect or imperfect 
but, rather, is ‘a perfectible creature’ (Ivry 2006: 459). In other words, an unborn 
baby’s attributes are framed as the product of diligent mothers-to-be as opposed to 
emerging from a random assemblage of genes and chromosomes. As ‘makers’ of 
the perfectible (not ‘ready-made’) baby, thus, mothers-to-be are burdened with 
heavy responsibilities and can be disciplined into making certain reproductive 
decisions (Ivry 2006). This includes consenting to Down’s syndrome screening. 
Discursive devices such as risk and perfection accomplish screening as a normal 
part of pregnancy and moral duty of the responsible mother-to-be, and certainly 
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the mother-to-be aged thirty-five and above, who must ensure a perfect pregnancy 
outcome. 
 
Making and unmaking the unborn baby 
In this chapter, I have captured how Down’s syndrome screening intersects with 
cultural notions of perfection and how this implicates (particularly older) mothers-
to-be. For the remainder of this chapter, I describe how a possible termination of a 
pregnancy is discussed within Down’s syndrome screening consultations and other 
encounters predominantly taking place in FMD. I begin by citing the following 
extract between Nicola (FAD midwife) and Mrs Li (mother-to-be) in a Down’s 
syndrome screening consultation: 
 
Nicola: I’m going to tell you about the test and then I’m going to take you 
through so you can have your bloods done. So you’re offered the 
screening test today. It won’t tell you if the baby has Down’s syndrome 
but it provides a risk ratio which gives a lower-risk or higher-risk of the 
condition. If you’re a higher-risk, we telephone you within three to five 
working days where you’re invited back here. You’ll receive counselling 
and you’re offered a further diagnostic test called an amniocentesis. 
Have you heard of it? 
Mrs Li: Yes. I had one in the last pregnancy. Actually, I’m going back to 
Cambodia in a few days’ time for three weeks. What can we do? I’m back 
on [date] when I’m having the second [anomaly] scan. 
Nicola: Well the amniocentesis should take place in three and a half 
weeks because if you wanted to terminate, it’s leaving it very late in the 
pregnancy. [Mrs Li looks concerned] If you came back as higher-risk, 
would you have an amniocentesis? Because if not, you might have to 
think whether having this test would be the best option. You could be 
higher-risk but it could all still be OK. 
Mrs Li: I would rather know if I was higher-risk. 
Nicola: OK. Well if you ring in six days’ time, we might have your result. If 
you’re higher-risk, we can book you an amniocentesis over the phone. 
But you should really consider this because obviously the baby will be at 
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such an advanced gestation for amniocentesis and potentially a 
termination. 
Mrs Li: I understand. 
Nicola: How old are you? 
Mrs Li: Thirty-three. 
Nicola: OK. If you did want an amniocentesis, you would be counselled 
beforehand. It has a 1% risk of miscarriage and if there’s a diagnosis, 
you’re offered a termination of pregnancy. You could come back as 
lower-risk but lower-risk does not necessarily mean no risk [of having a 
child with Down’s syndrome]. OK? 
Mrs Li: OK. 
 
This extract highlights many points identified earlier in the thesis: the figuring of 
mothers-to-be as ‘lower-risk or higher-risk’, the significance of maternal age (‘how 
old are you?’), the absence of Down’s syndrome, the notion of nondirective care 
being difficult to uphold (‘you might have to think whether having this test would be 
the best option’), and the naturalisation of screening practices. For my intentions 
here, I highlight Nicola’s frequent allusions to the word ‘termination’. Prior to 
having the screening test, Nicola cites termination on three occasions, using this to 
highlight the gravity of Mrs Li’s decision-making and how delaying this becomes 
increasingly problematic as the pregnancy progresses. However, the option of 
hypothetically continuing a pregnancy following a diagnosis of Down’s syndrome 
is never established. I observed similar occasions in other screening consultations 
including those where parents-to-be with a higher-risk result of Down’s syndrome 
were invited back to Freymarsh to discuss the result75. 
 
To refresh, if a diagnosis of Down’s syndrome or another condition is suspected 
following screening at FAD or SAD, parents-to-be are offered diagnostic testing. If 
this is accepted, they are referred to FMD since this care is available free-of-charge 
(Dr Karman works in both Springtown and FMD so is likely to deal with such 
cases). If a diagnosis of Down’s syndrome is established, parents-to-be are offered 
                                                     
75 In Springtown, parents-to-be receive higher-risk results via telephone. This is primarily done by 
Francine who also works at FMD. She often telephones these parents-to-be at night from her home. 
As such, observing these telephone calls was unfeasible. 
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a termination of pregnancy and are now under the care of FMD consultants. During 
one conversation, Dr Karman (FMD consultant) identifies some concerns after 
hypothetical diagnoses of Edward’s syndrome or Patau’s syndrome: 
 
I think when there’s a problem, some mothers feel abandoned and 
require support. Some midwives say “well the foetus has Edward’s 
[syndrome] or Patau’s [syndrome] and it’s going to die so what can I do 
about it?” They forget there is still a woman here who is pregnant and 
has all of these concerns. 
 
Dr Karman acknowledges how women feel abandoned in receipt of a diagnosis 
and, as well as denouncing midwives, describes the unborn baby with Edward’s 
syndrome/Patau’s syndrome as ‘the foetus’. The following fieldnotes are taken 
from another conversation in which Dr Karman76 uses similar language: 
 
Dr Karman, Roxanne (FMD sonographer), Robyn (FMD midwife) and Francine 
(FMD head midwife) are in the office. Dr Karman attended a hospital meeting 
yesterday where a range of obstetric professionals from Freymarsh and 
surrounding hospitals discussed ‘the big issues in prenatal care’. Dr Karman 
recounts the event: 
 
Dr Karman: You wouldn’t believe it. Maternity have more say in 
meetings over us. They had six main outcome factors: obesity, alcohol, 
breastfeeding, maternal satisfaction, caesarean, and good birth. So they 
talked about soft issues like breastfeeding, not stillbirth or foetal death. 
The focus has been completely lost. I was like well the best thing is an 
alive mum and alive baby, and the next best thing is a well mum and well 
baby. And everything else comes after that. You just can’t believe it 
sometimes. They’ve lost the plot. They looked so horrified when I 
mentioned stillbirth and foetal death. There’s too much emphasis on 
smoking, alcohol, breastfeeding and all that. Everyone’s concentrating on 
                                                     
76 Many of the extracts cite Dr Karman since there are only two practicing consultants in FMD. Dr 
Karman, as one of these consultants, deals with the vast majority of cases I observed. 
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this and if they get the fluffy pink pram and that. They want all of the soft 
stuff, not the bad stuff. That part of the pregnancy is all fine but they have 
to think of the bad stuff too. The primary outcome should be a good 
healthy baby. You just don’t know what will happen during screening 
and the extent of the many different problems until birth.  
Robyn: Exactly. 
Francine: Too right. 
Dr Karman: You can’t win till afterwards. One percent of babies are born 
with CMV77 where there are different severities. And it’s not appropriate 
apparently. You can’t tell them one in one-hundred babies will have CMV. 
 
Dr Karman bemoans attention in pregnancy being exclusively projected toward 
‘soft stuff’, including ‘breastfeeding’ and ‘smoking’, rather than the ‘bad stuff’, such 
as ‘stillbirth’ and ‘foetal death’. Dr Karman’s classification of ‘bad stuff’ reveals a 
distinction between ‘foetal death’ and ‘a good healthy baby’. In an environment in 
which professionals ‘can’t win till [after childbirth]’, Dr Karman opts for the term 
foetus over baby when discussing prospective death and/or termination. This label 
is also embedded in discourse once a potential defect/condition is diagnosed and a 
termination of pregnancy is offered. In FMD, once a termination of a pregnancy – 
for any condition – is considered to be a feasible option, discourses commonly shift 
from ‘baby’ to ‘foetus’. In contrast, during consultations where the pregnancy is 
seen as ‘viable’ or ‘compatible with life’, the term ‘baby’ is commonly assumed78. 
Thus, it is here where the unborn baby can be made and unmade. 
 
The frailty and litheness of the baby category is exemplified in a conversation 
between Victoria (SAD nurse) and Mrs John (mother-to-be) before an NT scan. 
When Victoria asks Mrs John ‘so is this your first pregnancy?’, she responds ‘no but 
                                                     
77 CMV (cytomegalovirus) is a virus which can be transmitted to an unborn baby before birth. It is a 
common cause of birth defects and has a range of severities.  
78 In England and Wales, under the Abortion Act 1967, abortions can only be carried out in a 
hospital or a specialist licensed clinic. According to the NHS (2013), the method of abortion 
depends on the length of the pregnancy. Methods include early medical abortion (up to nine weeks 
of pregnancy), vacuum aspiration or suction termination (from seven to fifteen weeks of 
pregnancy), late medical abortion (from nine to twenty weeks of pregnancy), surgical dilation and 
evacuation (from fifteen weeks of pregnancy onwards), and late abortion (from twenty to twenty-
four weeks of pregnancy). There are two options for late abortion: surgical two-stage abortion and 
medically induced abortion. 
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this is my first baby’. Mrs John indicates the unborn baby in her prior pregnancy, 
ending in a miscarriage, was not a ‘baby’. Instead, this current (viable) unborn baby 
is afforded the status of baby. The following fieldnotes are taken from a discussion 
involving Dr Karman and Francine (FMD head midwife) of a possible ‘feticide’, an 
act causing the death of an unborn baby prior to termination: 
 
Dr Karman: [Walks into the office] This is not good. There’s a feticide I 
have to organise for next week. 
Francine: [Dejected] What a bad Friday. 
Dr Karman: You’re telling me. Placenta previa79, early pregnancy, feticide 
and induction of labour [medically induced abortion] but lots of bleeding 
if delivered. [...] She wants to terminate after twenty-four weeks and 
she’s currently around twenty-three weeks in. The prognosis is very 
poor so we’re going to recommend a feticide. This is not good. 
 
Dr Karman, upset, leaves the room. I ask Francine why the parents-to-be need 
to terminate the pregnancy after twenty-four weeks: 
 
Francine: So the baby can be registered as a stillbirth rather than 
miscarriage which is easier for funerals. I think it makes the baby seem 
more real. 
 
Two minutes pass before Dr Karman returns to the silent office. Dr Karman 
invites me to attend the feticide. The unborn baby has been diagnosed with a 
‘severe cardiac defect’: 
 
                                                     
79 Placenta previa is a complication in which the placenta is inserted partially or wholly in the lower 
uterine segment. It is the largest cause of antepartum haemorrhage (vaginal bleeding). 
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Dr Karman: It’s important for you Gareth because this screening and 
termination is after twenty-one weeks and six days80. Sometimes this 
happens with foetuses that have Down’s syndrome. If they have a cardiac 
scan, then a test, then terminating a foetus with Down’s [syndrome] can 
go beyond twenty-one weeks and six days. And to terminate a foetus 
with Down’s [syndrome] after twenty-one weeks and six days is best 
through feticide. 
 
I attend the procedure with Dr Karman. [...] Dr Karman refers to the unborn 
baby as ‘the foetus’ a few times during the procedure. Afterwards, I enter the 
office with Dr Karman and Francine: 
 
Dr Karman: That was unusual. It’s usually quicker and more straight-
forward than that. We usually inject potassium chloride into the left 
ventricle inducing immediate asystole81 and cardiac arrest but the foetus 
was curled up. 
 
Dr Karman and Francine reflect on a ‘bad Friday’ in FMD, with Francine explaining 
the mother-to-be wants a termination of pregnancy after twenty-four weeks ‘so the 
baby can be registered as a stillbirth rather than miscarriage which is easier for 
funerals’. This action ‘makes the baby seem more real’. The practices highlighted in 
the consultation illustrate the contested and malleable nature of the unborn baby 
figure, shifting to foetus – using Dr Karman’s discourse – from baby once a 
problem is suspected and, potentially, back to baby once more for a funeral. 
According to Olarte Sierra (2010: 206), an unborn baby which is terminated can 
still ‘become’ a baby for parents-to-be via memorials such as ultrasound pictures 
and keeping ashes; ‘choosing to interrupt a pregnancy does not necessarily mean 
                                                     
80 In FMD, the recommended gestation after which feticide should be offered as part of a 
termination of pregnancy is twenty-one weeks and six days gestation (Springtown do not offer this 
service as they are not equipped to perform this procedure). Notably, Buckley and Buckley (2008) 
estimate current screening practices in England and Wales reduce yearly live births of babies with 
Down’s syndrome by approximately 660 and cause the loss of 400 babies without Down’s 
syndrome following miscarriages from diagnostic testing. To date, there are no UK statistics on the 
number of pregnancy losses following diagnostic testing via amniocentesis/CVS or on the possible 
association between operator performance and miscarriage rates (NHS FASP 2012). 
81 Asystole is a state of no cardiac electrical activity (colloquially known as flatline) which may be 
one of the conditions used to certify clinical or legal death. 
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to re-interpret what was felt as a child into the term foetus’. However, whilst Olarte 
Sierra claims a termination does not necessarily suggest such a shift from baby to 
foetus, the language used in FMD indicates this can occur once a condition is seen 
as ‘incompatible with life’. 
 
Upset at the prospect of conducting a feticide since ‘the prognosis is so poor’, Dr 
Karman invites me to attend the procedure since ‘if [parents-to-be] have a cardiac 
scan, then a test, then terminating a foetus with Down’s [syndrome] can go beyond 
twenty-one weeks and six days’. When discussing this case, Dr Karman commonly 
employs the word ‘foetus’ with the ‘baby’ status being cast aside; indeed, the 
procedure is always referred to as a ‘feticide’ which emphasises the word foetus 
over baby. The technical discourse of foetus points toward the strategies employed 
by professionals to help hollow out the emotionality of the term baby, both for 
themselves and for parents-to-be. Consider the following exchange between Annie 
(FMD sonographer) and Francine (FMD head midwife) regarding the feticide case 
described above: 
 
Mr and Mrs Elton (parents-to-be) have opted for a feticide: 
 
Annie: All the family are there [during the ultrasound scan preceding the 
feticide] and [Mr Elton] was asking me to make out all these things as he 
couldn’t. The eyes, head, heart, legs, and the Mum was like “aw look at 
her all curled up”. They’re such a lovely family, so supportive and close to 
one another. I don’t often get affected by it but it’s really hard sometimes. 
Francine: Yes and it’s not like you’re heartless. 
Annie: No definitely. 
Francine: You have to be detached. 
Annie: Well you couldn’t do this job if you didn’t. 
Francine: Exactly. It’s crazy because I’m crying at stuff on TV all the time 
but my son asks me if I cry when I give bad news. I mean not usually. I 
suppose it’s just part of the job. 
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Discussing the situation of Mr and Mrs Elton, Annie claims her work is ‘really hard 
sometimes’, a sentiment supported by Francine who claims her conduct is not 
being ‘heartless’ but rather a product of ‘[having] to be detached’. Annie contends 
that without assuming emotional distance from parents-to-be and the issues at 
hand, ‘you couldn’t do this job’. Francine concludes the exchange by acknowledging 
such difficulties as ‘part of the job’. In an environment in which ‘the unthinkable 
becomes a reality’ (Elena, FMD head midwife), professionals must adopt tactics to 
manage this emotional work. I want to suggest that assuming a technical discourse 
which strategically creates boundaries between the ‘foetus’ and ‘baby’ can help 
accomplish this. In their study of medical student training, Lief and Fox (1963) 
describe how the operating room’s appearance and the serious conduct required 
of students justify and facilitate a technical and impersonal attitude to death. Body 
parts strongly connected with human qualities (face, genitalia, hands) are never 
dissected and tissues are depersonalised by removing a body from the room once 
an organ is removed. For Lief and Fox, this allows students to approach actions 
scientifically rather than emotionally, to develop a ‘detached concern’, enabling 
them to both dissect a cadaver without disgust and listen empathetically to a 
patient without becoming emotionally involved. Similarly, in FMD, one method of 
maintaining moral and emotional distance from the issues at hand, to adopt a 
‘detached concern’ (Lief and Fox 1963), is figuratively shifting the baby to a foetus. 
 
‘Disposing’ of Down’s syndrome 
So how does Down’s syndrome figure in this? In the previous extract describing 
the feticide, Dr Karman (FMD consultant) refers to the foetus, not baby, diagnosed 
with Down’s syndrome. This technical discourse seems contrary to the positive 
accounts provided by professionals earlier in the thesis, namely Down’s syndrome 
as being ‘compatible with life’ and as promising a ‘good quality of life’ (although I 
identified how such accounts were replaced during consultations with discourses 
such as risk and abnormality). The following fieldnotes are taken from an 
interaction between Dr Karman and Robyn (FMD midwife) in the FMD office: 
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Dr Karman enters the office following a consultation with Mr and Mrs Pitt. I 
am handed a form by Dr Karman which contains details about Mr and Mrs Pitt 
and their unborn child: 
 
Dr Karman: The foetus has a lateral ventriculomegaly82. [Mrs Pitt] had a 
scan and it looks like two nerves are crossing over at the front of the 
brain. There is an agenesis of the corpus callosum83 which means part of 
the brain is absent. It’s a difficult consultation because it could be 
absolutely fine and the ventriculomegaly has no impact later on. But it 
could be associated with lissencephaly84, also known as smooth brain. 
That’s associated with a real handicap and not handicapped like Down’s 
[syndrome] where there is such a wide spectrum [of prognosis]. 
Robyn: Would you offer a termination with that? 
Dr Karman: [Nod’s head] Yes. It’s not really compatible with a good 
quality of life. It has associations with cerebral palsy85 and other 
problems. 
 
Dr Karman describes the case of a ‘foetus’ diagnosed with lateral ventriculomegaly 
and an agenesis of the corpus callosum, suggesting this is a ‘difficult consultation’ 
owing to the uncertainty of a prognosis. However, Dr Karman suspects the foetus 
could have lissencephaly, a condition ‘associated with a real handicap’ unlike 
Down’s syndrome ‘where there is such a wide spectrum [of prognosis]’. Finally, Dr 
Karman informs Robyn a termination will be recommended since it is ‘not really 
compatible with a good quality of life’ and is indicative of ‘other problems’. It is clear 
Dr Karman, as a consultant, is the only professional who can realistically constitute 
if an unborn baby is ‘compatible with a good quality of life’. Although midwives and 
sonographers are often highly critical of screening because Down’s syndrome is 
                                                     
82 Ventriculomegaly is a brain condition which occurs when the lateral ventricles become dilated. It 
occurs in around 1% of pregnancies. 
83 Agenesis of the corpus callosum is a rare birth defect in which there is a partial or complete 
absence of the corpus callosum, the band of white matter connecting the two hemispheres in the 
brain.  
84 Lissencephaly is a rare brain defect caused by defective neuronal migration during the twelfth 
and twenty-fourth week of gestation. It is a form of cephalic disorder, meaning congenital 
conditions stemming from damage to or abnormal development of the budding nervous system. 
85 Cerebral palsy is a blanket term covering a range of neurological conditions which affect a child’s 
movement and coordination.  
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‘compatible with life’, they have little say in clinical practice about what constitutes 
a compatible condition since they only take responsibility for parents-to-be when 
screening for Down’s syndrome. 
 
In FMD, it is not possible for professionals to explicitly advise parents-to-be to 
terminate a pregnancy following a Down’s syndrome diagnosis for two reasons. 
First, a strict adherence to the principles of informed choice and nondirective care 
emphasises that parents-to-be must make their own decisions independent of 
professional intervention. Despite several professionals being critical of screening 
and testing for Down’s syndrome, the interchangeable rhetoric of informed choice 
and non-directive care becomes a resource for suppressing these values. Notably, 
Dr Karman claims during another conversation that ‘two out of three professionals 
will not perform a feticide beyond thirty-two weeks for Down’s syndrome’ since ‘it is 
not seen as obstructing the quality of life’ and ‘it is ethically wrong to do a late 
amniocentesis if it’s to determine whether to terminate or not’. This shows how 
professionals formulate distinctions between whether a termination of pregnancy 
is appropriate or not with reference to the week of gestation. However, since most 
unborn babies with Down’s syndrome are diagnosed before thirty-two weeks 
gestation, the rhetoric of informed choice and non-directive care is drawn upon in 
such situations to reallocate responsibility for decision-making to parents-to-be. 
 
 Second, as Dr Karman claims, there is a ‘wide spectrum’ of the condition. This 
seems to be an irresolvable quandary for professionals and parents-to-be. Down’s 
syndrome occupies a difficult position since it is enacted as ‘compatible with life’ 
yet can be offered as a legal reason for termination. At the interface of obstetrics, 
the impetus is on identifying ‘pathological’ cases (using the discourse from chapter 
five) and attempting to ensure the unborn baby is born alive or that the unviable 
foetus is terminated. Down’s syndrome, however, endangers this distinction. 
During an interview, for example, Elena (FMD head midwife) claims: 
 
The question all parents ask before they make a decision about their 
pregnancy [and termination] is “What sort of Down’s baby will I have?” 
And this is another biggie which will help them make a decision. But 
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there’s no way of assessing abilities and a prognosis. But then you sort of 
say “well if you look at any child, you don’t know their intelligence, their 
emotionality, you don’t know”. I think it’s that uncertainty which is the 
big push for some parents [to terminate], that unknown. I personally find 
that strange as all children are unknown. [...] And I’m sure there are a lot 
of parents, if this baby was sort of born out of the blue, they probably 
wouldn’t [put him/her up for adoption] but it’s because they have the 
choice [to terminate]. [...] I think people’s perception of Down’s 
syndrome is mostly from institutions still but I think what you put in is 
what you come out with, but that’s true with any kid. But you’ve got to 
admire parents that go ahead with pregnancies after a Down’s syndrome 
diagnosis, just as you admire parents who have to make that awful 
decision about not wanting to continue their pregnancies. 
 
Elena suggests parents-to-be, after a Down’s syndrome diagnosis, enquire about 
the prognosis. The inability to ‘[assess] abilities and a prognosis’, for Elena, is a ‘big 
push’ for some parents-to-be for terminating a pregnancy. Elena attempts to 
alleviate angst by identifying how uncertainty surrounds any child’s future, later 
suggesting the negative image of Down’s syndrome may still haunt reproductive 
practices. She concludes by ‘[admiring]’ those who either continue or terminate 
pregnancies after a diagnosis of Down’s syndrome. Elena’s suggestion that the 
‘unknown’ of Down’s syndrome constitutes a reason why parents-to-be terminate 
the pregnancy also explains why the condition is inherently problematic for FMD. 
Its uncertainty, together with responsibility for choices being transferred to 
parents-to-be, ensures Down’s syndrome dwells in a betwixt and between state. It 
is neither fish nor fowl; the prognosis is uncertain yet a termination is offered. A 
solution to settling this uncertainty is to classify the unborn baby with Down’s 
syndrome as a foetus, a discourse frequently utilised in FMD to describe those with 
the condition. According to Hillman (2007), the shifting of people and their 
subsequent transformation into the other is achieved on the basis of constituting 
them in particular ways. For Berg (1992), certain people are dissembled into traits 
and it is these traits which are used to order and classify them to achieve their best 
possible ‘disposal’ (Latimer 1997; Munro 2001; White et al. 2012).  
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Through an ‘effacing of the face’ (Bauman 1989: 216) in which people are 
positioned in a way which means they are not ascribed moral subjectivities, the 
appropriate figurative and literal disposal of non-conforming bodies (such as the 
future body with Down’s syndrome) is accomplished. In antenatal medicine, as 
Roberts (2012: 301) claims, the ‘search for anomalies [...] may undermine claims to 
foetal personhood’. Since ‘its present position is ambiguous, its future equally’, the 
unborn baby is ‘often treated as both vulnerable and dangerous’ since its status is 
indefinable without the intervention of medicine (Douglas 1966: 96). Douglas’ 
analysis of dirt and how it indexes a contravention to a social order is a valuable 
asset here. For Douglas, that which transgresses boundaries is classified as dirt, as 
disorder reaffirming the validity, naturalness, and purity of that remaining within. 
Cultural categories, as public matters, cannot so easily be subjected to revision; its 
public character makes categories, in which ‘ideas and values are tidily ordered’, 
more rigid (1966: 40). 
 
Using Douglas’ discussion of dirt as matter out of place and the symbolic 
interpretation of the rules of purity and pollution, we can see how gestures of 
separation, classifying, and cleansing emerge in FMD. In the case of Down’s 
syndrome, it is viewed as offending against order. The unborn baby with the 
condition is thus recast as disposable; ‘eliminating it is not a negative movement, 
but a positive effort to reorganise the environment’ (1966: 2). FMD, as stated, is in 
the business of attempting to ensure the unborn baby is born alive or that the 
unviable foetus is terminated. As such, the unborn baby – or rather foetus – with 
Down’s syndrome, as an ‘inappropriate element’, is viewed as polluting since it is 
‘likely to confuse or contradict cherished classifications’ (Douglas 1966: 36-7). By 
settling on an interpretation of Down’s syndrome as a condition which parents-to-
be can legally terminate for (as an ‘abnormality’), ambiguity is reduced. According 
to Evans-Pritchard (1956), the Nuer treat unborn babies with anatomical defects 
as baby hippopotamuses accidently born to humans. Since such babies obscure the 
distinction between human and nonhuman, placing them in the river dismisses the 
indefinable and ‘affirms and strengthens the definitions to which they do not 
conform’ (Douglas 1966: 40). Given that Down’s syndrome is such a variable and 
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complex condition as professionals recognise, transforming a (human) baby with 
the condition into a (nonhuman) foetus means that a termination is made possible, 
ambiguities are settled, and order is restored by professionals. 
 
The cleft board 
This analysis of how the baby status can be made and unmade extends to cultural 
materials and specifically the ‘cleft board’, a large display adorned on half of a wall 
in the FMD waiting room. Professionals encourage parents-to-be, after childbirth, 
to supply pictures of their baby with cleft lip/palate and/or congenital conditions 
such as spina bifida to the FMD. The following fieldnotes are taken from a 
consultation between Dr Karman (FMD consultant) and Mr and Mrs Holt (parents-
to-be) whose unborn baby has an abnormal aortic arch86: 
 
Dr Karman: So would you like a late amniocentesis? 
Mrs Hunt: I plan not to because I want to concentrate on the heart side of 
things. And I've heard from a few of the people that if something was 
wrong, a number of other problems would have been detected by now. 
Dr Karman: Well not in all cases do all other problems show up in the 
scans or diagnostic tests. The heart is linked to other stuff but this may 
be the only sign. A heart defect will indicate abnormality in 5% of cases 
and the only way you can know whether there are any problems is by an 
amniocentesis. [Elena, head midwife, enters the room] But the likelihood 
is that the baby’s chromosomal development is normal. That’s 95% likely 
[Dr Karman smiles. Mr and Mrs Hunt smile back]. 
Elena: You should book an appoint to come here again so we can keep an 
eye on everything. 
Dr Karman: Yes [Mr and Mrs Hunt nod]. Can you bring baby into the 
department after he or she is born? 
Mrs Hunt: Sure. 
Mr Hunt: Of course. 
Dr Karman: I’d like to add a photograph of him or her to the [cleft] board. 
Elena: Yes. If something is wrong, it's good for parents to see a picture 
                                                     
86 An aortic arch is the part of the aorta, the largest artery in the human body, in the heart. 
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with the problem and see that there is still a baby here. 
Dr Karman: Absolutely [smiles at Mr and Mrs Hunt]. 
Mrs Hunt: Yes it’s nice to know that you’re [slightly pauses]. 
Dr Karman: [Interrupting] It’s nice to see the baby ahead of the problem. 
Elena: Definitely. 
Mrs Hunt: Definitely. It’s nice to see that you're not on your own. 
 
Mrs Hunt rejects Dr Karman’s offer of a late amniocentesis because she intends to 
‘concentrate on the heart side of things’ and she doubts ‘something [is] wrong’ owing 
to the absence of other symptoms. Dr Karman’s response is far from nondirective, 
potentially inciting anxiety in Mr and Mrs Hunt by claiming ‘other problems’ may be 
hidden. Dr Karman suggests an amniocentesis would resolve the uncertain status 
of the unborn baby and is ‘the only way’ to establish an absence or presence of 
‘abnormality’. Dr Karman tries to repair this by recognising that a ‘normal’ baby 
development is ‘95% likely’. However, such a discourse is arguably suggestive of a 
‘problem’. This is a problem potentially absorbed and interpreted by both Mr and 
Mrs Hunt, especially since Dr Karman initially suggests that ‘a heart defect will 
indicate abnormality in 5% of cases’ rather than it being ‘95% likely’ that ‘the baby’s 
chromosomal development is normal’. In addition, one could attribute Elena’s plea 
for Mr and Mrs Hunt’s return as an extension of surveillance medicine and the 
medical gaze (Foucault 1973; Armstrong 1995). Nonetheless, I note Dr Karman’s 
preference for the word baby over foetus once a pregnancy is ‘compatible with life’ 
rather than ‘incompatible with life’, that is, a condition for which a termination of 
pregnancy will not be offered.  
 
Dr Karman also asks Mr and Mrs Hunt – despite a specific problem not necessarily 
being diagnosed other than an abnormal aortic arch – if they would bring their 
newborn baby into FMD so a photograph can be taken and added to the cleft board. 
If ‘something is wrong’, Elena deduces, other parents-to-be in a similar situation 
will benefit from seeing ‘that there is still a baby here’. Dr Karman claims ‘it’s nice to 
see the baby ahead of the problem’ before Mrs Hunt adds ‘it’s nice to see that you're 
not on your own’. Re-affirming the baby status of the unborn once a problem occurs 
seems to be of paramount importance to FMD. It encourages public parental 
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displays of satisfaction with the service and plays up the future years of normality 
(Silverman 1987). During an interview, Francine (FMD head midwife) highlights 
its importance: 
 
I think [the cleft board] is for women to come in and see their babies 
could be diagnosed with certain abnormalities but at the end of the day, 
they still look normal. I think because you can’t see your baby apart from 
through the black and white images [via ultrasound scan], a lot of 
women picture some horrific things in their mind. Babies have 
gastroschisis87 or spina bifida and they have images of these huge 
messes when in fact you’re looking at something really small. So I think 
it’s just to get things into perspective. So if we say baby’s got a cleft or 
whatever, and they say “what’s that going to look like”, you can show 
them a picture and say “this looks like a normal baby”. At the end of the 
day, it might have a structural problem but it will look like a normal 
baby. The other toss of the coin is that women terminate because of 
abnormalities and they say to me what will my baby look like when they 
deliver having terminated the pregnancy and I say, well, it will look 
normal. If they terminated a pregnancy for a brain abnormality, the baby 
will look normal and I think that’s quite hard because a woman will have 
at the back of her mind “did I do the right thing? I know they’re telling 
me it did have brain abnormalities but did it, and would it really be 
affected that way?” And it could be the same with Down’s syndrome. 
They might terminate and look at the baby when the baby’s born and 
think “he doesn’t look very Down’s syndrome, have they got it right, was 
it just a mildly affected Down’s [syndrome baby], and could we have 
coped with it?” 
 
Francine’s account begins by her identifying the cleft board as beneficial for 
mothers-to-be to see ‘their babies could be diagnosed with certain abnormalities but 
at the end of the day, they still look normal’. Since many parents-to-be ‘picture some 
                                                     
87 Gastroschisis is a congenital defect characterised by a structural defect in the abdominal wall 
through which the abdominal contents protrude. 
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horrific things’ if receiving a diagnosis, the cleft board becomes a normalising 
technology which helps ‘get things into perspective’ by revealing a baby which ‘will 
look like a normal baby’. Similar normalising technologies include offering 4D baby 
bonding scans free-of-charge to parents-to-be after a diagnosis of cleft lip/palate 
or another structural defect (these are offered at SAD/FMD but only take place at 
SAD). Such materials reveal the importance of (visual) ‘normality’, constituted as a 
perceived visual absence of abnormality. Interestingly, there is no picture of a 
newborn baby with Down’s syndrome currently adorning the cleft board. In an 
interview, Elena (FMD head midwife) reflects on this together with the board’s 
value: 
 
Parents look at it all the time and the most positive thing we’ve ever 
done here is put that up. But the only thing we haven’t got up there is 
Down’s [syndrome] because parents don’t send pictures back of their 
Down’s babies.  
 
Elena perceives the cleft board as allowing parents-to-be to frame their unborn 
baby in a positive light by, as she articulates during the consultation with Mr and 
Mrs Hunt cited earlier in this chapter, ‘see[ing] there is a still a baby there’. I have 
already identified how the Down’s syndrome ‘face’ (Latimer 2013), corresponding 
to the distinctive facial features caused by the presence of an extra chromosome, 
can signify a failure to fulfil expectations in the pursuit of perfection in a pregnancy 
outcome. Elena’s and Francine’s accounts taken together suggest a picture of a 
newborn baby with Down’s syndrome may transform perceptions of parents-to-be 
and (re)produce normality, at least an artificial/aesthetic normality. However, the 
concrete absence of Down’s syndrome on the board ironically reflects the absence 
of explicit details regarding the condition in screening consultations. 
 
I argue that the absence of a Down’s syndrome presence on the board relates to 
the denigrating portrayal accomplished in everyday clinical life. In the early stages 
of antenatal care, the future body of Down’s syndrome is subjected to narrow and 
universalising constitutions of ‘risk’ and ‘abnormality’ whilst in FMD, the term 
‘foetus’ is used when discussing the possible termination of unborn babies with the 
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condition. Müller-Rockstroh (2011) argues in such situations, professionals treat 
the unborn baby as an organ without taking account of its specificity of developing, 
moving and growing. With the unborn baby categorised as a foetus, its baby status 
is denied. This not only helps professionals retain emotional and moral distance 
from the unborn baby but may additionally help parents-to-be do the same when a 
termination of pregnancy is possible. Such practices, in addition to reflecting the 
absence of Down’s syndrome on the cleft board, permit the effective disposal of the 
condition in antenatal care. Down’s syndrome is an uncertain and unpredictable 
condition yet in the clinic, unborn babies with the condition are ‘effaced’ (Bauman 
1989) and, essentially, made ‘killable’ (Haraway 2005: 38). 
 
Summary 
In this chapter, I explored how Down’s syndrome screening can promote a notion 
of human perfectibility which, according to some authors, masks a motivation to 
eliminate all which does not meet society’s increasingly rigid standards (Ginsburg 
and Rapp 1995; Lippman 1994; Rapp 2000; Rothschild 2005). It seems wider lines 
and obsessions around beauty and perfection shape understandings of disability, 
particularly with respect to reproductive practices (Buchbinder and Timmermans 
2012; Landsman 2009). Pursuing perfection is largely aesthetic in character, with 
Down’s syndrome – particularly its ‘face’ – constituted as a non-perfect pregnancy 
outcome (Thomas 2014). The future child with Down’s syndrome, thus, is 
constructed as disrupting maternal and familial expectations, a threat to ongoing 
presentations of ‘normality’, and a deviation in the embodiment of prenatal 
expectation. In addition, I describe how an ‘advanced maternal age’, translating as 
mothers-to-be aged thirty-five and above, is embroiled in cultural ideologies of 
perfection and how mothers-to-be may, regularly undertaking Down’s syndrome 
screening as one of the routines of ritual purity, subsequently feel to blame should 
any deviation in the expected outcome be encountered. 
 
I also suggested that the notion of perfection intersects with a distinction made in 
FMD between the ‘baby’ and the ‘foetus’. The unborn baby with Down’s syndrome 
occupies a between and betwixt state as it is recognised as ‘compatible with life’ 
yet the condition can be used as a reason for terminating a pregnancy. Since the 
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condition cannot be ‘fixed’ or ‘cured’, a diagnosis can diminish or at least threaten 
the baby status. As gatekeepers to meaningful data, FMD professionals can 
subsequently transform a perceptibly healthy unborn ‘baby’ into an unhealthy 
‘foetus’; ‘by definition, of course, we believe the person with a stigma is not quite 
human’ (Goffman 1963: 5). These classifications restore order and accomplish and 
re-accomplish clearly-defined boundaries in the clinic. Just as Foucault (1983) 
presses there is no madness without reason, there is no abnormal without normal 
in antenatal care; it is in its asymmetry that the ‘normal’ baby without Down’s 
syndrome is brought into view. 
 
A combination of all of these factors – the value placed on producing perfection 
during pregnancy, an imperative for mothers-to-be to eliminate all ‘risks’, the 
making and unmaking of the baby into a foetus, and screening ultimately fostering 
the contention that unborn babies with Down’s syndrome should be detected and 
terminated (Alderson 2001; Burton-Jeangros et al. 2013) – may highlight, as built 
on in chapter seven, one reason why termination statistics in England and Wales 
remain between 89% and 94%. In chapter nine, I conclude my thesis and discuss 
how this focus on one specific aspect of medical work raises important questions 
for both antenatal medicine and wider society.  
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Chapter Nine 
Discussion 
 
In the preceding chapters, I explored how Down’s syndrome and screening for the 
condition is organised, negotiated, constituted, and (re)produced in the everyday 
practices of professionals in antenatal care. Drawing heavily on observations of 
screening consultations, that is, thick descriptions of slim encounters, I began my 
analysis in chapter five by exploring how Down’s syndrome screening is organised 
and how it is downgraded by professionals in everyday conduct. Its sedimentation 
in antenatal care produces and reproduces both hierarchies and identities. Doctors 
are able to defend disciplinary boundaries and protect the purity of the clinic 
through screening consultations being relegated to midwives and sonographers. 
Doctors only attach to Down’s syndrome screening once a diagnosis and potential 
termination is possible whilst midwives and sonographers, in contrast, appear 
reluctantly attached. However, midwives in particular minimise the value of 
screening by privileging other tasks, namely ‘hands-on midwifery work’, affording 
the successful construction of a meaningful professional identity. They dismiss 
Down’s syndrome screening as ‘boring’ and ‘routine’, a tedious duty not connecting 
effectively with work-based expectations. 
 
In analysing the conduct of care in chapter six, I captured how professionals 
further detach from Down’s syndrome screening by reassigning responsibility for 
decision-making to parents-to-be. The transposable rhetoric of ‘informed choice’ 
and ‘non-directive care’ becomes a resource for shifting liability (and thus blame) 
and, albeit unwittingly, accomplishes screening as a ‘normal’ part of pregnancy. 
This analysis continued by attending to how ultrasound scans and specifically NT 
scans are reconstructed as a ‘day out’ to greet a new family member and reproduce 
kinship. This often trounces the medical agenda, namely of prenatally detecting 
potential conditions or other concerns with the unborn baby. Whilst the ‘medical’ 
dimensions of NT scans are discussed, its ‘social’ dimensions are widely promoted 
and its value as a serious procedure is simultaneously diminished. In addition, 
producing an unborn baby for parents-to-be to gaze at – a baby with distinctive 
219 
behaviours and physical features affiliated with personality traits and gendered 
conduct – contributes toward the configuring of certain types of ‘normal’ bodies. 
 
I built on this concept in chapter seven by exploring how Down’s syndrome itself is 
constituted inside and outside screening encounters. Professionals often condemn 
screening by citing Down’s syndrome as ‘compatible with life’, a catch-all term 
signifying that someone with the condition can survive birth and enjoy a good 
‘quality of life’. However, such criticisms disappear during consultations. Down’s 
syndrome is rarely discussed and subsequently made absent. I explained how this 
corresponds to its familiarity to the UK public, the organisation of care, and a lack 
of knowledge of the condition among professionals. Down’s syndrome, however, 
becomes present inside and outside consultations through a dominant discourse 
which associates the condition with ‘risk’ and its ancillary categories of ‘problem’, 
‘bad news’, and ‘abnormality’. Professionals do not overtly identify the ‘miserable 
lives of people with disabilities’ like the geneticists in Kerr et al.’s (1998: 181) 
research. However, they instead implicitly construct Down’s syndrome as a dismal 
pregnancy outcome and confine the condition to a purely technical definition of 
being outside the ‘normal’. 
 
In chapter eight, I extended this analysis to show how such discourses intersect 
with the production and reproduction of ideas around ‘perfection’ in the social 
practices and cultural materials of the clinic. This frequently implicates mothers-
to-be, particularly those of an ‘advanced maternal age’. These mothers-to-be may 
interpret screening as an instance of conformity and the chance to eliminate any 
‘risks’ flagged up in antenatal care, this defining the responsible mother ‘who does 
everything – takes all tests – to ensure foetal health’ (Lippman 1994: 22). Finally, I 
show how a diagnosis, as both category and process, triggers a potential unsettling 
of the ‘baby’ status and its replacement with the technical category of ‘foetus’. In 
the case of Down’s syndrome, a contestable condition in the ‘grey area’ owing to its 
uncertain prognosis, there are contradictions and ambiguities. This surrounds the 
condition being defined as ‘compatible with life’ but also as something which can 
be used as a reason for legal termination. These contradictions and ambiguities are 
settled by constructing the unborn baby as a ‘foetus’ which deny an unborn ‘baby’ 
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its personhood. A termination of pregnancy is therefore made possible. The 
unborn baby becomes ‘disposable’ (Latimer 1999) both figuratively, recast as 
somebody or something not worthy of moral subjectivities, and literally, via 
termination. Such moves, in turn, restore local order and reinforce the boundaries 
between normal (babies) and abnormal (foetuses). 
 
In sum, my thesis contributes to accounts around how medical work is organised 
and performed in everyday routines (Bosk 1992; Latimer 2000, 2013; Silverman 
1987; Strong 1979) and how values around disability intersect with reproductive 
technologies (Ettorre 2002; Landsman 1998, 2009; Lippman 1994; Parens and 
Asch 2000; Rapp 2000; Rothman 1986; Rothschild 2005). It also extends the field 
in four explicit ways. Firstly, it draws on ethnographic data often missing in 
research on Down’s syndrome screening, simultaneously highlighting the shifts 
between participants’ accounts and what happens in everyday clinical practice. My 
ethnography of two healthcare institutions, thus, champions using observational 
fieldwork in explicating the implicit and exposing the taken-for-granted affairs of 
everyday life (Garfinkel 1967). Secondly, it supports the call to expose and reject 
universalising categories trivialising and unfairly classifying Down’s syndrome as a 
‘disability’. This neat classification of ‘disability’ discounts the complexities and 
contradictions of Down’s syndrome and prevents a thorough dissection of how the 
condition is constructed in the everyday practices of the clinic. Thirdly, I identify 
the sociological value of theoretical pluralism for analysing the mundane and 
ordinary routines deeply embedded in the fabric of medical work which produce 
and reproduce certain power relations and cultural values. Fourthly, it attends to 
the complex interplay of practices, discourses, and materials in deconstructing one 
of the most taken-for-granted aspects of pregnancy in the UK. 
 
Generally, my thesis shows how medicine is accomplished and re-accomplished in 
ritual and mundane forms. Less generally, I highlight how screening for Down’s 
syndrome represents a routine practice which has transformed obstetric medicine, 
invigorated parental expectations, shaped many issues surrounding the ‘politics of 
reproduction’ (Ginsburg and Rapp 1991), and reproduced certain body-society 
relations. I have drawn explicit attention to social practices and cultural materials 
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in which alignments are made, accounts are produced, typifications are erected 
and mutated, identities are accomplished, and knowledge is ultimately produced 
and reproduced in local settings. By separating the discussion of screening for 
Down’s syndrome from other kinds of screening, I track the processes and 
associations and produce soft data which, as shown, raises hard questions about 
some of the most profound dilemmas of our time. 
 
Specifically, I show how Down’s syndrome occupies a rather odd position in the 
clinic. There are inherent shifts – I borrow and employ the term ‘motility’ (Latimer 
2013; Latimer and Munro 2006; Munro 2001) when referring to this throughout 
the thesis – in antenatal care. These shifts are not interpreted as contradictions, 
deviancies, or unguarded statements which involve professionals ‘slipping up’ and 
cancelling out other pronouncements. Rather, I interpret them as examples of how 
professionals shift backward and forward between distinct discursive forms 
(Latimer 2008b). Early in Down’s syndrome screening, for instance, doctors resist 
attaching to the practice since it has yet to reach the status of clinical interest. In 
order to protect the purity of the clinic, this duty is relegated to midwives and 
sonographers. Such professionals, though midwives particularly, however, 
similarly do not attach to screening since it does not constitute ‘hands-on 
midwifery’. Thus, in Freymarsh and Springtown, screening becomes ‘matter out of 
place’ (Douglas 1966). 
 
What is more, this motility emerges in how midwives (more than sonographers at 
least) claim they do not ‘do pathology’ yet spend most of their time monitoring and 
probing mothers-to-be in an unrelenting cycle of clinically oriented surveillance. 
But most importantly, perhaps, many professionals (midwives included) claim not 
only that screening has eugenic echoes and creates more problems than solutions 
but also that the condition itself is ‘compatible with life’. However, much of their 
work downgrades Down’s syndrome screening; it is not prioritised since other 
tasks are privileged, it is not allocated time and money (e.g. hiring translators) 
which represent essential resources for accomplishing a certain level of care, 
ultrasound scans become primarily cast as ‘days out’ rather than serious medical 
procedures, and so on. Whilst professionals are critical of the practice on medical, 
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socio-political, and moral grounds, screening for Down’s syndrome persists as a 
natural and routine part of a pregnancy. 
 
In addition, despite professionals’ condemnations of Down’s syndrome screening, 
everyday practices in the clinic render the condition absent. Symptoms, prognosis, 
and the ‘social realities’ (Rapp 1988) of a future child with the condition are 
eviscerated from everyday routines. Unborn babies with Down’s syndrome, or at 
least those considered at risk of having the condition, are not given presence in the 
clinic, or wider policies, as people. Since it is conventional to appeal for ‘normal’ 
children (Shakespeare 2011), the moral value of the unborn baby with Down’s 
syndrome appears to have scant purchase in antenatal care. With the condition 
lacking a language of its own, it is colonised by universal negatives such as ‘risk’, 
‘problem’, and ‘abnormality’. This black-boxes Down’s syndrome and masks the 
sizeable physiological and intellectual variation of people with the condition. Such 
discourses act as ‘a stuff mould into which processes and beings must be made to 
fit even at the cost of distorting them’ (Martin 1998: 126). The notion that people 
with the condition vary considerably is eclipsed as well as the notion that disability 
more generally is shaped by cultural ideas of ‘the normal’ and a complex interplay 
of social, cultural, material, biological, economic, and political factors (Davis 1995; 
Ginsburg and Rapp 2013; Oliver 1990; Shakespeare 1999). Social conditions are as 
enabling or disabling as biological conditions. However, the former are interpreted 
as preventable and the latter as intractable givens (Lippman 1994; Shakespeare 
1999). 
 
Taken together, such developments highlight the complexity of a practice in which 
Down’s syndrome itself is constructed as ‘compatible with life’ in one moment and 
in another as a ‘problem’ and legally-acceptable reason for terminating an unborn 
baby. For the most part, however, Down’s syndrome is imbued with negativity and 
holds a metonymical status for matter out of place, that is, something which should 
be detected and, if a diagnosis is established, something which constitutes a reason 
for terminating a pregnancy (Asch 1999; Burton-Jeangros et al. 2013; Rothschild 
2005; Saxton 2010). The classification of Down’s syndrome – and disability more 
generally – is interstitial and indeterminate. In antenatal care, however, this is 
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rarely recognised. Agreeing with Silverman (1987) that the illness of a child (in 
this case an unborn child) and ideas around both medicine and family/kinship are 
discursively constituted in consultations, I have shown how screening for Down’s 
syndrome is downgraded and how the condition, before a diagnosis is fully 
established or even suspected, is vitiated and constituted as an emotional tragedy 
and future family disruption. The interesting and ironic paradox, then, is the 
discipline which substantially increases the life expectancy and quality of life of the 
child with Down’s syndrome after he or she is born also decreases the chance of an 
unborn baby with the condition coming into the world. 
 
At this point, I reiterate that I do not subscribe to arguments about all population 
screening/testing as equating to a negative valuation of disabled peoples’ lives 
(Gillam 1999; Lippman 1994; Parens and Asch 2000). It is unhelpful and insulting 
both to professionals and parents-to-be making difficult choices to use ‘highly 
emotive rhetoric to denounce modern antenatal screening’ (Shakespeare 1999: 
682). This often manifests itself in claims that screening/testing is an egregious 
eugenic exercise evocative of Nazi Germany (Rock 1996). This simple classification 
discounts the complexity of an intricate issue, denies the meaning of impairment in 
conceptualising disability, upholds unhelpful distinctions (e.g. eugenics vs. choice), 
and is forever irresolvable since the label of eugenics has many meanings (Duster 
1990; Shakespeare 1999, 2000, 2011). It is tempting to identify screening as a tale 
of triumph or tragedy, that is, of being wonderfully progressive or as nightmarishly 
evil. The reality, in truth, is much more complicated. Indeed, screening for Down’s 
syndrome is different than screening families with a history of another condition 
(Shakespeare 2000). Additionally, Down’s syndrome is different to the likes of Tay 
Sachs disease88, achondroplasia89, and Edward’s syndrome. It would be wrong, 
therefore, to indulge in exaggerated hype about all current screening procedures 
and how genetic research and practice in its entirety translates to an ‘old eugenics’ 
(Kerr et al. 1998: 176). 
 
                                                     
88 Tay Sachs disease is a rare and usually fatal autosomal recessive genetic disorder which causes 
progressive damage to the nervous system. 
89 Achondroplasia is a common form of short-limbed dwarfism. 
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Rather, drawing on my fieldwork, I reveal how mundane clinical affairs accomplish 
and re-accomplish Down’s syndrome screening (and not all screening practices) as 
a routine component of antenatal care and the condition itself in negative terms. 
This, I claim, may suggest a reason why parents-to-be may terminate for Down’s 
syndrome following a prenatal diagnosis. In his analysis on the social and ethical 
issues ignited by genetic technologies, Duster (1990) suggests there are different 
drives for terminating a pregnancy for foetal conditions, censuring simplistic and 
unfair accusations aimed at the alleged eugenics of modern medicine. Agreeing 
with Duster, I do not read screening as a planned plot against people with Down’s 
syndrome and I do not entertain the argument that termination is exclusively 
attributable to discrimination against people with Down’s syndrome. Decisions are 
complex and can be made with reference to wanting to prevent suffering or feeling 
that a family will be unable to cope with the strain of caring for a disabled child 
(Korenromp et al. 2007). Control appears to be with parents-to-be as much as it is 
with medicine. 
 
However, I do show how a termination is made possible and how this might, in 
turn, be elicited through how everyday practices construct Down’s syndrome as a 
tragic and adverse pregnancy outcome. Whilst I refrain from emotionally-charged 
eugenic accusations against Down’s syndrome screening, I am equally wary of not 
idealising UK prenatal care as an arena free of enacting values around particular 
bodies or of UK society as tolerant of people with disabilities. Since one cannot 
consider screening and testing more generally apart from its eugenic roots (Kerr 
and Cunningham-Burley 2000), it might be fairer, then, to erect a division between 
‘historical eugenics’, operating at the level of populations, and ‘contemporary 
eugenics’, operating at the level of individuals and families (Shakespeare 1995: 8-
10). Screening for Down’s syndrome, as shown in this thesis, is arguably associated 
with the latter. The race for a Down’s syndrome diagnosis in the absence of a cure 
made possible by the availability of prenatal technology – and its sedimentation in 
antenatal care as revealed by this study – inadvertently serves as a commentary on 
which lives are valued and unvalued in society. The only option, thus, seems to be 
to terminate a pregnancy (Alderson 2001; Asch 1999; Shakespeare 1999; Sooben 
2010), with screening consultations becoming specific and salient outlets for the 
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reproduction, reaffirmation, and reconstitution of Down’s syndrome as a tragic 
pregnancy outcome. 
 
This is amplified by the routinisation of this technology; ‘the easier it is to blur the 
eugenic purpose of a technology, the more it is allowed to become routinised’ (Ivry 
2006: 460). The range of technology available for detecting potentially disabling 
conditions has increased geometrically yet it seems the fund of social knowledge 
accompanying such decision-making processes are limited (Ginsburg and Rapp 
2013). Whilst this arguably turns parents-to-be into ‘moral pioneers’ (Rapp 2000), 
it seems few people have an understanding about what it might be like to live with 
the particular disability diagnosed (Franklin and Roberts 2006; Ginsburg and Rapp 
2013). This emerges alongside a spread of disability consciousness which offers 
support to families of children with disabilities (Finger 1999) and reports family 
life is not the tragedy one initially expected it to be (Thomas 2014). Medicine, thus, 
must take responsibility for ensuring a fair and accurate depiction of conditions 
such as Down’s syndrome is realised rather than reinforcing inequalities and 
stigmatisations. 
 
It is entirely unfair, however, to lay the blame entirely at the feet of professionals 
who face mounting pressures to ‘meet targets and adhere to forms of clinical 
governance’ infiltrating the minutiae of clinical work (White et al. 2012: 79). 
Tensions between efficiency, economy, and care play out in everyday clinical life. 
The pressures facing midwives has been recently outlined in an anonymous letter 
from an NHS midwife published in a UK newspaper (Anon 2014). The midwife 
describes her exhaustion, fear, and demoralisation working in an increasingly 
understaffed system ‘moving away from high-quality maternity care’. My point is 
that whilst professionals do play a role in the downgrading of Down’s syndrome 
screening and how the condition is negatively constituted in antenatal care, they 
are clearly not solely accountable for such developments. There are a number of 
heterogeneous elements which have combined to accomplish and re-accomplish 
Down’s syndrome screening as a routine affair and particularly the condition itself 
as a negative life event. This includes a history of people with the condition being 
institutionalised (Logan 2011), introducing prenatal testing (i.e. amniocentesis) for 
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terminating conditions other than Down’s syndrome (Cowan 1994), the passing of 
abortion laws (Rapp 2000), the acceptability of medical screening as a knowledge 
practice (Armstrong and Eborall 2012), the medicalisation of pregnancy (Hiddinga 
and Blume 1992), a preoccupation with avoiding ‘risks’ (Beck 1992) and pursuing 
perfection in pregnancy outcome (Landsman 1998, 2009), recommendations of 
prenatal self-care which understands an unborn baby’s health as perfectible rather 
than as through predetermined genetic and chromosomal constitution (Ivry 2006), 
and public discrimination against people with disabilities (Oliver 1990). Thus, 
many people, practices, and materials are complicit ‘in the reproduction of a given 
ideology’ (White et al. 2012: 79). 
 
It seems the technological path to prevent the birth of an unborn baby with Down’s 
syndrome, drawing on Ivry (2006: 459), is ‘indexed as a back-stage business 
because of a historically charged politics of disability’. Nonetheless, I have shown 
how this depiction of Down’s syndrome comes to life most powerfully and most 
effectively in antenatal care. Although disability being a catastrophic outcome is 
part of a broader discourse in Western culture (Oliver 1990), it is particularly 
strong in the context of prenatal screening. This correlates with the medicalisation 
of pregnancy as part of the project of obstetrics. Whilst I have previously suggested 
consultants relegate screening via a hierarchy of clinical value, obstetric medicine 
is not always absent from the early stages of screening. Its influence is felt in the 
division between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ pregnancies and future bodies (Hiddinga 
and Blume 1992; Olarte Sierra 2010). Obstetrics introduced the notion of ‘potential 
abnormality’ in practice by gaining knowledge of, whilst diagnosing and treating, 
‘pathological’ pregnancies. 
 
Such categories of normal and abnormal remain today. As an indelible part of our 
medical and social culture, such technologies bring to life what counts as a ‘normal’ 
body. This construction of the normal body is an extension of our society which 
seemingly privileges the mind over the body, identifying cognition as essential to 
personhood. It seems, thus, obstetric medicine has played a key role in designing 
the politics of reproduction throughout the modern UK history. The language of 
medicine claims to be neutral and universal yet it produces and reproduces rich, 
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layered, and powerful messages via divisions of the normal and abnormal body 
(Rapp 1988, 2000); ‘if you are not like everybody else, then you are abnormal, if 
you are abnormal, then you are sick’ (Foucault 2004: 95). According to Foucault, 
these three categories – of not being like everybody else, of abnormality, and of 
being sick – are different yet have been reduced to the same thing. In Freymarsh 
and Springtown and antenatal care more generally, Down’s syndrome is similarly 
implicated in such ‘dividing practices’ (Foucault 1983) as abnormal, sick, and not 
like everybody else. This reduces its character and changes what people with 
Down’s syndrome are or could become. Rather than being figured as ‘one way, 
among others, of being human’ as Clarke (1994: 19) describes, the condition is 
embedded in a single class of ‘abnormal’ which shrouds the variable physical and 
intellectual difference of people with the condition under a blanket of universal 
and narrow categories. This undercuts and problematises the choice purportedly 
promised by reproductive technologies: 
 
‘The choices promised by the advocates of the new human genetics are 
also highly circumscribed by the personal, clinical and wider social 
context in which they are offered. Bodies remain docile when the options 
for their reinvention follow the conventions of beauty and health; and 
reproduction remains a fateful process because of the very ability to 
eliminate the undesirable in favour of a norm’ (Kerr and Cunningham-
Burley 2000: 294). 
 
Whilst Kerr and Cunningham-Burley concentrate on the new genetics, their work 
is important for my arguments here. The rhetoric of ‘choice’, for Lippman (1994: 
19), cannot be viewed as ‘a real option when society does not truly accept children 
with disabilities or provide assistance for their nurturance’. As Kerr and 
Cunningham-Burley (2000: 289) show, the constant focus on curing or eliminating 
people with genetic defects, coupled with the development of new reproductive 
technologies framed as benefitting the collective, bears much in common with the 
modernist project to efface and eradicate the ‘other’ (Bauman 1989). The desire 
for a ‘perfect child’ has become a common refrain, as has the alleged anguish and 
misery caused by genetic conditions (Kerr and Cunningham-Burley 2000: 291). 
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Reproductive technologies, as revealed in this research, intersect with wider social 
and cultural preoccupations with certain bodies. Divisions of normal and abnormal 
produced and reproduced via the moral ordering work of contemporary hospital 
life seem to be widely enacted and consumed. Coupled with a society increasingly 
driven by consumer ideals, the unborn baby imagined as having Down’s syndrome 
becomes an abnormal product, disrupting pre-set expectations of perfection in a 
pregnancy outcome (Lippman 1994; Rapp 1995, 2000; Rothschild 2005). Using 
Colen’s (1995) concept of ‘stratified reproduction’, Ginsburg and Rapp (1995: 3) 
describe the ways by which ‘some reproductive futures are valued while others are 
despised’, this relating to the valuation of reproductive futures and the valuation of 
children. According to Ginsburg and Rapp, then, children with disabilities are not 
valued by both reproductive medicine and the wider public. This is particularly 
pertinent in antenatal care where those certified as worthy of being born exist 
beside ‘imperfect’ babies, that is, ‘those who may be dispensed with’ (Rothschild 
2005: 3-4). By making screening and testing available for Down’s syndrome, as 
shown in this study, one can argue this is already, by definition, problematising the 
birth of a child with the condition (Asch 1999; Alderson 2001; Lippman 1994). 
 
My focus on the ongoing negotiations of Down’s syndrome screening in the clinic 
not only reveals the overt and covert inclinations toward selective reproduction 
but also challenges simplistic or entirely beneficent readings of modern biomedical 
screening technologies. Prenatal screening and testing is a mixed blessing. It offers 
the possibility of detecting severe health conditions before birth and can prevent 
suffering for families yet it can also induce great anxiety in parents-to-be and 
provide a running commentary on what lives we value. Reproductive technologies, 
thus, raise urgent and disquieting questions, for the public and professionals alike, 
about our ideas of ‘normality’, of human variation, and when variation becomes a 
disability.  
 
What next? 
So what is the future for Down’s syndrome screening? Recent developments in 
medical and scientific worlds include a group of US scientists announcing they are 
closer to ‘treating’ people with Down’s syndrome having ‘switched off’, albeit in 
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isolated cells, the chromosome causing the condition (Jiang et al. 2013). According 
to Jiang et al. (2013), this increases the possibility of developing a ‘chromosome 
therapy’ for the condition which can improve treatment for common symptoms. 
Another group of US scientists have similarly found a way to reverse the condition 
in newborn lab mice by injecting a compound causing ‘normal’ brain development, 
potentially raising the possibility of ‘reversing cognitive dysfunction in Down’s 
syndrome’ (Das et al. 2013: 1). Most importantly, a number of UK privately-funded 
clinics have recently offered parents-to-be an opportunity to undertake the Ariosa 
Harmony Prenatal Test, a non-invasive prenatal test (NIPT) for Down’s syndrome 
and other conditions. This involves analysing cell-free DNA circulating in the blood 
of a mother-to-be in all single pregnancies and is advertised as the most accurate 
screening – 99% for Down’s syndrome – available in estimating the chance that an 
unborn baby has a genetic condition (Ariosa Diagnostics 2013). 
 
Since the test is non-invasive, it presents no risk of miscarriage or other adverse 
outcomes associated with CVS or amniocentesis. As such, the amount of mothers-
to-be offered an amniocentesis or CVS after undertaking the NIPT is less than 1%. 
NIPT therefore offers an earlier and safer test causing fewer terminations and 
miscarriages. However, it also raises a number of concerns surrounding peoples’ 
access to the technology, the provision of information, the emphasis on prevention 
as opposed to management (Kerr 2005), and the ability to detect conditions other 
than Down’s syndrome and associated chromosomal conditions. The latter concern 
corresponds to an overriding fear that, as Latimer (2013: 192) claims, ‘the normal 
is shrinking’ at the same time as our consciousness of the riskiness of reproduction 
is intensified. With screening becoming more accurate, less invasive and more 
widely available, the ‘normal’ is threatened by the possibility of detecting more 
genetic duplications, deletions, translocations, inversions, and insertions. As the 
body itself is more fully probed and finely enumerated, the category of the normal 
shrivels and the parallel category of the abnormal swells. 
 
Whilst I make no grand claims about NIPT or what will come of it here, I recognise 
how it may extend the dichotomy of normal/abnormal. In addition, I identify how 
it intersects with how Down’s syndrome screening has become a routine affair in 
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the antenatal clinic. To illustrate this point further, I draw a comparison with the 
recent public dialogues organised by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority on mitochondrial transfer (HFEA 2013). These events were arranged to 
seek public views on emerging techniques, specifically on their social and ethical 
impact, designed to avoid parents passing on genetically-inherited mitochondrial 
diseases to their children. Interestingly, no such debates were, or have since been, 
organised regarding NIPT or Down’s syndrome screening more generally. NIPT 
has followed a linear path from scientific knowledge to technological application to 
its diffusion into routine practice; ‘where new tests fit old paradigms, uptake is 
higher and concerns are more mute’ (Kerr and Cunningham-Burley 2000: 289). 
Since Down’s syndrome screening is such a routine procedure, the diffusion of 
NIPT into medical practice has been largely untroubled and unchallenged, a subtle 
reconfiguration rather than leaping into a brave new world. 
 
This reflects how the drive toward Down’s syndrome screening ‘appears to come 
from medical agencies, not from lay people or through democratic debate’ 
(Alderson 2001: 362). This drive to obtain a diagnosis in the absence of a cure, 
therefore, does not emerge from public consultations demanding this care. With no 
UK parliamentary discussion on Down’s syndrome screening, policies are 
formulated by advisory committees and emphasise preventing (alleged) suffering 
and promising informed choice. Thus, I agree with Buckley and Buckley (2008) 
that policies permitting screening for conditions such as Down’s syndrome should 
be reviewed through wide public debates before its development and diffusion. In 
addition, we should ask what or who is driving this practice, if screening is an 
unsustainable luxury as its increasing sophistication seemingly ushers in further 
uncertainty, and what accumulative effects the inclination to tinker has for 
reducing what constitutes ‘normality’ in our conceptions of certain (future) bodies. 
 
Our relentless march toward scientific innovations renders the chance of putting a 
brake on the progress of prenatal screening for Down’s syndrome as incredibly 
slim. Indeed, we may be kindling a fire we cannot control. Nonetheless, I call not 
for an end to reproductive choice or a ban on Down’s syndrome screening but 
rather to develop a more nuanced and informed approach to screening and testing 
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(Shakespeare 1999, 2011; Williams et al. 2005). We are entering an era in which 
we may eventually be able to screen and test (and potentially terminate) for not 
only serious conditions but also for mild conditions and late-onset disorders 
(Pilnick 2004). As such, parents-to-be must be provided with balanced information 
about conditions screened/tested for in the UK so they can successfully digest this 
data and make a decision which is right for them (Boardman 2010; Sooben 2010). 
Here, it needs to be emphasised that as both my own and Latimer's (2013) studies 
have shown, how clinical consultations are enacted and performed is constitutive. 
That is, it is the implicit which is communicated in how screening is conducted. The 
implicit mediates the information shared within medical work and installs not just 
the need for a choice but what choice will be made. This means we should invest 
money both in the science and technology of this practice and the training and 
support which accompanies it (Shakespeare 2011). At this time, antenatal settings 
seem to provide little opportunity for people to discuss and explore their beliefs 
about disability (Bryant et al. 2006). This demands immediate attention in order to 
move closer towards promising ‘informed’ choice. 
 
We must also be honest about the limitations of medical and scientific knowledge 
(Shakespeare 2011), witness a more careful regulation of technologies, and have 
more fundamental discussions around the values embedded in the knowledge and 
practices of screening/testing (Kerr 2003). Rather than focusing exclusively on the 
reproductive autonomy such techniques allegedly promise, rooted in discourses of 
certainty and responsibility, we must remove this fig leaf to genuinely engage with 
issues around Down’s syndrome and what lives we value in modern healthcare 
systems and wider society. Skotko (2009: 823) fears as medical progress leaps 
ahead, people with Down’s syndrome will gradually ‘disappear’ from society. It is 
important, thus, to fully engage with concerns surrounding Down’s syndrome and 
other disabilities as a ‘fact of life’ not always to be eliminated in the drive for a 
‘perfect baby’ (Shakespeare 2011: 40). By lifting Down’s syndrome specifically out 
of the medical context, this will make it possible to ‘speak in other languages’ about 
the condition so parents-to-be can ‘come to a decision from a more nuanced and 
knowledgeable position’ (Rapp 1988: 155–6). Rather than focusing exclusively on 
abstract ideals such as autonomy and non-directive care when discussing how we 
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can improve healthcare practices (Mol 2008), therefore, it may be better to explore 
how one conveys information around conditions such as Down’s syndrome prior 
to screening (Bryant et al. 2001). 
 
With NIPT minimising physical risks and offering an earlier result, one suspects 
parents-to-be choosing to undertake Down’s syndrome screening is set to expand, 
particularly with plans to diffuse NIPT into NHS practice. As such, these concerns 
become a matter of urgency. Via detailed empirical insights into Down’s syndrome 
screening and a continued dialogue between respective stakeholders – including 
professionals, parents-to-be, policymakers, charity organisations, academics, and 
those with personal experience of Down’s syndrome – we can ‘continue to provoke 
and challenge, not relieve and mollify, policy-makers and experts’ (Kerr and 
Cunningham-Burley 2000: 298). 
 
Conclusion 
My intention is not to propose specific policies or discourses designed to change or 
improve practice. More modestly, I hope my arguments will ignite more reflexive 
and pluralistic dialogues – and so better communication between professionals, 
parents-to-be, and the wider lay public – around prenatal screening for Down’s 
syndrome and potentially other conditions too. We know knowledge implanted as 
innovation and absorbed by wider society creates new relationships, identities, 
‘biosocialities’ (Rabinow 1996), and responsibilities. Screening and antenatal care, 
indeed, changes the way we think and act and alters our perceptions ‘of self and 
other, of normality and abnormality’ (Lippman 1994: 9). Spilling beyond the 
biological and into public arenas and intimate lives, screening is a potent site for 
uncovering assumptions buried deep in medical work and for exploring how ideas 
around family, parenthood, and personhood are produced and reproduced. In sum, 
by taking the politics of reproduction seriously, I reveal how analysing the ‘terrible 
ordinariness’ (Bosk 1992: xvii) of clinical life in Freymarsh and Springtown raises 
vital questions for professionals, parents-to-be, governments, and sociologists 
alike. All ethnographies become social history and Down’s syndrome screening will 
move on. However, many of the dilemmas will remain the same, namely about 
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what lives we consider valuable as a society, and the cultural forms of the clinic 
will likely show remarkable stability (Atkinson 1995). 
 
This study of one specific medical situation has broader appeal for considering the 
intersections of kinship, disability, motherhood, and healthcare communication. It 
illustrates how Down’s syndrome screening is downgraded in everyday practices 
and how the condition is accomplished and re-accomplished as a negative life 
event, thus providing a commentary on what lives are valued, who is ascribed 
personhood, and who/what is instituted as ‘normal’ during pregnancy. With 
increasingly sophisticated technologies showing no sign of abating, antenatal 
medicine will continue to transform and shape reproductive politics and how the 
(future) baby with Down’s syndrome is constituted in the UK and beyond for the 
foreseeable future. We must remember that sociologists are particularly valuable 
assets in exploring and making sense of such developments. 
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Appendix 1: Antenatal screening timeline 
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Appendix 2: Down’s syndrome screening flowchart (Freymarsh) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Down’s syndrome screening consultation 
(FAD midwife) 
Higher-risk result 
 
Lower-risk result 
Counselling offered 
(FAD midwife) 
Diagnostic testing 
(FMD consultant) 
No diagnostic testing 
(No further action) 
 
Letter sent 
(No further action) 
 
No diagnosis 
(No further action) 
 
Diagnosis 
Counselling 
(FMD consultant) 
Continue pregnancy 
(No further action) 
 
Terminate pregnancy 
(FMD consultant) 
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Appendix 3: Down’s syndrome screening flowchart (Springtown) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*When parents-to-be in Springtown receive a higher-risk result for Down’s 
syndrome and decide to undertake diagnostic testing, they are referred to the 
Freymarsh foetal medicine department (FMD) 
 
  
Down’s syndrome screening consultation 
(SAD sonographer) 
Higher-risk result Lower-risk result 
 
Counsel by telephone 
(SAD nurse) 
Diagnostic testing 
(FMD consultant)* 
No diagnostic testing 
(No further action) 
 
Telephone call made 
(No further action) 
 
No diagnosis 
(No further action) 
 
Diagnosis 
Counselling 
(FMD consultant) 
Continue pregnancy 
(No further action) 
 
Terminate pregnancy 
(FMD consultant) 
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Appendix 4: Information sheet for professionals (example) 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PROFESSIONALS (FREYMARSH) 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before deciding whether you 
would like to participate, it is important for you to understand why the research is 
being carried out and what it involves. This sheet outlines the purpose and 
implications of the study and provides more detailed information about its 
conduct. I am happy to answer anything which is unclear or needs clarification. 
Please take time to decide whether you want to participate. You will be able to 
keep this sheet and a signed consent form. If you would like to participate, please 
contact me by telephone, by email, by letter, or in person. Thank you for reading 
this. 
 
This is not a clinical study. The purpose of this study is to examine the 
experiences of parents and clinical professionals for the duration of Down’s 
syndrome screening and testing procedures in antenatal practice. Specifically, the 
objectives are to explore parents’ understanding of Down’s syndrome and their 
knowledge of testing which detects the condition, how clinicians communicate and 
parents perceive the notion of ‘low-risk’ or ‘high-risk’ during screening, why 
parents choose to undertake or avoid further diagnostic testing, whether clinical 
professionals view hospital resources as adequate for the needs of patients, and 
how parents who have undertaken a quadruple screen and/or diagnostic testing 
view their overall prenatal experience.  
 
I would like your consent to observe the antenatal clinic and maternity services at 
the hospital. Observing clinical practices of the antenatal process involves the 
researcher being present during quadruple screens, consultations informing 
parents that their foetus has a high-risk of Down’s syndrome, and diagnostic 
testing procedures (i.e. amniocentesis or CVS). I will not be providing nor 
interfering with prevention, diagnosis, or treatment. These events will not be 
audio-recorded, but notes will be taken. You will have to provide informed 
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consent, you can withdraw from the study at any time without explanation, and 
information which might identify you will be removed as far as possible. 
 
After this, you may be approached for an interview which will last between 30 
minutes and 1 hour. You may be approached for a second interview if necessary. If 
you agree, your interview will be audio-recorded for transcription purposes. You 
will have to provide informed consent, information which might identify you will 
be removed as far as possible, and you can withdraw from the interview at any 
time without explanation. When the research study stops, you will receive a 
summary of the study’s findings on request so you can check that where you are 
quoted, it is both accurate and anonymous. The data collected will be published in 
a PhD thesis approved by Cardiff University and potentially through academic 
publications such as books, book chapters, and peer-reviewed journal articles. At 
the end of the study, your anonymised interview transcript will be submitted to 
the ESDS Qualidata unit at the UK Data Archive, which will store it and make it 
available to future researchers.  
 
All information collected during the study will be kept strictly confidential. 
The research location and identities of everyone taking part in the study will 
be subjected to anonymisation. Any information which may identify you will 
be removed. Electronic or manual data collected (audio recordings, 
transcripts, typed-up field notes) will be either stored in a locked filing 
cabinet on Cardiff University security-controlled premises or on an 
encrypted, password-protected USB device, both of which will only be 
accessible by the researcher. Audio recordings and manual copies of field 
notes will be destroyed after use in accordance with Cardiff University 
regulations. A manual copy of your contact details will be kept in case you 
need to be contacted for a second interview and so you can receive a copy of 
the study’s findings, but these will be shredded after the PhD thesis is 
completed. Please note that you have the right to check the accuracy of data 
held.  
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The research is being funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). 
Information on antenatal screening and Down’s syndrome made available by 
Antenatal Results and Choices (ARC) and the Down’s Syndrome Association (DSA), 
organisations which both support this project, can also be provided to you on 
request. If you would like to request more information about the study or register 
an interest in participating, please contact me using the details provided below: 
 
Gareth Thomas 
Cardiff University School of Social Sciences 
1-3 Museum Place 
Cardiff 
CF10 3BD 
02920 875260 
ThomasG23@cardiff.ac.uk 
 
If you have read this sheet and have decided not to participate in the study, I would 
really appreciate some feedback and comments regarding why this was the case. 
You can do this by contacting me by email, telephone, or by letter. I would be 
grateful for any advice or constructive criticism you have concerning my project 
and the participant information sheets, as this will help me revise my approach 
and may bring about issues I have yet to sufficiently consider. 
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Appendix 5: Information sheet for parents-to-be (example) 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARENTS-TO-BE (FREYMARSH) 
Quadruple Screen, High-Chance Result, and Potential Interview 
 
Introduction 
My name is Gareth Thomas and I’m currently a PhD student at Cardiff University. 
As part of my degree, I am looking to study the experiences of parents that are 
taking part in screening and testing for Down’s syndrome during a pregnancy. I am 
inviting you to take part in this research study. Your involvement will be voluntary, 
your medical treatment will not change, and I will not have access to your medical 
records. Before deciding whether you would like to participate, I would like you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it involves for you. Reading 
this sheet will take around 10-20 minutes. Part 1 of this sheet tells you the purpose 
of the study and Part 2 gives you more detailed information about the study itself. I 
am happy to answer anything which is unclear or needs explanation. Please take 
time to decide whether you want to participate. You will be able to keep this sheet 
and a signed consent form. If you would like to participate, please contact me by 
telephone, by email, or by letter. You may also confirm your interest in 
participating in this research with the healthcare professional responsible for your 
care. Thank you for reading this. 
 
Part 1: Essential Elements of the Study 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
It is becoming increasingly likely that parents will receive a diagnosis of Down’s 
syndrome or at least given the option of having tests which would provide this 
information during a pregnancy. This poses huge decisions for parents expecting a 
child. Some studies have reported that parents have received inaccurate, 
incomplete, and sometimes offensive information on conditions such as Down’s 
syndrome during antenatal care. Research has also indicated that some healthcare 
staff are concerned that they are not fully prepared to offer screening or deliver 
news of potential medical issues with the baby to expectant parents. 
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This study will look to see whether these trends appear in the NHS and will 
examine a number of different issues, including: 
 
 Parents’ understanding of Down’s syndrome and their knowledge of testing 
which can detect the condition 
 How healthcare professionals communicate and parents understand the 
notion of ‘low-chance’ or ‘high-chance’ during screening 
 Why parents choose to undertake or avoid further testing during a 
pregnancy 
 Whether healthcare professionals view hospital resources as appropriate 
for the needs of patients 
 How parents who have undertaken testing view their overall experience 
during pregnancy 
 
Exploring these issues may indicate whether prenatal events may be handled 
differently and could suggest possibilities which assist parents in making an 
informed decision regarding their choices. This will provide an important resource 
for both parents and healthcare professionals responsible for their care. 
 
You have been asked to participate in the research as you are having a quadruple 
screen and/or have received a high-chance of Down’s syndrome. If you are 
interested in participating, more information is provided below in the section 
entitled ‘What will happen if you take part?’. If there is anything which is unclear, 
please contact me and I will clarify any questions you have. 
 
Why you? 
You have been selected because you have chosen to have a quadruple screen 
and/or have received news of a high-chance of Down’s syndrome. If parents agree 
to participate in this research, I intend to be present during their quadruple screen 
and, if it occurs, the meeting in which parents are told that they have a high-chance 
of having a baby with Down’s syndrome. I’m also hoping to conduct a number of 
interviews with parents. If you agree to participate by consenting to an interview 
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and/or by consenting to me being in attendance during your quadruple screen 
(and, if it occurs, the meeting in which you are told you have a high-chance of 
Down’s syndrome), I will ask you to sign a consent form. Information which might 
identify you will be removed as far as possible and you are free to withdraw at any 
time without explanation. This will not affect the standard of care you receive. All 
information about you will be handled in confidence (see part 2). It is up to you to 
decide to join the study.  
 
What will happen if you take part? 
If you agree to take part, I will be in attendance during your quadruple screen 
procedure and, if it occurs, the meeting in which you are told that you have a high-
chance of Down’s syndrome. I will be taking notes during this test and I will focus 
on the following issues: 
 
 The communication between yourself and the healthcare professional 
 Your understanding of ‘high/low chance’, the tests which you have 
undertaken, and Down’s syndrome 
 What information you are provided with 
 How you are cared for and treated by healthcare professionals 
 Whether you want to undertake further testing 
 Whether you appear happy with the care you have received 
 
I will not be providing any form of diagnosis or treatment during these 
consultations and I will not be requesting extra time on top of what is already 
allowed for your care. In addition, you may be invited to participate in an interview 
which you can choose to refuse. You will also be asked to take part in the interview 
together with your partner, but you may request that you are both interviewed 
separately. There may be an opportunity for you to be interviewed individually if 
your partner does not wish to participate. You may refuse to let me attend your 
quadruple screen and, if necessary, the meeting in which you are informed about 
being at a high-chance of having a child with Down’s syndrome, yet still participate 
in an interview (and vice versa). If you agree to participate in an interview, you will 
be asked to comment on a number of issues, including: 
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 What tests you have undertaken 
 How you understand the tests that you have so far undertaken 
 How you have understood ‘high/low chance’ 
 Why you have chosen to have certain tests 
 What information you have been provided with by healthcare professionals 
 How you have been cared for and treated by healthcare professionals 
 Whether you view your antenatal care as a positive or negative experience 
 
The one-off interview will be audio-recorded so that I can type out exactly what 
was said during the interview. The interview will last around 30 minutes to 1 hour. 
Your interview may take place in the hospital, but you may find it more convenient 
for it to take place in your home. The location of the interview will be your 
decision. At each stage of the research, you will have to provide informed consent, 
you can withdraw from the study at any time without explanation, and information 
which could identify you will be removed as far as possible. Rarely, you may be 
approached for a second interview which you are able to refuse. If you agree to 
participate in a second interview, you will be asked to provide consent for this. A 
second interview is likely to last between 20 and 30 minutes. You will only be 
invited for a second interview if I think there are issues which were not addressed 
in your first interview. 
 
When the research study stops, you will receive a summary of the study’s findings 
on request so you can check that where you are quoted, it is both accurate and 
anonymous. I will take every measure to ensure that you cannot be identified by 
the information you provide during your interview. The data collected will be 
published in a PhD thesis approved by Cardiff University and potentially through 
academic publications such as books, book chapters, and journal articles. At the 
end of the study, your typed-out interview will be submitted to the UK Data 
Archive (UKDA). The UKDA will store the data and make it available to future 
researchers. 
 
What are the potential disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
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I may ask you to comment on sensitive issues, such as how you understand and 
feel about Down’s syndrome and antenatal screening for a child. The approach of 
the project has been carefully considered to ensure that it is carried out in an 
appropriate manner and ensures your wellbeing. I have experience in studies 
involving interviews with parents on delicate topics concerned with their children. 
I have also received training in designing, managing, and conducting research 
during a one-year Masters degree entitled ‘Social Science Research Methods’. This 
was undertaken at Cardiff University and was completed in September 2010. I 
have also talked to a large number of healthcare professionals before the study. 
They have supported the project and have offered advice on how it may be 
managed. The project has also been supported by Antenatal Results and Choices 
(ARC) and the Down’s Syndrome Association (DSA). Both of these organisations 
believe this is a valuable study and have offered to provide information to you if 
you wish to receive it. 
 
If you become distressed during the study, direct accessible support will be 
available to you. A foetal medicine consultant is present during every morning 
within the Foetal Medicine Unit and specialist midwives are available for support 
between 09:00 and 16:30. Dr Karman, whilst also working as a consultant within 
the Foetal Medicine Department, will also be available out of hours on a mobile 
telephone should you require further support. If you participate in an interview in 
the hospital, this interview will be carried out in an area where access to back-up 
support from the healthcare team is available. If you participate in an interview in 
your home and you feel you require further support, you can contact Dr Karman 
out of hours directly. Dr Karman is happy to perform this role. You can also receive 
further support by contacting the Down’s Syndrome Association (DSA) and 
Antenatal Results and Choices (ARC). If you would like to have this information, I 
can provide you with it at any time during the study. 
 
Please note that you are free to withdraw at any point during the research without 
explanation. If you choose to do so, all of your data collected up until that point will 
be deleted consistent with Cardiff University policy.  
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What are the potential benefits of taking part? 
The study will not help you directly, but the information you provide may help 
improve the way Down’s syndrome and the relevant tests are understood and 
managed by both parents and healthcare professionals in the future. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
Any complaint about the way you have been handled during the study or any other 
concerns that you have will be promptly dealt with. Detailed information on this is 
provided in Part 2, which you should read before making any decision. 
 
Part 2: Other Information 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
If you wish to withdraw from the study, please tell me immediately. Data already 
collected up to this point will be deleted. However, you may re-register an interest 
in participating at any time during the study.  
 
What if I have a complaint? 
If you have a concern about the study, please do not hesitate to contact me (02920 
875260, ThomasG23@cardiff.ac.uk) or my academic supervisors Joanna Latimer 
(02920 876908, LatimerJE@cardiff.ac.uk) and Adam Hedgecoe (02920 870027, 
HedgecoeAM@cardiff.ac.uk). You may also wish to contact Dr Karman, a consultant 
in foetal medicine at Freymarsh and Clinical Supervisor for this project. If you 
remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, the hospital can provide a copy of 
its complaints procedure which explains how to proceed. Your first step will 
normally be to raise the matter with the practitioner (your nurse, midwife, or 
doctor) or with their organisation. For further details, visit:  
http://www.nhs.uk/choiceintheNHS/Rightsandpledges/complaints. 
 
What happens if I am harmed while participating in the research? 
In the unlikely event that something does go wrong and you are harmed during the 
research and this is due to someone’s negligence, you may have grounds for legal 
action against Cardiff University or the NHS but you may have to pay your legal 
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costs. The normal NHS complaints mechanisms will still be available to you (if 
appropriate). 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
You will not be identified in any report or publication unless you have given 
consent (you will be asked to sign a consent form indicating this). The research 
location and identities of everyone taking part in the study will be given fake 
names or numerical codes. The data you provide (audio recordings, typed-up field 
notes, typed-up interviews) will be stored either in a locked filing cabinet which 
only I can access on security-controlled Cardiff University premises or on a 
password-protected USB computer device. This data will have your name removed 
and replaced by a numerical code. The sheet containing these codes and your 
contact details will be kept as manual records in a locked filing cabinet on security-
controlled Cardiff University premises. Your contact details will be kept in case you 
need to be contacted for a second interview and so you can receive a copy of the 
study’s findings. After the PhD thesis is completed, your data and details will be 
deleted and/or shredded in accordance with Cardiff University regulations. Please 
note that you have the right to check the accuracy of data that I hold.  
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
This study is sponsored by Cardiff University and is funded by the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC). 
 
What consequences will this have for the data? 
The ESRC requires that each researcher provides data to be given to the UK Data 
Archive (UKDA). This data will include your typed-up interview which will be 
heavily edited to make sure that there is no identifiable data available. As such, 
they will be sent to the UKDA at a standard which would mean that it could be used 
by a third party. However, your details will still be anonymised in the data and any 
of your quotations will be selected carefully to make sure that you cannot be 
identified by their publication. The notes that I take during your quadruple screen 
(and potentially your meeting for a high-chance) will not be sent to the UKDA. 
These notes and your typed-up interview will also need to be kept for a minimum 
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of 5 years from the end of the project. This is in accordance with Cardiff 
University’s data retention period. After 5 years, the data will be destroyed 
consistent with Cardiff University’s ‘Complying with Data Protection and Freedom 
of Information’ legislation. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people called a 
Research Ethics Committee to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed 
and given favourable opinion by an NHS Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Further information and contact details 
Thank you for taking the time to read this sheet. If you would like to request more 
information about the study or register an interest in participating, please contact 
me using the details provided below: 
 
Gareth Thomas 
Cardiff University School of Social Sciences 
1-3 Museum Place 
Cardiff 
CF10 3BD 
02920 875260 
ThomasG23@cf.ac.uk 
 
If you have read this sheet and have decided not to participate in the study, I would 
really appreciate some feedback and comments about why this was the case. You 
can do this by contacting me by email, telephone, letter, or via hospital 
staff/healthcare professionals. I would be grateful for any advice or constructive 
criticism you have concerning my project and the information sheets. This will 
help me revise my approach and may bring about issues that I have yet to consider. 
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Appendix 6: Consent form for professionals (example) 
 
QUADRUPLE SCREEN/NUCHAL TRANSLUCENCY SCAN/HIGH-CHANCE RESULT 
CONSENT FORM (PROFESSIONALS) 
Please 
initial 
box 
 
1.  I have read and understood the information sheet dated 
……………… for the study. I have had the opportunity to 
consider the information, ask questions, and have had these 
answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I 
am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason. 
 
3. I agree to participate in a later interview, if this is necessary, 
which will be audio-recorded and will be anonymised. 
 
4. I acknowledge that my data may be used in the PhD thesis 
and academic/other publications. 
 
5. I consent to the researcher being present and taking notes 
during the quadruple screen/NT scan and, if necessary, the 
consultation informing the patient(s) about their child 
having a high-risk of Down’s syndrome. NB: this will also 
require consent from the patient(s). 
 
6. I acknowledge that I can request a summary of the study and 
its findings. I acknowledge that these may also be made 
available to the Down’s Syndrome Association and affiliated 
independent support groups. 
 
 
I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
 
 Name of Participant  Date     Signature 
 
 
 
 Name of Person Taking  Date     Signature 
 
When completed: 1 for participant; 1 for researcher (original). 
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Appendix 7: Consent form for parents-to-be (example) 
 
QUADRUPLE SCREEN/NUCHAL TRANSLUCENCY SCAN/HIGH-RISK RESULT 
CONSENT FORM (PARENTS-TO-BE) 
Please 
initial 
box 
 
1.  I have read and understood the information sheet dated 
……………… for the study. I have had the opportunity to 
consider the information, ask questions, and have had these 
answered satisfactorily. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I 
am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason, 
without my medical care or legal rights being affected. 
 
3. I agree to participate in a later interview, if this is necessary, 
which will be audio-recorded and will be anonymised. 
 
4. I acknowledge that my data may be used in the PhD thesis 
and academic/other publications.  
 
5. I consent to the researcher being present and taking notes 
during the quadruple screen/NT scan and, if necessary, the 
consultation informing me about my child having a high-
risk of Down’s syndrome. NB: this will also require consent 
from the relevant clinical professional(s). 
 
6. I acknowledge that I can request a summary of the study and 
its findings. I acknowledge that these may also be made 
available to the Down’s Syndrome Association and affiliated 
independent support groups. 
 
 
I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
 
 
 Name of Participant  Date     Signature 
 
 
 
 Name of Person Taking  Date     Signature 
 
When completed: 1 for participant; 1 for researcher (original). 
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Appendix 8: Interview schedule for professionals (example) 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE (FREYMARSH) 
 
Brief to interview: 
This interview will focus on your professional experiences of Down’s syndrome 
screening and testing procedures. The questions provided here are meant as a 
broad outline of what will be discussed, and you may be asked other questions 
based on what answers you provide. Your answers may be as long or as short as 
you wish. You may also refuse to answer certain questions without explanation. 
The interview is expected to last between 30 minutes and 1 hour. 
 
Establish consent: 
I would like to stress that everything you say will be treated as completely 
confidential and you will remain anonymous in any report that may result from 
this research.  This interview will be tape recorded so that I can produce a 
transcript. At any time during the interview, you may stop the tape recorder if you 
wish. If you would still like to proceed with the interview, you will now be required 
to sign a consent form. 
 
Questions 
 
1. How long have you been practicing medicine? 
 
2. How long have you been working within this speciality of medicine? 
 
3. Currently, what are your professional roles in the prenatal process? 
 
4. What do you think the main reasons are for parents choosing to accept or reject 
prenatal testing? Who do you think is the dominant figure in deciding this (mother, 
father, clinical staff)? Do you ever recommend that patients undertake certain 
tests? 
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5. How do you describe screening and test results to patients, and how do you 
ensure that patients completely understand what care they are receiving? In 
particular, how do you communicate the notion of a low-risk and a high-risk of 
Down’s syndrome?  
 
6. Generally, what are the reactions of patients once they find out that their child 
has a low-risk or high-risk of Down’s syndrome? How do you manage these 
reactions? How long do you discuss the patient’s options with them, and how much 
detail do you go into? 
 
7. How do you think patients within antenatal care perceive the care they receive 
at your hospital? Do you think you have an active role in patients’ decision-making 
(of prenatal screening and testing) during the pregnancy? 
 
8. Do you think patients have a good understanding of Down’s syndrome, 
particularly regarding their knowledge of screening for the condition, aetiology, 
genetics/inheritance, and the consequences of a child being at a high-risk or as 
being diagnosed with the condition? 
 
9. Are you confident that parents, when receiving a high-risk or low-risk of Down’s 
syndrome, know exactly what this means, and that they know the rationale behind 
why particular prenatal tests are being carried out? Are parents’ expectations of 
the screening and tests realistic? 
 
10. Do you think that the quality of information the hospital provides to parents 
regarding antenatal screening and Down’s syndrome is sufficient for their needs 
and assists them in making an informed decision regarding their choices? If not, 
what do you think was missing? 
 
11. Do you have particularly strong or clear views on the use of prenatal testing for 
a condition like Down’s syndrome? Do you think the choice of a test should be 
available to everybody? What do you think the future of medical technology within 
antenatal care is? 
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12. What do you think of those parents who do decide to end their pregnancies? Do 
you support their right to decide? Do you think their minds would be changed if 
different information about Down’s syndrome was conveyed to prospective 
parents? 
 
13. Do you notice any clear differences between mothers and fathers regarding 
their opinions and decisions during the pregnancy? 
 
14. What impact has the introduction of a quadruple screen, which is more likely 
than a triple blood test to detect Down’s syndrome and has a lower false-positive 
rate, had for you and the parents? 
 
15. Do you consider the prenatal tests currently used, and the policies stipulated 
by the NHS, as sufficient for the needs of parents and clinical practice? If not, what 
else do you think the hospital and its staff can do to improve its service and assist 
parents in making an informed decision regarding their reproductive choices?  
 
16. If you have any more thoughts about your experiences as a clinical professional 
within antenatal care or anything else which you think is relevant, please feel free 
to share them now. 
 
17. Finally, if the researcher would like to conduct a second interview with you, 
would you like to participate in this? This is completely your choice to accept or 
refuse. You will only be invited for a second interview if I think there are issues 
which were not addressed during this interview. 
 
Interview End 
